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V • •^^' A* ... V *^-%0 '^^•. 



RUSSIA'S AGONY 



RUSSIA'S AGONY 



BY 

ROBERT WILTON 

Correspondent of Tee Times at Petrograd, 
Knight of Saint George, etc., etc. 




NEW YORK 
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 

681 Fifth Avenue 



fc^ 






Copyright, 1919 

BY 

E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY 



All Rights Reserved 



FEB 25 19!9 



Printed in the United States of America 



5'. 00 



TO 

THE MEMORY 

OP 

THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR ALL 

FOR 

THE GREAT CAUSE 



PREFACE 

To MY Readees: 

In the following pages I speak of Russian affairs with the 
experience of an observer who has lived from early boyhood 
among the Russian people and has shared with them their 
joys and their sorrows. 

"Russia's Agony" was written in compliance with a per- 
sonal call and with the discharge of a public duty; it com- 
bines a human document with a historical treatise. Men, 
events and conditions have, I believe, been dealt with in a 
spirit of fairness, for although the original edition of this 
book was begun and completed a year ago, the storm and 
stress of later developments call for no substantial changes. 
That a comprehensive account of Russia from the inside 
was in demand has been shown by the rapid exhaustion of 
several impressions of this work, and indicated by the pub- 
lication of an American edition. 

Serious study of Russian affairs is more than ever im- 
portant, and even necessary, for every thinking man and 
woman, not only because of the ignorance that prevails on 
the subject — a great handicap to us in the War — ^but because 
of the great social drama that has been staged in that 
country. Since her collapse, Russia has become the focus 
of social unrest throughout the world. Bolshevism — a foe 
more deadly to our civilization than German Militarism — 
cannot be effectively combated unless we understand the cir- 
cumstances of its origin and working, indissolubly connected 
with the so-called Russian Revolution — a Revolution that 
has still to justify its name. 

The questions that have been put to me so often will rise 
to the reader's lips: "What is Bolshevism.?" and "Why did 

vii 



viii PREFACE 

the Russians succumb to its influences?" This book answers 
them in full. Here I give a few preliminary outlines: 

Bolshevism demands an immediate application of Social- 
istic ideals. Its protagonists care not by what methods or 
with whose help they carry out their experiment. Bolshevism 
recognizes no nationality, no society, no family — nothing but 
a conglomeration of manual workers governed bj "idealists" 
with the help of a Red Army. It is essentially un-demo- 
cratic ; it involves the forcible subversion of all the laws and 
covenants upon which human society has been established. 

Why then has it obsessed the Russian people? There 
were predisposing conditions, some permanent, others acci- 
dental. A mystic idealism combined with singular proneness 
to mass action have long characterized the Russians; the 
suiferings and perplexities of the war have affected with 
peculiar intensity an ignorant and illiterate people in an 
ill-governed State. Planted in such favorable soil, the seeds 
of Bolshevism induced a veritable psychic disorder which 
defeated — temporarily at least — the fair promise of the 
Revolution and has spread its contagion to other lands. 

The Bolshevist experiment has been applied. Russia to- 
day is a desolate land; millions of its inhabitants are 
unclothed and dying of hunger ; all the sufPer^'ngs of the war 
are as nothing in comparison with the first-fruits of Bol- 
shevism; and, naturally, the workers have suffered most, as 
they must invariably suffer from any assault upon the social 
fabric. In Russia to-day the masses, deprived of remunera- 
tive toil, despoiled of their savings and even of their bread 
to feed a ravening horde of mercenaries, are closing their 
account with Bolshevism. The reaction has already come, 
sweeping and intense as was the collapse. The Bolshevist 
garrison in and around Moscow feels the mutterings of the 
coming storm. Like Ludendorff, it is preparing a final 
assault. The plundered billion of Russia's gold reserve, the 
co-operation of the "Blond Beast" and the sentimental igno- 
rance of cranks or enthusiasts in other lands provide for- 



PREFACE ix 

midable weapons of offense. Like their friends in Berlin the 
Bolsheviki dispose of a vast propaganda fund, which even 
now makes its insidious power felt in all countries, becloud- 
ing the public conscience. 

Germany's ruthless attempt to dominate the world will 
not have failed until Bolshevism is overthrown. The lists 
are still open, Germany, bleeding and distraught, has an 
unconquered ally in Bolshevism. By sapping the bases of 
our national life, Berlin still hopes to destroy the fruits of 
our Victory. Until the evil has been reached in its present 
stronghold, Moscow, and Russia has revived to new nation- 
hood the German conspiracy will not have been crushed — 
there can be no real peace in the world. 

Bolshevism is not Russian — it is essentially non-national ; 
its leaders belong almost entirely to the race that lost its 
country and its nationhood long ago. In April, 1918, the 
Bolshevist "Government," including 384 "Peoples' Commis- 
saries," was represented by 2 negroes, 13 Russians, 15 
Chinamen, 22 Armenians and Georgians, and more than 300 
Jews. Of the last 264 had come to Russia from the United 
States during the "Revolution." 

Let us awaken to the full significance of this phenomenon. 
Let us, before all, make reparation to the race that gave us 
our religion, the very basis of our civilization ; let us restore 
the Jews to their country and to their nationhood. It will 
be but an act of sacred Justice; it will also be a means of 
social salvation. The liberation of Palestine from Turkish 
thralldom and its promised return to the Chosen Race have 
been rightly heralded and acclaimed by Jew and Gentile alike. 

We have fought in order to assure the unfettered prog- 
ress of nations towards universal brotherhood by placing 
national life on the sure foundations of peace, ordered liberty 
and social justice. At a great price we have won this boon 
for ourselves and for other nations, cementing with our blood 
a comradeship that eschews class privileges and distinctions. 
Is this great step in human progress — with all its inevitable 



X PREFACE 

sacrifices — ^to be imperiled by a mere handful of madmen, 
seeking to destroy the very existence of nations ? The people 
of the United Kingdom have given their response in the elec- 
toral consultation which has just been concluded. Who can 
doubt that France and the United States will be equally 
emphatic? 

Russia has to voice her sentiment otherwise. The time 
for peaceful expression will come when the hostile garrison 
of Bolshevism and its German supporters have been driven 
out. What form of government may then be adopted by 
the free decision of the Russian people concerns only them- 
selves. Three centuriei^ ago they elected a Tsar of the 
Romanovs. The elements of a true democracy were embodied 
in the Zemsky Sobor, or Assembly of the Land. But Russia 
then was dominated by Byzantine tradition, and later by Ger- 
man influence. The voice of the people was dulled by these 
un-Russian forces. Freed of their deadening power, Russia 
will assert the principles of justice and true democracy that 
are inherent to the Russian character. Her troubles came 
not from the Monarchy, but from the alien influences that 
the Monarchy imbibed. The German incubus will have been 
removed ere Russia can revive. 

Of that revival I perceive sure and certain promise. I 
believe that the Russian people were destined to play an 
exalted part in the advancement of mankind, and that the 
day wiU soon dawn when the peoples of the world will duly 
appreciate the sacrifices that the Russians have endured, not 
less than the services that they render to the common cause 
of humanity. It is with this confidence that I am leaving 
the hospitable shores of America to rejoin my Russian com- 
rades in the great adventure of this unparalleled war — the 
restoration of Russia. 

R. W. 
Bohemian Club, 
San Francisco, 

January 4, 1919. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

Introduction . 1 

PART I— SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

CHAPTER n 

Origins, Rise, and Decline 7 

CHAPTER ni 
BxmEAVCRACY AND Okhrana . . . • > . 15 

CHAPTER IV 
The National Conscience . . . • , . 22 

CHAPTER V 
Razputinism and the Court . . • / ^» • • 30 

CHAPTER VI 

German Influences .... ... .48 

CHAPTER Vn 

The Jews • ^f • • 54 

CHAPTER Vin 

Conditions OF Upheaval . . . ^ -^ - ^ ^ gj 

xi 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IX 

PAGB 

Revolution Versus Evolution 75 

CHAPTER X 
Revolutionary Parties . . . . . . . 93 



PART 11—" DEMOCRACY r " SOCIALISM^ 
AND " FREEDOM " 

CHAPTER XI 
The Revolution 101 

CHAPTER XII 
The Soviet, " Coalition," and Bolshevism . . 132 

CHAPTER XIII 
Abdication and After . 151 

CHAPTER XIV 
Mutiny op the Sailors 165 

CHAPTER XV 
" No Annexation and No Indemnity " ... 173 

CHAPTER XVI 

Anarchy 182 



PART III— RUSSIA AT WAR 

CHAPTER XVn 
The Outbreak of Hostilities 197 



CONTENTS xui 

CHAPTER XVIII 

PAGE 

Poor Armaments; Splendid Army 209 

CHAPTER XIX 
Soldau-Tannenberg and After . . . . • 224 

CHAPTER XX 
*• The Hun within the Gates " . . , . . 240 

CHAPTER XXI 
Nationality Problems 247 

CHAPTER XXII 
Short-lived Victory 262 

CHAPTER XXIII 
The Bolshevist Betrayal 280 

PART IV—KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

CHAPTER XXIV 
The Fight with Bolshevism 295 

CHAPTER XXV 
The Hope of Russia . 315 

CONCLUSION 

CHAPTER XXVI 
The New Russia 331 



xiv CONTENTS 

PAOB 

Appendix I — ^Declaration of the Progressive Bloc . 841 

Appendix II — ^The "Soldiers' Charter" . . . 344 

Appendix III — ^Foreign Trade op Russia • , . 347 

Index ^ . ,^ 349 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



The AtJTHOR • . Frontispiece 

PAGE 

Gregory Razputin and His "Devotees'* ..•••• 38 

Nicholas II with His Son and Daughters 46 

The Tsab and His Ministers 78 

Soldiers' and Sailors' "Delegates" in the Dxtma .... 142 

The Garden op Captivity 158 

One op the "Army Committees" 174 

Early Ideals op the Revolution 182 

Free Joy Rides fob Revolutionary Soldiers 190 

Russia's Fighting Generai^ 198 

The Grand Duke Nicholas when Generalissimo Conversing with 

AN Army Chaplain ... 206 

Caucasian Native Horse Division in the Carpathians . . . 214 

The Savages in the Carpathians 222 

"Meeting Strategy" 230 

General L. G. Kornilov 238 

General M. V. Alexeiev 238 

Amazons at Prayers 262 

Stampeded by the Bolshevik 302 

Type op Kuban Cossack 318 

General Kaledin 326 

Michael Vladimirovich Rodzl/^nko . . , , . . . . 326 

Lenin and Trotsky 326 



IV 



MAPS 



PAGX 

Plan op the Citt of Pbtrogbad 113 

Russia's Northern Communications in 1917 241 

The Russian Battle-line 265 

Map Showing the Principal Places Mentioned in the Account op 
Operations in the Directions of Bzhezany and Zlochow (July, 
1917) 278 

Map Illustrating the Russian Offensive and Retreat in Gamcia 
(July. 1917) 287 

The Russl^n Offensive in 1916 293 

Map of Russia Showing Distribution of Cossack Armies and theib 
Possible Communication with Aliied Countries. Also Distri- 
bution op Principal Coal and Oil Fields . . . Facing 347 



RUSSIA'S AGONY 



RUSSIA'S AGONY 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

Inspired by conceptions of government borrowed 
from the adjacent Empire of Byzantium, the Russian 
autocracy was destined, like its protagonist, to enjoy 
prosperity so long as it avoided direct conflict with 
powerful neighbors, and, having exceeded this rule, to 
suffer a gradual process of internal decay and of external 
disaster. The influences of western civilization ever 
acted as a dissolvent upon the eastern system of autoc- 
racy. 

Weakened and retarded in their development by suc- 
cessive waves of Tatar invasion, the Russian people were 
long in manifesting any decisive tendency to eschew 
Asiatic in preference for western models. Peter the 
Great foresaw and prepared his coimtry for the coming 
change. His successors, devoid of his genius, interpret- 
ing his clear-sighted endeavor to reach the open sea as a 
mere lust for conquest, remained oblivious to the inward 
teaching of his reign. They introduced reforms tardily, 
under the stress of circumstance, never anticipating the 
dangers of delay except by specious methods of police 
repression which served only to intensify — even if they 
concealed — the fires of discontent. 

Over a century ago Russian oflScers, returning from 
the Napoleonic wars, organized the first revolutionary 
movement in Russia. The disastrous Crimean War half 



2 RUSSIA'S AGONY 

a century later, revealing the internal weakness of Russia, 
led to the emancipation of the serfs and great adminis- 
trative and judicial reform ^ in the sixties. In the 
intervals the autocracy had reverted towards reaction, 
which was enhanced by the successful war against Tur- 
key, undertaken for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs 
and — as the irony of internal politics demanded — ^for the 
strengthening of despotism in Russia. 

Yet another fifty years later a war against Japan, 
lightly entered upon from analogous " internal" motives, 
led to widespread disorders, which could be repressed 
then, and to a marked development of a constitutional 
movement, which had to be satisfied. The semi-Consti- 
tution of October, 1905, introducing Representative Gov- 
ernment, was followed by another period of reaction and 
by the further development of the ohhrana or secret 
police system, which belittled and discredited the Duma 
in the eyes of the masses. Temperance — long urged by 
the Duma, and at last ordained by Imperial Edict in 
the early part of 1914 — opened the eyes of the peasant 
masses, while it enhanced their material prosperity. 

The great war with Germany thus found Russia un- 
prepared — her ruler and her people devoid of an organic 
bond of union. The popularity of the struggle, its humane 
and exalted aims, were soon overshadowed by internal 
differences and by the maladministration and abuses of 
the Old Regime. 

Razputinism, symbolizing the superstitions and favor- 
itism of a Court severed from vivifying contact with 
the People, undermined the prestige of the Throne and 
of the Church among the masses. 

The blessings of temperance bestowed by the autocrat 

* These included local government by provincial and district Zemstvos 
elected by all classes, including a numerous contingent of peasants and municipal 
councils (Dumas) elected by a property suflFrage, also reform of the Law Courts, 
assuring "speedy and merciful justice," and introduction of trial by jury. 



INTRODUCTION S 

proved a fatal gift for the autocracy. The masses only 
realized more clearly the evils of the autocratic rule. 
They were many. Disorganization in army supply had 
involved unnecessary losses of men and territory during 
the war. Corruption in high places and disorder in 
railway management had brought about a dearth of 
food in the cities. Millions of men were needlessly 
called to the colors. These factors, sufficient in them- 
selves to shake the loyalty of the troops and the people, 
were aggravated by persistent unwillingness or inabihty 
on the part of the autocrat to comply with warnings 
that had been repeatedly conveyed to him by the repre- 
sentatives of the nation, and even by the Allies, as to the 
urgent need of Responsible Government. 

When he at last gave way in March, 1917, it was too 
late; the Revolutionary movement — ^prepared long before- 
hand — had already acquired too great an impetus to 
afford the Moderate parties an opportunity for imme- 
diate and effective resistance. 

History offers nothing comparable with the events of 
1917. An empire covering one-sixth of the world's 
territories and numbering upwards of 180,000,000 souls 
suddenly cast off its government and remained bereft 
of authority, of law, and of order for a prolonged period 
in the very midst of a great war. The human imagi- 
nation is overwhelmed by the dimensions of the Russian 
Revolution. Other countries felt its influences, good 
and bad, profoundly. Its dramatic incidents and lessons, 
the pathetic fall of the autocrat, a promise of revival 
followed by disasters that seemed to be irreparable — 
all these themes engage our curiosity and arrest our 
attention. Good and evil are closely interwoven in the 
Revolutionary record. The evil came uppermost, but 
the good was bound to survive. One great benefit it 
has already conferred upon Russia and her friends is 



4 RUSSIA'S AGONY 

the awakening of a deeper interest in her affairs and a 
desire to know the real truth about her. 

An old woman threw a stone at a baker's shop-window 
and "started" the Russian Revolution. Some days 
later, in March, 1917, I was standing in the vast square 
that faces the dull red pile of the Winter Palace, and 
saw soldiers and civilians, men and women, pulling down 
the black and yellow standard of the autocracy. It 
had floated from the high flagstaff surmounting the main 
gateway ever since that proud building had replaced 
the humble Dutch cottage — still one of the show places 
of his metropolis — wherein two centuries ago Peter the 
Great had made his abode during the foundation of the 
city that was to be his "window into Europe." 

Crude withal and unpolished, his genius, like an uncut 
diamond of finest water, had shed a new light amid the 
shadows of Muscovy. Breaking all resistance, severing 
himself from the trammels of semi-Asiatic tradition, he 
had boldly, far-sightedly launched and steered the ship 
of State towards the West. Was this removal of its 
emblems to be prophetic merely of the end of autocracy .^^ 
Or was I witnessing the logical sequel to the great work 
that Peter had begun — the final passing of Russia into 
the communion of western nations? 

The yellow folds, emblazoned with the black double- 
headed eagle, had been adopted by John the Third, on 
his marriage to a Byzantine princess. It symbolized 
the union of temporal and spiritual power wielded by 
the autocrator over Constantinople and the Roman 
Empire of the East. That symbol had been the guiding 
motto of Russia's rulers since the days of the Terrible 
One. In its place, amid the plaudits of the assembled 
crowd, the Red Flag of Revolution was soon afterwards 



INTRODUCTION 5 

hoisted, brazenly announcing the end of the autocratic 
era. Some weeks went by, and, under the mellowing 
influence of wind and weather, its sanguinary hue faded 
perceptibly, gradually assuming a dull gray tone. The 
process of time was to exert a like influence upon the 
shortsighted enthusiasm of the multitude. Wild and 
dangerous visionaries, acting largely in collusion with 
the country's foes, applied Socialistic " ideals." Political 
chimera was to lead to disillusion and apathy, interrupted 
by sporadic joy and depression as the ephemeral success 
of the Revolution alternated with crushing disasters in 
the field and a shameful peace. 

Other thoughts and reminiscences obtruded them- 
selves amidst the turmoil of that eventful day and in that 
historical square. It had witnessed the loyal outpourings 
of an emancipated people, when the peasant serfs knelt in 
gratitude before Alexander II. Here also, when the 
Great War began, a hundred thousand people acclaimed 
Nicholas II, forgetting the innocent blood that had been 
shed within its precincts a decade earlier. Then men, 
women, and children had come to seek the countenance 
of their Little Father, desiring a larger measure of freedom, 
and were received with bullets; now they were avenging 
that ghastly blunder, dominated by long pent-up feelings 
of revolt. 

We had attained at last a closer communion with 
Russia, and were bound together by the ties of a common 
interest against a common enemy, only to find the great 
cause of Country and Freedom, that we had at heart, 
tragically weakened by Russia's internal troubles — a 
temporary weakening, it was to be hoped. But upon our 
comprehension of its causes and of the remedies that 
were to be an indispensable condition of recovery would 
depend the future of Russia and of her Allies. 



PART I 
SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

CHAPTER n 

ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 

The Conflict between Slavdom and the Tatars — Early Civilization Over- 
whelmed — Republics and Principalities give place to Tsardom — ^The 
Autocracy — Its Greatness — Its Evils. 

At the dawn of history the Slav — last-come of the 
races that migrated from Asia — gradually colonized the 
vast domain familiar to us under the names of Serbia, 
Bohemia, Poland, Galicia, and Russia. Originally pagan 
tribal communities, they slowly developed into Chris- 
tian principalities and republics — an evolutionary process 
called forth and stimulated by circumstances of an 
economic order. 

The great rivers of northern Slavdom — the Vistula, 
the Dvina, and the Dnieper, with their tributaries, and 
later the Volga — afforded natural avenues for commerce 
in the exchange of European commodities — largely domi- 
nated by the Hansa cities of the Baltic — with Asiatic 
markets: Byzantium, Persia, India, and Siberia. And 
the dwellers by these rivers became the sturdiest and 
most enterprising representatives of the Northern Slav 
peoples. Their descendants have preserved these traits. 
Among them are the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don, 
and the Volga, and the Pomory (literally By-the-sea 
dwellers) of the Far North. 

7 



8 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

In what is now European Russia we find in the early 
Middle Ages flourishing commercial organizations, like 
the republics of Pskov and Novgorod, doing much busi- 
ness with the Hansa and the principality of Kiev, acting 
as an entrepot for trade with Byzantium. Those enter- 
prising sea-rovers, the Vikings, who were keen traders 
as well as fighters, gradually imposed themselves upon 
the northern Slavs. Hence arose the legend of Rurik, 
Sineus, and Truvor, the Variag, or Norse brethren, who 
came to "rule over" these communities. The Norman 
conquest of northern France and England was attended 
by circumstances not less far-reaching. 

By and by they acquired a permanent status, and their 
descendants figure largely in the early chronicles of 
Russia. Among them was Alexander Nevsky, who drove 
back the Swedes (his ancestors) and Finns many centur- 
ies before the time of Peter the Great. Earlier still, 
Vladimir Krasnoe Solnyshko (Little Red Sun) had reigned 
in Eaev and converted his people to Christianity. He 
was so well beloved that his name still lives in the memory 
of simple Russian peasants. Both these Grand Dukes 
were canonized by the Church. Descendants of " Rurik" 
associated themselves with their people, and largely, 
thanks to their spirit of duty and self-sacrifice, the nation 
did not " go under " during the sad times of Tatar 
domination. Li order to obtain investiture from the 
Khan they had to travel countless miles — to Mukden, a 
whole year on the road through Siberia — and to debase 
themselves in sign of homage; and some never returned. 

It is said that the name " Rus " was borne by a Norse 
tribe, and that the Dnieper warriors coming to Constan- 
tinople to vindicate the rights of their merchants were 
so styled by the Byzantines. The name "Rusfian" 
would thus appear to be of Norse origin. 

The Tatars converted the Dnieper Valley into a wilder- 
ness. Kiev lay in ruins for two centuries, until it was 



if .\ ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 9 

r^olonized % Sluv^jojLfiusdaj^ — the Little Rus- 

sians of to-day. 

Russia's "center of gravity" was lost for a time. 
Many small "dukedoms" had, however, "budded off" 
north and eastward, which were later to form a new 
"center" in Muscovy. To this new country came 
settlers from the Dnieper, the Dvina, and the Volkhov, 
bringing the names of their original abodes. Thus Nizhni 
(Lower) N6vgorod on the Volga recalled Veliky (Great) 
N6vgorod, the Northern Dvina recalled the river of the 
Baltic; many place-names in Little Russia were dupli- 
cated jnGxeat Russia. 

A nej? and larger State thus arose. It had attracted 
numerous elements from the disturbed oTcr dirty (borders), 
where Swedes, Lithuanians, Poles, and German "knights" 
alternately made incursions. It developed the concomi- 
tants of statehood — a defensive and administrative 
apparatus, necessarily crude in its earlier forms, but 
essentially Russian. The servants of the State were 
called tidglye liudi (burden-bearers). They had to appear 
honno i zhruyno (horsed and harnessed) at the summons 
of the voyevoda (war leader), as the local official was 
called. When the Tatar raids began to molest Muscovy 
the people naturally preferred the shelter of strong or 
less affected dukedoms or voyevodstva. In order to put 
a stop to these migrations and prevent a weakening of 
the country's defenses, the settlers or laborers were 
"bonded" to the local administrator or pomieshckik 
(fief -holder), land tenure being conditional to military 
obligations. This measure of State defense afterwards 
degenerated into the enslavement of the peasants to the 
pomieshchik — a name that came to be applied to land- 
owners. Such was the origin of serfdom. 

Without attempting to give more than an outline of 
the broad aspects of early Russian history, I think it 
is important to note that the Russian people displayed 



10 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

in remote times a spirit of enterprise and freedom, and 
that extraneous circumstances subsequently dulled the 
one and quenched the other. Wave after wave of Asiatic 
invasion swept over Russia, effacing the landmarks of 
national growth, and preparing the way for the reign 
of autocracy, wherein the people saw their only hopes 
of salvation. In this view they were confirmed by the 
teachings of the Church. 

Autocratic Russia, like its Asiatic predecessors, waxed 
in might, majesty, and dominion, in the end subjugat- 
ing other nations, yet remaining herself nationally unde- 
veloped, and, like the Tatar empires of the East, bound 
to disclose inherent elements of weakness whensoever 
she came into decisive collision with the progressive 
nations of the West. 

If we carry the parallel farther, we find the subju- 
gation of more highly civilized races was in itself a source 
of disintegration. The Tatars left a deep and abiding 
impression upon Russia, yet, weakened, disrupted, and 
subjugated, the Russians in the end destroyed the power 
of the Khans. Similarly, by conquest of the Teutonic 
and Polish borderlands, the Russian autocracy prepared 
the way for its own downfall. Had Peter the Great not 
"opened a window," through which western influences 
forced themselves headlong into the Asiatic calm of 
Muscovy, had his successors not laid violent hands upon 
Lithuania and Poland, through which extraneous, dis- 
integrating elements gained admission into the heart of 
Russian politics, the history of Russia would have been 
a very different one. 

The autocracy could endure only on one condition: 
that, like the despotisms of China or Turkey, it sedu- 
lously avoided active intervention in the affairs of other 
States. Alexander I having sent his armies into France, 
his oflScers, on returning home, conspired to overthrow 
the autocracy. This was the famous Decembrist plot. 



ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 11 

which nearly cost his successor the Throne. When 
Nicholas I subdued the Magyar revolution in defense 
of the Hapsburg Crown, he blindly furthered the cause 
of German world-power, the foundation of which had 
been laid by former autocrats in starting the Elector 
of Brandenburg on a career of Empire. The military 
power of Germany and Austria, with which the Russians 
and their Allies have engaged in a battle to the death, 
owes its development to the mistakes of the autocracy, 
which perished during the war. The Slavophil idea, 
which prompted the emancipation of Bulgaria, had directly 
and indirectly sapped the foundations of autocracy. 
Russia came into the anomalous position of a State that 
conferred political freedom upon other nations without 
enjoying it herself. Exalted, humane ideals inspired 
the autocrats, but were fatal to the autocracy. When 
Alexander I pledged his word to the Finns to safeguard 
their civic liberties, he intended to gradually extend 
the same to his own people, but he found it impossible 
to do so without sacrificing the autocracy. 

The election of the Romanovs three centuries ago did 
not affect the status of the autocracy, as some students 
of history would have us believe. Election by the people 
did not presume a change of principle: it was merely 
an expedient necessitated by default in the succession. 
The Tsar Michael Fedorovich and his successors were 
autocrats enjoying the mystical, unquestioned, and un- 
questionable power wielded by John the Terrible. In 
the language of the people they were Bdtiushka Tsar 
(Little Father); they impersonated the absolute, God- 
given authority of the Parent of the State, to whom all 
owed blind obedience, whose word alone was law, who 
had the power of life and death over all his children. 
The besotted German who reigned in Petrograd more 
than a century ago under the style of Peter III,i ignor- 

1 Strangled by order of his wife, who became Catherine the Great. 



12 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

ant of the language of his subjects, reviling their Church, 
was none the less an autocrat in the eyes of Russia. 
The power of the autocracy was so great, so exalted, 
that it retained its hold upon the people till very recent 
times. What more striking example can be given than 
the effect of the Tsar's edict on temperance. Nicholas II 
could boast with reason that only the autocracy had the 
power to suddenly convert the Russian nation to total 
abstinence. 

We cannot understand the causes of the Russian Revo- 
lution unless we gain a clear insight into the essence of 
autocracy, its grandeur as well as its weakness. Why 
has Russian history during the past century been marked 
and marred by spasmodic attempts to enlarge the social 
framework, followed by periods, more or less prolonged, 
of obscure, apparently senseless and hopeless, reaction? 
Why were the latter days of Alexander II poisoned by 
a seeming repudiation of the bright promise contained 
in his emancipation of the Serfs .^^ Old age had not made 
him a despot. What idea inspired his successor to insist 
upon the repression of all liberal principles .f^ Yet Alex- 
ander III was the very soul of honesty and kindhness. 
How can we reconcile the enlightened personal goodness 
of Nicholas II with his inveterate distaste for the "vain 
delusions" of modern statehood.^ Surely it could not 
be greed of power. The explanation must be sought 
in the traditional significance of the autocracy. Under 
its shadow the nation had waxed in numbers, Russia 
had become a great empire, wielding enormous power. 
The sacred, mystical attribute of autocracy, its very 
essence, had to be maintained at all costs. The mind 
of the autocrat, indoctrinated by teachers of the school 
of Pobedonostsev, associated the preservation of the 
autocracy with the maintenance of the State. In a 
sense they were right. The Russia of the autocracy 
would naturally cease to be the same Russia without the 



ORIGINS, RISE, AND DECLINE 13 

autocracy. And so, quite honestly and sincerely, see- 
ing the good of their people in the maintenance of their 
absolute power, successive autocrats did their utmost 
to shield Russia from any change that might imperil 
that sacred, limitless power with which the greatness and 
prosperity of the State had been identified. Nicholas II 
is reputed to have said that he considered it to be his most 
solemn duty to hand over to his son that sacred power, 
unbelittled, unimpaired. We have no reason to doubt 
the sincerity of his purpose or the unselfishness of his 
motives, although in the light of its tragic end we may 
well dispute the soundness of the autocratic theory in- 
voked by him and his predecessors. 

Without a Chinese wall of isolation, without inter- 
ference in the affairs of other States, without progress in 
the western sense, the autocracy might have enjoyed 
years of calm, unruffled existence, subject only to occa- 
sional "palace revolutions." But all these conditions of 
permanency were lacking, as we have seen. The dead- 
liest foe was " western progress." Its worst feature, 
industrialism, with its attendant problem of capital and 
labor, could not be excluded entirely. Developing, it 
profoundly modified the rural, semi-patriarchal life of the 
nation, which so easily concorded with the autocratic 
principle. Its other aspects — education, with its inevit- 
able influx of European thought, the management of their 
local affairs by the people, and last, but most fatal of all, 
the advent of Representative Government — one after 
the other came hammering at the door of autocracy, to 
the accompaniment of military disasters in far-off Man- 
churia and, later, in the blood-stained fields of Poland. 
The war with Japan sounded the first danger-signal to 
autocracy. Heeding it, Nicholas II granted a Constitu- 
tion; but falling again under the spell of the autocratic 
idea, he reasserted the old doctrine. The Great War 
brought the second and final summons. 



14 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

But how long, how convulsive was the struggle that 
came to an end in March of 1917! We have seen the 
autocrats repeatedly imperiling the autocracy and some- 
times the interests of the State by rash, ill-considered 
or Quixotic adventures in foreign policy; we have noted 
them acting upon high-minded, humane impulses in the 
conduct of internal affairs, assuring the liberties of the 
conquered Finns, abolishing serfdom, curing their people 
of Russia's worst evil, drink; and we have found them 
halting midway, unable to give full scope to their noblest 
efforts. The principle of autocracy reared itself up as 
an overmastering obsession; it ever dominated the main 
principle of all sound government: compromise and 
conciliation. 

German influence, all-powerful at the Russian Court, 
added a baneful stimulus to the autocratic prejudice. 
One of the greatest of modern Russian statesmen, the 
late Count Witte, persistently advocated a pro-German 
policy as an indispensable safeguard to autocracy and 
a bulwark against Revolution, 



CHAPTER III 

BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA 

The Autocracy Supplanted — Forty Thousand Clerks — Bureaucracy Subor- 
dinated to Police — Fear of Progress — National Ignorance — Agrarian 
Reform. 

As Russia waxed great in area and in complexity of 
population, the autocrat's paternal, all-wise, unlimited 
authority could not be exercised by one man; it had 
to be delegated to innumerable agents. Nicholas I once 
said : " Russia is ruled not by me, but by my forty 
thousand clerks." The autocracy implied in name, if 
not in deed, an entirely centralized, one-man govern- 
ment; in practise, in a huge empire like Russia, it re- 
solved itself into government by irresponsible officials, 
who ruled according to their caste or individual pro- 
pensities, whether for good or for evil. Herein lies the 
origin of the bureaucracy. 

In becoming the ruling caste in Russia, the bureau- 
cracy was, by its very nature, committed to the support 
of the autocratic power whence it derived its authority 
and privileges. The work of administering the Empire 
was not neglected; indeed, it may be said without exag- 
geration that, as bureaucrats, the Russian officials were 
not a whit less competent or efficient than civil servants 
in other lands; and certainly they had a far more formid- 
able task to cope with. Profit and honor could be gained 
in the official careers more surely than in any other 
capacity; it would have been surprising that a gifted 
race like the Russians should be poor in bureaucratic 

15 



16 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

talents. The Russian bureaucracy suffered, it is true, 
from a lack of integrity among the lower grades for 
reasons which will be dealt with later, but its besetting 
sin was neither of omission nor commission, but one of 
origin. Everything that tended to undermine or belittle 
the autocracy was per se repugnant to the bureaucratic 
caste. Its leaders, with a few distinguished exceptions, 
saw danger in the slightest concession to liberal tendencies. 
Freedom of speech, of the Press, and of meeting was 
tabooed; the enlightenment of the masses was syste- 
matically retarded; trade and industry were held under 
suspicion and hampered by vexatious regulations. Poli- 
tical offenders were relegated to Siberia on a par with 
convicts, while emigration of the teeming peasant popu- 
lation found no favor. The bureaucracy did not wish 
to be troubled with too many colonists, who might become 
difficult to control from a distance. 

When Russian trade and industry began to develop 
by leaps and bounds as a result of the railway and finan- 
cial reforms of the last twenty-five years, a new terror 
was added to the many cares of the bureaucracy: it 
became necessary to keep a firm hand upon the laboring 
classes, which began to increase in numbers and to provide 
a rich soil for political and revolutionary propaganda. 

The emancipated serfs had been tethered by commu- 
nal land-holdings to the village, kept in ignorance, de- 
prived of an outlet to the fertile plains and valleys of 
Siberia, and shorn of their original and rightful share in 
the Zemstvo (local government) councils created by the 
Tsar Liberator; now these same peasants found employ- 
ment in the newly created industries, in the steel and iron 
works of the South, in the textile factories of the Center 
and the North, and returning periodically to their homes, 
sowed the seeds of future revolution. 

Above all, the bureaucracy feared war. Plehve, the 
all-powerful Minister who was assassinated in July, 1904, 



BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA 17 

committed the unpardonable blunder of conniving at 
the adventure which led to an armed conflict with Japan. 
He believed that it would " clear the air." The experi- 
ment was a ghastly failure for the bureaucracy. Every 
bureaucratic nerve was strained thereafter to avoid 
international complications. For many years after the 
Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia neglected her defenses, 
starved her army and navy, and, partly as a result of that 
neglect, was unable to meet the requirements of the great 
struggle with Germany into which she was drawn. 

From what has been said it is apparent that the 
bureaucracy subordinated its normal activities during 
the past century to a police system. The fight with 
" privy conspiracy and rebellion," perceived on all sides 
by the terrified gaze of the bureaucratic wiseacres, claimed 
absorbing consideration. Policemen rose to the highest 
places in the land, not as humble guardians of the public 
peace or as detectives of crime against the person or 
property of citizens — these lowly tasks were relegated to 
the humble constabulary — ^but as wardens over the 
autocracy. 

It is a sad and characteristic commentary upon the 
good intentions of one autocrat to recall the reason 
which led him to institute the famous Third Section. 
Alexander I wanted to right the wrongs of the fatherless 
and widows, to wipe away all tears from the eyes of the 
oppressed. The Third Section of His Majesty's Cabinet 
was formed to discover these wrongs to tell the Sovereign 
about them, and to act as his medium for reparation. 
His most trusted officers and courtiers were placed in 
charge of the service. We know what was the result. 
The Third Section began by delving into the life-history 
of the Tsar's subjects, and found that all was not agree- 
able to the safety of the autocratic power. By easy and 
rapid stages it became, not an instrument of mercy, but 
one of oppression. Its business grew till it embraced 



18 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

every class and calling In the Empire. The odium of 
the office led to its transfer to the Ministry of the Interior 
under the style of Department of Police, more popularly 
known as the ohhrana, a word meaning " protection." 
And verily this institution was intended to " protect " 
the autocracy and its agents from internal foes. John 
the Terrible, his bright intellect dimmed in old age by a 
mania of persecution, treated his subjects as enemies, 
and to protect himself instituted the ojprichninay a brother- 
hood sworn to defend him, whose members carried at 
their saddle-bows a dog's head and a broom, indicating 
fidelity and the sweeping out of sedition. The oprich- 
niki could rob and murder whomsoever they chose, 
always justified in their acts by the high mission con- 
fided to them of safeguarding the autocrat. What was 
even in those rough days regarded as an abomination 
became under the guise of the okhrana the mainstay of 
the Russian bureaucracy. Its agents did not wear the 
brutal emblems of their protagonists; they did not openly 
rob and murder; but we know that they did not scruple 
to provoke crime and to lend a hand in political assassina- 
tion. The okhrana was not loved by the bureaucracy, 
be it added. It was repugnant to the best men who held 
high offices. I include even some of those who in the 
course of their official career stood at the head of the 
Police Department. They deplored its abuses. Many 
would have liked to be rid of it. But the okhrana had 
become an indispensable adjunct of government. Bewail 
its evils as they might, no one dared to lift a finger against 
this institution. To have done so would have been 
tantamount to official suicide. How could the autocracy 
and the bureaucratic system hope to control and check- 
mate their many foes if the okhrana were abolished.'* 
It was a vicious circle, whence escape seemed impossible 
— a Gordian knot which had to be severed by the Revo- 
lution. 



BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA 19 

With a distorted sense of political perspective, seeing 
things through the colored glasses of an irresponsible 
police system, their best intentions warped, the autocrats 
drew farther and farther away from their people, from 
the realities of the situation, captives in mind and deed 
of the okhrana. And the people? How did the classes 
and masses, the many creeds and races peopling the 
Empire, react under this treatment? Crushed in rebel- 
lion, the Poles stolidly awaited the end of their trials. 
The Cossacks and the Caucasian races, shorn of freedom, 
held fast their traditions of independence. The Germans 
of the Baltic provinces, spoilt children of the bureau- 
cracy, flourished mightily, ruling the local Esthonians 
and Letts, and enjoying fat offices. The Mussulmans, 
inured to autocracy, were docile. The Jews, poor, pro- 
lific, and pushful, adapted themselves to oppression, 
secretly nurturing plans of revenge. The Finns, long a 
privileged race, watched for opportunities to enlarge their 
autonomy. All this conglomeration of races was borne 
on the broad back of Great Russia, by the might of a 
loyal army drawn from a hundred millions of peasants, 
led by nobles, and subservient to the police system of 
government described above. 

When the reservists, who went to fight with Japan 
over a quarrel that they did not understand, came back 
to the villages, bringing tales of defelat and inefficiency, 
the prestige of the old authority dwindled perceptibly. 
Political propaganda easily started a jacquerie, recalling 
some of the worst features of a similar movement in 
Ireland. The Government tried to remedy some of its 
past errors. Emigration to Siberia was encouraged. 
The accounts brought back by the soldiers of fertile 
lands beyond the Urals helped greatly to foster a whole- 
sale exodus. It was difficult for the land agents of the 
Government to keep pace with the demand for allot- 
ments. All approachable regions were quickly colonized. 



20 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

New railways were built, and more were required. Siberia 
began to accumulate great stores of grain, demanding 
outlets to the northern and southern seaboards. There 
was a sure promise of a new and Greater Russia, peopled 
by the most enterprising and energetic elements from 
the Old Country. 

But this exodus, great as it was, did not attain the 
proportions necessary to keep pace with the growth of 
the population, which had reached the enormous figure 
of over two and a half millions yearly, and, for technical 
causes mentioned above, it tended rather to diminish. 
The Great War, with its insatiable demands upon the 
manhood of Russia, temporarily stopped the movement. 
The millions that should have gone to people Siberia 
partly fell in battle or became prisoners of war toiling 
in German lands. 

Simultaneously with the encouragement of emigra- 
tion, the bureaucracy fostered the introduction of indi- 
vidual ownership of land and the creation of small farms. 
After the emancipation of the serfs, the existing village 
communities were retained, and held their lands in com- 
mon until they had paid off the redemption dues. Primi- 
tive, uneducated, unable to think or act on his own 
initiative, the serf, after his emancipation, could not be 
expected to become an independent farmer. He clung 
to his commune as the only familiar landmark in a new 
world full of pitfalls for the unwary. Meanwhile the 
village elder continued to draw comfort and guidance 
from the pomieshchik squire, his former owner. 

The commune (dbshchina) was favored by the bureau- 
cracy; in its perpetuation the oMirana saw a good hope of 
preserving the peasant from disagreeable influences; but 
suddenly the commune lost its popularity. M. Stolypin 
opened the eyes of his countrymen to the danger of 
communal ownership. It was a negation of the rights 
of property, a lure for the socialistic doctrinaire, an 



BUREAUCRACY AND OKHRANA 21^ 

impediment to individual effort and enterprise. All 
this was very true. The remedy was applied with all 
the force that this strong statesman could command. 
The redemption dues having been paid up, it was an- 
nounced that communal ownership had served its purpose, 
that the peasants were free to take up their allotments 
as individual owners, and that the State was prepared 
to advance them money for the purchase and equipment 
of small farms. " We place our stakes on the strong 
men," said M. Stolypin. 

Now, as a matter of fact, the communal system was 
a natural outcome of the primitive conditions and ignor- 
ance under which the peasants Hved. The more enter- 
prising peasants had already bought up lands, either 
individually or in companies, from the squirearchy, and 
with the progress of time and education communal 
ownership was bound to disappear. The attempt to 
suddenly disrupt a system organically bound up with 
ignorance may be justified as a political expedient; it 
could not fail to bring much friction and disappointment. 
The laziest, poorer, and less developed members of the 
commune offered all the resistance of inertia to a scheme 
that would compel them to rely upon themselves, and 
were secretly encouraged by the political elements which 
favored the commune as a profitable soil for socialistic 
propaganda. ^ 



CHAPTER IV 

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 

R6Ie of the Aristocracy and Middle Class — Absentee Landlordism — Disunited 
Elements — The Duma — Its Parties — ^The Church — National Character- 
istics — ^Drunkenness — ^The Temperance Edict — Its Hidden Aspects. 

Perhaps the least comprehensible feature of the Old 
Regime to a western mind was the absence of guiding 
and controlling centers. Propensity for mass action had 
been characteristic of the Slavs since their appearance 
in Europe. Inhabiting a vast plain, remote from the 
open sea, the Russians had not developed the individual- 
ism or self-reliance of the Anglo-Saxon. To the present 
day, Russian peasants migrate collectively, in whole 
villages. Democracy had no equivalent in Russia. 

The masses were aristocrats owning huge landed 
estates and enjoying all the privileges of the nobility, 
such as the right of petition to the Throne and a virtual 
monopoly of high offices in the civil and military adminis- 
tration, but they had no political power as an aristo- 
cracy—only as bureaucrats; and for that reason many 
of them were not free agents. They were divided into 
two hostile clans: representatives of bureaucracy on the 
one side and of the Zemstvos and other local elective 
bodies on the other side. In the first case they figured 
as absentee landlords, drawing revenues from their estates, 
but devoid of direct contact with the peasants; in the 
second case they formed the moderate wing of a healthy 
but necessarily weak opposition, including within its 
ranks the nascent middle class. 

22 



THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 23 

Similarly, the middle class, as represented in England, 
had no corresponding existence. It was not much more 
numerous than the nobility, and certainly less influential. 
It included the merchants and the better educated 
element. But many of the so-called intelligentsia were 
peasants or poor Jews who had obtained a university 
education, losing their original roots in the process, with- 
out engrafting themselves solidly upon their new station. 
From them were recruited most of the revolutionary 
leaders. Thus neither in the aristocracy nor in the middle 
class could Russia find a sheet-anchor against the coming 
storm. 

Many of the nobles and gentry espoused the cause of 
Reform, and, making use of their right of petition, sent 
remonstrance after remonstrance to the Tsar. But a 
Congress of Nobles, instituted under bureaucratic and 
autocratic auspices, invariably succeeded in stifling these 
isolated voices. 

The middle class was split up into constitutional and 
socialist factions. Besides, this class was semi-inarticu- 
late. It had not the right to appeal directly to the 
Monarch. Its voice was heard feebly through the col- 
umns of the Press, which was subject to a rigorous cen- 
sorship. 

Every Russian was ticketed and docketed according 
to class or calling: eighty out of every hundred were 
peasants, including about ten workmen engaged in 
industries, nineteen were burgesses (merchants and 
artisans), a fraction represented the nobility from which 
the ruling caste was recruited. Sixty per cent were 
illiterate, twenty-five per cent could read and write, 
ten per cent were educated, five per cent were intelli- 
gentda. 

Default of education, the innate conservatism of the 
farmer, the natural subserviency of masses new-fledged 
from serfdom, rendered them passive, inert. Their half- 



24 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

articulate cry during the generations of slavery for 
zemlid i volia (land and freedom) was stilled by the 
emancipation. Brought into sudden contact with indus- 
trialism, they lost their primitive virtues, honesty and 
godliness, without acquiring the birthright of free men, 
love of honor and of country. Carefully segregated from 
enlightening influences, they learnt only what was re- 
prehensible. Drunkenness became a great national curse. 
The introduction for fiscal purposes of a State Liquor 
Monopoly placed drink within easy reach of the peasant, 
exhausting him physically and morally, and draining 
away the resources of the village into the Exchequer. 
The artificial impediments to emigration and settlement 
in the boundless, fertile regions of Siberia caused a glut 
of the rural population and a renewal of the land hunger. 
Of this circumstance political parties took full advantage. 
Land nationalization, expropriation, and the other lures 
of socialistic doctrine found many willing listeners among 
the ignorant, and especially among the peasants who 
had inherited a "starvation" allotment of land.^ 

In response to popular clamor and tumult against 
the abuses revealed during the war with Japan, and in 
compliance with the demands of constitutional parties 
supported by the Zemstvo nobles and by a large section 
of the middle class, the Tsar signed the Manifesto of 
October 30, 1905, a semi-Constitution perpetuating the 
autocracy. 

The Church had long been perverted by bureaucratic 
interference. Since the days of Peter the Great it had 
been deprived of its Patriarch,^ who enjoyed an amount 

^The serfs, on emancipation, could choose a "working" allotment suf- 
ficient for their sustenance, by paying for it in instalments (redemption dues), 
or they could obtain a smaller ("starvation") allotment without payment. 

2 The schism of the Starovery and Staroobriddtsy (Old Believers and Fol- 
lowers of the Old Rite) dates back to this period. Schismatics in minor points 
of dogma and ritual, they were Dissenters in the political and some of them also 
in the ecclesiastical sense. All were opposed to the violent introduction of 



THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 25 

of influence and independence that did not please the 
masterful reformer, and its affairs had been placed in 
commission under a Holy Synod, which in its turn was 
subjected to the dictatorial powers of the Grand Pro- 
curator, an agent of the bureaucracy. 

The clergy were divided into parish priests, who had 
to be married, and monks, who alone could hope to 
attain the prelacy. The white or parish clergy formed a 
caste, their cures descending from father to son. They 
were often only a little less ignorant than the peasants, 
tilled their own fields, and were given, like their parish- 
ioners, to indulgence in strong drink. The villagers 
respected the priestly office, but could not always respect 
the individuals. They paid them tithes in kind, unwill- 
ingly, and bargained with them for the price of their 
ministrations. 

Among the prelates were men of all classes, peasants 
and nobles. They included some very high-minded and 
learned divines. But among them were also many 
time-servers who subordinated their high calling to 
purely selfish dictates. The Holy Synod, as it was in 
the days of the autocracy, could not afford much scope 
for anything else. 

Monastic life in Russia offered certain advantages to 
the peasants. They came there in youth to fill menial 
offices and casually pick up some rudiments of knowl- 
edge. In maturer life they went thither on pilgrimages. 

western, chiefly German, dress, customs, and methods of government carried 
out by the ruthless Peter. Some adopted their priesthood from the Galician 
or Bielokrynitsa eparchy; others became bezpopovtsy (priestless ones), having 
sought refuge in the eastern borderlands, where priests were unavailable. All 
sturdily refused to shave their beards, accounting it a sin. All were total 
abstainers, unaddicted to the use of tobacco, and hard-working and thrifty. 
A "reconciliation" between the Old Faith and the Orthodox Church was 
solemnized in 1907, when the Ukaz on Freedom of Conscience was promulgated. 
The altars of the Old Believers were then "unsealed" after a lapse of three cen- 
turies. The number of adherents of the Old Faith is reputed to be about 
20,000,000. 



26 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

Some of the monasteries were homes of idleness and its 
usual accompaniments; others, again, became admirable 
centers of industry. The Solovetsky monastery, situated 
on an island in the White Sea, was an example of this 
kind. Its hard-working inmates created a garden amidst 
an arctic wilderness. They were excellent husbandmen, 
dairy farmers, architects and builders, and fishermen. 
Wild birds and animals were sacred at Solovki and at the 
Ladoga monastery of Balaam. There I have often 
watched the seagulls and wildfowl, hares, foxes, and 
badgers enjoying complete impunity amid the pilgrim 
and tourist crowds. 

The Revolution emancipated the Church from its 
police duties. The reaction that followed upon the ex- 
cesses of Bolshevism was marked by a great religious 
revival, which restored much of the influence wielded by 
the Church in olden times. 

The real Russian is naturally good-tempered, kindly, 
extremely intelligent, and lovable. Qualities of heart 
perhaps dominate in him over qualities of mind. He is 
gregarious, sociable, and expansive. He is given to bursts 
of energy, accomplishing an extraordinary amount of 
work in a short time, rather than to steady, prolonged 
labor. The long winter has left a permanent imprint 
upon him. He is not a hater. He has not even a sense 
of retributive justice. The peasants would stone a horse- 
thief caught red-handed, but they would feed and care 
for him if he recovered. Trial by jury, introduced in the 
sixties, invariably led to a verdict of "not guilty." Cor- 
poral punishment was not permitted in the schools, and 
the death penalty was held in abhorrence. The soldiers 
had always been kind to prisoners. Some regiments did 
not, it is true, take prisoners, but that was only when 
they had seen their comrades tortured by the Germans 
or Hungarians, or when they had been exposed too long 
to the explosive bullets used by the Austrian Army. 



THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE 27 

But under the influence of drink the Russians, espe- 
cially the ignorant masses, were capable to committing 
terrible excesses. Drink had an irresistible fascination 
for them. The peasant would imbibe as often and as 
much as he could afford; and, as he grew more pros- 
perous — during the decade preceding the war — he spent 
more money on vodka. Births, marriages, and bereave- 
ments imposed traditional obligations of hospitality. The 
result was an orgy. Village festivals and holidays — they 
were all too numerous — involved a general debauch. It 
was dangerous to enter a village while the people were 
drunk. They frequently murdered each other, and would 
not hesitate to assault or murder a stranger. Drink 
played an important part in the affairs of the commune. 
Any muzhik who had a grievance could be sure of a favor- 
able hearing if he put up "drinks all round." The more 
wealthy or fashionable villagers occasionally indulged in 
beer, but vodka undiluted (potato spirit of 40 degrees) 
was the staple beverage. It brought about the speediest 
and pleasantest results. When the ex-Tsar visited the 
home of his ancestors in Kostroma on the occasion of 
the Romanov Tercentenary (1913), he heard a good deal 
about this wretched state of affairs, and probably saw 
something of village life. 

Had he taken the trouble to study the conditions that 
had prevailed, and still, to a certain extent, prevail in 
other countries, the ex-Tsar would have understood that 
a sudden and miraculous cure could not be permanently 
achieved without first spreading education and enlighten- 
ment among the rustics. But he would not listen to the 
warnings of his able Prime Minister, Count Kokovtsov, 
who explained to him that any sudden prohibition measure 
would cripple the Treasury, and in the end fail of its 
direct purpose. Events subsequently justified the states- 
man's arguments. Nicholas II — a typical Russian — 
inclined towards the dictates of a kind heart. He was 



28 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

probably unconscious of the fact that the temperance 
plan was being fostered by the Reactionary gang in order 
to get rid of a liberal-minded Prime Minister, and that 
they were leading him (the Tsar) into a trap. Every- 
thing seemed at first to accord with the Reactionary 
scheme. Count Kokovtsov's resignation coincided with 
the famous edict on temperance at the commencement 
of 1914. The villages became orderly, peaceful, while 
deposits in the State savings banks accumulated in un- 
precedented proportions. 

But I had a conversation with some of my muzhik 
acquaintances shortly after the edict had been applied 
which somewhat surprised me. It was an old peasant 
who spoke. "We old ones rather like it," he said; "we 
have had our day. And the young ones — the boys and 
the girls — used to beat us when we had drink in the 
villages. But the youngsters are all against total absti- 
nence. They think it is unfair. They have not had their 
fling yet, and they are rather sulky." 

However, we all blessed the Emperor for his temper- 
ance edict when the war began, because it enormously 
helped the mobilization. Many villages had voluntarily 
abjured the Monopoly shops. Had drink been procurable 
in the villages, there would have been delay and trouble. 
The Government would have closed the liquor shops 
around the depots under the old system, but all the 
reservists would have been drunk before they left home 
and drunk on the way. As it was, only one serious 
disturbance occurred. At Barnaul, in Siberia, the reser- 
vists wandered about the streets. No arrangements 
had been made for them. In disgust they broke open 
a vodka store and then proceeded "to paint the town 
red." Half the houses were burned down. 

I must say that the enforced absence of liquor was 
never complained of by the troops. On every occasion 
when I visited the trenches the men appeared fully con- 



THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE ,29 

scious of the great benefits of temperance. Moreover, 
with the characteristic responsiveness of the Russian, 
they had appreciated the good intentions of the Little 
Father and never repined, although there were times and 
seasons when a vodka ration would have been extremely 
welcome and usefuL 



CHAPTER V 

RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 

Belief in "Holy Men" — ^The Advent of Razputin — ^Healing the Tsarevich — 
The Empress's Infatuation — ^An Anxious Mother — The Tsar and the 
Dalai Lama — Alexandra's Ambitions — ^The Weakness of Nicholas II — 
Razputin Appoints and Dismisses Ministers — "Remarkable Prophecies" 
— ^Razputin's Peace Intrigue with Germany — "Removed" by the Army 
— ^The Circumstances of Razputin's Death — Protopopov's Madness — 
The Court at Mogilev. 

The Russian was ever a God-seeker (hogoislcdtel) , 
This trait found its expression in various ways, bad and 
good — in the formation of quaint sects, some of which, 
like the abominable khlysty (flagellants), resisted all 
attempts at conversion; in the schism known as the Old 
Faith; but above all in the popularity of elders {stdrtsy), 
to whom multitudes came seeking light and guidance. 
It was wonderful how quickly the fame of a "holy man" 
traveled over the country. People of all classes got to 
hear of him, and traveled enormous distances to see his 
face and to receive his blessing. Now, as all sects were 
banned by the Church, these ghostly comforters generally 
selected their abode under the protection of some monas- 
tery. They signalized themselves by their blamelessness 
and otherwise. They might be ignorant laymen or 
learned clerics; it mattered not so long as they had 
the requisite gifts and qualities. We shall see how this 
characteristic of Russian life was to affect the whole 
course of politics and to produce one of the contributory 
causes of the Revolution. 

While the semi-skeptical intelligentsia professed dis- 

30 



RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 31 

dainful tolerance for all beliefs, and the educated classes 
displayed a widespread laxity of morals — as has been 
strikingly illustrated in the works of Russian writers — 
they could never attain the profundities of out-and-out 
skepticism. The lower orders might, and were often, 
misled by false prophets like the mad monk Iliodor in 
Tsaritsyn, who converted his cloister into a revolutionary 
fortress, or a Father Gapon, who led the workpeople of 
Petrograd to revolt in 1905, with the connivance of the 
okhrana; the enlightened classes were equally subject 
to mistake the false prophet for the true. 

Father John of Kronstadt was, for many years, the 
leading "holy man" of Russia. He attracted rich and 
poor, high and low. Through his hands passed a golden 
stream of charity. Yet he died comparatively poor. It 
was by his advice that the Emperor and Empress went 
on a pilgrimage to disinter the remains of Serafim of 
Sarov (near Nizhni Novgorod) and beatify that "holy 
man," in recompense whereof they were to be blessed 
with the long-awaited Heir to the Throne. The prophecy 
came true. 

Prior to that, a recourse to occult arts, under the 
guidance of a well-known charlatan named Philippe, had 
brought about scandalous disappointment. But the 
Court did not scruple to revert to these practises. Then 
follows the first appearance in Petrograd of the notorious 
Razputin. A peasant of Tobolsk, in Siberia, he had 
served in a monastery, picking up a smatter of biblical 
phrases and laying the foundations of his future trans- 
formation into a staretz, A wealthy merchant's wife 
from Moscow "discovered" him during her pilgrimages 
to the shrines of Siberia, and introduced him to her friends 
in the great city. 

Razputin's name signified "the vicious one," or "he 
of the bad roads." His record in his native village fully 
justified these appellations. A drunken and abnormally 



32 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

perverted and lazy peasant and illiterate, he was yet able 
to impose upon susceptible people by his monastic 
verbiage, and particularly by a forceful, if brutal, per- 
sonality. 

I saw him once or twice. His face and appearance 
reminded me of Repin's celebrated painting of John the 
Terrible, where the tyrant is depicted holding to his 
breast the bleeding head of the Tsarevich and glaring 
upward in a frenzy of despair at having murdered his 
only son. Razputin's face was coarser, less intelligent. 
But the two men bore a striking resemblance — the mad, 
vicious, bloodthirsty genius who, like Louis XI, alter- 
nated between orgies of torture and paroxysms of prayer, 
exterminated the flower of his aristocracy, yet united his 
country under one scepter, and the depraved peasant 
who was also destined to exert such a fateful influence 
upon his native land. The Terrible One and the Tobolsk 
muzhik were cast in the same mold, physical and moral. 
This fact must be appreciated. It was one of the causes 
of the extraordinary hold which Razputin obtained upon 
a superstitious Court. 

The lure of occultism ever appealed to Nicholas 11. 
By nature secretive and mistrustful of all who approached 
him, inherently well-intentioned, devoted to his wife and 
children, he, like men of weak character, was obstinate, 
unable to brook dictation or advice. Above all, he was 
permeated by a profound belief in the sanctity of his 
mission and office. Any appeal to autocratic prejudice 
ever found him a ready listener. The Empress unfortu- 
nately encouraged rather than corrected these inclina- 
tions. Her semi-English, semi-German upbringing had 
yielded an untoward admixture. She could never identify 
herself with her adopted people. From the outset of her 
long sojourn among the Russians she was never liked by 
them, nor seemed capable of understanding them. But 
she adopted their superstitions and beliefs. The circum- 



RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 33 

stances under which Alexis was born appear to have left 
an indelible imprint upon her mind. It was on the 
Tsarevich's account that she first made the acquaintance 
of Razputin. 

The boy suffered from a bodily ailment, inherited from 
his mother, transmitted to the male issue, known as 
haemophilia, a condition of the blood which might cause 
danger from a ruptured vein or from a mere nose-bleeding. 
Picture the unceasing anxiety of this mother about her 
boy, and remember that in him were centered all the 
hopes of a great empire; remember also how many girl 
children she had borne before the arrival of the Heir; 
take into account the mournful fact that no other children 
would ever bless her home — this boy was to be the only 
one and the last; then you begin to perceive an incomplete 
but faithful image of the Empress. Add to this that she 
was a proud, aloof, masterful woman, living in the hot- 
house atmosphere of a semi-Byzantine Court, amid people 
whom she disliked and distrusted, not over-intelligent, 
yet convinced of her ovm political sagacity, imbued by a 
belief instilled into her by courtiers and clerics that the 
peasants, whom she did not, could not, know would for 
ever remain loyal to the Throne — that they were the 
only sound element in the country. 

Razputin's fame as a staretz, who, by occult powers, 
could save her boy, appealed to her mother instinct; 
Razputin's peasant origin enlisted her confidence and 
political interest. Because Razputin was able by the 
simple and well-known exercise of animal magnetism to 
stop nose-bleeding, which the Tsarevich's physicians 
could not arrest, the Empress was persuaded of his occult 
powers. He was a "holy man," no matter what evil 
courses he might pursue or what unkind people might 
say of him. The charlatan's boastful announcement that 
the boy's life depended upon him was accepted as an 
inspired utterance. He became the privileged libertine 



34 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

of the Court. Worse still, his word — the artless expression 
of a loyal peasant — carried weight in the highest counsels. 
As the years went by he became more impudent, more 
interfering and more dangerous. 

Remonstrances reached the Emperor's ears. Among 
his oldest courtiers were men who saw the danger and had 
the courage to speak out. Nicholas II always turned 
the conversation by saying : " These are my private affairs, 
and they are nobody's concern except mine." In vain 
it was represented to him that Razputin was interfering 
in affairs of State, that he was the tool of alien influences, 
that he was discrediting the Monarchy by scandalous 
boasts indulged in openly by him during his bouts of 
drunkenness and debauch. The Emperor treated, or 
affected to treat, all these attempts to oust the charlatan 
as an unwarrantable invasion of his domestic life. Pre- 
sumably he had tried to remonstrate with his wife about 
the man, and had encountered such opposition that he 
had decided to tolerate Razputin rather than further 
incense the Empress. To one old General of my acquaint- 
ance, who had ventured to bring up the sore question, 
he said: "I prefer five Razputins to one hysterical 
woman." 

Occasionally the staretz went to visit his wife and chil- 
dren in Tobolsk. He had built a gorgeous hut for them. 
There he flaunted himself in silk shirt, velvet sharovary 
(pantaloons), and patent leather boots — the acme of 
muzhik dandyism. The peasants could not but feel flat- 
tered that one of themselves should have become so rich 
and powerful. The local authorities, lay and clerical, 
paid court to him. In Petrograd hope arose each time 
that he had gone for good. But he came back more im- 
pudent than ever. One of his daughters was placed by 
the Empress in a school reserved for nobles, and became 
engaged to an officer. His house in Petrograd was 
besieged by callers, high and low, asking for official favor 



RA.ZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 35 

and bringing presents. A few words scrawled by Raz- 
putin to a Minister would bring immediate results. 

Razputin kept a sort of debit and credit account with 
high functionaries. If they did what he wanted, he would 
return the favor. Ministers always needed a friend at 
Court. Some were too squeamish about accepting Raz- 
putin' s overtures, others dared even to resist. They 
invariably suffered. M. Samarin, a distinguished public 
man belonging to the Conservative party, had under- 
taken to restore the shattered prestige of the Church by 
accepting the post of Grand Procurator of the Holy Synod. 
He was summarily dismissed for "coldness" towards one 
of Razputin's proteges who had been made a bishop. 
General Djunkovsky, chief of the all-powerful okhr^na, 
kicked Razputin out of his office when he came in unbidden 
to present some impertinent request. He was immedi- 
ately deprived of his post. No Minister's career, no 
woman's honor, were safe from the enterprise of the 
"holy man." 

The newspapers had, of course, been forbidden to 
mention Razputin, but in covert ways, using subterfuges 
which were understood by their readers, they kept the 
initiated public aware of all that went on. If the Emperor 
could have heard what was being said by his faithful 
and loyal subjects about Razputin's connection with the 
Court, he might have risked even an open rupture with 
his Consort to save the Monarchy. Officers and Generals 
at the Front often discussed the scandal with me in such 
a tone that I felt sure had Razputin ever ventured^to 
come near the Army he would have been killed. The 
Grand Duke Nicholas, when he was GeneraHssimo, openly 
announced his intention of hanging Razputin if he ever 
got hold of him. (That was perhaps the main cause of 
the Grand Duke's transfer to the Caucasus.) 

All this was bad enough, but it was not yet irreparable. 
Soon, however, the scandal became known to the common 



36 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

people, and the autocracy became discredited. So also 
did the Church. Razputinism had belittled the Prelacy. 
The late Mr. John Birkbeck, an old friend of Russia and 
of the Emperor, was in Moscow in the summer of 1916, 
and told me how shocked and surprised he had been by 
unmistakable evidences of the widespread unpopularity 
of the Empress. During a cinema performance the people 
had actually hissed when her picture appeared on the 
screen. This was an unprecedented — an almost incredible 
— occurrence. 

Unfortunately the Emperor did not understand what 
was happening. He heard of these manifestations from 
the okhrana and other interested parties, who colored 
them to suit their own purposes. The campaign against 
Razputin was represented as a malicious intrigue which 
could be checked only by further police measures, a 
symptom of revolution which could be doctored only 
by repression. 

The influence of the Empress had for many years 
estranged the best Russians from the Court. Naturally 
a sociable man, given to conviviality, Nicholas II had 
to fall back upon the company of persons who were ap- 
proved by his Consort. He had no continuous, healthy 
touch with his subjects. ^ During recent years the Sov- 
ereigns lived in retirement. Most of the Tsar's huge 
revenues were swallowed up for the maintenance of 
innumerable palaces and retainers; the residue was 
invested in the War Loans. (Hence the Tsar had to be 
careful about expenditure. He was poorer than many of 
the Grand Dukes, or even his own children.) 

Razputin's power grew. The highest appointments 
were within his gift. A word from him to the Empress 

^ Even purely Court functions and entertainments had been given up. 
The last "function" that the author remembers was given on the occasion of 
the young Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna's marriage to a Swedish Prince at 
Tsarskoe Selo — a marriage that ended in a divorce. 



RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 37 

and Ministers were dismissed or nominated, probably 
without the Emperor knowing whence the recommen- 
dation came. 

Thus Maklakov (a brother of the deputy) was given 
the all-important post of Home Secretary because he had 
taken Razputin's fancy, and later the Falstaffian Khvos- 
tov, a Deputy of the Right, succeeded him. 

Khvostov and his nominal subordinate, Beletsky, then 
chief of the okhrana, were engaged in a duel at cross- 
purposes for the possession of the Empress's letters to 
Razputin, which had been abstracted by a brother "saint." 
The Minister sent funds to Norway to secure the docu- 
ments, but the emissary with the papers was "inter- 
cepted" by Beletsky, who thought he would thereby earn 
Razputin's gratitude and oust his superior. Beletsky 
overreached himself, however, and was relegated to the 
Governor-Generalship of Irkutsk. 

This state of affairs grew worse when the Emperor, 
acting under his wife's influence, decided in an ill-fated 
moment to assume personal command of the armies. 
Delighted to be at the Front together with his boy among 
his soldiers, away from the hateful worries of Tsarskoe 
and Petrograd, Nicholas 11 thus relinquished the reins of 
government to Alexandra, with consequences that might 
be foreseen. Razputin and his clique did exactly what 
they pleased. The "holy man" had visions which were 
interpreted as guides to policy. As a matter of fact they 
suited the interests, not of Russia, but of Germany, whence 
they in all probability emanated. 

Some years before, the late Count Witte,^ who had 
never been a friend of England, was asked for an "inter- 
view" by the Cologne Gazette to justify Razputin in the 

^ A talented Minister who had played a foremost part in the promotion of 
Russian industries, the originator of the spirit monopoly and currency reform, 
chief negotiator of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and Prime Minister dming 
the uprising of 1905. 



38 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

eyes of the German public. The staretz himself declared 
soon after the war began that had he not been absent 
in Tobolsk at the time, he would never have allowed 
Russia to fight, and predicted misfortune because he had 
not been consulted. The fatherly tone adopted by 
Wilhelm to Nicholas in the messages which they ex- 
changed on the eve of war argued a degree of assurance 
in the power of Germany's influence at the Russian Court, 
and subservience thereto on the part of Nicholas, which 
reveals consciousness of a very powerful hand being 
exerted at Tsarskoe in the interests of Germany and 
"peace." But that influence, or rather the agency 
through which it had been working, was too far away 
in Siberia. Later we knew that the Emperor had at 
the last moment countermanded his own order for a 
general mobilization, but the Staff could not stop it. 
Berlin, of course, distorted this fact, attempting to attrib- 
ute the origin of this war to incompetent and disobedient 
Generals. But doubtless the "holy man" had some- 
thing to do with the counter-orders. 

While the Emperor remained in supreme command of 
the armies, some of the most important ministries were 
being confided to men who had notoriously acted in the 
interests of Germany. Thus M. Sazonov, who had suc- 
ceeded M. Izvolsky at the Foreign OflSce and loyally 
developed the Entente policy, was suddenly (July, 1916), 
and without any avowable cause, supplanted by M. Sttir- 
mer, an old bureaucrat of Austrian origin, who, more- 
over, wielded the Premiership. His ultra-reactionary 
and pro-German antecedents were only too well known. 
He had been singled out on the recommendation of Raz- 
putin's friends. He took his orders from the Empress. 
The British Government showed its disapproval o{ this 
extraordinary procedure by demonstratively bestowing 
the Grand Cross of the Bath upon M. Sazonov. 

Next came the appointment of M. Protopopov to the 




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RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 39 

Home OflBce. He was a prominent public man who had 
suddenly displayed marked pro-German sympathies. 
Returning with a Legislative Delegation from Paris to 
Petrograd, he arranged a secret meeting with some Ger- 
man emissaries in Stockholm with a view to discussing 
peace terms. Soon after his arrival in Russia he was 
honored by an Imperial audience. A fortnight spent 
with Razputin in a round of restaurant orgies had brought 
him his opportunity. Afterwards it transpired that he 
was bankrupt and suffering from an incurable disease 
which affected his mind. (Later he had to be placed in a 
lunatic asylum.) The appointment of this broken-down, 
half -crazed adventurer was flaunted by the agents of the 
autocracy as a gracious concession to the Duma, of which 
he had been vice-president in his sane and prosperous 
days. This Protopopov was to play a fateful part in the 
Revolution. 

All Russia loathed Razputinism, and turned her coun- 
tenance from the Emperor, who had not sufficient strength 
to put an end to the scandal. The murder of Grishka 
(a contemptuous diminutive of his Christian name)^ 
was talked of long before it took place. And its occurrence 
probably stimulated the revolutionary outburst which 
followed two and a half months later. The Army had 
more particularly felt the harm and ignominy of Raz- 
putinism, and it was the Army that finally "removed" 
him. Young Guardsmen, including Prince Felix Yusupov 
and his kinsman, the Grand Duke Dmitry Pavlovich, and 
a Conservative Deputy named Purishkevich, who had 
been in charge of relief work at the Front, were present 
at a supper in the Yusupov Palace on the Moika Canal 
in Petrograd, to which Razputin was lured by the promise 
of meeting some fair guests. 

It had been resolved that he should die "like a dog," 
and such indeed was his end. The body, riddled with 

1 December 29, 1916. 



40 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

bullets, was swiftly removed in a motor-ear and flung, 
weighted so that it should sink, into an arm of the Neva. 
The weights, hurriedly attached with string, came off, 
and the corpse floated up, the water at this place being 
clear of ice. Marks of blood had been found on the bridge 
whence the body had been flung. So the police were on 
the lookout. Sure enough, here it was found and con- 
veyed to a mortuary. I read the secret report of the 
post-mortem examination. It described the body as 
that of a man of over forty-five years of age, normally 
constituted. 

The Empress, maddened by grief and anger, came from 
Tsarskoe disguised as a sister of mercy, and together 
with Protopopov visited the mortuary, where she con- 
vinced herself that the "saint" was really dead. She 
was more than ever convinced that he was a "saint/' 
because the arms were crossed. She had ordered the 
arrest of her nephew Dmitry, and had summoned the 
Emperor. Prince Felix had made his escape to the 
Crimea. Purishkevich had returned to the Front. The 
Emperor came to Tsarskoe, exiled his nephew to Persia, 
himself went back to the Front, and the affair was hushed 
up. The body was quietly buried in a secret place in 
Tsarskoe Park. 

Protopopov, who had been displaying unmistakable 
signs of mental derangement, came often to condole with 
the Empress. During his visits he was subject to hallu- 
cinations, imagining that the "saint" was holding con- 
verse with him. "See, there he is," he would exclaim, 
stretching out his arms to empty space. "Our blessed 
one beckons. He is talking. He wishes me to tell you 
that dire misfortune will befall Russia because he was 
martyred. Woe unto us! Woe unto us!" And then, 
the vision ended, Protopopov and the Empress would 
talk about their lost one. She would recall the circum- 
stances of her first meeting with the "saint." It was 



RAZPUXmiSM AND THE COURT 41 

eight years earlier. They had been yachting in the Gulf. 
Wilhelm had come to visit them at Biorke Sound, near 
Vyborg. She grew reminiscent. 

She related how Nicholas had signed a secret treaty 
with him earlier — in 1905 — that would make war with 
France impossible. That funny old Admiral Birilev, 
who could crow hke a cock — almost as funny as Minister 
Maklakov, who could tell such amusing stories, and 
General Sukhomlinov, a born actor — well, Birilev coun- 
tersigned it without knowing what was inside. But later 
the signature of the Minister of Marine had to be endorsed 
by the Prime Minister, and that was that horrid Witte.^ 
He would have nothing to do with the secret treaty, so 
it lapsed, and he frightened Nicholas into signing the 
Manifesto and summoning the Duma. 

Well, to return to "our beloved saint," it was at Biorke 
that five-year-old Alexis, skipping about the yacht, fell 
and bruised himself. Chagin, the captain of the Standart, 
could never get over that affair. We know he after- 
wards shot himself, and people talked so much disgusting 
nonsense about it. Alexis kept his hurt to himself. A 
tumor formed on the groin, and he was given up for 
lost. The "saint" appeared, and since then the boy 
had been saved, and she (Alexandra) had daily prayed 
for Grisha. 

She had kept him with her as much as she could. 
Every night when he was not in the Palace she asked for 
his blessing by telephone. He could order her to sleep 
with a word in that dear commanding voice of his, and 
then she was sure of getting some rest. He was so intel- 
ligent, magnetic, so full of life. It was such a pity 
that he would not remain always in the Palace. But 

1 Returning then through Germany, Count Witte was received with Im- 
perial honors at Potsdam. The Kaiser presented him with his portrait bearing 
a mysterious date. "You will know what it means when you see the Tsar," 
he said. It was the date of the secret treaty— the " Nicky " and " Willi " treaty. 



42 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

then so many interests called to him. She could not 
expect to have him always by her side. And oh! how 
much she had always dreaded those wanderings of his. 
He had so many enemies, dear, good soul. She could not 
trust the Russian detectives. (Let Protopopov not be 
offended!) So she had ordered two private detectives 
from London, and one of them was on guard always. 
And there was a village girl, very devoted to the saintly 
one, who went everywhere with him, dressed as a sister 
of mercy. Yes, everywhere. On the fatal night Grisha 
had promised to heed her warnings, and not to go out, 
for they knew that enemies were plotting to kill him. So 
the detectives and the "sister" were absent, and they — 
the horrible murderers — ^had lured him to his doom. 
Well, what was written was written! 

Protopopov would take up the parable. "Our holy 
one" had ever foretold coming events with clear-sighted 
perspicacity. He was conscious of his exalted mission. 
Did the lady recall his prophecy when an abominable 
peasant girl in Siberia had stuck a knife into him? Every- 
body was so delighted, and hoped he would not recover. 
He was himself that way inclined in those benighted 
days. That was a month or so before the war. Grisha 
did recover. He said: "My blood has been shed, and, 
in retribution for it, rivers of blood will flow." How true, 
how wonderful! And then, just before the disaster in 
Galicia, in 1915, did she recall another prediction, just 
as wonderful and true. The "holy one" was kicked and 
beaten by some of those depraved guardsmen in a res- 
taurant. (Grishka had been caught dining with one of 
their brother officer's wife. But of this Protopopov, of 
course, said nothing.) And he had lain two weeks in a 
private hospital. He said: "I have been ill-treated; 
soon our armies will suffer defeat." And now Grisha 
had told him in visions that soon his death would be vis- 
ited upon all Russia, that there would be sorrow unspeak- 



RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 43 

able and pandemonium, but they would have to endure 
and to make peace. 

Oh yes, something terrible would soon happen! The 
other day an impudent journalist had come to him and 
begun to take notes with a red pencil. He (Protopopov) 
had wrenched it from him. Red! red! that awful color! 
He saw it all round him. It was the hue of Revolution. 
That awful color would be the ruin of Russia. And then 
the same impertinent one had looked round at all the 
Buddhas and icons which adorned the Minister's study. 
Two of the idols were particularly dangerous. He had 
told the journalist about them. They had to be placed 
together in a niche of honor, lest one, becoming jealous, 
might avenge himself. The journalist had suggested they 
should be placed apart in separate rooms. "Then, you 
see, one will counteract the other." There was a great 
deal in that. He must think about it. Oh! if "our 
saint" were only with them always! He could help them 
out of all these terrible difficulties. 

These are not fancied conversations; they are genuine, 
reported by unimpeachable witnesses. Is it surprising 
that, speaking some months later before the first Great 
Congress of the Church at Moscow, Prince Eugene 
Trubetsk6y, an eminent Russian savant and public man, 
should have declared: "In the latter years of Nicholas II 
Russia was like some dark, hellish kingdom"? 

The reign had opened with an awful tragedy. On the 
Hodynka, a field in the outskirts of Moscow, great crowds 
gathered to receive the Tsar's bounty, as customary at 
each coronation. By the carelessness of the police, such 
a crush of people occurred that hundreds were trampled 
to death. Midway in his reign thousands of soldiers 
were to die in the wind-swept fields of Manchuria for 
a cause that they did not even comprehend, and many 
hundreds of workmen were to be shot down at the 
doors of his great Palace, craving for freedom. And 



44 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

the end of his reign was to come amid still greater 
bloodshed. 

Like the Bourbons, Nicholas II and his Court could 
"learn nothing and forget nothing." New ideas could 
not displace the old. He inclined towards the archaic. 
Soothsayers and occultist charlatans attracted him more 
than the stern calls of statesmanship. He sent emissaries 
to the Dalai Lama, seeking a revelation. And the Indian 
Government imagined he was thirsting for Tibetan terri- 
tory. He assembled the nations at a Peace Conference 
at The Hague at the bidding of visionaries, and himself 
drifted into a senseless war with Japan. At his accession 
he told the Tver Zemstvoist Rodichev and a deputation 
craving representative rights for the nation to "put 
away these vain illusions." Yet when Count Witte 
came to him in 1905 and said that the Army could not 
be relied upon to suppress a revolution, he granted what 
he had previously refused. And then he tried to take 
back what he had given. Mistrustful of all and every- 
body, yet led captive at the heels of a distracted woman, 
bearing upon his shoulders the weight of a gigantic empire, 
he was a pathetic figure. 

He had his cup of bitterness. The boy he loved, that 
bright, sunny lad with the limp which told its tale — 
would he live to inherit the great Throne of All the Rus- 
sias? For him he toiled day and night, poring over 
reports and papers which gave him knowledge without 
understanding. And it was so sad to see the boy already 
comprehending many painful things. He did not seem 
to like his mother as much as of old; and he would spit 
fiercely whenever he heard the name of Razputin. Well, 
he would see. A fatalist, like his subjects, Nicholas II 
never repined, never lost his temper. One night in 1905, 
when the mutineers in Kronstadt were shooting and 
burning the town, he had calmly watched the perform- 
ance from the windows of his Peterhof villa, across the 



RAZPUTINISM AND THE COURT 45 

bay, and exclaimed to an officer of his suite: "It would 
be so interesting to know how it will all end." 

To the reader of these lines it will seem strange that 
people who casuajjiy approached the former Sovereigns 
of Russia should have failed to note the slightest taint 
of Byzantinism. All were impressed by their apparent 
good sense and charmed by their kind ways. All de- 
parted absolutely convinced of the absurdity of the 
"legends" about Razputin, and of the irremediable 
mischief that was being wrought within the Empire. 
Almost on the eve of revolution distinguished foreigners 
visited Petrograd and saw the ex-Tsar and his Consort. 
I do not think I exaggerate in saying that they formed 
no exception to the rule, and that they carried away with 
them an all too optimistic impression. Only those who 
had lived in the country and had had experience of its 
sad realities could appreciate the facts at their true 
value. 

Only three months before the Revolution I saw the 
Imperial family at Mogilev and talked with Alexis. A 
winsome lad, bright and full of mischief, he interested and 
attracted all who knew him. As he had been thoroughly 
spoiled by his doting parents, and did pretty well what he 
pleased, this was rather wonderful. On that occasion 
I had been invited to lunch at the Palace. The Empress 
and the daughters happened to be in Mogilev. Alex- 
andra had come to talk about Stiirmer's resignation. 

The Governor's Palace, which was occupied by the 
Tsar and his suite, forms a semicircular row of buildings 
overlooking the picturesque valley of the Dneiper. In 
the large drawing-room twenty-five or thirty guests had 
assembled, standing in a long row and waiting for the 
hosts to come out of their apartments. Lieutenant- 
General Sir John Hanbury Wilhams and other representa- 
tives of the Allied armies, some Grand Dukes, Ministers, 
and officials, were among them. General Voyeikov, a 



46 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

heavy-faced but energetic-looking functionary, was in 
attendance. Although a civilian, I had to wear a sword, 
such being the etiquette. One of the British officers lent 
me his. 

Walking round to greet their guests, the Sovereigns 
stopped to say a few words to friends or strangers. The 
Grand Duchesses filed past like a bevy of school girls, 
holding up their hands to be kissed. In front of them 
came Alexis, dressed in soldier's uniform, khaki shirt, 
trousers and top-boots, and wearing the medal of St. 
George, of which he was very proud. It had been be- 
stowed on him for service in the trenches. He gave me a 
friendly nod, and glanced admiringly at my ribbons, 
which were those of his Order. Everybody then entered 
the dining-room, where a long table was spread for lunch- 
eon. Another table containing the celebrated zakusha 
stood near the windows, from which a glorious snowy view 
of Russia's historic river offered itself. Having partaken 
of caviare and other delicacies, we sat down to a modest 
repast served on silver. 

Half an hour later we were again in the drawing-room. 
This time the Emperor spoke at greater length with those 
of his guests whom he wished to entertain. He chatted 
with me about my visits to the Front, displaying a remark- 
able acquaintance with regiments and their respective 
positions. He knew about my son's service in the Rus- 
sian and in the British Guards, remembering even the 
smallest thing. We spoke English and Russian. He 
had scarcely any trace of foreign accent. I had never 
met any one more simple and unaffected. He looked shy 
and diffident, with a quiet dignity and an indefinable 
charm of manner. The clear, resonant voice betrayed 
physical vigor, the mournful eyes an internal dreaminess. 
Altogether a typical Russian. I never saw him again. 

The Empress wore a plain, but not unbecoming, dress 
of grayish material. Hers and the girls' dresses were 




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RAZPUTINISM ANDjlTHE COURT 47 

evidently home-made. The Grand Duchesses were win- 
some lasses, while the third, Marie, was decidedly pretty. 
Their mother looked well. No one could have suspected 
this rosy-cheeked, somewhat prim matron, with the thin, 
rather cruel lips, of being the devotee of a Razputin. 
Mme. Vyrubova was also there — a stocky, rather coarse- 
featured person, very lame since her leg had been broken 
in an accident to the Tsarskoe train, designed, it was said, 
to do away with the *' saint." (As it happened, Raz- 
putin did not travel with her that night.) 

That was in November, 1916. Six months later I 
visited the same rooms to see General Brusilov, and, 
in the following month of August I had tea in the dining- 
room with General Kornilov. General Alexeiev had 
preferred to remain in his old quarters. An A.D.C. 
showed me all over the house. The Tsar's study and the 
adjoining bedroom, which he had shared with his son, 
had satisfied his modest requirements. In Count Free- 
dericks' room I saw the telephone that formerly connected 
the Palace at Mogilev with the villa at Tsarskoe. It 
looked a most ingenious and complicated contrivance. 
What tragic conversations it had carried! 



CHAPTER VI 

GERMAN INFLUENCES 

All-powerful, All-pervasive — Colonists — Merchants — Barons — Monopoly of 
Trade and Office — ^The Court — Russia's Allies Belittled — An Insidious 
Campaign — ^The Press Dependent on German Advertising — Dalliance 
with Reaction — Suspicion of France and Great Britain. 

Under the Old Regime German influences had been 
all-powerful and all-pervasive. I shall explain how 
they operated. They all tended in one direction — to 
the subordination of Russia in political and commercial 
matters. When the arch-conspirator at Potsdam dis- 
covered that Russia meant to liberate herself from the 
German yoke, he struck at Russia's ally, France, and then 
launched his legions into Russia. But later, when the 
Russian people were in the throes of revolution, he sent 
into their midst a diabolical firebrand, who, under the 
flag of Bolshevism, carried ruin and desolation far more 
terrible than any engine or appliance of war, as waged 
by the Germans. 

During the reign of Nicholas II, and earlier. Reaction 
had been undoubtedly exploited by dark influences of 
German origin. That does not necessarily imply that 
Tsarskoe Selo was in direct collusion with Berlin. The 
German influence in Russia derived its sources of strength 
at home as well as abroad. There were many millions 
of Germans residents in the country. German colonies 
had been planted in the choicest parts of European Russia: 
on the western border, in Poland, in the fertile south, on 
the Volga, and around Petrograd in flagrant disregard of 
military considerations, Catherine the Great, a German 

48 



GERMAN INFLUENCES 49 

princess, started the fashion. It had been her intention 
to promote improved methods of farming. Later, the 
"peaceful penetration" of Poland and adjacent lands 
was encouraged in compliance with the anti-Polish policy 
to which Russia had been committed by the partition of 
Poland. 

As a matter of fact, the German colonists, while thriv- 
ing by dint of their better adaptation to rural require- 
ments, lived quite apart from the surrounding villagers, 
preserving their own language and faith, enjoying educa- 
tional privileges which were denied to the Russian peasants 
and neither helped the peasants, who were still under the 
deadening influence of the commune, nor associated 
themselves with the interests and destinies of the Empire 
which harbored them. They owed their first allegiance 
to the Kaiser. They spoke and thought in German, and 
regarded Germany as their home. 

German merchants and manufacturers thrived and 
multiplied in Russia under the same favorable conditions. 
They were numerous and wealthy. Goods and machinery 
could be obtained in abundance from the Fatherland, 
money also. When the internal prosperity of Russia 
began to develop rapidly after the Japanese war, the 
Germans reaped a golden harvest. German manu- 
factured goods flooded the market, while Russian rye 
exported to Germany went to fatten pigs. Custom-house 
duties had been suitably arranged in gratitude for German 
"friendship" during the war. All the benefit of the 
exchange went into German pockets. 

British manufacturers had business enough at home 
or in the colonies, and were so ignorant of Russian methods 
that they never attempted to compete seriously with 
the Germans. Germans came to regard Russia as their 
lawful domain. The predominance of German capital 
in the banks and of German enterprise in trade and 
industry naturally led to a large dependence upon them 



50 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

of the Russian newspapers. Here came in a potent 
factor in the political situation. The Germans had 
helped to build up trade and industry, with great advan- 
tage to themselves, it is true, but undoubtedly with 
benefit to the country, in developing its resources. But 
the ultimate result was distinctly unfavorable to Russia. 
Public opinion was being subjected to a pro-German 
propaganda. 

This danger had long ago arisen in another quarter. 
The Baltic provinces were ruled by German barons and 
German burgesses. The former, descendants of the 
Teutonic Knights, who had waged relentless war with 
Slavdom in the Middle Ages, found themselves included 
under the Russian scepter as a result of Peter the Great's 
conquests. But they lost few, if any, of their feudal 
privileges. German castles and country seats belonging 
to the barons, and German warehouses which dated 
back to the days of the Hanseatic League held the prov- 
inces in undisputed possession. Thence emanated a 
stream of powerful German influence throughout the 
country. High offices of State, Court dignities, commands 
in the Army and Navy, were monopolized by the numerous 
heads or cadets of baronial houses. They were efficient, 
honest, and clannish. The Foreign Office was full of 
them, so were the Guard regiments. 

I do not wish to doubt their loyalty. Far from it. 
Officers bearing German names fought well, although 
sometimes their kinsmen were fighting against them. 
But their German associations and kinship naturally 
colored their feelings. They were ever inclined to 
magnify the prowess of their country of origin, and 
to belittle the power of non-German allies of Russia. 
This feeling existed throughout the ministries, and 
had numerous and powerful exponents throughout the 
country. 

Alexander III had realized all the perils of this situa- 



GERMAN INFLUENCES 51 

tion. He initiated a veritable anti-German campaign. 
German names diminished in number among courtiers and 
functionaries during his reign. So wide-awake was he to 
the necessity of safeguarding the national spirit from 
dangerous encroachments, so clearly did he realize the 
aggressiveness of German activity abroad as well as at 
home, that he concluded the famous alliance with France. 
That agreement deeply shocked the apostles of autocracy, 
and was hailed with delight by the Russian people. All 
saw in it a hope of riddance from Germanism and a blow 
to despotism. 

The pro-German orientation of Russia, promoted by 
her strong German element, was, indeed, based upon 
the prejudices and interests of the autocratic regime and 
its supporters. Germany was regarded by the bureau- 
cracy and the oikhrana as the refuge of absolutism, and 
therefore as the natural friend and ally of Russia. The 
French alliance had always been a bugbear to them. 
The tendency of the powerful German influence and its 
bureaucratic adherents was hostile to it. After the 
disastrous war with Japan, which had been connived 
at both by Germany and by the bureaucracy — the former 
desiring to divert Russia's attention to the Far East, 
the latter stupidly hoping to introduce a counter-irritant 
to internal unrest — the pro-German movement sustained 
an unexpected check, which enabled Russia to secure a 
necessary rapprochement with Great Britain — a con- 
summation above all hateful to the bureaucracy, which 
identified English institutions with revolution. Once the 
course of foreign policy had been set in the Entente direc- 
tion, the pro-German intrigue became more difficult.^ 

But in Petrograd, as well as in Berlin, hopes were enter- 
tained that Russia would leave her allies in the lurch 
rather than risk another war, inasmuch as the bureau- 

1 Note Wilhelm*s negotiation of a secret treaty with Nicholas II and its 
failure (1905). 



52 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

cracy had been taught by bitter experience that war 
might entail a revolt against the autocratic power. 

I have often been asked, even by the Russians — 
extraordinarily ignoran tabout political affairs — "Who 
are the pro-German party?" The answer has been 
supplied above. Their name was and is Legion. And 
it would be a mistake to suppose that persons bearing 
German names — whether Gentiles or Jews — alone nour- 
ished covert or open sympathy for Germany. Durnov6 
and Voyeikov were just as pro-German as Plehve or 
Sttirmer. Many Russians had received their education 
in German schools and universities, imbibing German 
science and German ideas. Literature and the Press 
were largely inspired from German sources. The art of 
Munich, the fashions of Berlin, the news agencies and 
the manufactured produce of the Fatherland permeated 
everyday life in Russia. The height of one pro-German 
editor's ambition was to receive the Red Eagle and the 
rank of Komerzienrat. 

Even the Duma had been adapted to German models. 
Its party leaders were grouped in a "Senioren Convent," 
like the Reichstag. And its "Prsesidium" and rules of 
debate were fashioned after the German manner. If 
Kaiserdom had openly prevailed on the banks of the 
Neva, it could not have colored the organization of 
the Russian Empire, its politics, and even its language 
more than it had done. German influence assumed pro- 
portions that can be compared only with the Norman- 
Variag lordship over the early Russian communities or 
the Norman-French conquest of Saxon England. Ger- 
man words and German titles (Graf and Baron) were 
all-pervading. The hierarchy of the Court was eloquent 
of its German origin: Hof-Marschal, Hof-Meister, Kam- 
mer-Junker, Kammer-Herr, Stahl-Meister, Ober-Schenk, 
Jager-Meister — such were the honorific dignities that 
appealed to bureaucratic ambition. Likewise, for an 



GERMAN INFLUENCES 53 

officer to become Fltigel- Adjutant meant adoption into 
the privileged ranks of Court dignitaries and a brilliant 
career. For Court rank carried precedence over the 
civilian and military hierarchies. At the commencement 
of the war, Nicholas II changed the name of his capital 
from St. Petersburg to Petrograd. The German Court 
titles remained. 

But just because the German hold upon the country 
was so all-embracing, the Russians themselves became 
alive to its dangers, and a great anti-German rally set 
in. The war intensified it. At first the high commands 
in the Army were largely in the hands of Generals bearing 
German names. Two years later they had been weeded 
out. During the Revolution the soldiers drove out many 
of their officers simply because their names were German. 

One of the causes that led to the downfall of the Old 
Regime must be sought in the deep-rooted conviction 
of the masses that they had been sold to the Germans, 
and that Russia's reverses in the field were part and 
parcel of a huge pro-German conspiracy. This feeling 
led to serious anti-German riots in Moscow soon after 
the outbreak of war. But even here the ohhrana disclosed 
its vicious hand. The lawless outburst was insidiously 
diverted against Russians and Allies, who suffered com- 
paratively more than did the German-owned properties. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE JEWS 

Influx of Jews after the Partition of Poland — ^The Pale as a Barrier — Misery 
and Abuses — A Source of Political Poison — Origin of the Pseudo-Jew 
Extremist — Cause of Pogroms. 

For a fuller comprehension of the situation in Russia 
under the Old Regime, and more particularly of the 
events that occurred during the Revolution, it becomes 
necessary to deal at some length with the position of 
the Jews. It had an intimate bearing upon all that 
happened in 1917 and 1918. 

Something like six millions of Jews inhabited the 
Russian Empire at the beginning of the war. They 
were twice as numerous as the Germans, with whom 
they were largely associated in business. Their numbers 
had been enormously increased as the result of an evil 
act — the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth 
century. By this political blunder Russia strengthened 
the Brandenburg-Prussian realm, and saddled herself with 
the Polish and Jewish questions. Thereby she was 
destined to come, sooner or later, into direct collision 
with the Germans and to find herself handicapped in 
her struggle. 

The ancestors of the Polish Jews had fled from Ger- 
many — the Biblical Ashkenaz — to escape persecution.^ 
But they brought with them a deep-rooted association 
with that country. During centuries of abode in Teu- 

^ The Jews of Germany and their descendants are known as Ashkenazim; 
those that settled in Spain as Sephardim — a Jewish "aristocracy." 

54 



THE JEWS 55 

tonic lands they had evolved a specific language known 
as Yiddish, a German jargon. They acted as a sort of 
advance-guard of German penetration. In Poland they 
enjoyed a large measure of freedom. All business was 
in their hands. They acted as agents to the great land- 
lords. The urban population was — and remains — mostly 
Jewish, But Poles and Jews lived peacefully enough 
together. The Jews certainly had the best of the bar- 
gain; they prospered, and were not ungrateful. They 
helped the Poles with money during the insurrections of 
1831 and 1863. 

Thirty years ago the Poles began to go into business 
themselves. Competition arose. The landlords started 
agricultural associations to shake off the Jewish monopoly. 
A rift betokened itself, and has been growing ever since, 
— effectually discrediting Assimilationist theories, largely 
based upon the earlier and one-sided adjustment of Polish 
and Jewish interests. ^ 

Old Russia tried vainly to denationalize the Poles, 
and, obeying the dictates of self-preservation, to prevent 
the Jews from spreading eastward. This was the origin 
of the Pale. 

No Jew was supposed to enjoy rights of residence, 
roughly speaking, east of the Dnieper. The Little 
Russians had become more or less inured to Jewish 
methods, and were left to bear the brunt of an ever- 
increasing Jewish element. For every Jewish boy and 
girl had to marry and produce a numerous progeny. 
Such was the Talmudic law. Unpermitted to hold lands 
and thus incapacitated for husbandry, the Jewish masses 
filled the towns and settlements, managing to eke out a 

* The history of Polish politics during the past three decades does not enter 
within the scope of this book. In the author's opinion, based on long residence 
in Poland, it should afford convincing evidence of the utter failure of Assimi- 
lation or any other solution of the Jewish problem except Zionism, i.e., the 
restoration of Jewish nationhood, the Jewish masses in Russia will follow their 
Rabbis, who, on religious grounds, are favorably disposed towards Zionism. 



56 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

miserable existence, living under the menace of pogroms^ 
which exploited Gentiles were ready to perpetrate when- 
ever the police gave the signal. 

That the enforcement of the Pale system would lead 
to abuses was to be expected. Jews could not own land 
or reside outside specified settlements, even within the 
Pale. The police were able to levy blackmail for all 
kinds of real or alleged infractions of this rule. Wealthier 
Jews could always evade it by means of bribery. Without 
this source of income the police could not, indeed, have 
made ends meet. Their pay and allowances were ludi- 
crously insuflficient. But with the help of the Jewish 
revenue they accumulated comfortable fortunes. Thus 
the police had an interest in the Jews so long as the Pale 
was maintained, and tolerated or prompted pogroms only 
when the okhrana judged them to be necessary. We 
shall see how this system of corruption gradually affected 
the whole Empire. 

In addition to his propensity for the accumulation 
of riches, the Jew living within the Pale was incited 
thereto by the degrading position of his impecunious co- 
religionary. The poorest peasant lived like a prince in 
comparison with the average Jew. A piece of herring, 
an onion, and a crust of bread formed the Jew's diet. 
Dirt, squalor, and privation were his destined portion. 
Besides, the pogroms affected rich and poor alike. Was it 
surprising that the Jew strove to escape from the Pale by 
fair means or foul, and that to him the lands east of the 
Dnieper seemed j like a Canaan, a land flowing with milk 
and honey, where he might wax rich and live secure? 
But how could the moneyless Jew hope to reach it? The 
struggle to gain affluence was naturally intense. Only 
the craftiest and least scrupulous could hope to raise 
their heads above the seething mass of Jewish pauperdom. 

Amongst this suffering multitude the devil of class- 
hatred raised a fearsome harvest. The teachings of 



THE JEWS 57 

Karl Marx were here decocted in their quintessence and 
spread by migrants from the Pale into more favored lands 
— ^into the heart of Russia, into England and far America. 

The rich and the poor among the Jews were bound 
together by ties of rehgion and charity. The wealthier 
Israelites gave of their abundance to the less fortunate 
ones of their faith. But this bond was not a compre- 
hensive one. Certain important elements repudiated it 
by severing all ties with Jewry. For apostasy was one 
of the manifold evils arising out of Jewish disabilities. 
The poorer Jew could also break open the door of his 
prison by passing stringent academic tests. Then he 
went into the cities, an isolated, needy adventurer, losing 
his faith, dominated by a thirst for vengeance, seeing in 
the most violent political creeds and methods an appeal 
to redress the wrongs of his people, and ready to implicate 
the bourgeois Jew and the Gentile in his feelings of class 
and political hatred. 

Through the schools the Jew sought to satisfy his 
desire for freedom rather than an inclination for learning. 
University degrees gave certain rights and privileges, 
including the right to travel or reside anywhere in Russia. 
Every Jewish boy strove to enter a university. For this 
purpose he had to matriculate through a high school. 
The proportion of Jews admissible had to be limited, how- 
ever, or they would have swamped the "gymnasia" 
within the Pale. Only the very cleverest Jewish boys 
could gain access to the State schools and eventually 
enter the university. And the proportion of Jewish 
undergraduates was also restricted. It represented more 
than double the ratio of the Jewish to the Gentile popula- 
tion, but this did not satisfy Jewish appetites. Handi- 
capped, the Jews yet managed to exceed the norm at the 
close of their studies, because they were more persistent 
and could endure greater privations than the poorest 
Russian student. An outcry was raised when the Min- 



58 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

istry of Education insisted on refusing further admittance 
to Jewish undergraduates until the proportions had been 
readjusted. 

Attempts to safeguard the Russians from Jewish 
encroachment became more pronounced and desperate 
as the tide of Hebrew invasion rose higher, and — I may 
add — as outcasts from Jewry developed revolutionary 
tendencies. The Jews were slowly but surely pervading 
all the lucrative professions: the Bar and medicine ^ 
and to a lesser degree art and literature. They had 
small inclination for science or engineering. Commissions 
in the Army and Navy were barred to them. Commerce 
and industry could not appeal to the impecunious Jew. 
These lucrative branches were reserved for wealthy 
Hebrews, who, by payment of a certain Guild tax (amount- 
ing to about $500 per annum), could reside everywhere. 
In banking and industries the Jews became all-pervasive, 
as in the Press. They were confidants of Grand Dukes. 
The bureaucracy tried to restrain their irresistible sway 
by introducing senseless restrictions. For instance, a Jew 
could not be freely elected to boards of companies. 

Numerous methods of evading the law of residence 
arose. Dentists' and chemists' assistants and certain 
artificers were granted partial exemptions. These callings 
were glutted with Jews. "Colleges" sprung up which 
did a profitable trade in "diplomas." The police readily 
winked at irregularities for a consideration. Petrograd 
was full of Jews who had no legal right of residence. 
They lived in suburban districts on payment of a "private 
tax" to the police, who watched over their interests 
paternally, and were disposed to molest only those Jews 
who had a right to reside there. 

It becomes clear that the purpose for which the Pale 
and all the other anti-Jewish restrictions had been devised 
was mistaken and mischievous. It defeated itself. It 

* They had almost monopolized them by the time the Revolution broke out. 



THE JEWS 59 

led to the penetration of Russia by Hebrew elements 
of the most aggressive kind which had severed themselves 
from Jewry — had become pseudo-Jews — while it left the 
Jewish masses to suffer in congestion and misery. The 
purpose was one of self-preservation, yet it was mis- 
represented in the eyes of the world by the Jews plausibly 
enough, for motives that are easily comprehensible. 

No instigation was necessary to provoke pogroms. 
They would have occurred oftener if the police had not 
interfered. The Little Russian, Lithuanian or Pohsh 
peasants wrecked Jewish shops whenever Jewish "ex- 
ploitation" assumed intensive forms. A similar phe- 
nomenon had been observed in Austria-Hungary,^ and 
its recurrence in Russia since the Revolution puts an 
end to the fiction that the police alone were responsible. 
Indeed, the frequency of ^pogroms during 1917 was all 
the more remarkable because Revolutionary Russia was 
disposed to champion the Jews as a race that had been 
oppressed by the Old Regime. 

Another point must be explained before I leave the 
Jewish question. When the Russian armies entered 
Poland at the beginning of the war many regiments 
from other parts of the Empire knew little or nothing 
about the Jews. The soldiers had a religious prejudice 
against them and also a certain contempt, because the 
Jews systematically evaded service in the ranks. Here 
they found enormous populations of Jews who were 
obsequious and omniscient. Jewish "factors" supplied 
them with anything for money, even drink. To ingratiate 
themselves with oflScers and men they would tell them 
— ^long anticipating oflScial knowledge — of promotions 
and of impending transfers of units. As the Germans 
displayed by means of derisive placards hoisted over the 
trenches a similar knowledge of military secrets, the idea 
gained ground that the Jews were spying in the interests 

iH. Wickham Steed, "The Hapsburg Monarchy." 



60 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

of Germany. "Telephone" wires discovered around 
Jewish houses confirmed this suspicion. It is interesting 
to note that the Jews had a habit of "wiring" their 
compounds in order to evade some of the Talmudic laws 
of ritual and other observances. This simple explana- 
tion accounts for many of the cruelties to which Jews 
were unjustly subjected. Let me add that to my knowl- 
edge Jewish soldiers of the right sort performed many 
gallant deeds — worthy of their remote ancestors, the 
Maccabeans. 



CHAPTER VIII 

CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 

The Ordeal of Wax — Dearth in the Cities — ^Disease and Desertion among the 
Troops — ^The Government Suspected of Treachery — Silence about the 
Allies — No more Volunteers — The Drink Evil Revives — Dearness of 
Living — What had Become of the Food? — M. Guchkov and the Grand 
Dukes — Plans for a Palace Revolution — Grand Duke's Letter — Revolt 
of the Nobles — Last Warnings — The Zemstvos — M. Rodzianko and the 
Duma — Demands for Responsible Government — ^Arrest of Labor Members 
— In Moscow — Protopopov's Confidence. 

In Petrograd, early in 1917, everybody felt that a 
revolution was impending, and that, sooner or later, it 
would break out unless some radical change was intro- 
duced in the system of government. The old system 
had been thoroughly discredited by the sad experience of 
the war — that searching test of a nation's fitness and 
efficiency. The Russians were a long-suffering people, 
but continuous evidence of blundering and lack of organ- 
ization, reverses in the field, corruption and abuse of 
power on the part of the Government, which the Duma 
pitilessly exposed, lamentable default of co-ordination 
between the civilian departments and the Army, the 
unnecessary mobilization of many millions of peasant 
farmers affecting the production of food, the breakdown 
of the transport services provoking scarcity of bread in 
the cities — all these disheartening symptoms had slowly 
but surely diminished the ardor of the people. Russia 
was not so much war- weary as discouraged by the blind 
or wilful stupidity of her rulers, who were acting like 
tools of German influence and ambitions. Superadded 
to this unhappy situation was the tragic discredit in 

61 



62 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

which the autocracy had been involved by the Razputin 
scandal, coupled with a diminished prestige of the Church. 

As the queues at the bakeries and provision shops 
lengthened, the prospect of revolution grew nearer. It 
was sad for the people to wait in their hundreds and 
thousands for a small ration of coarse bread. The rich 
had to hire extra servants, who did nothing but stand 
in line at various shops to obtain the simple necessaries 
of life. For the poor clerk's family it involved great 
hardship. The working classes were receiving high wages, 
but the women and children had to spend most of their 
time in the queues. Waiting the whole day and a good 
part of the night was trying enough, but standing outside 
in the bitter winter cold caused suffering that would have 
tried the temper and exhausted the patience of the 
hardiest. Co-operative food stores were started by the 
mills, banks, and ministries, by journalists, lawyers, 
doctors, and other professional men. They were quickly 
overrun with demands. People tried to obtain food from 
the villages, where it was to be had in abundance. But 
the Government had enacted that no food should be 
transported from one province to another without special 
permission. This had been done ostensibly in order to 
prevent speculation. It failed entirely of its purpose. 
The sack of flour or potatoes consigned to a private 
individual was impounded by "zealous" oflScials and 
appropriated to their own use. At the same time huge 
transactions were being carried on by the banks in flour 
and sugar. With the help of bribery they could defy 
all regulations and "buy" railway cars, reducing thereby 
the already insufficient supply of rolling-stock. 

Meat had become extremely scarce. The countless 
herds raised on the steppes of southern and southeastern 
Russia had been used up wastefully to supply the needs 
of the Army. Two-thirds of the live stock consigned to 
the Front died on the way. And larger numbers had 



CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 63 

to be sent in order to provide copious meat rations for 
the men in the trenches. The soldiers were being well 
fed — much better than they had ever fared in the villages, 
where, indeed, they lived chiefly on bread, cabbage, and 
hdsha (a porridge made of buckwheat). The cry was 
"All for the Army," and the soldiers were not stinted. 
But this soon brought about a meat crisis. The peasants 
and farmers naturally took advantage of the situation to 
slaughter their calves rather than raise cattle that would 
be requisitioned. An interdict was placed upon the 
maAeting of veal, but it could not be enforced, owing 
to the great demand for meat. Then the farmers devoted 
all their attention to fattening pigs. It became more 
profitable to use cereals as food for pigs. So the supply of 
bread grew dearer and more difficult. 

Meanwhile the troops could no longer be fed in the 
old lavish way. Meat and even bread rations had to be 
cut down. Formerly the soldiers received 3 lb. of rye 
bread and \ lb. of meat daily. They could not eat all 
the bread, and used to sell the remainder to peasants, 
who fed the pigs with it. On the eve of the Revolution 
they were receiving 2 lb. of bread a day and a smaller 
ration of meat twice a week; on other days they received 
salt herring. 1 This diet induced much tribulation in the 
trenches. Men suffered from thirst, and used up the 
timbering for fuel to boil tea. (Methylated spirits could 
not be served out for this purpose, because the men would 
consume them in the liquid or in the solid state.) During 
the winter of 1916-17 scurvy was very prevalent at the 
Front. Desertion began to occur. Many companies 
were reduced by these causes to one-third of their normal 
strength. 

The huge agglomerations of reserve troops in the towns 
and cities were not much better off. Tobacc© and sugar 

*In 1917 the Army and the reserve troops required 1,000,000 tons of 
meat. 



64 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

all had in fair abundance, and the men could eke out 
their rations with food purchased outside. But soldiers' 
pay amounted to 90 kopeks per month (less than 50 cents 
at pre-war rates of exchange). They got a little money 
from the villages occasionally. In some respects they 
were worse off than the men at the Front, because presents 
of food and comforts were sent to the active regiments 
by the towns and provinces ^whose names they bore, 
whereas the reserve troops had no territorial designations. 

In Petrograd and in the larger cities conditions were 
somewhat better, but soldiers who had been in my service 
often came to me to complain that they were underfed. 
Suspicion prevailed in the minds of all the men, both at 
the Front and in the Rear, that their food was being 
tampered with by unscrupulous officials. The wildest 
stories of profiteering received ready credence. Even the 
hardships endured by their civilian fellow-citizens did 
not convince them that there was a real shortage of 
food in the towns and cities, easily explicable by the 
disorganization of railway transport. They heard of 
vast speculations by functionaries and merchants, or 
bankers; they could see for themselves that money was 
being spent extravagantly by civilians and officers, 
never had there been so many luxurious motor-cars 
about the streets of Petrograd, and they concluded that 
the "famine" was being "arranged" by speculators for 
selfish purposes, or by pro-Germans in order to provoke 
a revolution: they felt that in either case the people were 
being betrayed and that Russia was doomed to defeat. 

Little or nothing was known about the Allies. The 
Staff and the Government had not done much to remove 
this ignorance, and, in this respect, the cryptic influence 
of the German element in the military and civil adminis- 
trations and in a large section of the Press had asserted 
itself with persistent disregard of the Allied cause. I 
must add that the Press was long shorn of information 



CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 65 

regarding the achievements of its own Army. Narrow- 
minded conceptions of the war correspondent's true 
mission, prevailing at Headquarters, deprived the public 
of an asset of incalculable importance — of a daily, living, 
human bond of union between the people and the soldiers. 
As General Alexeiev aptly defined it to me in a conver- 
sation dating back to the end of 1915: "They have 
converted the Army int'- an anonymous entity, void of 
human face or form." I had just then been on a visit to 
the Front, and had told thousands of the men what I 
knew about the Allies. It was a revelation to them — 
and, I may add, to their officers. Generals who were 
real Russians, in name and in heart, asked me to visit 
the British Army and French A]*mies. They realized 
how important it was that the soldiers should hear more 
about their comrades in the West. At the same time. 
General Alexeiev urged the Tsar to break down the wall 
of silence around his armies. A party of Russian writers 
soon afterwards visited England and France under my 
charge. 

Much good work was subsequently accomplished. 
Officers heard enough about the Allies to discount any 
too obvious insinuations against them which pro-German 
partisans were always ready to produce. (An insidious 
campaign had been directed against the Allies after the 
Russian retreat in 1915.) But the soldiers in the trenches, 
constantly replacing heavy casualties in the ranks, still 
remained ignorant of what was really going on. They 
still imagined that the bulk of the enemy's forces were in 
front of them, and there was no end of the war in sight. 
Pro-German agents did their best to perpetuate this belief. 

The officers had also become discouraged. It seemed 
to them that the Government was deliberately trying to 
quench popular enthusiasm from the outset of the war. 
All the well-born youth of Russia — and many a poor 
peasant— had volunteered in the early days. Then, 



66 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

gradually, the spirit of the nation, reflected in its purest 
elements, its young men, had been quenched. We all 
noticed the change, and we knew the cause. The disas- 
trous retreat of 1915 had much to do with it, but it was 
mainly due to a consciousness of the incapacity of the 
Government and of the prevalence of German influences. 
Volunteers diminished, and finally ceased. The young 
men had to be conscripted. Enormous numbers evaded 
active service; a majority joined their regiments after 
a brief preparatory training. But theirs was not a whole- 
hearted service. The morale of the Army suffered accord- 
ingly. 

Discouragement also led to laxity among Staff officers. 
To the towns in which various staffs were quartered soon 
came wives and families. There they could be sure of 
obtaining food. Officers who would not allow their 
domestic arrangements to interfere with their duties at 
the Front took the alternative course of sending flour 
and sugar home. Thus the railways were engaged in 
carrying food to the Front and of transporting it back 
to the Rear. 

In the Navy everything was quite different; the men 
suffered very little from the war, either in casualties or 
in comforts. Discipline was severe, for the officers as 
well as for the men. Seldom was a naval uniform to be 
seen in Petrograd. But the long winter anchorage in 
the Baltic, and particularly the influence of depot life in 
Kronstadt, reacted badly upon the seamen. Later these 
conditions were destined to afford a rich soil for revolu- 
tionary propaganda, with disastrous consequences to the 
Navy and to Russia. 

Side by side with the growing dearth of food in Petro- 
grad, Moscow, and other cities, the drink evil had been 
gradually reasserting its sway. In the cities the sale of 
methylated spirit was strictly regulated; vodka, of course, 
could not be obtained. But by subterfuges the common 



CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 67 

people managed to procure intoxicants. Methylated 
spirit, varnish, eau-de-cologne, various "laiock-out" drops 
dispensed by the chemists, were all severally or col- 
lectively impressed into the secret drink service. The 
first-named method was the cheapest, although the most 
deadly. It led to an extraordinary increase in the con- 
sumption of cranberry waters. The breweries had had to 
close down because beer was also forbidden. Some of 
them began to make cranberry kvass. It was soon dis- 
covered that a judicious admixture thereof with methyl- 
ated spirits removed the unpleasant odor and partially 
neutralized the poison. Small grocers waxed rich on the 
sale of kvass. 

Another cause of widespread discontent was the 
increasing dearness of all the necessaries of life. On 
the eve of the Revolution they had risen fivefold, and 
more. Rye bread cost 17 kopeks (8c.) a pound, instead 
of 2 kopeks (Ic); potatoes 80 kopeks (40c.) instead of 
8 kopeks (4c.). Tea was at 3 roubles ($1.50), or three 
times its usual price; bacon-fat at 3 roubles 50 kopeks 
($1.75), or six times higher. Sugar could be obtained in 
small quantities at double the former figure, although it 
was produced in huge quantities within the country. 
The cost of heating had risen tenfold. Wood was almost 
unprocurable. The stoppage of imported coal had di- 
verted wood fuel to the mills. The working-men drew 
four and five times their former wages, and did not feel 
the pinch. But the numerous class of employees in 
private and Government oflSces suffered terribly. There 
were cases of women smothering their children rather 
than see them die of starvation. 

To such a pass had the country been brought by an 
incompetent Government. For three years no cereals 
had been exported, no bacon, no butter, no eggs, no sugar; 
yet these staples of life had provided the bulk of Russia's 
huge export trade without prejudice to home consump- 



68 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

tion. What had become of all the food? It was not 
forthcoming in sufificient quantities in the towns and in the 
armies. Naturally enough, the people could feel no 
confidence in the ability of the Government to assure a 
proper distribution. In Germany the people were also 
starving, but they were convinced that their Government 
was not to blame — England, of course, being the chief 
culprit. In Russia the blame could not possibly be 
diverted outside. 

Signs of the coming storm had been read correctly by 
many and many Russians. But for reasons which have 
been fully explained, no remedy could be applied. The 
okhrana, the German intrigue, Razputin and the Empress, 
encompassed the Tsar. The majority of his kinsmen 
understood, but could not make him give heed. One of 
Russia's prominent men tried to organize a Palace revolu- 
tion in order to prevent the coming revolt of the people 
and of the Army. This was M. Guchkov, a leading citi- 
zen of Moscow, brother of the mayor of that city and 
founder of the Octobrist (a Moderate Constitutional) 
party. He had been President of the Duma. The Tsar 
took a dislike to him on account of his blunt, straight- 
forward speeches. He had publicly insisted that the 
Grand Dukes should resign their high offices in the Army 
and Navy, and as chairman of the Defense Committee in 
the Duma had displayed too close an interest in military 
affairs. He had sided with General Polivanov, then As- 
sistant War Minister, against General Sukhomlinov, and 
had exposed Colonel Miasoiedov, who had been commis- 
sioned by the Minister (Sukhomlinov) to spy on officers, 
and was afterwards proved to be a spy himself in the pay 
of Germany. Probably the Tsar was influenced by the 
Razputin clique to get rid of M. Guchkov. Anyhow, the 
latter had to resign from the Presidency of the Duma, 
and afterwards lost his seat as deputy. M. Guchkov had 
no faith in Nicholas II, and still less in the Court, but 



CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 69 

he thought he might induce the Grand Dukes to join in 
a combined movement either to compel the Emperor to 
give way or to dethrone him. 

During the autumn of 1916 M. Guchkov attended a 
number of secret conclaves in one of the palaces in Petro- 
grad, at which the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess 
Cyril and other members of the Imperial family were 
present. No agreement could be reached, however, and 
M. Guchkov's plan failed. He had tried to improve 
matters by appealing to General Alexeiev. His letters 
were intercepted and misconstrued. This correspondence 
led to .a temporary coolness between the Tsar and his 
Chief of Staff. General Alexeiev, although a man of an 
iron constitution, fell seriously ill as a result of the anx- 
ieties and worry caused by the political situation, and 
was replaced temporarily by General Gurko. 

The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, relegated to 
the Viceroyalty and Command-in-Chief of the Caucasus, 
had achieved a brilliant victory in Asia Minor, capturing 
Erzerum and driving the Turks south and westward, 
which did not serve to diminish his unpopularity at Court. 
Razputin was unrelenting. The Tsar's most intimate 
friend. Count Orlov, had left him to join the Grand Duke. 
This was an additional grievance. Later, when young 
Dmitry Pavlovich was banished to the Persian Front, for 
the "removal" of Razputin, strict orders were given that 
Dmitry should on no account visit Tiflis or meet his 
kinsman of the Caucasus. The Grand Duke's opposition 
to the Court was a matter of notoriety. He did not 
scruple to make his feelings known to the Tsar, and had 
he been nearer to Petrograd he would have acted still 
more energetically. 

His cousin, the burly historian, Nicholas Mikhailovich, 
took up the cudgels. He sought the Emperor and told 
him very plainly what dangers he was incurring by his 
subservience to the Empress and the Razputin gang. 



70 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

But he (the Grand Duke) was much more perturbed than 
the Tsar. During the conversation the Grand Duke 
forgot to keep his cigarette ahght, and the Tsar politely 
struck matches for him. At length, thinking he had 
gone too far in his outspoken indictment of Alexandra, 
the visitor said: "Now call your Cossacks. It is easy 
to kill me. I shall be buried in the garden, and nobody 
will be the wiser." The Tsar merely smiled and thanked 
him. A few days later he wrote him a note "imploring" 
him to go to his estates. Before his departure the Grand 
Duke addressed a letter to the Tsar, which deserves to 
be cited in full. He wrote: 

You have frequently proclaimed your will to continue the war to a vic- 
torious end. Are you sure that the present condition of the country permits 
this? Are you well enough acquainted v\^ith affairs within the Empire, par- 
ticularly in Siberia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus? Do you hear the whole 
truth, or is much concealed? Where is the root of the evil? Let me explain 
it in a few words. 

So long as your manner of choosing Ministers was known only in narrow 
circles, things could muddle along; but when it became a matter of public 
knowledge, and all classes in Russia talked about it, it was senseless to attempt 
to continue to govern Russia in this fashion. Often did you tell me of your 
concern for the country; that you could put faith in no one, and that you were 
being deceived. 

If this is so, then it applies particularly to your wife, who loves you and yet 
led you into error, being surrounded by evil-minded intimates. You believe 
in Alexandra Feodorovna. That is natural. But the words she utters are the 
product of skilful machinations, not of truth. If you are powerless to liberate 
her from these influences, then at all events, be on your guard against the con- 
stant and systematic influence of intriguers, who are using your wife as their 
instrument. If your persuasions are unavailing — and I am sure you have 
repeatedly tried to combat these influences — try other methods to rid yourself 
of them once and for all. 

Your first impulse and decision are always remarkably true and to the point. 
But as soon as other influences supervene, you begin to waver, and your ultimate 
decisions are not the same. If you could remove the persistent interference of 
dark forces in all matters, the regeneration of Russia would instantly be 
advanced, and you would regain the confidence of the enormous majority of 
your subjects, which you have forfeited. Everything will then go smoothly. 
You will find people who, under changed conditions, will agree to work under 
your personal direction. 

When the time comes — and it is not far distant — you can yourself proclaim 



CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 71 

from the throne the gift of the desired responsibility of Ministers to yourself 
and to the legislative institutions. That will come about simply of itself, 
without pressure from outside, not like the memorable enactment of October 
30, 1905. 

I long hesitated to tell you the whole truth, but decided to do so after I 
had been convinced by your mother and sisters that it must be done. 

You are on the eve of new troubles — I say more; on the eve of attempts on 
your life. 

Believe me, if I thus press your own emancipation from the shackles that 
bind you, I do so- not from personal motives — I have none, as you and Her 
Majesty well know — but only in the hope of saving you, your Throne and our 
dear country from dire and irreparable consequences. 

The Grand Duchess Victoria (wife of the Grand Duke 
Cyril) went to the Empress, and, on bended knees, im- 
plored her to desist from dangerous courses. Alexandra 
repulsed her with fury. (She had never forgiven her 
for separating from and divorcing the Grand Duke of 
Hesse, her brother.) "How dare you speak to me about 
politics! You and the others can only chatter and play 
bridge, while I have been concerned about the affairs 
of Russia for twenty-two years!" she exclaimed. The 
luckless visitor had to leave Petrograd, and went to stay 
with her sister, the Queen of Rumania. Next, a lady of 
the Court, Princess Vasilchikova, addressed an outspoken 
epistle to Alexandra about Razputin. For this she was 
exiled, together with her husband, to their estates. 

The unfortunate Empress-Mother had retired some 
time previously to Kiev and the Crimea. She had never 
approved of her daughter-in-law'g behavior, and recently 
their relations had become very strained. Had all the 
Imperial family acted in unison, they might have suc- 
ceeded in averting a catastrophe. 

Two events of commanding importance occurred about 
this time. The Nobles' Congress, an ultra-Conservative 
body, passed a resolution in favor of immediate political 
reforms and Responsible Government. In the Council of 
Empire a similar resolution was also adopted. The 
respective presidents were severely censured. M. Golu- 



72 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

bev, who had presided in the Upper House, was summarily 
dismissed. Never had such a revolt been anticipated 
by the Court clique. Instructions immediately went to 
the subsidized "Black Hundred" organizations, and 
telegrams denouncing the Nobles and the Council were 
promptly forthcoming, which somewhat cheered the 
Court. However, a memorandum, signed by seventeen 
leading statesmen, came to hand warning the Emperor, 
without result. 

The British Ambassador saw the Emperor in Decem- 
ber for the third time since the summer of 1916, and told 
him, without the slightest reserve, that he was gravely 
imperiling his Throne. There was only one way out of 
the food crisis, he urged, and that was to entrust the 
whole business of supply to the Zemstvos (County Coun- 
cils) and other public bodies, so that the people should 
regain some measure of confidence. Now the Zemstvos 
had been doing splendid work at the Front in Red Cross 
and other auxiliary relief services. They had shown their 
ability, under the able direction of Prince Lvov, to 
organize and handle such business. Nicholas H listened 
without wincing, and thanked the Ambassador. It was 
all quite true, of course, but nothing came of it. The 
Empress insisted that no concessions should be made. 
To give the Zemstvos such power would convert Russia 
into a Constitutional Monarchy before they knew where 
they were. And then good-bye to the autocracy. The 
"saint" did not approve, so there was an end of it. More- 
over, her own lust of power inclined the scales against 
any compromise. So the Emperor remained at Head- 
quarters. The "saint's" death steeled the opposition of 
the Court. 

President Rodzianko, acting as spokesman of the 
Duma, came to Headquarters at the end of January with 
a last despairing appeal. A tried and faithful supporter 
of the Throne, he poured out his fears and misgivings. 



CONDITIONS OF UPHEAVAL 73 

Members had visited their constituencies and returned 
with a clear and categorical demand for Responsible 
Government. The country would not wait any longer. 
Periculum in mora. Vague promises were made to him, 
but it was urged that reforms must wait till the war was 
over. A few Ministers might be changed. Stiirmer was 
replaced by M. Pokrovsky, a colorless financier. Pro- 
topopov remained. And Razputin's influence survived 
in the person of Pitirim, the new Metropolitan of Petro- 
grad. 

In an Imperial Rescript (January 20th) the Tsar 
directed his Premier, Prince Golitsyn, to devote special 
care to the food and transport questions, and to work in 
harmony with the Duma and the Zemstvos. These gen- 
eralities, meaningless in themselves, kept hope alive. 

The Duma was to reassemble at the end of February. 
On the 12th, Protopopov arrested twelve Labor members 
of the Industrial War Committee, an organization which 
had long previously been started by M. Guchkov to 
promote munition work. As usual in proceedings against 
the working class, they were accused of conspiracy to 
set up a Social-Democratic Republic. There were prob- 
ably excellent grounds for the accusation this time, as 
we shall see, but nothing had ostensibly occurred that 
could lend color to it, and, in any case, the arrest of 
these men was likely to promote the movement that they 
were accused of fomenting. The crazy Minister imagined 
that by this measure he had precluded further trouble. 
Nevertheless, great anxiety was felt at the okhrana head- 
quarters. Rumors of trouble when the Duma met cir- 
culated everywhere. However, nothing happened. And 
people still "hoped." 

Some days later I visited Moscow. Conditions there 
were much the same as in Petrograd. Strikes were con- 
stantly occurring. The queues extended down every 
street. People were perishing with cold and hunger. 



74 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

Everybody foresaw trouble, but few thought it was so 
near. We all hoped, even then, that the Emperor would 
give way, and all Russia, even then was ready to "bless 
him and to forgive and forget the sad past." On return- 
ing to Petrograd I learned that things were again critical. 
The Emperor had been to Tsarskoe. Protopopov reas- 
sured him. He had reorganized the police in such a 
fashion that they would stiffen the wavering loyalty of 
the garrison. He had posted machine-guns on roofs, in 
garrets, and near basement windows, so that his men, 
knowing little about machine-guns, would nevertheless be 
able to sweep all the main squares and thoroughfares. 
The Emperor returned to Headquarters, almost tran- 
quilized. 

As a matter of fact, Protopopov and the Empress 
wanted an outburst, fondly believing that they could 
nip incipient revolution in the bud by summarily crush- 
ing disorders in the capital. 



CHAPTER IX 

REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 

Earlier Revolutionary Movements — ^The Decembrists — Influence of Literary 
Men — The Emancipation — Origin of Socialist Groups — ^The Assassination 
of Alexander II — Reaction — ^Role of the Zemstvos — Growth of Industries 
— Labor Um'est — ^The First "Soviet" — ^Workmen and Peasants in the 
Duma — ^The "Cadets" and "Expropriation" — Stolypui and Agrarian 
Reform — ^Kokovtsov's Administration — No more Famines — Unexampled 
Prosperity — Spread of Education — Progress of Siberia — The Co-operative 
Movement— The "Thu-d Element." 

Revolutionary forces had long been struggling for 
expression under the autocratic regime. They manifested 
themselves at the dawn of the nineteenth century in the 
conspiracy of young officers who had imbibed Liberal 
ideas while serving in the Napoleonic wars, and had borne 
the brunt of national disaster and humiliation during 
the Conqueror's march to Moscow in 1812. Attracted 
and inspired by the noble ideals of the French Revolution, 
they had been correspondingly incensed by the obscu- 
rantism, corruption, and inefficiency of their Government 
at home. But the people were too ignorant to understand 
them. When Volkonsky and the other Decembrists haled 
their men to the Square in front of the Senate and Holy 
Synod buildings, under the shadow of St. Isaac's Cathe- 
dral, with the rallying cry of " Constitution," these be- 
nighted followers imagined they were cheering for their 
"New Empress," the wife of the Grand Duke Constantine 
(Konstantin — Konstitutsia). Falconet's equestrian statue 
of the Great Peter witnessed a short and decisive combat 
between the Decembrists and the supporters of the 
autocracy. Unbeknown to the conspirators, Constan- 

75 



76 SLAVDOM, THE TATAKS, AND AUTOCRACY 

tine, the liberal-minded, then Viceroy at Warsaw, had 
renounced his right of succeeding Alexander I on marry- 
ing a Polish lady, whose name, of course, had nothing 
to do with " Constitution." Nicholas I had no difficulty 
in asserting his claims to the autocracy. The noble 
ringleaders of a premature movement were ruthlessly 
executed or deported to Siberia. 

For half a century no serious movement against the 
ills of autocracy could assume form. The voice of an 
enslaved people remained inarticulate. Only Russian 
"intellectuals," recruited from the gentry, could make 
themselves heard, but they did so at the risk of having 
to seek refuge abroad or suffer grievous penalties at home. 
Hertzen and Bakunin the forerunners of Russian Social- 
ism, Pushkin the Russian Byron, Dostoievsky the novelist 
of Despair, Turgeniev the advocate of Emancipation — 
all felt the heavy hand of the autocrat and of the okhrana. 
But while Hertzen indited abusive epistles to the despot 
from London or Paris, while Pushkin satirized the Court 
(just as Gogol, the inimitable Little Russian genius, 
had castigated the old-fashioned bureaucracy and the 
police, and, later, Chekhov in his caustic tales admon- 
ished the middle class), while Dostoievsky sensitized the 
minds of his readers by tear-stained records of suffering, 
insanity, and revolt, Turgeniev prepared and heralded 
the great reforms of Alexander II's reign. In " The 
Memoirs of a Sportsman " Turgeniev sounded the 
death-knell of serfdom. Count Leo Tolstoy, the author 
of many remarkable novels, gave promise of continuing 
the traditions of Turgeniev, but in later years devoted 
himself to politico-philosophical writings that served, 
like those of J. J. Rousseau, to provide a literary inspira- 
tion for revolutionaries. 

The okhrana had not yet attained the fatal power it 
afterwards exercised. Alexander II took to heart the 
lessons of the Crimean War and laid the foundations of 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 77 

Representative Government. With the enthusiastic sup- 
port of the highest and best elements in his country, and 
the help of its best brains, he freed the serfs and en- 
dowed them with land, preservuig the commune until 
the land redemption dues should be paid off. He then 
created the Zemstvos, admitting the peasants to a large 
share in local government thus introduced, so that when 
the time came for " crowning the edifice " by the institu- 
tion of a Parliament all classes should have had some 
experience in public affairs. But he seems to have been 
frightened by what he had done under the influence of 
Miliutin and other high-minded statesmen, and for a 
whole decade reverted to despotism. W^e know that he 
again relented, and that almost on the eve of his assas- 
sination (March, 1881) he signed, and his son endorsed, 
a Constitution. 

Meanwhile, revolutionary ferment was working. The 
Government had to deal with a new and, to them, dis- 
concerting element. Students of both sexes — the girls 
wearing short hair and spectacles — ^formed the rank and 
(file of a dismal revolutionary battalion. They were the 
" Nihilists." For them there was no God, no Tsar, no 
law, no country, no family ties. Sprung from the under- 
world of poverty and ignorance, uprooted, unclassed, and 
unsexed, they gloried in trampling underfoot all that 
was sacred to their elders. 

Pohtical groups, successively formed under the ban- 
ners of " Land and Freedom " and " The People's V^ill," 
had been trying to stir up the masses. They meant 
well, but, like the Socialists in 1917, they were childlike 
in their ignorance of political realities and in their hopes 
of attaining a social millennium. Finding no encourage- 
ment among the peasants or among the workmen — then 
few and scattered — they turned to assassination as a 
panacea for political ills. 

The murder of Alexander II, perpetrated by political 



78 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

enthusiasts to " avenge the execution of revolutionary 
partisans " — with, perhaps, the tacit connivance of re- 
trograde elements that could not forgive him his great 
reforms, turned the whole current of Russian political 
life. The conscience of the masses, who adored him as 
their Liberator, was inexpressibly shocked and outraged. 
For many a year to come the emissaries of *' The People's 
Will" (Narodovoltsy) appealed to deaf ears, and Reaction 
enjoyed undisputed sway. One by one the great reforms 
were truncated, education and emigration placed under 
a ban. The cauldron of discontent seethed ominously. 
Terrorism increased. 

i Perhaps Alexander II had waited too long before 
signing his still-born Constitution. (The advocates of 
delay found a plausible argument in the disinclination 
of the peasants to take an interest in other than purely 
village affairs.) On the other hand, perhaps had he 
not signed it his life might have been saved. But cer- 
tainly the enlightened minority of his subjects took the 
former view. Finding their hopes of internal political 
development were not likely to be fulfilled in the near 
future, they turned their attention abroad. This attitude 
stimulated the Slavophil (miscalled the Pan-Slav) move- 
ment. The names of leading public men like Katkov 
(the famous editor of the Moscow Gazette) and of literary 
celebrities of this epoch — ^Aksakov, Homiakov, and others 
— thus came to be associated with the salvation of the 
Balkan Slavs. Soldiers like Kireiev volunteered their 
services. Many generous-hearted Russians enrolled them- 
selves under the Slav banner. Their heroism and seK- 
sacrifice aroused popular interest in the ensuing war with 
Turkey in 1877-8, undertaken partly with a view to 
stilling the impatience of the Russians for constitutional 
reform. Successful in its purpose of freeing the Serbs 
and Bulgars, the war had, however, failed in its internal 
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REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 79 

and bungling on the part of the Government that a 
change was felt to be ail the more urgent. And two 
years later under the famous "Dictatorship of the 
Heart," wielded by Loris-Melikov, the Constitution was 
signed secretly, only a few days before the Tsar's mangled 
body reached the Winter Palace. Russia did not know 
till thirty years later of this tragic coincidence. The 
ensuing reaction comprised Slavophil as well as consti- 
tutional ideals. The administration of a Kaulbars at 
Sofia degraded the one, the omnipotence of a Pobed- 
nostev scoffed at the other. 

While the country was being stunted in its political 
development during the reign of Alexander III, that 
sovereign studiously avoided war and foreign complica- 
tions. He set his face against pro-German influences, 
and pointed to the larger interests of colonizing Siberia. 
So he is depicted by a sculptor of genius in the symbolic 
statue that faces the Nicholas railway station — a great 
burly man astride of a ponderous horse, curbing its 
restiveness as he contained his legions, and pointing 
eastwards. But the great political act of his reign, the 
Franco-Russian Alliance, involved far-reaching economic 
changes that were destined to bring new revolutionary 
elements int'^ play. 

The French money-market had become available for 
developing the enormous latent resources of the Empire. 
Witte used this credit with a free hand to promote rail- 
way-building, to introduce a gold currency, and to 
stimulate industry. But he wanted still more money, 
and for this purpose he devised the Spirit Monopoly, 
which pumped all the cash that the peasant used to spend 
in the village "pub" straight into the Treasury. Thus, 
while satisfying the peasant's craving for liquor, the 
Monopoly impoverished the countryside. However, the 
gradual cessation of periodical famines (after 1909), 
thanks partly to improved transport, partly to organiza- 



80 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

tion of local reserves of grain, and the gradual increase 
in industrial prosperity, averted agrarian disturbances. 
Moreover, the growth of industries afforded an outlet 
for wage-earners. The working class thereby grew vastly 
more numerous, and revolutionary schemers devoted 
their attention to this favorable soil. 

Yet another revolutionary force was to come from the 
Zemstvos. These bodies had continued their discouraged 
labors under the guidance of public-spirited landowners 
belonging almost exclusively to the gentry. All the 
provinces of European Russia, excepting those of the 
western border, the Caucasus, and the extreme North, 
enjoyed the blessings of local government. But they 
were constantly encroached upon by the bureaucracy. 
The peasants alone dealt with the affairs of their com- 
munes iphshchiny) and parishes (volosti), cared less about 
provincial or district ^ concerns, and were willing to 
leave their management in the hands of the Zemstvo 
leaders. But they had a real grievance. The cost of 
the parochial and communal administrations had to be 
defrayed by the peasants, although other classes (mer- 
chants, nobles, etc.) had recourse to it. No remedy was, 
however, provided. The Government would not consider 
the extension of the Zemstvo system to the volosf, which 
would have eliminated this injustice, because the Old 
Regime sought in every way to restrict the Zemstvos, 
not daring, however, to abolish them outright. (The 
volost Zemstvo was introduced in August, 1917, when the 
Revolution was in progress.) 

The main cause of this attitude arose, as usual, in 
police requirements. The Zemstvo schools, hospitals, 
statistical and other services, had engendered an unrecog- 
nized class, composed of the people there employed, 
which came to be styled the " Third Element," because 

1 A district {uiezd) averaged 300,000 inhabitants. 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 81 

the Zemstvos were officially composed only of peasants 
and other property-owners (nobles, merchants, burgesses, 
etc.). These teachers, dressers, surveyors, and other 
employees played an important part in Zemstvo work. 
They were recruited almost exclusively from the poorer 
classes, men and women who had struggled to secure a 
secondary-school education, all more or less predisposed 
towards radical, and even revolutionary, doctrines. Even 
the higher branches of the Zemstvo services, the doctors 
for instance, were inclined in the same direction. W^as 
it surprising that they should he? Their daily work 
brought them into constant contact with evidences of 
bureaucratic misrule and the oppression exercised by the 
oJchrana, This Third Element afterwards provided^some 
of the cadres of revolutionary organization. 

It was to be expected that the okhrana would battle 
with the new danger in the old way, and that as the 
number of village schools multiplied the efforts to sterilize 
the influence of masters and mistresses would become more 
intense. Herein we have an explanation of the syste- 
matic opposition raised by the police to rural educa- 
tion. 

The old Narodovoltsy had failed in their attempts to 
enlist the peasant mass in a revolutionary movement. 
Their Socialist successors did not fare much better in the 
abortive revolution of 1905. But the Third Element 
went on with the work, less obtrusively, but ultimately 
with signal success. 

Meanwhile the working-men had become more adapt- 
able to revolution. As usual, strike movements had 
marked the growth and developments of industries. 
But labor organizations were unknown. There were 
artels or companies of workmen, bound together under 
an elected leader, who undertook contracts, but these 
primitive organizations had only an outside connection 
with the mills and factories. In the great textile districts 



82 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

gravitating around Moscow and Petrograd, and in the 
steel and iron works, coal mines, and oil fields of the 
South, many millions of men were massed together, and 
often suffering unnecessary hardships. Then there were 
the railway workers — a large and united force. So long 
as these men had tilled their fields the police did not 
interfere with them. In fact, the peasant did not feel 
the oppressive rule of the okhrana in his daily life. But 
as soon as he left the village he became an object of 
suspicion, particularly if he entered a mill. 

"Labor unrest " was precluded by the oJchrana in a 
very simple manner — no unions and no strikes were per- 
mitted. Factory inspectors, appointed to hear and settle 
grievances, were constantly torn between the repressive 
dictates of the okhrana and the impatient demands of 
the men. Still, as there was no resisting the men's 
tendency to "organize," and they were doing so in secret, 
the okhrana devised a plan whereby they fondly imagined 
the men would be "satisfied" and "the security of the 
State" assured. Thus arose the famous "Zubatovsh- 
china" (1903). Zubatov, an agent provocateur, was per- 
mitted to form workmen's associations in Moscow in 
order to keep an eye on the men. In Petrograd a similar 
mission was confided to Father Gapon. We know the 
tragic sequel of this experiment. 

Ninety years after the Decembrist uprising — a Nobles' 
movement — came the first semi-popular uprising, the 
Socialist revolt of 1905. It dominated and partly upset 
a Constitutional movement organized by the Zemstvo 
leaders. All the workmen struck, and the railways 
stopped running. The peasants indulged in excesses, 
but would not side with the strikers. A council of 
workmen's Deputies was formed in Petrograd, but no 
soldiers joined it. There was, however, a mutiny in the 
Black Sea fleet, due largely to the sad memories of 
Tsushima and Port Arthur. The repressions then applied 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 83 

were destined to find a terrible echo in the great Revolu- 
tion of 1917. Count Witte brought troops back from 
Manchuria, quenched the revolt, and at length wrested a 
Parliament of sorts from the unwilling hands of the 
autocrat (1905). 

Subsequent contests between Constitutional Reform 
and Reaction have already been dealt with in a previous 
chapter. The existence of the Duma disconcerted Revo- 
lution for a time. Terrorism had previously been in- 
creasing. Three Ministers — Bogolepov, Sipiagin, and 
Plehve — were murdered in rapid succession. The oJchrana 
got "into touch" with Terrorist organizations through 
Azev and other provocateurs, and hoped to control their 
energies. Many of the assassians were young Jews, who 
also figured in hundreds of murders of policemen and 
"expropriations" of banks, effected ostensibly to finance 
Revolution and to divert public attention from the main 
causes of political crime; a series of pogroms followed. 

Experience of revolutionary phenomena left its mark 
upon the bureaucracy. After the rude lesson of 1905 
much was done to alleviate the intolerable position of 
Russian Labor and to introduce agrarian reform. Com- 
pulsory insurance of workmen, employers' liability, 
hospital funds, reduction of hours, restriction of child 
labor, boards of conciliation — all received more or less 
attention. A separate Ministry of Commerce and Indus- 
try was created with a separate department dealing with 
"Labor questions." But the okhrana never gave it a 
fair chance. M. Liivinov-Falinsky, a young factory 
inspector who had been placed in charge of this service, 
repeatedly told me of the impediments that were being 
daily placed in his way. The workmen were entitled 
under the new law to elect delegates to the various boards. 
These delegates were always the most moderate and 
trustworthy representatives of their class. Yet the 
okhrana invariably had them arrested. Employers and 



84 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

employed were thus systematically deprived of a proper 
and responsible organization of labor. 

Among the peasants, revolutionary organization and 
propaganda made comparatively little headway. I re- 
member in 1905, during one of my frequent visits to 
the Zemstvo Congresses then assembling in Moscow to 
discuss constitutional reform, I was present at one of 
the first attempts to create a Peasant's Union. My 
venerable colleague, the late W. T. Stead, had come to 
Russia on a special mission. He had interceded success- 
fully with Governor-General Trepov for the release of 
M. Miliukov from the fortress,^ and had come to Moscow 
to address the Congress. A lady, who took great interest 
in politics, a Countess Borbinskaia, invited us to meet 
some peasants whom she was helping to form a party 
and union of their own. We went. It was a curious 
gathering. The real peasants said nothing, but an officer, 
who claimed rustic origin, talked much. His views 
became known later in the programs of Radical and 
Socialist parties: "All the land for the peasants." Our 
host, an old Etonian, apparently enjoyed the conversa- 
tion. He was a very large landowner. It amused him 
to hear his wife quite seriously endorse the doctrine of 
spoliation. Stead was so overcome by the eloquence of 
Mazurenko, the quasi-peasant, that he fell asleep. The 
heat of the room, the endless and fevered speech in Rus- 
sian, which he did not understand, poured forth too rapidly 
for interpreting, had been too much even for his iron 
constitution. How typical of present-day politics in 
Russia! The well-meaning dame, I think, only then 
realized that her plans might be misunderstood. But 
the "Union " was formed. It held two meetings. The 
police closed the second one, and arrested some of Mazu- 
renko's friends. 

* M. Miliukov had rashly attempted to address the factory hands in Pe- 
trograd. 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 85 

Later, in the first and in the second Dumas, elected 
on a very wide peasant suffrage, with an enormous con- 
tingent of rustics, we witnessed the same spectacle; many 
of the peasant Deputies kept aloof from parties, grouping 
themselves together, unresponsive to the bids offered 
from the Constitutional-Democratic (Cadet) benches and 
from the Sociahst camps. Many of these peasants had 
bought lands, and were frightened by the Cadet scheme 
and still more by the Socialist plan of land nationaliza- 
tion. M. Stolypin, the new Premier, aided by an able 
and energetic Minister of Agriculture, M. Krivoshein, 
introduced and carried out a gigantic measure to pro- 
mote small holdings — in other words, individual owner- 
ship. 

In the first and in the second Dumas good evidence 
was afforded to the Government of their exact position 
with the people, and had they listened attentively all 
might have been well. The Moderates and the Left 
were about equally divided, the Right was nowhere. 
Trepov wanted to summon a Cadet Ministry. But the 
Constitutional Democrats had, perhaps unadvisedly, 
espoused the agrarian program of Hertzenstein, a Jew- 
ish Deputy, providing for a restricted measure of com- 
pulsory expropriation in order to enlarge the peasants' 
holdings. Nobody could explain satisfactorily how the 
scheme was to be applied. It "looked attractive"; in 
reality it was specious, untimely, and needlessly compro- 
mising to its authors. It frightened all the propertied 
classes, and thereby indirectly stimulated reaction. 
Moreover, Hertzenstein had spoken in an unguarded 
moment (June, 1906) of the "illuminations of May," 
alluding to agrarian disorders which had notoriously 
been stimulated by Jewish agitators, "mounted on bi- 
cycles," and which he thought would frighten the Govern- 
ment into compliance. It did frighten them, but into 
resistance. Goremykin told the House that " compul- 



86 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

sory expropriation" would "under no circumstances be 
permitted." And when the Cadets wanted to issue an 
Appeal to the People against the Government, the Duma 
was dissolved. M. Miliukov and his followers thereupon 
issued the famous Vyborg Manifesto, summoning the 
people not to pay taxes. Practically all the best men in 
the party signed it, although many disapproved. It led 
to their trial, imprisonment, and disqualification. Their 
revolutionary acts seriously crippled the Cadets in the 
second Duma, although in 1917 they assured to them a 
leading part in the Revolutionary Government. Hert- 
zenstein was murdered by an emissary of the " Black 
^ Hundred" organization. 

The Duma afforded a useful outlet for pent-up griev- 
ances, but at the same time it focused and intensified 
revolutionary feeling. In drafting the election laws 
prominence had been given to the peasant representation, 
it being a bureaucratic axiom that the rural vote might 
be relied upon. The workmen also had a separate dele- 
gation. But the Socialist parties "boycotted" the first 
Duma, on the assumption that parliamentary methods 
would prejudice the Revolutionary cause. Hence the 
Labor Deputies then elected had only a casual connection 
with Socialist parties. The Socialists soon discovered 
their mistake, and in the second Duma (February, 1907) 
were exerting great influence under the guise of "Toilists." 
They, of course, had come to the Duma not to legislate, 
but to prepare a revolution. What they wanted was a 
Constituent Assembly, and eventually a Socialist Re- 
public. The ohhrana "discovered" the plot, and many of 
the conspirators were arrested and imprisoned. W^eak- 
ened in numbers and influence, the Cadets had lost all 
control over the House. Moderate parties like the Octo- 
brists — founded by M. Guchkov to support constitutional 
reform within the scope of the Tsar's Manifesto of 
October 30, 1905 — had been terrified by revolutionary 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 87 

excesses, and were inclined to support repressive meas- 
ures. 

Under these auspices M. Stolypin initiated his Pre- 
miership. His policy was based on ruthless repression 
of revolutionary and on the strengthening of conservative 
elements. In both directions he was handicapped by 
the okhrana, of which he was nominally chief. Repres- 
sion overran all limits, and in the end was destined to 
weary Stolypin's most ardent supporters, the Octobrists. 
Conservatism had been discredited by the creation of a 
so-called Monarchist party, commonly known as the 
"Black Hundred." Sycophants and scoundrels like 
Dubrovin, Glinka- Yanchevsky, and Bulatzel disgraced 
the cause for which they ostensibly worked. Yet the 
Tsar supported them with money and favors. The 
Black Hundred ruled the local police and directed pog- 
roms. Cadets and Socialists were included under one 
ban of political excommunication, and everything was 
done to favor the Reactionary minority. Stolypin knew 
the dangers he ran from Reactionary and Revolutionary 
sources. But he went on boldly with his scheme of 
agrarian reform, hoping to create a strong reliable peasant 
farmer class which should provide a safeguard against 
revolution. 

He did not scruple to change the electoral law in 
order to exclude undesirable elements from the Duma. 
This meant a coup d'etat The organic laws, as amended 
by the autocrat in 1906, expressly ordained that no change 
should be made in the law on elections without the con- 
sent of the Duma. But feeling at Court was then run- 
ning so high that Stolypin had to choose the lesser of two 
evils: either to abolish the Duma, or "amend" it. It 
had been assumed that the autocracy was "self -limited" 
by its own act. Exponents of the autocratic doctrine 
maintained, however, that the Tsar could always reassert 
his unlimited power and omnipotent will. Such was the 



88 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

explanation vouchsafed to his subjects when he arbitrarily 
enacted a new electoral law (June, 1907). 

A forceful, fearless man, Stolypin had faced single- 
handed a howling mob of agrarian rioters in Saratov 
while Governor of that province in 1905. Just as fear- 
lessly he entered upon his task of "saving Russia." 
Soon the Socialist ranks were dispersed. Revolutionary 
organizations disrupted and the leaders executed, de- 
ported, or driven to take refuge abroad. The lesser 
lights of Revolution adopted "neutral" or even "loyal" 
colors, and the work of agrarian reform proceeded without 
serious interruption. In the third and fourth Dumas, 
winnowed by electoral devices, very few Socialists gained 
entrance. Disqualification of "doubtful " persons was 
sweepingly applied by the police and local authorities. 
A few Socialists, who had not been too openly compro- 
mised by their antecedent activities, managed here and 
there to elude official watchfulness. Among them was 
young Kerensky. He passed as a Toilist from a small 
urban constituency.^ The Church had also exerted itself. 
Parish priests returned to previous Dumas had not been 
moderate or loyalist enough to please the Holy Synod. 
Now, the clerical interest had been alarmed by Socialist 
threats of confiscating Church lands. With the help of 
the new electoral law a large company of priests appeared 
in the Duma, voting solidly for the Government. 

But even with a subservient Duma little progress 
could be hoped for in reform legislation. The Lower 
House might pass an important Bill, only to encounter 
reactionary opposition in the Upper Chamber. Recourse 
had to be taken to emergency legislation under a clause 
that enabled the Government to enact urgent measures 
during a Parliamentary recess. In this manner the 
Agrarian Bills were carried into effect, and courts martial 

* He was selected quite casually by the opponents of Count Uvarov, who had 
represented the constituency (Volsk in Samara, Kerensky 's birthplace). 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 89 

instituted to try revolutionary offenses. It was a two- 
edged weapon, however. The Duma did not hke it, and 
revenged itself by amending or cutting down the measure 
when it came up for its subsequent legislative endorse- 
ment. In this manner also Stolypin extended the Zemstvo 
organization to the south-western provinces. Small- 
holdings were in disfavor with Socialists, Cadets, and 
Reactionaries alike, though for different reasons. The 
Stolypin Zemstvos discriminated against Polish land- 
owTiers in favor of Russian property-owners and Little 
Russian peasants. Intending to strengthen the bonds 
uniting the Ukraina with the Empire, he indirectly pro- 
moted rural unrest and separatism. 

Stolypin's life had been constantly in danger. The 
Revolutionaries blew up his summer residence on the 
Neva to avenge their comrades executed by order of 
courts martial, but he escaped, though one of his daughters 
was crippled. In Kiev, while attending a performance 
at the Grand Theater in September, 1911, he was fatally 
wounded by an agent of the oJckrana. A monument 
erected to him outside the theater was destroyed by the 
Revolutionaries four years later. 

The new Premier, M. (afterwards Count) Kokovtsov, 
had for eight years presided over the administration of 
Finances. He had never pursued a policy of repression, 
and he could not associate himself with the methods of 
the okhrana. But as revolution had been stamped out 
by his predecessor, he did not have to preoccupy himself 
with this unsavory task. He set his mind steadfastly 
to carry out economic reforms, to develop the agrarian 
policy of Stolypin and Krivoshein, and to provide money 
for education. His was a safe and statesmanlike admin- 
istration, and it should have met with greater support 
and encouragement. But the artificial Duma and the 
Reactionary Upper House were both dissatisfied. Revo- 
lution was secretly fermenting. Reaction had already its 



90 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

Razputin. Neither of them could, or would, accept a 
policy of gradual evolution. Discontent with the Premier 
assumed a concrete form in the Temperance movement. 
Peasants in the Duma and bishops (acting on Razputin's 
instigation) in the Council led the assault. The Tsar 
espoused the quarrel, and Kokovtsov resigned. 

Never had Russia enjoyed material prosperity com- 
parable with the decade of M. Kokovtsov's administra- 
tion. He had well earned his elevation to the dignity of 
a Count of the Russian Empire. What is more, he had 
enlisted the respect of all parties. Never had the Revolu- 
tionaries molested him, and later in the storm and stress 
of upheaval he was to be one of the few representatives 
of the Old Regime who did not suffer arrest or imprison- 
ment. 

Reaction had triumphed, and Goremykin succeeded to 
the Premiership. With the subsequent record of Raz- 
putinism we have become familiar. Under Goremykin 
Russia was destined, however, to engage in a world-war. 
The call of patriotism stilled all party passions. But 
blindness and incompetency in high places, aggravated 
by alien intrigue, were afterwards to lead to a foreseen 
disaster. The workmen, who had been periodically 
striking in protest against the interference of the okhrana 
in lawful Labor organization, and who on the eve of war 
were engaged in a strike fomented by German agitators 
with German money, instantly resumed their labors. 
Later they were to succumb to these and other influences. 
And the rustics, dismayed by endless drafts upon the man- 
hood of the villages without hope or prospect of victory, 
allowed themselves to be swept into the movement. 

Great changes had occurred in rural life during the 
previous decade, partly as a result of the Co-operative 
movement and partly because of the spread of education. 
The percentage of illiterate youths had fallen appreciably. 
In some provinces, notably on the Volga, every boy was 



REVOLUTION VERSUS EVOLUTION 91 

attending school suflSciently to acquire the rudiments of 
learning.^ I remember as far back as the winter of 1906, 
while staying near Yaroslav with a priest whom I had 
known when we were boys, learning from him that 
the peasants in his parish gave little heed to revolu- 
tionary questions, and were concerned only with one 
matter: how to introduce compulsory education. By 
their own efforts they anticipated the scholastic measures 
afterwards taken by the Government with the approval 
of the Duma. Moreover, the village youth were par- 
ticularly keen for technical instruction. Classes in 
farming, opened by the Government in agricultural 
districts, were packed to overflowing. 

Emigration to Siberia had changed the face of that 
vast region. Thousands of miles of the railway, and 
sometimes many hundreds of miles on either side, were 
dotted with settlements. The emigrants to Siberia had 
always been recruited from the most energetic and inde- 
pendent forces in the country, political and agricultural. 
Among them were peasant millionaires and huge Co- 
operatives. V^en Stolypin and Krivoshein made their 
colonial tour (in 1909) they were entertained by some of 
these " strong men." Stolypin had launched his famous 
challenge to the supporters of the commune in the Duma: 
"You want to foster the idleness of the Weak; I mean 
to stake my policy on the Strong!" Yet after his expe- 
riences in Siberia he said candidly: "The Siberian 
democracy requires careful watching: it may prove too 
strong." 

The Co-operative movement arose and flourished in 
Western Siberia. Dairy farmers associated themselves 
together, imported Danish experts, set up modern plants 

^ They formed the bulk of the Russian Army in 1914, which never wavered 
in its loyalty and patriotism. The older men, called to the colors later, were 
more ignorant and less reliable. Hence the success of Bolshevist propaganda 
in 1917. 



92 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

and machinery, and did a roaring business with the 
British market. Thence the movement spread westward 
into Russia. The Kokovtsov administration encouraged 
it; the okhrana, scenting danger from afar and fearing 
all organized labor, did its utmost to prevent its growth. 
One of the advocates of rural Co-operative Associations, 
M. Nicholas Chaikovsky,^ a well-known Russian revolu- 
tionary, was arrested on returning from exile in England 
and detained for some time in the Fortress of SS. Peter 
and Paul. The Co-operatives took up and developed the 
work that had been already initiated by Zemstvos organi- 
zations. The Zemstvos had suppKed the peasants and 
the numerous hustarny, or cottage industries, with raw 
material, and helped them to dispose of their produce. 

Thanks to the Zemstvo and the Co-operative organi- 
zations, Russia was in a position to deal with the huge 
problems of supply connected with the war. (It was the 
Government's fault that this invaluable machinery did 
not render its full measure of usefulness.) In themselves 
they were economical forces of the highest value. Placed 
in revolutionary hands they might become dangerous, 
and that they were so handled is beyond dispute. The 
Co-operatives and the Third Element were, indeed, the 
main channels through which revolutionary influences 
gained access to the peasantry, and afterwards brought 
them into temporary alliance with the Soviet. 

* He was at the head of the Local Government in Northern Russia in 1918. 



CHAPTER X 

REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 

Russian Socialism — ^Three Groups — ^Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolu- 
tionaries — Bolshevism and Maximalism — Terrorist Organization — ^The 
Doctrine of Murder — Lenin and Kerensky. 

Having surveyed the revolutionary terrain, we may 
now proceed to analyze the forces that were destined, by 
the logic of Despotism, to override the Moderate elements 
in the country and storm the citadel of State. We have 
seen how these forces looming in the background had 
sent forth skirmishers to capture all the positions that 
had been laboriously acquired by the Moderate forces: 
the Zemstvos, the Duma, and the Co-operatives. We 
have noted the pernicious influence of German intrigue 
and of pseudo-Jew vengefulness on the one hand and 
of pseudo-Conservatism on the other. Traversing the 
dark mazes of Court life, we have paused briefly to take 
stock of the progress made by the people. Nowhere 
did elements manifest themselves in strength, unity, and 
concord, suflicient to save the country from a sudden 
internal convulsion. 

Socialism, the mainspring of revolution, had assumed 
three concrete forms in Russia during the early part of 
the twentieth century. They were: the Labor Emanci- 
pation group, initiated by Plekhanov, Axelrod, and Vera 
Zasulich; the Social-Democratic party, organized with 
the help of a Russian, Vladimir Ulianov, alias Lenin, ^ 
Ilyin, etc. ; and the Socialist-Revolutionary party, formed 

^ See note at the end of this chapter. 
93 



94 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

under the auspices of Gerschuni, a pseudo-Jew, and 
E. K. Breshko-Breskovskaia, afterwards nicknamed 
"grandmother of the Russian Revolution." They were 
"outlaw" parties. Avowed membership in either of them 
entailed punishment. The organizations were secret, 
and the leaders directed affairs from the safe vantage of 
foreign countries, largely from Switzerland. Plekhanov 
also a Russian, had formerly been an associate of Lenin, 
but, unlike him, had grown moderate in his views, and 
his following was the least numerous. He dealt not in 
the excitement of murder, nor in the cupidity of "ex- 
propriation." Lenin was an early-Marxist. Himself of 
Russian birth, he owed his inspiration to Germany. 
Gerschuni was an enthusiast of terrorism. Their parties 
appealed respectively to the class prejudices and passions 
of the workmen and the peasants. 

Parallel with, but independently of the "out-law" 
factions, several groups of literary men figured as leaders 
of "advanced Liberalism." Mikhailovsky was the great- 
est of them. His death in 1903 was deplored by all the 
intelligentsia of Russia. Korolenko, a lesser light, strove 
like him, for the material welfare and happiness of the 
rural masses. They were, so to speak, the enlightened 
and moderate equivalents of the Socialist-Revolutionary 
party. M. Peter Struhwe devoted himself, on the other 
hand, to economic questions more closely concerned with 
Labor. Using a Russian definition, he was a "literary 
Marxist" in his earlier career. 

But this "intellectual" Socialism, like the disembodied 
anarchism of Kropotkin, did not appeal to university 
undergraduates, who had formed the readiest and most 
daring supporters of revolution up to and during the 
abortive movement of 1905. During that period of 
unrest the university and technical colleges in Petrograd 
were hotbeds of revolutionary propaganda — a fact which 
led to repressive measures against them, the abolition of 



REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 95 

Students' Clubs, and discrimination against Jewish under- 
graduates, who had been particularly prominent in 
revolutionary agitation. 

The moderate Russian Socialism of the Plekhanov 
school was side-tracked by the pseudo-Jewish element, 
and all the force of revolutionary activity found its out- 
let under the respective flags of industrial Social-Democ- 
racy and rural Socialist-Revolution, each formed, led, and 
developed mainly by pseudo-Jews. But each of these 
two revolutionary parties underwent considerable changes, 
as we shall see. 

Social-Democracy in Russia followed very much in 
the footsteps of its German protagonist. The teachings 
of Karl Marx formed its Alpha and Omega. It held 
forth the purely academic argument that sooner or later 
Labor must devour Capitalism. The Russian Social- 
Democrats divided on the question of method. Lenin 
represented the extreme tendency which insisted on 
activist propaganda, immediate and sanguinary conflicts, 
without quarter to or compromise with the bourgeoisie. 
The matter was broached at a secret congress held abroad 
(some dozen years ago in Stockholm). A majority sided 
with Lenin, whence the name of Bolshevist, or "major" 
group, thenceforth designated his followers. The Men- 
shevist or "lesser" group contented itself with the Marxian 
theory,! leaving the development of class warfare and the 
promised division of capitalist spoils to the process of 
time. This circumspect strategy was "justified" by 
the ruthless methods of the okhrana and by all the force 
and energy that Stolypin displayed in his campaign 
against the hidden forces of Revolution. The working 
classes had been sorely tried by the stern lessons of 1905 

* Lenin adopted the extreme methods advocated by K. Marx in his early 
days; the Menshevists preferred the later and far more moderate "system" 
that Marx himself had found to be necessary. Present-day German SociaHsm 
contains no element corresponding with the Bolsheviki. 



96 SLAVDOM, THE TARTARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

and subsequent years; and as a "burnt child fears the 
fire," they scented in all appeals to wolence the hidden 
hand of the agent provocateur. 

So for many years the Menshevist program pre- 
vailed, and, belying their name, the Bolsheviki were really 
in a minority. The Social-Democrats returned by Labor 
at ensuing elections were almost invariably Mensheviki. 
Their leaders in the Duma, Chkheidze and Tseretelli 
(both Georgians), were also the recognized chieftains of 
the Menshevist group. Lenin and his chief supporters — 
Bronstein-Trotsky, and others, nearly all pseudo-Jews — 
hid themselves abroad, biding their time. But they 
succeeded in imposing a certain Malinovsky upon the 
Moscow workmen, who returned him as their Deputy. 
During the Revolution it became known that Malinovsky 
had been in the pay of the okhrana. 

With the Socialist-Revolutionaries (political suc- 
cessors of the Narodovoltsy, or "People's Will party") 
matters assumed a somewhat different course. They 
were not Marxists. They were "rural " as well as "indus- 
trial" Socialists. Their motto read: "Land and freedom 
for all the toiling people. By strife shall they attain their 
rights." It offered a much broader program than that 
of the Social-Democrats. It embraced rustic and mill- 
hand within its scope, but it was intended chiefly for the 
land-hungry peasant, and appealed more especially to the 
increasing contingent of parasitic villagers who, through 
idleness and drink, had lost the capacity of bettering 
themselves,^ or of emigrating to the free and fertile lands 
of Siberia. But no political party, revolutionary or 
constitutional, can hope to endure if it fails to show cause 
for its existence — a truism that had disheartened the 
Russian Radical party, the Constitutional-Democrats or 
Cadets. (Rendered desperate by reaction, they flung 

* This parasitic element attained the huge proportion of 15 per cent of the 
total village population (in 1914). 



REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 97 

themselves headlong into demagogue appeals to the 
populace in 1906, unheeding the very patent argument 
that on this slippery path they were bound to be outpaced 
by revolutionary parties. They even renamed them- 
selves "Party of the People's Freedom.") Constant fail- 
ures had affected the Social-Democrats in another man- 
ner, as we have seen, and had the Government not been 
dominated by okhrana methods, that failure might have 
been prolonged. The Socialist-Revolutionaries could not 
justify their motto, so, in revenge, they organized political 
assassination. For internal and tactical reasons they 
had grouped themselves into Minimalists and Maxi- 
malists. The former advocated the first half of the 
party program: "Land and freedom for all the toiling 
people." The Maximalists accepted it in its entirety, 
and proceeded to apply the behest contained in the second 
half: "By strife shall they attain their rights." The 
Socialist-Revolutionary members of the Duma figured as 
"Toihsts." Their leader was Alexander Fedorovich 
Kerensky, a young lawyer, whose hysterical speeches 
gave no promise of a great political career.^ 

I remember reading a very interesting document 
prepared by the okhrana in 1904, setting forth the origin 
and growth of what was called "The Fighting Organiza- 
tion of the Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalist Group." 
This was the specially selected volunteer corps that car- 
ried out political assassination. The demure and respect- 
able intellectuals in the MinimaKst camp were not sup- 
posed to know how these things were done. Such and 
such a Minister was "sentenced" by the Maximahsts, 
and the "Fighting Organization" had to "execute" him. 
Gerschuni was the guiding spirit of this league of murder, 

^The Minimalists had an "internationalist" wing that naturally inclined 
towards Bolshevism, which is inherently anti-national and based on "inter- 
nationalization" of the masses. Kerensky belonged — prior to the Revolution — 
to the internationalist wing of }as party. In 1915 and 1916 he carried on 
revolutionary propaganda with funds sent from Germany. 



98 SLAVDOM, THE TARTARS, AND AUTOCRACY 

and he prided himself upon the perfection and success 
of the "Organization." Minister after Minister fell. But 
Gerschuni was himself betrayed by another Jew, the 
famous Evno Azev, who had been co-director of assas- 
sination in the pay of the ohkrana. Plehve was killed 
in Petrograd by a bomb thrown at his carriage at the 
end of July, 1904; the Grand Duke Sergius was mur- 
dered in February, 1905. Then the "Organization" sus- 
pended further operations. It had been tracked and its 
members dispersed or executed. 

Curiously enough, the Revolutionaries had previously 
decided to "exempt" the Tsar. They were afraid of 
compromising themselves like their predecessors in 1881. 
An attempt had been made in 1887, on the anniversary 
of Alexander II's death, to assassinate his son and the 
whole Imperial family by blowing up their train. For 
that attempt, which failed miraculously, several Naro- 
dovoltsy were executed, including Lenin's elder brother. 

The Socialist-Revolutionaries were unable to practise 
assassination after the Grand Duke's murder in Moscow, 
being disrupted. But they attributed their reticence to 
another cause, viz., to their having succeeded in terri- 
fying the Tsar into making concessions and promises. 
This theory was unjustifiable and absurd. Never had 
assassination evoked "concessions" or "promises." On 
the contrary, it had, in every case, only intensified repres- 
sion. Moreover, the Socialist-Revolutionaries themselves 
boycotted the Duma, which shows clearly enough what 
they thought about the "concessions." 

In nearly every case the horrible work was imposed 
upon hapless youths, who fancied they were "saving 
their country," while the pseudo-Jewish organizers di- 
rected murder from afar. One enthusiast entered the 
okhrana office (in 1905) with bombs all over him, so that 
none dare approach him. Many "expropriations" were 
carried out by mere hooligans under Maximalist colors. 



REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES 90 

Within a few short years the Maximalists had acquired 
such a sanguinary reputation that their name was destined 
to be misappHed to quite another, although a kindred, 
group, the Social-Democrat Bolsheviki, who "came into 
their own" during the Revolution of 1917. By that time 
the distinction between Maximalist and Minimalist 
Socialist-Revolutionaries had ceased to have any prac- 
tical significance. All became — if they had not already 
become — Maximalists. But the Social-Democrats re- 
mained, as hitherto, divided into Bolsheviki and Men- 
sheviki, not so much on strictly tactical or Labor policy, 
as on the question of continuing the war — for which pur- 
pose a coalition with the bourgeoisie was indispensable — or 
of concluding a separate peace. Lenin ^ and his followers 

^ In experience as a revolutionary, Lenin was greatly superior to Kerensky. 
They both came originally from one Volga city, but while Kerensky was still an 
undergraduate, Lenin, seventeen years his senior, had already made a name for 
himself as a leader in the Socialist world. Each had been influenced by environ- 
ment and circumstances. Lenin was a youth when his brother perished on 
the scaffold (1887), and while Kerensky passed his early manhood among com- 
fortable surroundings at Tashkent — where his stepfather directed the local 
high school — Lenin traversed the thorny path of the revolutionary outlaw. 
In the nineties he had tasted the "sweets" of Siberia. Then after a spell 
"abroad," controverting Plekhanov in Switzerland, he had proclaimed the 
doctrine of Bolshevism at Stockholm (1903) and come to Petrograd to act as 
the guiding-spirit of the first Soviet (1905). At that time Kerensky was just 
beginning to "conspire." For ten weary years Lenin remained abroad, and 
when the war broke out was in Austria. He was first "arrested" as a Russian 
spy, then on the recommendation of an Austrian Socialist named Adler regainri 
his liberty and finally entered into relations with the enemy Governments. 
Lenin and one of his friends named loltuhowski were respectively commis- 
sioned by the Germans to foment a revolution in Russia and to start a separatist 
movement in Ukraina. Passage in a "sealed" car was provided for Lenin and 
his friends through Germany. 

The mentality of the two men who were destined to exercise a fateful influ- 
ence over the course of the Revolution deserves careful analysis. 

Lenin displayed the characteristically Russian proclivity for carrying "ideas" 
to the uttermost extreme of ratiocination. Fanatics of this stamp were not 
uncommon among the undergraduates in Russian universities. It was during 
his early university days that Vladimir Ulianov — ^his real name — began to 
devote himself to the study of Karl Marx, and it is symptomatic of his inborn 
predilection for extreme doctrines that he should have espoused the quasi- 



100 SLAVDOM, THE TATARS, AND AUTOCRACY 



» 



had espoused the *Mefeatist" doctrine and "no coaHtion. 
Like the other Socialists, they Wanted a "new earth," 
but sought it in the ruin of society. The autocracy was 
to be overthrown by a defeat of Russia's armies. This 
was really a confession of their wish and their unaided 
inability to force a revolution. At any rate, they per- 
petuated this doctrine after the disappearance of the 
autocracy under the guise of a "democratic" peace. 

Bolshevism of the early-Marxian revelation and steadfastly repudiated the 
far more moderate tendency of his master's later teachings. Perhaps in this 
choice he was dominated by feelings of bitterness and vengeance rankling 
within his mind, since the tragic and violent end of his elder brother. Unlike 
the great majority of Russian revolutionary undergraduates, Lenin remained 
a revolutionary in his mature years and grew more uncompromising with age. 
There is no doubt that he deliberately entered into an arrangement with his 
country's foes and used German money to propagate his doctrines. To a fanatic 
who repudiates nationality and nationhood, there was nothing derogatory in 
such a proceeding. To him all means were good, provided he could achieve his 
end. 

It was in the application of his ideas that Lenin stood apart from his country- 
men. He was un-Russian not so much in the tendency to unconscious paradox 
as in the persistency with which he developed and imposed his doctrines. And 
we find him constrained to rely on the aid of almost exclusively non-Russian 
elements. The majority of his principal associates were of the pseudo-Jew 
class — the hate-laden product of the Pale, V/ithout them and without the help 
of German agents, like Robert Grimm, and German gold conveyed through 
well-known banks in Petrograd, he could never have assured the ephemeral 
triumph of Bolshevism; without these adjuncts there would never have been a 
separate peace negotiated at Brest-Litovsk by two Jews, Bronstein-Trotsky 
and Joffe, in the name of Russia and signed by four other Jews in Berlin. ' 

Kerensky's was a totally different mentality. A highly strung, somewhat 
hysterical young man of Jewish descent, he reacted in 1917 to his new surround- 
ings, boasted that he would lead the Army into battle, and adopted the ways of 
an autocrat. But the greatness that was thrust upon him reached far above 
his mental and moral caliber. He was not a statesman by genius or experience. 
Well-intentioned enough, he found himself torn by a thousand conflicting cares 
and interests. The author recalls a pathetic narrative of Kerensky's conversa- 
tion with the ex-Tsar, when, as Minister of Justice, he paid one of his periodical 
visits to the captive at Tsarskoe Selo. They had a friendly smoke and chat. 
Kerensky began to unbosom himself regarding the burdens of State. He 
complained that it was all "so difficult and perplexing." Nicholas II sym- 
pathized: "I can assure you, Alexander Fedorovich, that I had the same trouble. 
But you will find, as time goes on, that it comes easier." 



PART II 

DEMOCRACY," ^'SOCIALISM," AND 
"FREEDOM" 



CHAPTER XI 

THE REVOLUTION 

Alarm Signals — Kerensky discloses Revolutionary Plans — A well-organized 
Movement — "Peaceful" Demonstrations — "No Bread" a Pretext — ^The 
Duma "Used" — A Diary of the Crucial Days — Protopopov's Gunners — 
Mutiny of the Guards — Preobrazhentsy support Rodzianko — Last Appeals 
to the Tsar — ^The Provisional Committee — Socialists show their Hand — 
The Soviet — Divided Authority — "Ideals" and "Loot." 

We have now passed in review all the principal ele- 
ments of the situation as it presented itself to the initiated 
observer of Russian affairs in March, 1917. K the reader 
has patiently followed the unraveling of this skein, he 
will be able to understand the causes and the conse- 
quences of the Revolution. He will be familiar with 
the character of the forces that were then let loose, and 
note without surprise the form and manner in which 
they were exerted. Above all he will bear in mind that 
the masses were largely illiterate and politically immature, 
that revolution had long been fermenting, that it had 
gained a whole army of adherents among soldiers and 
civilians, because the country had been engaged for two 
and a half years in a mismanaged and unsuccessful war. 
In short, revolutionary dreamers and demagogues were 
in a position to mislead an ignorant and irresponsible 

101 



102 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

"democracy," under the banners of miscalled "Social- 
ism" to a "freedom" that quickly resolved itself into 
anarchy. 

Some months before the Revolution I paid a short 
visit to the Front and visited the men of a regiment with 
whom I had previously been in action. The officers were 
as keen as ever, and delighted to see an English friend. 
The men appeared to be less cheerful than I had been 
accustomed to find them. On returning to Headquarters 
I was asked by a friend who held high office: "How 
did you find the men.^^" And when I looked at him 
questioningly, he added: "Were they in good spirits-f^" 
I answered that there had seemed to me to be a decline. 
"Ah!" was the brief but significant commentary. My 
friend had carefully perused the weekly reports sent by 
regimental commanders about the feeling among their 
troops and the military censor's reviews of soldiers' letters 
to their homes; it was important for him to hear the 
opinion of a disinterested outsider. The gloomier tone 
of these communications — then unknown to me — was 
thus confirmed by my impressions. The causes of this 
change will be fully explained. I allude to this incident 
because it serves to emphasize the significance of a certain 
decline in morale among the troops at the Front some 
little time before the Revolution broke out. 

Only a few days before the outbreak I went to Moscow 
to attend the jubilee of a great Russian publisher, Ivan 
Dmitrievich Sytin, who began life as a peasant-boy 
hawking pictures and tracts in the villages and had built 
up one of the greatest printing and publishing houses in 
the world, with a million-circulation newspaper, the 
Russhoe Slovo, and many millions of popular publications 
to its credit. "All Moscow" was present at the celebra- 
tion. I was struck by the immense cheering that greeted 
my reference to British sympathy with Russia's progress 
"on the path of freedom," and painfully impressed by 



THE REVOLUTION 103 

the speeches of the workmen. Responding to M. Sytin's 
generous donations to bis employees, amounting to several 
hundreds of thousands of roubles, and the foundation of 
schools, hospitals, and other institutions for their especial 
benefit, the spokesman of the printing stajff bluntly said: 
"Ivan Dmitrievich, we do not thank you. We accept 
your offerings, and we have to say only this, that you 
should have made them long ago." It was a brutal 
and altogether un-Russian utterance. Everybody^under- 
stood that it had been prearranged "elsewhere," and 
that it was delivered "according to plan" for the benefit 
of the Socialist gallery in Petrograd. The impending 
outbreak of revolution was evidently suspected by, if 
not known to, the workmen. 

A speech delivered by M. Kerensky in the Duma 
explained the tone of the Moscow workmen. In the 
smother of subsequent events it was unheeded at the time, 
except by the okhrana, which wanted to arrest and im- 
peach him. Speaking two weeks before the outbreak in 
his usual hysterical and gesticulatory manner, the Social- 
ist-Revolutionary chieftain announced the approach of 
upheaval. "Its lightnings already illumine the horizon," 
he cried. It was an indiscreet utterance. It hinted 
all too clearly that he and his associates were organizing 
and fomenting the outbreak. 

The rest of his speech contained a precise indication 
of the program that had been decided upon by the 
Socialists in regard to the war: "We think that the 
man-power ^ and material resources of this country are 
exhausted, and that the time has come to prepare for 
a termination of the European conflict. It must be 
settled on a basis of self-definition of all nationalties. 

* This was a misleading statement. Russia's losses in men in the war were 
the smallest of any European Ally in proportion to population. See pp. 231 and 
234. Kerensky, moreover, betrayed a distinctly internationalistic tendency in 
this utterance. 



104 "DEMOCRACY/' "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

All Governments must forego to the same extent their 
Imperialistic aims." 

There was no room for misapprehension. The indi- 
cation of coming internal strife, the intention of the 
Revolutionaries to conclude peace, and the unwholesome 
allusion to the Allies afforded an epitome of the revolu- 
tionary plan. 

Having the workmen well in hand, counting upon 
disaffection among the troops in Petrograd and relying 
upon their sympathies among the Third Element (to 
which must be added the municipal employees) and the 
apathy of the villagers, the Socialists had decided to give 
battle with much greater forces than in 1905, and, in 
view of the discontent and unpreparedness of the Moder- 
ate elements, had all the chances of success. 

The Socialists waited merely for an opportunity to 
launch their attack. On February 27th, while Kerensky 
was making his speech in the Duma, "peaceful" Labor 
demonstrations began in the streets. The effect of these 
parades became apparent some days later. People 
waiting for bread and provisions grew more restive. On 
Wednesday, March 7th, an old woman indignantly broke 
a baker's window. Others followed her example. Some 
looting occiu'red. Cossack patrols appeared in the 
streets. But no collisions took place. The people re- 
mained quiet. Unrest was, however, visibly growing. 

Next day more bakeries were stormed, chiefly in the 
Vyborg quarter, where a large number of mills and fac- 
tories concentrated an almost exclusively working-class 
population. Huge crowds appeared in the streets. The 
workmen were invading the city. More Cossacks ap- 
peared on the scene. There was sporadic firing, appa- 
rently by workmen, but no serious conflicts. The 
Government evidently became much alarmed, for during 
the day General Habalov, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Garrison, explained that flour was arriving regularly and 



THE REVOLUTION 105 

being supplied to the bakers, and that there should he 
enough bread for everybody. Suspicion was thus cast 
upon the bakers, who were already in disfavor, and many 
of whom promptly closed up their businesses. 

Later in the day I read a notice in the newspaper win- 
dows in the Nevsky stating that the Government had 
decided to take urgent measures, that a conference with 
representatives of the Duma, the Zemstvos, and other 
public bodies would be convened on March 9th (the follow- 
ing day) and that everything would be done to settle the 
food crisis. Anything more fatuous could not be conceived. 
Here was a patent confession of laxity. Whom was it ex- 
pected to satisfy? The Socialists, who had already made 
up their minds for revolution, or the dissatisfied "man in 
the street," who did not want revolution, but pined for 
relief from. an incapable Government. However, "At last 
they are going to act. Let us hope it will not be too 
late! " Such was the tenor of comment in the Nevsky. 
I On the Friday morning the police tried to confine the 
workmen within their quarters, especially on the Vyborg 
side of the Neva, but they made long detours, crossed 
over the ice, and made their way into the Nevsky. A 
good deal of shopbreaking occurred in the outlying dis- 
tricts. The central portions of the city remained quiet. 
TraflSc became difficult, owing to the crowded state of 
the thoroughfares. Cossacks charged up and down the 
Nevsky without using sabers or knouts. The crowds 
cheered them. Very few policemen were visible. A few 
red flags appeared; on the other hand, loyal songs re- 
sounded. Besides the Revolutionaries there were many 
people in the streets who had no sympathy or connection 
with militant Socialism. 

In the Tauris Palace, Deputies talked long about the 
food crisis. M. Rittich, the Minister of Agriculture, 
argued fervently in defense of his own acts. He had 
been saddled with an impossible task. Such measures 



106 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM** 

as had been taken were not sufficiently supported by the 
people who were chiefly concerned. This was a direct hit 
at the Zemstvos and other public organizations. There was 
some truth in what he said. A certain amount of "pas- 
sive resistance" had been shown, with a view, probably, 
to force the Government to capitulate to the Zemstvos. 
But this was not the time to raise such questions. Every- 
body agreed that the situation had reached a critical point. 
And the hope of the Moderate parties lay in the meas- 
ures promised at the eleventh hour by the Government, 
with the concurrence of the Duma and the Zemstvos. 

On Saturday the crowds were more numerous than 
ever. Looting of bakeries continued. The workmen 
again came into the city, although armed resistance was 
shown by the police and the gendarmes. In order to 
safeguard the munition works from possible injury by 
strikers, the Government ventured to order out troops, 
who, up to this time, had been confined to their barracks. 
At one of the cartridge factories the strikers shot a young 
subaltern. His men did not retaliate. They had rela- 
tives amongst the strikers. In other cases the soldiers 
fired a few rounds. Most of the troops and the Cossacks 
were obviously disinclined to be rough with the people. 
It was becoming evident that the workmen acted under 
orders from a revolutionary organization. Nearly all of 
them were employed in the output of munitions or war 
supplies, and as such were in receipt of bread rations. 
They were consequently better off than the ordinary 
inhabitant, yet they were creating the greatest amount 
of disorder. Some policemen and gendarmes were killed 
in the mill districts. 

The Duma again discussed the food crisis. At the 
conference with the Government on the preceding night 
the fullest information had been obtained regarding the 
situation, and M. Nekrasov, a prominent Cadet Deputy 
from Siberia and an authority on railway matters, told 



THE REVOLUTION 107 

the House, of which he was Vice-President, that in his 
opinion there was good hope of solving the difficulty, 
which was mainly one of transport. He announced that 
the Government had agreed to hand over the whole busi- 
ness of food supply to the Zemstvos and municipalities. 
Here was a great and undoubted victory. The Govern- 
ment had always refused to make this concession, holding 
— and rightly so — that it would lead to further and larger 
measures of responsible administration. 

But nobody outside the Duma knew what had hap- 
pened. The papers did not appear on Sundays, and the 
effete Golitsyn Ministry took no steps to inform the public. 
Protopopov did not wish to trumpet his failure, for he 
had been the arch-opponent of the Zemstvo scheme, and 
perhaps he recognized the hopelessness of appeasing the 
Revolutionaries. 

Instead of taking the people Hpito their confidence and 
explaining the situation to them, the Government, feeling 
satisfied that enormous concessions had been made, de- 
cided to take "a strong line." On the Sunday morning, 
posters at all the street corners informed the inhabitants 
that all gatherings would be dispersed by force of arms. 
At once things assumed an ugly look. Up to this point the 
great majority of the civilians and soldiers, and even the 
workmen, had no idea that a revolution was inevitable, 
and actually in process of development. There had been 
a few people killed; more police than civilians. But 
when the soldiers appeared in the Nevsky with orders 
to fire on the crowd, some alarm arose. Nevertheless, 
it being a fine day, large numbers of people resorted to 
this popular promenade, undeterred by the stoppage of 
the tram service. 

Protopopov had succumbed to nervous prostration on 
the Saturday, and remained hidden in his official residence 
on the Fontanka Canal, flanked by the Police Department 
and the Gendarmerie. Thence he was in communication 



108 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

by telephone with the Empress at her residence in Tsar- 
skoe Selo, fifteen miles south of Petrograd, and the 
Empress could telephone by means of a special wire 
direct to the Tsar's Headquarters at Mogilev, some three 
hundred miles further south. 

There appears to be no foundation for the report that 
the Sovereigns were unable to obtain information about 
events in the Capital up to this stage. On the contrary, 
both knew what was going on, and they were quite pre- 
pared for an outbreak. They knew much more than 
the public in Petrograd or even the Duma (excepting the 
Socialists) could know about revolutionary plans and 
about the unreliability of the garrison, but they trusted 
in Protopopov's police, and never imagined that events 
would develop too rapidly to enable them to bring up 
reinforcements in time. What is more, they were quite 
aware of the use that the Revolutionaries intended to 
make of the Duma. 

Already the "peaceful" Labor demonstrations on 
February 27th, when the Duma opened, had indicated 
the revolutionary plan, and Kerensky's speech confirmed 
their suspicions. Prince Golitsyn had, therefore, been 
furnished with an undated ukaz of prorogation, which 
he could publish as soon as matters began to assume a 
critical form. Herein lies the explanation of what then 
appeared to be an incomprehensible measure. The Gov- 
ernment had given way to the Duma on Friday evening, 
yet on Sunday it decided to crush resistance and to close 
the Duma, realizing somewhat tardily that the Socialists 
meant to use the Duma as their rallying point and battle- 
cry. Either because "stern measures" had been decided 
upon or by some blunder,^ the bridges had not been closed 
that morning. So the crowds were very great. 

^ Protopopov and the Empress had agreed that a "local" disturbance should 
be encouraged in order that reprisals might be justified, they believed that 
immediate repression would "scotch" the revolution. 



THE REVOLUTION 109 

Platoons of guardsmen were posted along this thor- 
oughfare, extending two miles in a straight line from the 
Admiralty to the Nicholas railway station, and shortly 
before three o'clock they began to clear the street. But 
the crowds did not seem to mind. There was no rough- 
ness on either side. People moved away and cheered the 
soldiers. A company of the Pavlovsky Guards, drawn 
up at the corner of the Sadovaia, then opened fire up 
the Nevsky in the direction of the Anichkov Palace and 
the Fontanka, beyond which stood the Anglo-Russian 
Red Cross Hospital (Dmitri Palace). Some firing came 
also from the housetops, and one guardsman fell. 

Something like one hundred people were killed or 
wounded. Motor ambulances soon afterwards appeared 
on the spot and began removing the fallen. I saw hun- 
dreds of empty cartridge-cases littering the snow, which 
was deluged with blood. But the sharp lesson also failed 
to scare people away or even to provoke resentment 
against the troops. A woman shouted to them: "We 
are sorry for you, Pavlovtsy. You had to do your 
duty!" 

This company was marched to its barracks on the Field 
of Mars, near the British Embassy. The men had not 
had any food all day. When they were approaching 
their quarters they found another crowd barring the way. 
The officer ordered them to fire a volley. They did so. 
But the men aimed high, so that only a few people were 
wounded. Stopping to care for them, the company com- 
mander sent his men home, and at this moment was 
attacked and severely wounded by two men, apparently 
disguised, one as a student, the other as an officer. The 
assailants jumped into a sleigh and vanished, and at the 
same time shots rang out from the roofs and garrets of 
surrounding houses and from the adjoining Church of 
St. Saviour, erected on the site where Alexander II had 
been assassinated. 



no "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

And then followed the unexpected. As soon as the 
Pavlov tsy entered their barrack-yard, recriminations 
began among them. One of the men had recognized his 
own mother amid the slain. Another wanted to know who 
had fired from the housetops and killed one of their com- 
rades. "It is the police," was the unanimous verdict. 
"They are provoking bloodshed. They have betrayed 
us." Revolutionary sympathizers fed the flame. The 
whole company decided not to obey orders, but to 
side with the people. General Habalov was immediately 
informed of what was transpiring, and loyal troops were 
sent to surround the mutineers. But the latter had their 
rifles and ammunition, and it was decided not to resort 
to extreme measures. The company remained within its 
quarters. Some of the men ventured out and were 
arrested. On the following day this company was to be 
joined by others and to play a part in the rapid success 
of the Revolution. 

That Sunday afternoon Sir G. Buchanan returned from 
a few days' sojourn in Finland and heard the first news 
of trouble. Later, a number of our submarine reliefs 
came in from Archangel. The men could not understand 
what was happening in the city. 

More blood was spilt some hours later around the 
Nicholas station. Enormous crowds debouched from 
the Nevsky and Ligovskaia, surging around the great 
equestrian statue of Alexander III. The station square 
was an important strategical point guarding railway 
communications with Moscow, and down the Nevsky, 
with all the important Ministries. Here Protopopov had 
installed hundreds of machine guns and policemen on 
the surrounding houses. A commissary of police who 
was in charge of the men below found himself jostled. 
He spoke rudely to an officer who happened to be in the 
crowd. An altercation ensued. The officer drew his 
sword and cut down the policeman. Immediately the 



THE REVOLUTION 111 

crowd seized the body and tore it to pieces. Then the 
secreted maxims sent forth a stream of bullets. Firing 
resounded on all sides. Soldiers directed their rifles at 
the housetops. Cossacks joined in. It was a veritable 
pandemonium. Scores of people and soldiers were killed, 
hundreds wounded. This proved to be the most san- 
guinary episode in the Revolution. 

I had been an eye-witness of some acts in the Pavlovsky 
tragedy. I now tried to make my way to the Nicholas 
station. Firing could be heard in the Nevsky. Lines 
of soldiers were blazing away at each other, not knowing 
who was friend, who enemy. Later, I made another 
effort to pass. The street was quiet and deserted. Burly 
guardsmen held it from end to end with orders to let 
no one pass. The great thoroughfare was lit up by 
powerful searchlights from the Admiralty tower, street 
lamps having been smashed by the hail of bullets. It 
recalled the stormy days of 1905, when the whole city 
was plunged in darkness. Neither electric light nor 
water supply had been cut off, however. The Revolu- 
tionaries had learned a lesson then. 

The Government now began to feel some resentment 
at the delay in rendering them efficient counsel and 
assistance from Tsarskoe or Headquarters. On Sunday 
evening they almost decided to resign, but Beliaev ^ had 
received a brief message from the Tsar, ordering him "to 
hold on," and informing him that troops were coming 
and that General Ivanov had been sent as Dictator. 
Later it was rumored that Protopopov had been dis- 
missed and that the Tsar himself would arrive on Tuesday. 
As a result of the deliberations in the Duma on Saturday 
it had been decided to hasten an Emergency Food Bill, 
embodying the new scheme of Zemstvo organization 
to which the Government had agreed, and a Committee 
on this Bill was sitting at the Tauris Palace throughout 

* The War Minister. 



112 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Sunday. All the Deputies who could reach the Duma 
were also assembled there. They brought lurid accounts 
of all that had been happening throughout the day. The 
impression in the lobbies was one of intense excitement. 
The workmen refused to resume their duties until bread 
could be procured in abundance. There was evidence 
of a growing conflict between the police and the gar- 
rison. 

To add to this gloomy outlook, the Government was 
obviously indisposed to show confidence in the Duma. 
Voicing the feelings and anxieties of the Moderates in 
the House, President Rodzianko telegraphed an urgent 
and pressing appeal to the Tsar: 

Condition serious, anarchy in the Capital. Government paralyzed. Trans- 
port of food and provisions has entirely broken down. General discontent is 
growing. Disorderly firing is proceeding in the streets. Sections of troops 
are firing on one another. It is necessary to summon quickly persons enjoying 
the confidence of the country to form a new Government. Delay is impossible. 
Every delay is fatal. I pray God that a share of the responsibihty may not 
fall on the crowned head. 

Afterwards I learned from a friend at General Head- 
quarters that this message did not reach the Emperor. 
It was "intercepted" by the Palace Commandant, Gen- 
eral Voyeikov, who decided apparently that it was not 
worth while to bother the Tsar with fresh and impertinent 
demands for Hesponsible Government at a time when he 
was already much worried by events in Petrograd. To 
the courtier's mind Rodzianko, although a personage 
holding Court rank, was unconsciously lending himself 
to the designs of the Revolutionaries at a time when all 
loyal subjects should rally round the Throne. But the 
Tsar knew already that the situation was critical, although 
he did not realize how desperate it was. Anyhow, he 
could not answer the message, as he did not receive it. 
But all this was, of course, unknown to the Duma, and 
the Tsar's silence placed him in a bad light. Members 



THE REVOLUTION 



113 




114 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

decided to pass the night in the Tauris Palace against 
any emergency. So ended the first day of the Revolu- 
tion, properly speaking. 

On Monday morning Prince Golitsyn carried out the 
Government's decision to prorogue the Duma. It is said 
that he made a mistake in filling in the date of the Im- 
perial ukaz, and that it was marked March 11th instead of 
March 12th. It was placarded on the doors of the Palace, 
and there the Deputies found it in the early hours of 
Monday. It intimated briefly that the sessions of both 
Houses were prorogued for a month, "unless important 
circumstances should intervene." 

The impression produced thereby was one of stupor 
and indignation. How could the Government thus cut 
itself adrift from the accredited representatives of the 
people at a moment of intense popular crisis.^ It passed 
the wit of man to comprehend. Previous utterances in 
the House discrediting the Court confirmed the worse 
suspicions. M. Miliukov, the Cadet leader, had openly 
accused the Empress of promoting a separate peace 
with Germany. The Black Hundreds had urged that 
it was "better to compromise with the external foe 
rather than lose everything to the Revolutionaries." 

The persistent refusal of the Tsar to accede to demands 
for the summoning of a "Government enjoying the con- 
fidence of the country" — a demand that had been en- 
dorsed by the Upper House and even by the Nobles' 
Congress — lent color to other suspicions, that the Court 
party was seeking to provoke a revolution in order to 
have an excuse for concluding a separate peace. This 
suspicion had been so prevalent throughout Russia that 
repeatedly my Russian friends had asked me: "Is it 
true that there is a secret clause in Russia's agreement 
with the Entente Powers by which she resumes her free- 
dom of action in the event of internal troubles.'^" M. 
Miliukov called attention to the formidable military 



THE REVOLUTION 115 

preparations made by Protopopov. "We know now 
why he asked for $25,000,000 in January. It was to 
proclaim war on the people! " he cried. All these accumu- 
lated feelings of distrust, however unwarranted they 
might have been by the real facts of the situation, aroused 
resentment of the intensest kind and prompted immediate 
action. 

When the sun rose on these fateful events the Govern- 
ment still held most of the trump cards. Not a single 
regiment had mutinied yet, and the Old Regime had at 
its disposal enormous stores of arms and ammunition. 
It had the fortress and the arsenal, and commanded 
every important street and bridge with guns and maxims, 
and all the telegraphs and railways. The bridges were 
closed and the workmen cut off. But as the soldiers 
were "doubtful," Habalov lent himself to a "brilliant 
idea," emanating from the haK-crazed Minister; to dress 
up the police as soldiers. In that way the police would 
be safe from the crowd and from the troops. They 
would fire all right. And so everybody would be im- 
pressed by the "loyalty" of the garrison, and there would 
not be any risk of a scandalous refusal on the part of the 
soldiers to do their duty. Policemen were hurriedly 
supplied with brown-gray instead of black overcoats, 
and gray sheepskin headgear, cartridge holsters, and 
army rifles. It was difficult to distinguish them from 
ordinary infantrymen. They sallied forth in the mill 
districts and did much execution, especially on the 
Vyborg side. The rattle of musketry and machine guns 
resounded thence all through the morning. 

But Protopopov's ruse did not save the situation. (It 
was soon afterwards detected and led to wholesale exter- 
mination of the police.) The revolutionary spirit quickly 
spread among the units quartered around the Duma and 
on the Vyborg side. Here the 1st and 180th Reserve 
Regiments, largely recruited from the local population 



116 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

had already shown evidence of disaffection in November, 
1916. Some of them now joined their relations among 
the strikers. Armed parties captured the arsenal on the 
north side of the river, and having distributed rifles to 
the crowd, forced the Liteiny Bridge. There they easily 
took possession of the Artillery Department, looting it 
of stores and arms. 

Meanwhile the Guards battalions ^ in the Kirochnaia, 
a street leading from the Liteiny Prospect to the Tauris 
Gardens behind the Duma, had mutinied, one after 
another, amid scenes of the greatest atrocity. Some of 
the men in the Litovsky Guards (which with the Vol- 
hynsky regiment formed one of the two Guards Brigades 
previously stationed in Warsaw) had agreed during the 
night to mutiny and to murder their oflScers. At early 
morning parade they turned out as usual and lined up 
in the barrack-yard. Men who were not on duty mean- 
while took their rifles and ensconced themselves at the 
windows overlooking the parade ground. The oflScers 
came out, suspecting nothing. The CO. approached his 
company and greeted them with the customary "Good 
health, my lads!" Dead silence in the ranks. According 
to disciplinary usage the men should have answered, 
"We wish good health to Your Honor!" The CO. 
cried sharply, "Why don't you reply .f*" Then out of 
the ranks came several men with their rifles at the charge, 
and without a word spitted the CO. on their bayonets, 
lifting him high in the air. Instantly the men at the 
windows opened fire on the other ofiicers. Those whom 
they missed were hunted down and butchered. Very 
few escaped. One of the survivors told me this dreadful 
story afterwards. He had to hide for days before he 
could leave Petrograd, because the men searched every- 

^All the Guards units in Petrograd were Reserve Battalions numbering 
as much as 5000 men each. The regiments, thirteen in all, had been at the 
front since August. 1914. 



THE REVOLUTION 117 

where to find and kill the survivors. And this particular 
officer had been severely wounded at the Front. (It is 
said that the officers of this battahon were particularly 
strict with their men.) 

After satiating themselves with blood and slaughter, 
the Litovsky poured out into the street. There they 
heard that the Duma had been closed. Here was a con- 
venient means of justifying their crime. They had slain 
their "oppressors." It was all in defense of the people. 
Now they would rally round the Duma. "To the Duma! 
To the Duma!" they cried. The neighboring Volhyntsy 
and some Preobrazhentsy turned out of their barracks 
and joined the movement. And so a crazy mob of dis- 
banded guardsmen and civilians hurried to the Tauris 
Palace to defend the liberties of the people. 

Hearing nothing from Mogilev, the Deputies were 
somewhat disconcerted by the appearance of these "rein- 
forcements." They did not know their precise character 
nor the horrible circumstances under which they had 
originated, but it seemed quite clear that part of, and 
perhaps all, the garrison had gone over to the Revolution. 
So the sooner the Duma took action the better. They 
could not wait upon the pleasure of Nicholas II. Already, 
then, it was proposed to form a Provisional Government, 
and the Socialists talked about a Constituent Assembly. 
But President Rodzianko would not hear of it. He was 
a loyal subject of the Tsar, and he could not reconcile an 
act of open revolt with his feelings of loyalty. So he 
indited and dispatched a second and last message to 
Headquarters, telling Nicholas H: "The situation is 
becoming worse. Measures must be taken immediately, 
for to-morrow it may be too late. The last hour has 
arrived, when the fate of the country and the dynasty 
is being decided." (This telegram did reach its destina- 
tion, but the Emperor was already "acting" — troops 
had been sent from the Front — and was preparing to 



118 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

leave for Petrograd, so he did not reply.) As the Duma 
stood legally prorogued, no formal sitting could take place. 
The party leaders and other members met informally 
under the presidency of M. Rodzianko. For convenience' 
sake it was agreed that only the party leaders or "Elders" 
should deliberate. They represented the Progressive 
hloc and the Socialists. The Right would have no dealings 
with a Duma that had been prorogued by the Tsar, and 
all the members on that side withdrew. 

The duties of this Board of Elders were confined to one 
object: to get into touch with the Army and with the 
Nation. President Rodzianko held — and rightly too — 
that whatever happened they would not be justified in 
taking any decisions without the knowledge of the Army 
at the Front, and, if possible, of the country at large. 
But on the latter point the views of the Progressive 
element in the Duma were sufficient. He did not wish 
to be led astray by the clamor of the multitude outside, 
composed of soldiers and civilians who were obviously 
under the influence of passion. Generals Alexeiev, the 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikoiaievich, Ruzsky, and Brusilov 
were acquainted by telegraph with the messages to the 
Tsar, and asked to support them. 

All this did not suit the Socialist book. They had 
hoped for«something much more fiery. The Duma was 
to be their stepping-stone to power. They wanted to 
get on with the Revolution. So they resigned from the 
Board. However, a few hours afterwards they thought 
better of it. M. Kerensky urged them to relent for 
"tactical reasons." 

Events outside were proceeding with dramatic swift- 
ness. Army lorries had been requisitioned by the Revo- 
lutionaries. Filled with a motley crowd of soldiers, stu- 
dents, Red Cross nurses, and youngsters bestrung with 
bandoliers improvised out of machine-gun belts, they 
careered back and forth along the quays and thorough- 



THE REVOLUTION 119 

fares bristling with rifles and maxims. They visited out- 
lying barracks to stir up tardy units, and attempted to 
seize the telephone and telegraph offices. In this they 
did not then succeed. Elsewhere the victories of the rev- 
olutionary forces were rapid and decisive. Early in the 
morning the great Kresty prison on the Vyborg side had 
been captured and all the inmates, "politicals" and con- 
victs alike, set free. Among them were the Labor dele- 
gates to the War Industrial Committee, whose arrest a 
month previously had constituted one of Protopopov's 
measures to prevent a revolution, also Klirustalev-Nosar,^ 
President of the Council of Workmen's Delegates iii 1905. 
The La¥7 Courts (opposite the Artillery Department) 
and the adjoining prison were invaded and sacked. 
Among the prisoners here released was Stiirmer's fac- 
totum, Manasevich-Manuilov, whom Miliukov had de- 
scribed as one of the Razputin "camarilla." Manuilov 
was under trial for extortion. A wild-eyed soldier burst 
open his cell, crying out, "Are you for the Revolution?" 
"Anything you like," replied Manuilov, and quickly ap- 
praising the situation, he fled hatless and coatless into the 
cold. Unlike most of his fellow inmates, he was cap- 
tured later and exiled. Another captive Razputinite was 
the notorious Prince Andronikov, adventurer, informer, 
sycophant, who had frequently palmed himself off on 
unsuspecting foreigners as a "prominent" Russian. 

Escaped convicts set fire to the Courts in order to 
remove records of their crime. Former agents of the 
ohhrana sacked the Police Department to destroy evidence 
of their complicity. Enormous quantities of invaluable 
documents went to feed bonfires in the streets. All 
the notarial archives thus perished. Nobody in Petro- 
grad had any title-deeds to their houses or property. 

^ Nosar soon became a Commissary (Governor), and proceeded to intro- 
duce Bolshevist methods according to the plan of his former chief, Lenin. He 
was thought to be insane, and was "removed" by the Provisional Government. 



120 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

The Commandant's office was similarly ransacked in 
order to destroy the military service registers. 

Early in the afternoon the Fortress of SS. Peter and 
Paul, situated on an island opposite to the British Em- 
bassy, fell into the insurgents' hands after a short fusillade. 
The headquarters of the revolutionary forces was estab- 
lished here. With the guns of the fortress the insurgents 
could command the whole city. Within its walls were 
the tombs of the Romanovs, the mint, and the political 
prison. None of the edifices suffered. The prisoners 
were of course released.^ This acquisition practically 
settled the fate of the Government. 

Constant firing was to be heard on all sides. Civilian 
insurgents all had, or were procuring, arms, stopping 
officers and taking away their swords and revolvers. The 
soldiers were, however, fairly respectful to officers. 
Everybody was practising with rifles or pistols. 

No work was done that day at the munition and other 
factories. The men had been warned to report or be 
paid off. The Government still held the wires, the 
Admiralty, and most of the public offices. The censor- 
ship was working, but the newspapers had not appeared, 
because all printers and compositiors had struck. 

M. Shcheglovitov, the Reactionary President of the 
Upper House, had refused permission to the members to 
assemble informally after the ukaz of prorogation. He 
was apprehended and brought a prisoner to the Tauris 
Palace. Successively Archbishop Pitirim (the friend of 
Razputin), Stiirmer, Prefect Balk, General Kurlov (one 
of the okhrana chiefs), and a number of lesser lights of 
the Old Regime were conveyed thither, also many quite 
innocent persons. Everybody who wore a General's 

* Among them were some exceedingly dangerous German spies and a few 
mutineers of the Pavlovsky regiment. These had been sentenced to be shot 
on the following morning. Soon afterwards Protopopov, Stiirmer, Goremykin, 
etc., took their places and were subjected to all the rigors of their own regime. 



THE REVOLUTION 121 

uniform was regarded as a "suspect." The crowds 
brutally maltreated some unfortunate veterans. All these 
persons were indiscriminately subjected to insults by a 
jeering populace surrounding the Tauris Palace. Par- 
ticular joy burst forth at the appearance of any okhrana 
suspects or policemen, derisively nicknamed "Pharaohs" 
(Faraony). Regular hunts were proceeding in the gar- 
rets. Many policemen had been hurled from the roofs. 

At midnight a tired-looking old man struggled into 
the Duma. "I have come to give myself up," he mut- 
tered. " I am Protopopov, the ex-Minister of the Interior. 
Take me away. I want to serve my country. You 
shall hear ail I know." He collapsed on a sofa. It 
appeared he had sought refuge outside the city with a 
friend, the Tibetan "healer" Badmaiev, who was one 
of Razputin's intimates. But he could not rest. Con- 
science tormented him. He made his "confession" to 
Kerensky. It was an "old story." He had deserted 
his post, "resigned" it to Golitsyn, who himself announced 
his resignation some hours later to Rodzianko. An 
unknown General had been appointed Minister in Proto- 
popov's place. And while I was sitting in Rodzianko's 
study this "Minister" rang up to ask what he was to do. 

Meanwhile replies had come through the Duma tel- 
egraph office from several of the Army Chiefs, announcing 
that they on their side had remonstrated with the Tsar 
and were in sympathy with the Duma. Such was the 
tenor of messages from the Northern, Southwestern, and 
Caucasian Fronts. As the Tsar still maintained silence, 
and as the old Government showed no signs of existence, 
there was no longer any motive for further delay. Pres- 
ident Rodzianko's scruples and anxieties were overcome 
when he heard that a large contingent of the Preobra- 
zhensky Guards, with their officers, had come to the 
Duma ready to support a new Government. Discus- 
sion on this matter was actually in progress when a 



H2 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

summons came by telephone from tlie Marie Palace 
inviting Rodzianko to attend a meeting of the Council 
of Ministers. Guarded by soldiers lying along the mud- 
guards of his car with loaded rifles pointed ahead, the 
President of the Duma, who had become the idol and hope 
of the people, traversed the whole city safely, escaping 
the gusts of flying bullets. He had suspended the sitting 
of the Board to hear what news the Ministers had to give. 
He hoped to learn from them that the Tsar had sum- 
moned a Duma Government. He found all the Ministers 
assembled, and also the Grand Duke Michael, only 
brother of the Tsar. But they had no news. Then M. 
Rodzianko apprised them of the Duma's intentions. It 
was going to constitute a Provisional Government, as 
there seemed to be no other way of re-establishing order 
in the Capital, of saving the country from anarchy, and 
of enabling Russia to continue the war to a successful end. 

The majority of the Ministers signified their willingness 
to submit, and proposed that the Grand Duke Michael 
should become Regent. But General Beliaev declared 
that he could not thus violate his oath as a soldier, and 
that he would continue the struggle until he received 
contrary orders from the Tsar. M. Rodzianko returned 
to the Tauris Palace, and shortly afterwards it was 
unanimously resolved to elect a "Provisional Executive 
Committee" of twelve members, which should select a 
Provisional Government. At the same time orders were 
issued to arrest the members of the old Government; 
but when the emissaries of the Duma reached the Marie 
Palace the birds had flown. One old Minister, who 
had remained, hid himself under the table and was not 
detected. The others sought refuge in the Prefect's 
residence, opposite the Admiralty. 

That night the refugees cleared all the archives out 
of the Prefecture, transferred them across the Alexander 
Gardens to the Admiralty, and there sought sanctuary. 



THE REVOLUTION 123 

Here they were besieged on the following morning (Tues- 
day). Some reserve battalions from Novgorod had been 
brought in during the night. They formed the garrison. 
Beliaev had posted machine-guns, and even some field- 
guns in the building, and wanted to "hold out" till 
further reinforcements arrived. The freshly imported 
troops thought they were fighting the Germans — at least, 
so they were told — and were believed to be reliable. But 
the Revolutionaries announced that if the Admiralty 
did not surrender by three o'clock they would open fire 
from the fortress. Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of 
Marine, who, with the other Admiralty officials, resided 
in the building, was opposed to resistance. He pointed 
out that damage to the edifice might involve the loss of 
papers, plans, and technical appliances necessary for the 
conduct of naval operations. Beliaev reluctantly gave 
way, and himself, with Habalov and Balk, the Prefect, 
sought shelter in the Winter Palace. This he also wanted 
to "fortify," but was dissuaded from doing so on the 
ground that it would be easily wrecked by the fortress. 
He then disguised himself as a soldier and hid in the 
General Staff buildings opposite. 

I lived in the house adjoining the Prefecture,"and was 
able to follow all the stages of this closing act in the 
revolutionary conquest of Petrograd. 

Throughout Monday night armored cars, manned by 
the Revolutionaries, tried to capture the telephone ex- 
change in the Morskaia and the telegraph office in the 
Pochtamtskaia. The garret artillery raked them fore and 
aft, and when they attempted to cross the St. Isaac's 
Square they ran into a hot cross-fire, delivered from the 
roofs of the Marie Palace, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and the Cathedral of St. Isaac. The telephone office was 
guarded by a company of the Guards Rifles from Tsarskoe, 
who also held the Tsarskoe Selo (Vitebsk) and Nicholas 
railway stations, saving those buildings from utter destruc- 



lu " democracy;' "socialism," "freedom" 

tion by fire at the hands of the Revolutionaries, bent that 
night on preventing any fresh troops from entering the 
city. The Semenovsky and Izmailovsky Guards bat- 
talions quartered in this neighborhood remained stanch to 
the last. Mixed companies of the Guards had also held 
the Winter Palace throughout Monday. 

On visiting the telephone office at early dawn, ddring 
a momentary lull, I saw an armored car standing outside. 
The crew had carelessly opened the steel doors protecting 
the radiator, and a stream of machine-gun bullets had 
ripped it clean through; then, the fire becoming still more 
accurate, all the crew had been slain through the loopholes. 
The inside presented a tangled mass of human remains, 
blood, snow, and ammunition, all congealed by the sharp 
frost. The soldiers were chatting in the yard. Finally 
they went off hungry to Tsarskoe, feeling they had "done 
their bit." 

Soon afterwards the contagion reached the sailors in 
the depot in the Moika. They had been exchanging 
salvos during Monday with the men of the Kexholm 
Guards, whose barracks were "across the way." Neither 
side seemed to know why. Then they decided to join 
the Duma. The sailors marched up the Morskaia with 
their band playing the "Marseillaise" and red flags 
flying. On crossing the Isaac Square they were greeted 
with volleys from the irrepressible police. Somebody 
shouted that the bullets had come from the Astoria, 
or Military Hotel, where many officers, including the 
Allied Missions, resided. Immediately the sailors opened 
out in skirmishing order and sent a hail of bullets into the 
hotel windows. Every young hooligan who had been 
cheering the sailors carried a rifle and began to use it. 
The police loosed off more cartridge-belts. The fusillade 
grew intense. As a matter of fact, not a shot had been 
fired from the hotel. Thinking they had vanquished 
resistance, the mob — sailors, soldiers, and civilians— 



THE REVOLUTION 125 

stormed the building, smashed the plate-glass windows, 
and rushed in to arrest the inmates. There is every 
reason to believe that the attack on the hotel had been 
decided beforehand. I was there late the previous 
evening and heard that one was expected. Many of the 
residents had even left early in the morning, fearing 
violence. Nothing could exceed the brutality or ferocity 
of the "revolutionary" horde. The coolness and pluck 
of British and French officers alone prevented wholesale 
murder of Russian Generals, ladies, and children. They 
promptly assembled everybody and formed a line of 
defense. The Allied uniforms inspired sufficient respect 
to contain the violence of the mob. Only one old Gen- 
eral was killed. But the building was gutted, the cellars 
plundered, and the effects of the British officers stolen. 

On the outbreak of war the crowds had wrecked the 
German Embassy on the opposite side of the square in 
a frenzy of patriotism; now soldiers and sailors were 
committing worse excesses against their own officers and 
innocent women and children. It did not promise well 
for the Revolution, which everybody had hailed at first 
with gladness. Finally, the sailors marched off with 
scores of unfortunate Generals to the Duma. 

Only a few hours later a similar assault was delivered 
upon the town residence of Count Freedericks, a few doors 
from the telegraph office. Valuable works of art, wines, 
and money were plundered, the house set on fire, and 
the crippled wife and daughter of the Tsar's Minister of 
the Court dragged into the street and brutally beaten. 
The Kexholmers perpetrated this outrage. Count Freed- 
ericks was with the Emperor. 

A little farther down the Moika the Litovsky prison 
for women, a historic pile built in the form of a castle, 
was stormed and burnt down by the crowd under fierce 
machine-gun fire directed from the roofs of the famous 
Marie Theater. 



126 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

While agreeing ostensibly with the Duma resolution, 
the Socialists were preparing their own '* Council of Work- 
men's and Soldiers' Delegates," which was to assemble 
next day at the Tauris Palace. This fact alone shows 
how well the revolutionary plans had been matured. 
They had issued a "manifesto" to the workmen and to 
the soldiers, calling upon them to send delegates to the 
Soviet (Council), one per thousand workmen and one per 
company of troops. This manifesto appeared in the first 
number of the Bulletin, published by the Duma journalists 
on Monday. The elections were, necessarily, hurried, 
and more or less perfunctory. Whoever spoke loudest 
considered himself elected. Many "delegates" came 
who represented nobody except themselves. All the 
jail-deliveries swarmed into the meeting on Tuesday. 
The Soviet had so little prestige that, for the time being, 
the Revolutionaries had perforce to recognize the authority 
of the Duma Committee and to use it for their purposes. 

Many of these facts were not fully appreciated or 
estimated then. People were so carried away by feelings 
of intense joy over the prospective downfall of the Old 
Regime — the Revolutionaries by hope of an immediate 
Socialistic Millennium, the public at large by relief from 
the deadening influences of autocracy — that there was no 
recrimination. Many oflScers came to volunteer their 
services to the Duma. They formed the nucleus of the 
Military Committee, then organized, which took over 
such affairs as came within its purview. But already signs 
were not wanting of a coming clash with the rival revolu- 
tionary organizations. 

The greatest confusion still prevailed among the bulk 
of the garrison as to the cause of the fighting. Many 
thought quite seriously that the Germans had invaded 
Petrograd. I remember, while passing the Winter Palace 
that Monday afternoon on my way from the Duma, 
witnessing a case of this kind. The Winter Palace and 



THE REVOLUTION 127 

the Admiralty and neighboring Ministries were still in 
the hands of the Government troops. They began firing 
wildly at the Foreign Office, although only a mere handful 
of people were then in the Square. I had just left Sir G. 
Buchanan walking to the Foreign Office to pay his daily 
visit to M. Pokrovsky, who was still unmolested. By 
good fortune neither of us came into the line of fire. On 
his walk homeward the people recognized and cheered him. 

To most observers it would have seemed hopeless and 
futile to continue the struggle under such circumstances. 
The ignorant peasant troops were all too ready to change 
their allegiance, while the Labor element was dominated 
by Socialists. But the bulk of the soldiery still respected 
their officers, and there was no sign as yet of widespread 
indiscipline. The Soviet was soon able to change all 
that. Stubborn resistance was being shown, however, 
by the Military Colleges and by the Cyclist Battalions. 
These units, composed exclusively of real Russians of the 
educated class, showed by their behavior in this and 
subsequent conflicts between the forces of order and the 
forces of anarchy that the best elements in the country 
were stanch and reliable; that they might be swamped 
for a time by the tide of Revolution, but sooner or later 
would assert themselves. Some months afterwards many 
of these brave lads fought and fell, leading the troops at 
the Front. 

I had seen one or two drunken men during the first 
days of the Revolution. Excitement enough was afforded 
by the novelty of the thing. Besides, liquor was unpro- 
curable. The Monopoly shops, where methylated spirits 
had been dispensed, had closed. But after the sack of 
the Astoria and the Freedericks mansion drunken soldiers 
Kttered the sidewalks. The guard stationed at the 
telegraph office, whither I succeeded in penetrating, 
Tuesday night — thanks to a written permit from the 
Duma Committee — ^had imbibed so much that only one 



128 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

man could stand on Ms legs.^ Revolutionary, soldiers 
entered flats and houses demanding food and drink, and 
in many cases helped themselves to valuables. Weapons 
of all kinds, ancient and modern, were of course "requisi- 
tioned." 

Some days later I saw a whole company of guardsmen 
marching to the Post Office. Each man carried a heavy 
bundle under his arm — loot that they were sending home 
to their villages. To their simple minds the "ideals" of 
revolution had immediately assumed a "material" form. 
Later on the civilian "leaders" of the Revolution dis- 
played tendencies of a kindred nature, and the revolu- 
tionary movement was marred by acts of robbery and 
spoliation. Socialists could be tender only for the foes of 
their country: "No indemnity; no annexation" where 
the Germans were concerned, but both the one and the 
other could be applied towards their own countrymen. 

Although the Soviet had partly assembled on Tuesday 
night, and could not develop its organization till some 
days later, orders were being issued by mysterious persons 
in the Socialist camp throughout the incipient stages of 
the Revolution. And even while the Duma Elders acted 
in all good faith with the Socialists, the latter continued 
to "pull the strings" for their own purposes. The forma- 
tion of the Duma Committee ^ with two Socialists (Keren- 
sky and Chkheidze) produced no change in revolutionary 
tactics. Yet it was quite obvious to any except those 
who would not see that the institution of the Soviet 
was tantamount to preparing beforehand the overthrow 
of any Coalition Government. Herein lay the almost 

^Revolutionary leaders invariably discouraged drunkenness for practical 
reasons: a drunken follower was both discreditable and dangerous. He lost 
sight of the "ideals" of revolution while under the spell of drink. I had noticed 
this indignation of Revolutionaries with drunken workmen in 1905. 

2 The members of the Provisional Executive Committee were MM. Rod- 
zianko, Kerensky, Chkheidz^, Shulgin, Miliukov, Karaulov, Dmitrinkov, 
Rzhevsky, Shidlovsky, Nekrasov, Vladimir Lvov, and Colonel Engelhart. 



THE REVOLUTION 129 

utter hopelessness of the task that had been undertaken 
in all sincerity by the Moderate groups in the Duma. 

By Tuesday night the city was entirely in the hands of 
the Revolutionaries and, nominally at least, under the 
control of the Duma. Moscow had joined the movement. 
The police and the representatives of the Old Regime had 
been dispossessed with little difficulty and practically 
no bloodshed. All the railways were working. Fires 
had been extinguished. Everybody was glad to get 
some respite and to enjoy the new-found "freedom." 
City "militia" (paid constables) had been enrolled. The 
Duma Committee issued a proclamation signed by Michael 
Rodzianko, President, defining its mission: 

The Provisional Committee of members of the State Duma finds itself 
compelled, by the onerous circumstances of internal chaos, resulting from the 
courses pursued by the old Government, to take in hand the re-establishment 
of State and public order. 

Fully appreciating the responsibility it has assumed, the Committee feels 
confident that the people and the Army will help it in the diflScult task of cre- 
ating a new Government capable of meeting the wishes of the nation and of 
meriting its confidence. 

Another proclamation summoned all citizens to safeguard 
public property, and the lives and property of individuals. 
It had been a beautiful day, bringing the first breath 
and fragrance of spring, which is loveliest in these gloomy 
northern climes. People were elated and happy. Few 
understood or thought about the ominous events that 
had occurred, and that were bound to bring untold misery 
in the near future. It was an inspiring sight to watch 
regiment after regiment marching to present its homage 
to the Duma. The men stepped out so boldly, so confi- 
dently, as free men should. Their officers looked proud 
to lead such a gallant array. Inside the Duma I wit- 
nessed a stirring spectacle. Hundreds of Preobrazhentsy 
were fined up inside the huge lobby and presented arms to 
President Rodzianko, who addressed them: 



130 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

"Soldiers of the True Faith! Let me, as an old soldier, greet you according 
to our custom. I wish you good health." 

"We wish good health to your Excellency," came the thunderous response. 

The President continued: 

"I want to thank you for coming here to help the members of the State 
Duma to establish order and to safeguard the honor and glory of oiu- country. 
Your coDirades are fighting in the trenches for the might and majesty of Russia, 
and I am proud that my son has been serving since the beginning of the war in 
your gallant ranks. But in order that you should be able to advance the cause 
and interests which have been espoused by the Duma, you must remain a dis- 
ciplined force. You know as well as I do that soldiers are helpless without their 
officers. I ask you to remain faithful to your officers and to have confidence in 
them, just as we have confidence in them. Return quietly to your barracks, 
and come here at the first call when you may be required." 

"We are ready," they answered. "Show us the way." 

"The old authority is incapable of leading Russia the right way," was the 
answer. 'Our first task is to establish a new authority in which we may all 
believe and trust, and which will be able to save and magnify our Mother 
Russia." 

A group of twenty-two elected members of the Upper 
House, including MM. Guchkov, Stakhovich, Vasiliev, 
Grimm, Vernadsky, and Prince Trubetskoy, addressed a 
telegram to the Tsar: 

The maintenance of your old Government in office is tantamount to the 
complete overthrow of law and order, involving defeat on the battlefield, the 
end of the dynasty, and the greatest misfortunes for Russia. 

We consider that the only means of salvation lies in a complete and final 
rupture with the past, the immediate convocation of Parliament, and the sum- 
moning of a person enjoying the confidence of the nation, who shall form a new 
Cabinet capable of governing the country in full accord with the representatives 
of the nation. 

The partisans of Reform were still hoping to check- 
mate the forces of Revolution. But Time was against 
them. Already the men who were to direct Russia's 
destinies into anarchy had taken steps to shatter the very 
foundations of authority and discipline. President Rod- 
zianko's words to the Preobrazhentsy reflected the deep 
anxiety he felt on this subject. He was not led astray by 
the plaudits of the crowd, because he knew what fell 
designs were being hatched in the Socialist conclaves. 



THE REVOLUTION 131 

But he left open a door of possible salvation. He would 
not form a Revolutionary Government while there was 
some hope of reform, but that could be assured only by the 
Tsar's summoning a new Government. On Thursday 
that hope vanished with the appearance of prikaz No. 1. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE SOVIET, "COALITION," AND BOLSHEVISM 

The Soviet Proclaims Itself — PriJcaz No. 1 — Determined Opposition to the 
Duma — Incitement against OflScers — Origin of the Committee System — 
Soldiers Mystified and Misled — Pseudo-Jew Extremists — Kerensky and 
Coalition — Lvov Cabinet's Program — Surrender to the Soviet — Lenin's 
"Mission" — Bolshevists' "Coups" of May 2d and July 16th — Kerensky 
in the Toils — Bolshevism "Triumphant" — The Importation of Trotsky. 

This chapter opens on events that had their origin 
in the long struggle between Autocracy and Reform. 
Worsted in the conflict, the Reform leaders had not the 
force or the authority requisite for coping with the advo- 
cates of revolution. These had been preparing and organ- 
izing the machinery of upheaval. Popular discontent had 
supplied them with the requisite motive power. Once 
started, no matter under what name or auspices, whether 
of a "Cadet" — Prince Lvov, or a Minimalist — Kerensky, 
or a Bolshevik — ^Lenin, the mt'.chinery would work unremit- 
tently for the disruption of the sdcial and political fabric. 
Russia had wanted reform; she did not want revolu- 
tion. But national desires and interests had no concern 
with the aims and purposes of the Soviet. This body 
had been called into existence by professional revolu- 
tionaries to carry out their specific plans. To unpreju- 
diced observers its real character was clearly visible from 
the outset. On Wednesday (March 14th) I wrote to 
The Times: i 

What the Emperor may decide to do on his arrival is unknown at the hour 
of telegraphing, but one thing is quite certain. Unless his Majesty immediately 

1 The Times, March 16, 1917. 
132 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 133 

complies with the wishes of the moderate element among his loyal subjects, 
the influence at present exercised by the Provisional Committee of the Duma 
will pass wholesale into the hands of the Socialists, who want to see a Republic 
established, but who are unable to institute any kind of orderly government 
and would inevitably precipitate the country into anarchy within and disaster 
without. 

In the same message I referred to the issue by the Soviet 
of a seditious proclamation to the troops. That had 
prompted M. Rodzianko's warnings to the Preobraz- 
hentsy on the need of maintaining obedience to their 
officers. The Menshevist and Minimalist Soviet leaders 
(Kerensky, Chkheidze, and Tseretelli) repudiated fore- 
knowledge of the act. Next day another and much more 
insidious appeal was issued, known as prikaz (order) 
No. 1, concocted at the instigation of a Bolshevik pseudo- 
Jew in the Soviet, Nahamkez by name, and immediately 
circulated among the troops of the garrison by "emis- 
saries" of that faction. It called upon soldiers to disobey 
their officers and to take charge of arms and internal 
administration. Another prikaz ordered the formation of 
committees. These acts embodied the inward policy 
of Extremists in the Soviet, and were never countermanded 
by it, although some attempts were made afterwards by 
the Menshevist majority to explain that the "orders" 
did not apply to the whole Army, but only to the Petro- 
grad garrison. But this was a mere quibble, for the sedi- 
tious order, printed in official form, but unsigned, began 
to be scattered broadcast along the Front. Moreover, 
the "emissaries" of the Soviet hastened to Helsingfors to 
disseminate the doctrine of undiscipline and mutiny 
among the crews of the Baltic Fleet. 

To the reader who has familiarized himseK with the 
history of Russian revolutionary parties related in a 
preceding chapter, and is aware of the development of 
subsequent events, the appearance of prikaz No. 1 offers, 
indeed, no grounds for surprise. That " extremists" 
actually wrote, printed, or circulated it might also be 



134 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM/' "FREEDOM" 

expected. They invariably "acted" while the other 
Socialists "talked." Besides, the summoning of soldier 
delegates to join the Soviet was in itself an indication 
of Socialist intentions. 

The Socialists had agreed to work with the Duma 
Committee, which had already established its own mili- 
tary organization under Captain Karaulov, a Cossack 
Deputy, with the assistance of a large number of officers 
who had proclaimed themselves on the side of the Duma 
against the autocracy. What justifiable cause had the 
Socialists for doubting the sincerity of these men.? Obvi- 
ously none, except that the Cossacks would have nothing 
to do with the Soviet. Their delegates had attended its 
meetings, listened to the doctrines of anarchy and land 
spoliation, and had gone to report to their Congress, 
shortly afterwards assembled in Petrograd, that "it was 
no place for them." But could the Duma leaders be 
reasonably suspected of favoring a return to the Old 
Regime .^^ Certainly not. Were they not capable of 
taking the necessary measures to re-establish order 
among the garrison.? Most decidedly, yes. Then why 
was it necessary to bring the soldiers into the Soviet.? 
The Socialists explained that their motives were good; 
that their plan would "restore confidence " among the 
men, and that they were "saving the situation," be- 
cause, forsooth, without the "re-establishment" of 
"confidence," through the medium of the Soviet, the 
soldiers might "get out of hand," with "results too terrible 
to imagine." Similar arguments were advanced in justi- 
fication of the system of company committees. 

There was not, of course, the least atom of truth in 
these explanations, unless we deliberately agree to con- 
fuse cause with effect, for it was the "active" Socialists 
themselves who had taken the initiative in undermining 
"confidence" and sowing suspicion among the men 
towards their officers. At first the men did not under- 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 135 

stand. Excepting a few battalions — a small percentage 
of the garrison — in which officers had been overstrict 
or revolutionary agitators had managed to exert a mutin- 
ous influence, the bulk of the garrison was loyal to its 
chiefs. Officers, it was well known, had harbored no 
love for the Old Regime. Razputinism had disgusted 
them with it forever. In the prolongation of a struggle 
for a Government that had discredited itself irrevocably 
in the eyes of the Army they foresaw useless effusion of 
blood, and, desiring above all to save the Duma and to 
avert anarchy, they had led their men to the conquest 
of civic freedom. 

On the other hand, it might be argued that a Soviet 
without the soldiers would not have been possible. After 
all, the overthrow of the old Government had been accom- 
plished by the garrison. Out of the 460 recorded casual- 
ties more than half had been soldiers. The workmen 
would never have "risen" had the troops not sided with 
them. To revive the 1905 Soviet with its doubtful 
memories did not agree with Socialist interests. To 
summon a Soviet without the soldiers would have led 
to an immediate estrangement between them and the 
workmen. But the swift downfall of the old Government 
was due to the co-operation of all classes, especially the 
officers. Needless to say, Extremists did not stop to 
consider niceties of justice and community of class 
feeling and solidarity. On the contrary, they wanted a 
war of classes. And, having been carried to victory on 
the shoulders of the garrison, they would henceforth 
use the soldier as their stalking-horse. 

The invitation to send company delegates to the Soviet 
naturally flattered the troops. Every soldier who had 
fired a shot at a policeman, civilian, or a fellow-soldier 
in the wild pandemonium of Monday and Tuesday con- 
sidered himself a "hero." All wanted to be delegates. 
But only one man per company was invited, and the 



136 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

companies were at battalion strength. Even so the 
garrison contingent would exceed two hundred, and might 
swamp the Labor delegates, who were also to number 
one per thousand.^ Loud complaints immediately arose. 
And, paradoxically enough, the men came with their 
grievances to M. Rodzianko. It only showed the artless- 
ness of the soldiers. They believed in the Duma and in 
its President, and came to him for advice, all unconscious 
of the irony of their request, unsuspecting the Socialist 
snare that was soon to convert them into an armed rabble, 
harnessed to the Soviet chariot. 

I was present in the Duma on Tuesday evening at a 
conversation of this kind between M. Rodzianko and 
several Preobrazhentsy, who had been refused admittance 
to the Hall of Sessions, where the Soviet first assembled. 
M. Rodzianko did his best to pacify the complainants. 
Their companies had elected two delegates each, and they 
were the extra ones. He promised to intercede for them. 
It was an unenviable position for the President of the 
Duma. He was waiting upon the unready autocrat to 
save the cause of Reform; he was the hope and idol of 
Petrograd and the whole Empire, yet betrayed by those 
who claimed to lead these people. 

When he took a stroll in the crowded Shpalernaia the 
people thronged respectfully around him, walking in step 
with him, watching his countenance, hungering to hear 
the sound of his voice. His huge burly figure, massive 
rugged countenance, his homely comprehensible words of 
good cheer, his clarion voice — what comfort, what confi- 
dence they inspired in those delirious but awesome days! 
And this giant was sick — stricken in body and soul. 
Under an impassive exterior the pallor of his face betrayed 
the pain that gnawed his great heart. He was so weak 
that he ought to have been in his bed, not amidst these 
crowds. But he was ready to endure any suffering for 
1 Later the number of delegates exceeded 2000. 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 137 

"Mother Russia." If only the reply that he awaited 
with such inexpressible longing did not come too late! 
That haunting fear had given him no rest day or night. 

In summoning delegates from the men of the garrison, 
the Revolutionaries had, perhaps unconsciously, prompted 
another departure, viz., the election of officers. Once 
the companies had to elect delegates from their own midst, 
it was only natural that they should proceed to elect 
their C.O.'s and subalterns, just as they elected their 
starosta (elder) in the villages. There were always some 
unpopular officers. They could thus be eliminated. So, 
having chosen their delegates to the Soviet, the companies 
proceeded to " elect " their officers. In most cases this 
process affected the situation very slightly. 

What happened in one Guard regiment may be taken 
as an example. The officers were at dinner in their Mess 
on Tuesday, when a N.C.O. came in to report that they 
had been " elected." They were not altogether surprised. 
The Soviet scheme had prepared them for some such 
departure. Going out to the men, they thanked them 
for this mark of confidence. Some hours later, an 
orderly-clerk having aroused the suspicions of the men 
regarding the quantity of food supplied to them, they 
resolved to arrest their Colonel — an officer of great 
distinction and above all reproach. He was politely 
requested to report himself at the Duma and remain 
there. 

Prihaz No. 1 put an end to " amenities." The dele- 
gates had brought back from the Soviet enough of the 
spirit of anarchy to destroy all discipline, even had the 
prikaz been deferred. The orders contained in that 
document were immediately carried into effect. Officers 
who resisted the men in " taking possession of the arms" 
were arrested or murdered. 

It may seem strange to us that such excesses should 
be committed, but not if we understand the Russian 



138 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

character, which cannot brook injustice, real or fancied, 
and is always prone to violence in the assertion of its 
rights. For the same reason the Russians will go to the 
other extreme and allow themselves to be led by persons, 
good or evil, v/ho happen to please them or gain their 
confidence. 

The Soviet had taught the men that resistance on the 
part of the ofiicers might be expected, and that it would 
argue intent to deprive them of " freedom" — that it was 
"counter-revolutionary." Within a few hours a large 
number of the officers of the garrison were *' eliminated." 
Only those who combined the qualities of " general 
favorites" with absolute readiness to efface themselves 
before the men and avoid appearing too much in the 
streets were spared. Thus ensigns found themselves in 
"command" of battalions or regiments. But they were 
not safe from the men of other units. The "order" to 
"take possession of arms" was interpreted to the letter. 
It was taken to mean "all arms" — those of officers and 
even civilians also. 

Here is the true story of a wounded guardsman 
who, unluckily for himself, returned that day from the 
Front. Driving to his regimental headquarters, he was 
stopped by men belonging to his reserve battalion. They 
roughly demanded his sword, and threatened him with 
their bayonets. "My sword!" he cried. "What do 
you mean, scoundrels! I won this sword in battle!" 
Before he could draw it in self-defense he was overpowered 
and the weapon — a sword of St. George — wrested from 
him. W^eakened by his wound, the poor lad lost control 
over his feelings and burst into tears. He managed to 
reach his home, and there shot himself, unable to survive 
the shame that had been put upon him. These men 
belonged to the Grenadier regiment which afterwards 
deserted in face of the enemy. 

Thenceforth officers left their sidearms at home, and 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 139 

all who could do so hurried back to the armies in the 
field. There, at all events, they were safe — till the Soviet 
and Committees had extended their fatal influence. s| 
Subversion had been carried out by a handful of 
pseudo-Jew Extremists in the Soviet,^ but the Soviet 
was a party to the traitorous business. Most of the 
leaders — especially the pseudo-Jews — were a truculent 
pack, cowering behind the soldiery, intent upon realizing 
their revolutionary "ideals," but terrified by a possibility 
of failure and eventual reprisals. A Russian proverb 
truly says, " Fear hath big eyes." They egregiously 
magnified the danger of a "counter-revolution," and, 
just then, were in mortal fright of the Tsar's return to 
Petrograd. The whole garrison was on their side, or 
rather with the Duma, but, "Supposing the Tsar enter 
the city.f^ W^ho knows, he may also proclaim himself 
for the Duma, and then the people and many, perhaps 
all, of the soldiers may revert to their allegiance under a 

^ Afterwards their numbers increased largely, and although they studiously 
concealed their identity under assumed Russian or Polish names, it became 
known that the principal ones were: Nahamkez-Steklov, Apfelbaum-Zinoviev, 
Rosenfeldt-Kamenev, Goldmann-Gorev, Goldberg-Mekowski, Zederbaum- 
Martov, Himmer-Sukhanov, Krachman-Zagorski, HoUander-Mieshkowski, 
Lourier-Larin, Seffer-Bogdanov. Among the leaders of this gang — under Lenin 
— ^were: Trotsky, whose real name was Bronstein, and Feldmann, alias Chernov. 
Lenin's previous record has been given. He came to Russia in April, traveling 
from Switzerland and through Germany in a "sealed carriage" with Robert 
Grimm, Mme. Kolontay, etc., at the time when Austria, with Germany's 
approval, proposed "separate terms" to the Provisional Government. He 
had been amply provided with funds by a "wealthy lady" in Ziu^ich. He 
"requisitioned" a ballet-dancer's villa opposite the fortress and preached the 
doctrines of Bolshevism. Having stirred up a revolt in July to defeat Keren- 
sky's "offensive," he was permitted to go into seclusion. It is said he went to 
Germany. He came back to carry out the final "victory" of Bolshevism with 
the aid of Bronstein-Trotsky, who had been a refugee after the troubles of 1905, 
Trotsky had then been Vice-President of the Labor Soviet. He had beei 
expelled from France for anti-war agitation and before the Revolution went to 
America. His detention at Halifax aroused the greatest fury in the Soviet 
against the British Government, and as "Minister for Foreign Affairs" in the 
Lenin " Cabinet" he gave full vent to his feelings of revenge for his detention. 



140 "DEMOCRACY/' "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Constitutional Monarchy!" It was too dreadful to 
contemplate. Hence the feverish haste they had dis- 
played in summoning the soldiers to the Soviet and in 
issuing prikaz No. 1. And in these counsels of cowardice 
the Socialist leaders were unanimous and united. 

The situation had become so critical on the Wednesday 
that it was no longer possible to defer the formation of 
a Provisional Government. Only one representative of 
the Soviet agreed to enter it. That was Kerensky. 
The others preferred to wait, or to carry on their revolu- 
tionary intrigue outside. 

It was too late to pass over the Soviet. The Duma 
Committee negotiated through Chkheidze and Kerensky 
the terms upon which the Soviet agreed to support the 
new Government. But while the negotiations were pro- 
ceeding the soldiers had been '* stampeded" again by 
rumors purposely spread among them that they would 
be drafted to the Front. The pseudo-Jews were afraid 
of the Army, and mistrusted Chkheidze, their Menshevist 
president. He wielded great authority among the work- 
men, and was extraordinarily skilful in manipulating 
the unwieldy assembly of delegates. Who could tell 
what the Provisional Government might do, should a 
new garrison come into Petrograd, especially soldiers 
from the Front! So the soldiers were "panicked" into 
demanding that they, the "heroes" of the Revolution, 
should be absolved from fighting for their country, now 
that they had won such a victory for freedom. They 
required little prompting. To the usual demands of 
Constituent Assembly and political amnesty was added 
this other preposterous demand. 

The Provisional Government was finally constituted 
on Thursday, March 15th, as follows: 

Prince George Lvov (Cadet) Prime Minister and Interior 

M. Miliukov (Cadet) Foreign Affairs 

M. Guchkov (Octobrist) War and Marine 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 141 

M. Tereschchenko (Progressivist) Finance 

M. ManuUov (Cadet) Education 

M. Shingarev (Cadet) Agriculture 

M. Nekrasov (Cadet) Railways 

M. Konovalov (Octobrist) Commerce and Industry 

M. Kerensky (Socialist) Justice 

Vladimir Lvov (Center) Holy Synod 

M. Godney (Cadet) Comptroller-General 

There were only three "strong" men among them: 
Guchkov, Miliukov, and Kerensky. The new Minister 
of W^ar had seen service as a volunteer on the Boer side 
in the South African W^ar and with the Slavs in the 
Balkan Campaign. He had "managed" the Red Cross 
in Manchuria, and had been closely associated with Red 
Cross and munition work during the present war. He 
had been President of the Duma and was leader of the 
Octobrist party — essentially a politician and a man of 
action. Professor Miliukov had been for twenty years 
a leading Liberal, a well-known Bulgarophil, one of the 
founders of the Constitutional Democratic party, of 
which he was the recognized leader, foreign editor of 
the Rech, and a specialist on foreign affairs — essentially 
a man of words, and nicknamed by Doroshevich (editor 
of the Russhoe Slovo) the "god of untactfulness." Keren- 
sky was a struggling lawyer, who specialized in political 
trials. He had proposed a resolution to the Bar of Petro- 
grad denouncing the old Government for the Beyliss 
case. For this and for his association with the Socialist- 
Revolutionary party he had been "under suspicion," 
and had even been arrested — a bold and fiery orator, 
without any experience whatever of affairs of Govern- 
ment. 

That night Kerensky addressed a mass meeting in the 
Duma. "Comrades," he cried, "Regenerated Russia will 
not resort to the shameful means utilized by the Old 
Regime. Soldiers! I ask your co-operation. Do not 
listen to the promptings of the agents of the Old Regime. 



142 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Listen to your officers." So, according to Kerensky it 
was the okhrana that had issued prikaz No. 1. And 
Chkheidze ^ was still more emphatic. He attributed 
the "launching of vile proclamations inciting the soldiers 
to murder their officers" to "provocative efforts of the 
secret police." 

In the light of subsequent events it reads like a 
mockery. The Soviet leaders knew that their hearers 
would swallow any dish served up with this sauce. But 
it was such concoctions as this that were destined for 
many months to go down with the gullible public at home 
and the ignorant people abroad. In the gentle art of 
prevarication, and still more in the negation and dis- 
honor of "Free Russia" — their vaunted watchword — ■ 
they far outdistanced the agents of the Old Regime. 
Much talk was then dispensed about "dark forces" and 
okhrana agents disguised as soldiers trying to encourage 
pogroms and desertion in order to "discredit" the Revolu- 
tion. But all this talk turned out to be largely nonsense. 
Of course, the wretched police, who had been garbed in 
military uniforms by Protopopov, made their escape to 
the Army whenever that was possible. Naturally enough 
they could not feel safe in Petrograd. And even if they 
tried to instil notions of discipline and duty among the 
troops (which, of course, rendered them suspect of 
"counter-revolutionary" designs), who shall blame them.^^ 
The pogrom theory has been sufficiently accounted for in 
a previous chapter. The Jews were all in a state of terror 
and dreamt of nothing but pogroms. 

On Thursday the Tsar had abdicated and appointed 
Prince Lvov Prime Minister. This appointment was 

^ Chkheidze was the son of a Georgian peasant — one of the serf-retainers of 
the Dadianis, former sovereigns of Mingrelia, a small mediatized State in the 
Caucasus. His associate, Tseretelli, was a "noble" retainer of the Dadianis. 
Chkheidze was the "bellwether," Tseretelli the "nightingale" of Menshevist 
Sovietdom. 




DELEGATES IX THE DU^LV 



soldiers' and sailors' 

Their Committee (including some " officers ") installed in the Speaker's Chair. A young 
orator in the Rostrum addressing the " House," filled with Delegates, to insist upon a larger 
number of their representatives being admitted to the Soviet. March 23, 1917. The Tsar's 
Portrait has been removed from its frame. 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 143 

signed some hours before the Provisional Government 
was finally constituted, but the fact had not come to the 
knowledge of the Duma. Had the abdication taken 
place two days earlier, things might have been different. 
On the Friday morning the Provisional Government 
issued the following appeal to all the inhabitants of 
Russia: 

Citizens, the Provisional Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid 
and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has now triumphed 
over the noxious forces of the Old Regime in such a measure as to enable it to 
proceed to the more stable organization of the executive power. With this 
object the Provisional Committee has appointed as Ministers of the first 
National Cabinet men whose past political and public activity assures them the 
confidence of the country. 

The new Cabinet will adopt the following principles as the bases of its policy: 

1. An immediate general amnesty for aU political and religious offenses, 
including terrorist acts, military revolts, and agrarian crimes. 

2. Freedom of speech, of the Press, of association and labor organization, 
and the freedom to strike, with an extension of these liberties to civilians and 
soldiers in so far as military and technical conditions permit. 

3. The abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions. 

4. Immediate preparations for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, 
which, with universal suffrage as a basis, shall establish' the Governmental 
regime and the Constitution of the country. 

5. The substitution for the police of a national militia, with elective heads 
and subject to the self-government bodies. 

6. Elections to be carried out on the basis of universal suffrage. 

7. The troops that have taken part in the revolutionary movement shall 
not be disarmed, and they are not to leave Petrograd. 

8. While severe military discipline must be maintained on active service, 
all restrictions upon soldiers in the enjoyment of social rights granted to other 
citizens are to be abolished. 

9. The Provisional Government wishes to add that it has no intention of 
taking advantage of the existence of war conditions to delay the realization of 
the above-mentioned measures of reform. 

Even a casual perusal of these "principles" will satisfy 
the reader that the new Cabinet had bound itself hand 
and foot to Revolution. But they could no longer help 
themselves. They accepted the doctrine that "soldiers" 
should have the same right as ordinary working-men 
"to go on strike," that the Petrograd troops should not 



144 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

leave the city, that no restrictions should be placed upon 
soldiers when off duty. What else could they do? Ten 
thousand machine-gunners with one thousand maxims 
and several millions of cartridges had come in from 
Oranienbaum and quartered themselves in the People's 
Palace. They had killed or driven away their officers, 
and were ready to shoot indiscriminately. The Soviet 
knew its own strength and made its own terms. It was 
easy to criticize M. Rodzianko "for waiting so long" 
and Prince Lvov "for accepting such a program of 
government" — as the Moscow wiseacres did afterwards 
— it was a very different thing to have acted otherwise, 
placed as they had been. 

The city had resumed something of its normal appear- 
ance — ^restaurants were opened after three days devoid 
of food for those who had no domestic resources. Pro- 
vision shops had been open at intervals but were still ill- 
provided, and the queues were enormous. Some of the 
mills had resumed work. Were they, the Duma Com- 
mittee, to run the risk of another and a worse upheaval .f* 
There was danger of this if they refused the Soviet's 
terms. And these would become still more sweeping. 

The mob in Petrograd went wild on learning of the 
abdication. They proceeded to remove and destroy all 
the emblems of Tsardom on palaces and private houses. 
This spirit of wanton destruction had been Russia's bane. 
It caused an infinity of harm during the war, and still 
more during the Revolution and its resultant anarchy. 
But after a while the mob became calmer. General 
Kornilov, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief 
of the garrison, managed to restore a semblance of order 
among the troops, and life in the Capital became tolerable. 
The armies had adhered to the new Government, and it 
was hoped that they would not heed the Bolshevist 
agitation. 

One of the largest cartridge works in Petrograd had 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 145 

been the scene of a characteristic episode at this time. 
The soldiers employed in the clerical staff decided to 
form a committee to run the works. They drove out 
the management and "elected" two unknown officers, 
friends of the ringleaders. For several days the manage- 
ment and the funds were in their hands. Then they 
quarreled among themselves and betrayed each other. 
The two "officers" turned out to be "liberated" convicts. 
They had murdered a couple of officers in the street 
and donned their uniforms. 

The Russian General Staff had positive information, 
which was published later in the Press, ^ that Lenin had 
returned to Petrograd with a German mission to propa- 
gate pacifism in Russia, to undermine the Provisional 
Government, and to use all and any means to drive out 
Ministers who were opposed to a separate peace. Two 
meetings of Socialists took place in Berne, whereat 
loltuhowski, the Ukrainian agitator, and Lenin were 
present. Lenin was an intimate of loltuhowski, and 
often stayed at his house. With Lenin came a Swiss 
Socialist, named Robert Grimm, who helped him to prop- 
agate the Bolshevist doctrine. Grimm delivered speeches 
in Petrograd, in Kronstadt, and other places, not scrupling 
to address the people in German. During this time 
Grimm was in communication with the Germans through 
Federal Councilor Hofmann at Berne, sending and 
receiving cable messages in the Swiss cipher through 
the Petrograd Legation. ^ With them worked an ex- 
society woman named Kolontay, who had left her family 
and friends to follow Lenin. She afterwards became 
People's Commissary for Education, and one day dis- 
appeared with the Crown Jewels in company with a 
common sailor who was Minister of Marine under the 
the Bolsheviki. 

1 Eusshoe Slovo, September 2, 1917. 

2 " xfie Times History of the War," Part 163: "^Swiss Neutrality. 



146 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Lenin's first move was undertaken soon after his 
arrival. It is described in detail in another chapter. It 
had the desired effect of "eliminating" Miliukov, the 
"pet bugbear" of Berlin. On July 16th the Bolsheviki 
organized a still stronger onslaught upon their opponents. 
This time their stroke was directed not only against the 
Provisional Government, but also against the Soviet 
majority. The reason for this may be easily explained. 
In May they had the Soviet with them. The immediate 
Bolshevist objective was to get rid of Miliukov and of 
war aims based on "decisive victory" over the Germans. 
The Soviet and Kerensky were already committed to 
doctrines that could not be reconciled with the Miliukov 
program of out-and-out loyalty to the Allies. An 
"arrangement" with the Bolsheviki was, therefore, 
readily accepted on the basis of a "democratic peace," 
with "no annexation and no indemnity." 

In July, contrary to German hopes and expectations, 
the Russian Army began an offensive. With all its 
faults, the Old Regime had managed with the assistance 
of the Allies to provide the armies on the field with guns, 
munitions, etc., on a lavish scale. There was a super- 
abundance of men. The offensive should and would 
have brought a decisive victory in Galicia, which was 
to have been followed up by an invasion of Turkey. 
But the Bolsheviki wanted, not victory, but defeat, and 
the Provisional Government had not a clear mind on 
the subject. 

On July 16th several regiments of the Petrograd 
garrison obeyed orders from the Bolshevist "staff," 
and came out into the streets armed. The "Red Guard," 
a Bolshevist band of armed workmen, also mustered. 
The soldiers did not know what they had to do. They 
simply "took possession" of the streets. Kerensky being 
at the Front, Prince Lvov and the Soviet appealed to the 
Cossacks A sotnia went out to restore order. They did 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 147 

not use their rifles. The Bolshevist troops ambushed 
them and killed several. Then the Cossacks took drastic 
measures. Next day Bolshevist reinforcements arrived 
from Kronstadt. The Cossacks repulsed them, inflicting 
heavy losses. There was as much bloodshed during these 
two days as during the two worst days of the Revolution. 

The Bolshevist regiments then went over to the 
Soviet, and a temporary blight fell upon the Leninite 
propaganda in Petrograd, though, as we shall see in 
another chapter, it had been disastrously successful in 
checking the offensive movement of the Russian armies. 
Lenin had served the Germans well. 

I was absent from Petrograd, having gone to the Front. 
My friends in the Capital afterwards related to me what 
had happened. One of them was at the Tauris Palace, 
where the Soviet still had its headquarter s.^ He related 
that the building was full of Jews — reporters and others 
— who were in terror of being captured by the partisans 
of the Bolshevist- Jews. Frantic appeals were being sent 
over the telephone to "loyal" troops for help. A regular 
panic occurred when an armored car rattled up. To 
their intense relief, the Jewish "garrison" were told that 
the crew of the armored car were on the side of the Pro- 
visional Government. Equal dismay was felt when, on 
looking out of the windows, the "garrison" saw the 
crew talking to a group of workmen. Some of the bolder 
spirits ventured to go out and begged the crew to come 
inside the Palace. They feared that the workmen might 
seduce them from their allegiance. "Save us!" the 
piteous cry resounded upon the ears of the armored-car 
warriors. "Don't listen to those workmen!" "Save us 



*Soon afterwards the Soviet transferred its headquarters to the Smolny 
Institute, a huge building outside the city, where noblemen's daughters had 
received their education. It ofiFered a great advantage. It could be more easily 
fortified. The Tauris Palace was plundered by members of the Soviet before 
they left it. 



148 "DEMOCRACY/" "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

and you save Russia!" ^^ Tovdrishchi, we implore you, 
we appeal to your sense of revolutionary solidarity!" 
"The fate of free Russia and of the great ideals of the 
Revolution, Land and Freedom, are in your hands!" 
While these objurgations were being launched at the 
astounded soldiers, cigarettes, buns, and glasses of tea 
were thrust into their hands, even into their mouths. 
They could not utter a word, but as they took the prof- 
fered douceurs the anxiety of their hosts quickly subsided. 
Then began a tragi-comedy of another sort. The 
"guilty" Bolsheviki had to be "punished." Writs were 
issued against Lenin and the ringleaders — Trotsky, Kolon- 
tay, etc. (Grimm had already left). General Polovtsov, 
who had succeeded General Kornilov as Commander-in- 
Chief, was instructed to take "stern measures." But 
the Soviet and Kerensky (the latter in Petrograd by this 
time) were not inclined for reprisals. They were bound 
by party ties with the Bolsheviki and committed to "free- 
dom." It was "dangerous" for the Revolution — and 
for themselves — to proclaim open war against these 
"misguided" but "well-intentioned" persons. After all, 
they were "revolutionaries." It was necessary to "step 
warily." So the "stern measures" came to nothing. 
Lenin was able to "evade" arrest. When General 
Polovtsov came to apprehend two of the Bolshevist 
ringleaders, including Trotsky, he found Kerensky at 
their quarters, and from him received orders to leave them 
alone. When General Polovtsov proceeded to disarm the 
Red Guard, he was forbidden to do so by orders from 
Prince Lvov, "in compliance with the wishes of the 
Soviet." The peaceful majority of the workmen had 
themselves come to General Polovtsov offering to disclose 
the secret stores of arms, but both they and the Soviet 
were in terror of the Bolsheviki. General Polovtsov 
sallied forth with Cossacks and armored-cars to repress a 
Bolshevist mutiny in one of the rifle factories outside 



THE SOVIET, "COALITION," BOLSHEVISM 149 

Petrograd. The "mutineers" were "sniping" the loyal 
garrison of a neighboring fort. But the Soviet forbade 
him to disarm them. He thereupon resigned. 

M. Kerensky and the Soviet had been saved from 
the Bolsheviki in July by a few Cossack regiments 
stationed in Petrograd. But at the Moscow Conference 
he assumed the airs of an autocrat. Previously he 
had claimed dictatorial powers to suppress an alleged 
conspiracy to re-establish the Old Regime, and had 
arrested General Gurko without any just cause. (Some 
months later he had to release him, and asked the British 
Embassy to facilitate General Gurko's journey abroad.) 
At Moscow he announced that all attempts to upset the 
Revolutionary Government would be suppressed "with 
blood and iron." He would brook no dictation from 
General 7:Cornilov or General Kaledin, both of whom 
demanded instant and energetic measures to put down 
anarchy in the Army and in the country. M. Kerensky 
remained blind and obdurate. He forgot that he had still 
to reckon with the Bolsheviki, who were stronger than 
ever in the Soviet. 

A crash was bound to come. The Bolsheviki chal- 
lenged him once more, and once more he had to appeal to 
Kaledin's Cossacks and to General Kornilov. The latter 
had been preparing to take drastic measures. He sent 
cavalry to the aid of Kerensky, but Kerensky then realized 
that the Soviet, now entirely Bolshevist, held him in 
its power. So, taking its side, he betrayed Kornilov and 
the troops that were coming to aid the Government. 

Another conference was summoned, this time exclu- 
sively "democratic," another name for "Socialist." On 
September 28th Kerensky, in a speech, declared that 
"anarchy was growing irresistibly, and spreading in 
enormous waves throughout the State." Russian troops 
were helping the Finnish Diet to defy the Government. 



150 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," * FREEDOM" 

The Ukraina had already proclaimed a semi-independence 
with Kerensky's own connivance. The German Fleet 
and Army were advancing. 

Coalition had suffered shipwreck because the Cadets 
could not agree to the autonomy of Ukraina under 
auspices that were notoriously inspired from Vienna and 
Berlin. Now the "sham" was again enacted. Consti- 
tutional and revolutionary elements once more joined 
the Ministry. The earliest promoter of the sham, M. 
Kerensky, informed the world that all the trouble had been 
caused by General Kornilov, who, it was alleged, had done 
incalculable harm to the Army. A semi-Bolshevist War 
Minister named Verkhovsky, who had never seen any 
fighting, undertook to "cleanse" the Army of Kornilo- 
vists. Upwards of ten thousand Generals and officers — 
the pick of the Army — were dismissed, and one-third of 
the reserves were immediately disbanded. 

But still the Bolsheviki were not satisfied. How could 
they he? They had wanted certain things from the 
outset: peace, and the destruction pi property and of 
the whole social fabric. To these schemes the sham 
Coalition had unconsciously lent itself, but, knowing that 
the country at large would not accept open repudiation 
of national interests and obligations, had cloaked its 
subserviency to the Extremists with smooth words. Again 
the Bolsheviki proceeded to juxtapose oratory with 
action. This time there was no Kornilov, no Kaledin 
to serve as rescuer or catspaw, and the sham was killed. 
Anarchy reigned supreme. 



CHAPTER XIII 

ABDICATION AND AFTER 

Nicholas II goes to Pskov — ^The Last Hours of the Autocracy — ^Touching Fare- 
wells to the Army — the Manifesto — "I cannot part with My Son" — 
General Ivanov's "Forlorn Hope" — ^Renunciation of the Grand Duke 
Michael — Kerensky and Alexis — At Tsarskoe Selo — Light at Last — Alexis 
Adopts the Revolutionary Badge — In Exile — ^The Other Romanovs — 
Confiscation of Estates — ^The Tsar a "Poor Man." 

We left the Emperor at Mogilev on Monday, March 
12th, leisurely preparing for his return to Petrograd. 
When he finally departed with the usual precautions and 
accessories — two trains proceeding at half-an-hour's in- 
terval — he and his suite, including Count Freedericks and 
General Voyeikov, knew that matters were serious, but 
they did not know how serious. They did not realize 
that the Revolution was to triumph on the morrow. The 
telephone wires with Tsarskoe had been cut. As the 
Vitebsk line, a single track, had been much shaken by 
heavy traffic, the Imperial trains usually went by a cir- 
cuitous route to the Moscow line, and thence via Petro- 
grad to Tsarskoe Selo. Thus they traveled on this occa- 
sion. At Bologoe junction news came warning the Tsar 
not to attempt to approach the Capital. The Revolu- 
tionaries were in control of the stations. So the trains 
were switched on to the Pskov line, with a view to rejoining 
the Vitebsk railway at Dno, and thence proceeding to 
Tsarskoe direct. Nicholas was very anxious about his 
family. The children were ill, and that was why the 
Csarevich had been removed from Headquarters. At 

151 



152 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Dno the news became still worse, so it was decided to go 
on to Pskov and consult with General Ruzsky. Here they 
arrived on Wednesday. Hearing of this, the Duma Com- 
mittee decided to send two of its members, MM. Guchkov 
and Shulgin, thither. They were instructed to secure a 
Writ of Abdication in favor of Alexis, with the Grand 
Duke Michael as Regent. 

M. Guchkov related to me afterwards the circum- 
stances of the journey. The two commissioners were 
very nearly intercepted by a telegram from the Soviet to 
the railway employees at Luga, on the Warsaw line, who 
had joined the Revolution and deposed the gendarmerie, 
but they managed to get through, traveling all night, and 
reaching Pskov, weary and unkempt, after four days' 
ceaseless vigil in Petrograd and on the road. 

Nicholas II had been fully informed by General Ruzsky 
of events in Petrograd. Moreover, it transpired that 
General Alexeiev, at Headquarters, had been for three 
days (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday) in communi- 
cation with the Tsar, urging him to abstain from sending 
more troops to Petrograd,^ and to comply with the wishes 
of the Duma and even to abdicate. These facts, hitherto 
little known, had prepared the Tsar for his ordeal. The 
Tsar received his old enemy (Guchkov) and M. Shulgin, 
the Conservative member for Kiev, in the saloon of his 
railway carriage. It was a bleak winter's day. In the 
dim light Nicholas II looked pale, as usual, and careworn, 
but was perfectly calm and self-possessed. 

Addressing Guchkov, he said: "Tell me the whole 
truth." 

"We come to tell your Majesty that all the troops in 

* Acting on General Voy^ikov's advice, the Tsar had ordered a brigade of 
cavalry and infantry to leave the Front. It is said that General Alexeiev 
implored him with tears, on bended knee, to refrain from weakening the Front 
even by a few regiments. During the journey there had been gome conversa- 
tion among the suite about opening the Central Front "to save the autocracy." 



ABDICATION AND AFTER 153 

Petrograd are on our side." And, with slow emphasis: 
"Even your own Bodyguard!" 

This was news to the unhappy Sovereign. He quiv- 
ered under the blow. "They also," he murmured. 

"Yes," went on Guehkov pitilessly. "It is useless 
to send more regiments. They will go over as soon as 
they reach the station." 

"I know it," replied the Tsar. "The order has 
already been given to them to return to the Front." 
Then, after a slight pause, the Tsar asked: "What do you 
want me to do?" 

"Your Majesty must abdicate in favor of the Heir- 
Apparent, under the Regency of the Grand Duke Michael 
Alexandrovich. Such is the will of the new Government 
which we are forming under Prince Lvov." 

"I had already decided to do so," the Tsar said, 
glancing at General Ruzsky, who was a silent participant 
in the interview. "But I have changed my mind." 
And he added with emotion: "I cannot part with my 
boy. I shall hand the Throne to my brother. You 
understand my motives." 

This was a surprise to the commissioners. They 
had no instructions to agree to such an arrangement, but 
they could not but be sensible to the motives invoked by 
the Tsar, and after some demur they agreed. 

Then began the drafting of the last Imperial Manifesto 
to the Russian people. General Alexeiev had already 
drawn up and telegraphed a suggested text on the lines 
proposed by the Duma. It had to be amended and typed 
afresh in two copies. Moreover, the Tsar could not forget 
his beloved Army. In a touching farewell he commanded 
his faithful soldiers to obey the new Government. When 
all these papers had been typewritten, the Tsar sat down 
and signed a ukaz appointing Prince Lvov Prime Min- 
ister, and another ukaz appointing the Grand Duke 
Nicholas generalissimo, and his last Order of the Day to 



154 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" ■ 

the Army. (It was intercepted by the Soviet, and never 
reached its destination.) Then, without a trace of emo- 
tion, he appended his signature to the Manifesto for the 
last time as Tsar of All the Russias. It was couched in 
lofty and impressive language: 

By the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor of All the Russias, Tsar of 
Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., to all our faithful subjects be it known: 

In the days of great struggle with a foreign foe, who has been endeavoring 
for three years to enslave our land, it has pleased God to send Russia another 
grievous trial. 

Internal troubles threaten to mar the further progress of our obstinate 
struggle. The destinies of Russia, the honor of her heroic Army, the happiness 
of the people, and the whole future of our beloved country demand that the war 
should be conducted at all costs to a victorious end. 

The cruel enemy is making his last efforts, and the moment is nigh when our 
valiant Army, in concert with our gallant Allies, will finally overthrow him. 

In these days of Russia's ordeal we consider ourselves beholden to our 
people to assure close union and organization of all their resources for speedy 
victory: therefore, in agreement with the State Duma, we have recognized 
that it is for the good of the country that we should abdicate the Crown of the 
Russian State and lay aside the Supreme Powder. 

Not wishing to separate ourselves from om* beloved son, we bequeath our 
heritage to our brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, with our bless- 
ing for the future of the Throne of Russia. 

We bequeath it to our brother to govern in full union with the national 
representatives sitting in the Legislative Institutions, and to take his inviolable 
oath to them in the name of our well-beloved country. 

We call upon all faithful sons of our native land to fulfil their sacred and 
patriotic duty in obeying the Tsar at this sad hour of national trial and to aid 
him, in union with the representatives of the nation, to conduct the Russian 
Realm in the path of prosperity and glory. 

May God save Russia! 

In great distress about his wife and children, the Tsar 
had, before leaving Mogilev, ordered one of his oldest 
and most trusted soldiers. General N. I. Ivanov, to pro- 
ceed with a small force to their rescue. While Comman- 
der-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front, General Ivanov 
had prompted the Council of the Military Order to confer 
upon Nicholas II the Order of St. George, and he was 
now given command of the St. George's Battalion, com- 



ABDICATION AND AFTER 155 

posed of men who had won the coveted cross. Having 
accomplished this mission, General Ivanov was to act as 
Dictator. From my knowledge of General Ivanov, I 
should say that he was quite incapable of "counter- 
revolutionary" designs. Himself a son of the people, 
he had preserved throughout his great military career 
a simple, homely demeanor that had earned for him 
the affectionate sobriquet diedushha (grandfather). His 
men, also, were not inclined to engage in civil war. The 
battalion returned to Mogilev without having accom- 
plished its mission. General Ivanov fell into the hands 
of the Revolutionaries, but was able to prove his entire 
innocence and good faith, and was released. He was 
killed a year later in Kiev when the Bolshevist troops 
stormed the sacred Lavra and slaughtered the Prior and 
10,000 of its defenders. 

After his abdication, Nicholas II, still without direct 
news from Tsarskoe, was advised to return to Head- 
quarters. He would be safe there under the watchful 
and trusted care of General Alexeiev. He returned to 
Mogilev, and took up his residence as usual in the Gov- 
ernor's Palace, motored, walked, and saw General Alex- 
eiev and the few people with whom he was intimate. He 
was treated with every mark of respect and deference, 
but he had nothing to do with the business of the Staff. 
Some of the Grand Dukes were also there. He received 
a visit from his mother. He made plans to go into retire- 
ment in the Crimea, to live as "a private gentleman." 
Learning that his son and the other children were mending 
rapidly, he only waited for them to come and join him 
before they all started for the South. His dreams were 
not realized. They clashed with the plans of the Soviet. 

The Grand Duke Nicholas had been making all expedi- 
tion tc reach Mogilev in order to assume the Supreme 
Command. Telegrams were sent at the instigation of 
the Soviet to stop him at all costs, but they did not reach 



156 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

him. On arrival at Headquarters the troops and the 
people gave him an enthusiastic reception. He found 
a message from the Provisional Government urging him 
not to assume charge. It was a bitter humiliation. He 
bore it stoically, like a soldier, and hurried back to the 
Caucasus. The people and the troops who had cheered 
him were respectful in their farewells, and evidently 
disappointed at his going. 

M. Miliukov, as leader of the Constitutional-Demo- 
crats, who held six out of the eleven Ministerial posts in 
the Provisional Coalition Government, proceeded imme- 
diately after its formation to set forth its views of the 
situation in a statement to the Press. He believed that 
"recent events would increase popular enthusiasm for the 
war and enable Russia to win. ' He went on: "During 
the last few days the Duma has attracted the attention of 
the whole country and acquired great moral influence. 
And now, with the Army at its side, it becomes a great 
material force." Like most people outside the Socialist 
ranks, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs counted upon 
the Army — not the troops in Petrograd so much as those 
at the Front, who had not yet been subjected to the 
Soviet and Committee influence. He confidently added: 

"The new Government considers it to be indispensable 
that the abdication of the Emperor should be oflacial, 
and that the Regency should be temporarily entrusted 
to the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Such is 
our decision. We consider it impossible to alter it." On 
the following day (March 16th) he modified this state- 
ment, declaring that what he had said about the Regency 
was his own personal opinion. 

The Socialists had been very angry. They did not 
like references to "war enthusiasm," though, for the 
moment, they thought it best not to say so, but they 
were furious at the mention of a Regency. Their aim 
was a "Democratic Republic," which to them meant a 



ABDICATION AND AFTER 157 

Socialist regime, and for this purpose they had insisted 
upon a Constituent, intending to inveigle the people in 
the meanwhile by methods of agitation that were familiar 
to them. M. Kerensky was accused by his colleagues in 
the Soviet of having betrayed the revolutionary cause. 
A stormy scene followed, as a result of which M. Miliukov 
had to retract his words. 

When MM. Guchkov and Shulgin returned with the 
text of the abdication, the Socialists were still more 
aroused. It made no difference to them whether the 
Grand Duke Michael was designated as Tsar or as Regent: 
they had not wanted the Tsar to abdicate; they had 
intended to depose him. The Provisional Government 
had been formed with their consent. It was a "revolu- 
tionary organization." To them the ukaz appointing 
Prince Lvov was equally unpalatable. Altogether it 
looked as if the Executive Committee of the Duma had 
been juggling with them. Had the extreme wing in 
the Soviet been as strong then as it was destined to 
become later, an open rupture would have occurred. 
M. Kerensky pacified them by inducing the Grand Duke 
Michael to renounce his rights, until he should be duly 
elected. It would be futile for me to speculate on the 
possible advantages of a Regency, but I think perhaps 
M. Kerensky would have had a more difficult task had the 
original plan proposed to Nicholas II in behalf of the 
Duma been followed. To overcome Soviet suspicion, 
M. Kerensky dictated a clause in the Grand Duke's 
renunciation, stipulating for a Constituent. 

His "Declaration from the Throne" was signed by 
the Grand Duke Michael late on Friday, March 16th, 
after a lengthy consultation at his Palace with the members 
of the Provisional Government: 

A heavy task has been entrusted to me by the will of my brother, who 
has given me the Imperial Throne at a time of unprecedented war and of 
domestic strife. Animated by the same feeling as the entire nation — namely. 



158 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

that the welfare of the country overshadows all other interests — I am firmly 
resolved to accept the Supreme Power only if this should be the desire of our 
great people, who must, by means of a plebiscite, through their representa- 
tives in the Constituent Assembly, establish the form of government and the 
new fundamental laws of the Russian State. 

Invoking God's blessing, I, therefore, request all citizens of Russia to 
obey the Provisional Government, set up on the initiative of the Duma and 
invested with plenary power , until, within as short a time as possible, the 
Constituent Assembly, elected on a basis of universal, equal, secret, and direct 
suffrage, shall express the will of the nation regarding the form of government 
to be adopted. 

M. Kerensky had been the principal spokesman, and 
after the document — which he himself inspired — ^had been 
signed, he warmly thanked the Grand Duke. The Soviet 
was so pleased with its "revolutionary" clauses that it 
quite forgot about the obligations imposed by the Grand 
Duke's renunciation — "to obey the Provisional Govern- 
ment" until "the Constituent should express the will 
of the people." The Soviet never did "obey," and M. 
Kerensky himself afterwards violated the "Constituent" 
pledge and his oath as a member of the Provisional Gov- 
ment by proclaiming a Republic. M. Kerensky deposited 
the Acts of Abdication and Renunciation with the Senate 
(Supreme Court of Judicature), whence they were after- 
wards abstracted by burglarious Revolutionaries, together 
with other historical documents and relics. 

Six days later (March 22d) the ex-Tsar was conveyed 
as plain Colonel Nicholas Alexandrovich Romanov to 
Tsarskoe Selo and taken to the Imperial villa, where 
his wife and children — the latter recovering from their 
attack of measles — had already been placed under arrest. 
All remained captives there until August, when Kerensky, 
as Prime Minister, ordered them to be transferred to 
the bleak Siberian town of Tobolsk, capital of the province 
where Razputin had lived. Later they were taken by the 
Bolsheviki to Ekaterinburg, where Nicholas II, his son 
and others were murdered. 

Only two or three faithful followers remained with 




THE GARDEN OF CAPTIVITY 

On March 26, 1917, Nicholas II was still the Absolute Master of all the Russias. One week later 
■he was a poor captive in his own Garden at Tsarskoe Selo, guarded by simple soldiers who only a few 
•days earher would have fallen down and worshiped him, had he had the strength of mind not to 
heed his wife's evil counsels and had listened to the warnings and appeals of his faithful people. He 
is much changed in appearance, his form is bent, his hands are listless. He calmly awaits his fate. 
He still wears his Colonel's uniform and his Cross of St. George. He is plain Nicholas Alexandrovich 
"Romanov and the soldiers address him as " Mr. Colonel." 



ABDICATION AND AFTER 159 

the family after the ex-Tsar's arrest at Mogilev, among 
these few being Count Benckendorff, Marshal of the 
Court and brother of the late Ambassador in London, and 
the Empress's bosom, friend, Mme. Vyrubova, Razputin's 
firm adherent. Count Freedericks and General Voyeikov 
had both been arrested while traveling from Mogilev. 
The latter was on his way to his estates, where he had 
a large artificial mineral- water business. The sale of 
this beverage had been greatly promoted by the Temper- 
ance Edict, and it was alleged that railway transport 
was always available for the Voyekov table-water, even 
when there were not sufficient trucks to carry bread 
and fuel. 

While at Tsarskoe the captives did not sufiPer from 
ill-treatment. A sum of four roubles (about $2) was 
allowed for the daily food of each person. The Tsar 
was not allowed to see his wife. Several hours each 
day all had the right to take exercise in the garden. 
They were, however, under constant guard by the troops 
of the garrison, and through the garden palings they 
could be seen and were stared at by curious sightseers. 
The Tsar spent all his time in the garden. As the spring 
and summer advanced he seemed to have quite adapted 
himself to captivity. He was "so fond of flowers." 
Bending over his flower-beds, he forgot his troubles. 

Repeatedly the Extremists tried to force Kerensky to 
bring the ex-Tsar to the fortress in Petrograd, or send 
him to the dungeons of Kronstadt. Kerensky defeated 
these schemes — he knew that the Bolsheviki wanted sim- 
ply to secure a "hostage" and to use the fallen monarch 
for their own purposes. 

M. Kerensky had paid occasional visits of inspection 
to the Imperial villa. On one occasion young Alexis 
approached him, saluted, and gravely asked: "Are you a 
lawyer?" "Yes," was the reply. "Can you tell me 
me what I want to know?" "I shall try," answered 



160 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM/' "FREEDOM" 

the Minister of Justice. "Well, please explain one 
thing: had father the right to abdicate for me? Could 
he renounce my rights?" It was a ticklish question to 
answer offhand. The Minister hesitated a few moments. 
The grave, boyish face looked so appealing. "Tell me 
the truth," Alexis urged. "I think that as your father 
he had not the right," answered Kerensky. "But as 
the Emperor he had the right." The boy looked puzzled 
for a moment, then he seemed to understand the legal 
view of the case. He was disappointed, and the tone 
of his voice as he said "Thank you" showed it. 
Who had stirred the lad's imagination with these mat- 
ters? 

His question augured ill for his peace of mind, and 
bore out the current gossip that family differences had 
cast a deeper gloom upon the fallen household. The boy 
had previously shown distaste for his mother's society, 
and, since he had lived at Headquarters, he had conceived 
a violent hatred and disgust for Razputin. Was the 
ex-Empress setting the boy against his father, blaming 
him for abdicating, and still more for disinheriting his 
boy? The last refuge of parental affection, his renun- 
ciation in behalf of his son because he could not bear "to 
part with him" — was even this to be denied to the hap- 
less autocrat? During the earlier days of his captivity 
Nicholas H had attributed the responsibility for all that 
had happened to incompetent subordinates. He told a 
Staff officer, who had been sent to him by the Provisional 
Government: "You were to blame. I always said that 
those Petrograd reservists would betray me. Yet the 
Staff allowed them to serve in the city." In his solitary 
walks in the garden the ex-autocrat had gained a clearer 
vision of the past. Later he came to realize that his 
wife's influence had been his bane. 

While the fallen Sovereigns and their children were 
being secretly conveyed to Tobolsk, another quaint thing 



ABDICATION AND AFTER 161 

happened. The boy donned a red ribbon and one of 
the little medals that had been struck to commemorate 
the Revolution. These badges he wore demonstratively, 
as if he wished everybody to know that he had severed 
himself from his past. It was suggested, however, that 
he had been persuaded to adopt the red color. Marie 
Antoinette and the Dauphin had donned the bonnet rouge 
when the fish wives came to Versailles. In this, as in 
other points of comparison between the French and 
Russian Revolutions, there was a difference — a very con- 
siderable difference, due to the complete disparity between 
national character and temperament. As nobody knew 
who the boy was, and as no constraint was exercised 
upon him in this matter, he probably acted on the motives 
I ascribe. The train conveying the family stopped only 
at unfrequented stations, or in the open country, for the 
passengers to take some exercise during the long journey 
of three thousand miles. And not even the engine- 
drivers, who were frequently changed, knew who was 
traveling. 

After the Revolution all the Romanovs were excluded 
from the Army and other services. Many were arrested. 
All suffered privations because their properties and for- 
tunes were confiscated. Many sustained bad treatment, 
though none were actually killed. Whenever it was 
possible for them to do so, they migrated to Finland. 
The majority had taken refuge in the Crimea and in the 
Caucasus. The Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich 
received scant recognition for having renounced his rights. 
He was allowed to reside at his palace in Gutchina, but 
suffered arrest afterwards. The Grand Duke Cyril and 
his wife went to Finland. He had brought the Guards* 
Naval Brigade, of which he was Commander, to the 
Tauris Palace in the early days of upheaval. But this 
did not save him from obloquy and distress. The Grand 
Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich was a prisoner in the 



162 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Crimea.* So was the Grand Duchess Vladimir. For- 
tunately for himself, the Grand Duke Dmitry was in 
Persia. There he remained. His father, the Grand 
Duke Paul, was imprisoned but afterwards released. 
The Yusupov family enjoyed complete immunity for 
several months. Then the young Prince Felix, who with 
the Grand Duke Dmitry had figured in the affair of Raz- 
putin's deatji, fell under suspicion and was arrested. 
Some of the Romanovs took advantage of the Revolution 
to contract marriages that had formerly been forbidden 
by the law of their House. The Grand Duchess Olga, 
sister of the fallen monarch, solaced herself by marrying 
ah officer. The Grand Duke Andrew had married Mile. 
Ksheshinskaia, the famous ballerina, whose mansion was 
"annexed" by Lenin and afterwards plundered. 

The worst sufferer was the unhappy Empress Marie, 
who had always been opposed to her son's reactionary 
tendencies and to the evil influence exercised upon him by 
his wife. Deprived of her revenues and possessions, she 
had been permitted to live in one of the Crimean resi- 
dences on an allowance of £1200 a year. Here she was 
rudely awakened at night by mutinous seamen of the 
Black Sea Fleet, who had been incited thereto by Soviet 
agitators on the pretext that she was in treasonable corre- 
spondence with the "counter-revolution." They pulled 
her out of bed in order to search for documents, and 
insulted and ill-treated her. Her health was severely 
affected by this ill-usage. 

But all that has been said in this chapter about the 
treatment of the Romanovs pales into insignificance 
besides the barbarism of the Lenin regime. 

All the property of the Romanov family was confis- 

^The former Generalissimo fell into the hands of the Germans when the 
Crimea was occupied by them in the spring of 1918. They took him to Kiev 
and tried to persuade him to assume the Crown under their protection. He 
refused to have anything to do with the enemies of his country. 



ABDICATION AND AFTER 163 

cated during the Revolution, and their private fortunes 
"sequestered." The Tsar's Civil List, about $7,500,000, 
did not suffice for the upkeep of his innumerable palaces 
in and around Petrograd, Moscow, and Warsaw, his villas 
at Tsarskoe, Peterhof, etc., his shooting seats at Spala 
(in Poland) and Bieloviezh ^ (in Lithuania), and his 
stately abode, Livadia, in the Crimea. The huge sums 
required for the Court came mostly from "His Majesty's 
Cabinet," which owned and exploited vast possessions in 
Siberia (the gold mines of the Altai, the quicksilver mines 
of Nerchinsk, etc.). The Tsar threw open large tracts of 
fertile land in the Altai valleys to colonization during 
Stolypin's agrarian reform movement. In spite of all 
his wealth he was a poor man. 

To provide for the numerous members of the Romanov 
family, which at the present time comprises about seventy 
Grand Dukes, Grand Duchesses, etc., a certain portion 
of Crown lands (quite distinct from State lands, which 
include all the boundless forests of Northern Russia and 
most of the land in Siberia) was set apart a century ago 
under the name of Imperial Appanages and administered 
as a separate department (Udielnoie viedomstvo) of the 
Ministry of the Court. The appanages produced and 
dealt in wine, raised in the Crimea and Caucasus, timber, 
etc. Each member of the Romanov family received a 
certain endowment (averaging about $35,000 per annum) 
from the day of birth, which accumulated till his or her 
majority. The Emperor, as head of the family, could 
dispose of the available appanage funds and revenues 
to provide marriage portions or special grants to his 
kinsmen. 

Many of the wealthiest among his titled subjects owed 
their fortunes to the bounty of earlier sovereigns. Cath- 

* The piischcha (dense forest) of Bieloviezh was renowned for its herds of 
forest bison (z'dbry), commonly known as aurochs, and large preserves of elk 
and deer, which were mostly destroyed by the German troops during the war. 



164 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

erine the Great was particularly liberal in gifts of land 
and "souls" (serfs) to her favorites: Potemkin (who 
built the Tauris Palace), Zubov, and others. Peter the 
Great had "Possessioned" or "fiefed" vast tracts in the 
Urals to the Stroganovs, who, like the Sheremetevs, 
Demidovs, etc., were slowly developing the incalculable 
mineral wealth of that favored region. 

Comparatively few of the Romanovs were really well 
off. The Constantinovichi were the wealthiest, the 
Vladimirovichi the poorest. Enormous fortunes were 
locked up in art collections. The Rembrandts in the 
Hermitage, and the arms, jewels, and old English plate 
in the adjoining Winter Palace — not to speak of the 
regalia in the Kremlin — were of priceless value, and the 
same may be said of the Constantine Palace at Pavlovsk, 
near Tsarskoe Selo. Much of this heritage of art had 
been collected during the Revolutions in England and 
France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
They were destined to "disappear," destroyed or plun- 
dered, during the Russian Revolution. 



CHAPTER XIV 

MUTINY OF THE SAILORS 

Bolsheviki at Helsingfors — A Delayed Manifesto — Finnish and Swedish 
Socialists — Murder of OflBcers — How Admirals met their Death — Max- 
imov Elected — Death-blow to Discipline — Committees and British Sub- 
marines — A "Watery" Reception — At Kronstadt — Admiral Viren Tor- 
tured — ^The Black Sea Fleet — Admiral Kochak "Dismissed" — Further 
Bolshevist Agitation — Admiral Verderevsky and "Admiral" Lebedev 
— Shipbuilding Suspended. 

An appalling tragedy had been enacted at Helsingfors 
and Kronstadt. Soviet agitators went thither on Thurs- 
day, March 15th, to subvert the sailors. On the following 
day the Manifesto was wirelessed to the Fleet, but the 
transmission stopped midway and a service message in- 
sisted that the Manifesto must on no account be com- 
municated to the crews. We know the reason: the 
Soviet had objected to it, and Kerensky had undertaken 
to obtain the Grand Duke's renunciation. They were 
afraid that the Army and Navy might straightway accept 
the new Tsar. At Mogilev the Staff was also nonplused, 
but the Army knew nothing, whereas at Kronstadt and 
Helsingfors the garrison and crews learned from the wire- 
less operators that the Tsar had abdicated and that the 
Manifesto had been "recalled." It was midnight on 
Friday when the Grand Duke's renunciation became 
available for transmission. M. Kerensky and the Soviet 
doubtless had no idea what serious misapprehension was 
being caused by delaying the Manifesto. 

During those hours of uncertainty the Bolsheviki at 
Helsingfors and Kronstadt spread a tale to the effect 

165 



166 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

that the "counter-revolution had restored Tsarism and 
destroyed the new-found liberties." Such is the true 
cause and explanation of the atrocities that followed. 
The men were deliberately misled into the belief that 
they were being betrayed by their officers, and proceeded 
to murder them wholesale. When the Acts of Abdication 
and Renunciation did come through, the harm had already 
been done. From that awful butchery the fleet did not 
recover, and Kronstadt remained a Bolshevist plague-spot. 
The fleet was at anchor in winter quarters, grouped 
in squadrons off Helsingfors. The Gulf of Finland being 
icebound, they were in no danger from the enemy. A 
few hundred yards of stout ice separated the vessels from 
the city. Many thousands of seamen and hundreds of 
officers lived on board. About a thousand marines 
and some of the officers were quartered in town. There, 
also, resided about a thousand artificers employed on 
munitions. Trouble broke out first among the men on 
shore, they having received the earliest news about events 
in Petrograd from the Soviet's emissaries. Discipline was 
well maintained in the fleet. The seamen had permission 
to visit the town within prescribed hours. Through 
them the crews also obtained their information. They 
were exhilarated by the news and anxious to enjoy all 
the extraordinary "liberties" that had been secured by 
the Petrograd garrison. 

When the whisper went round that they were to be 
"done out" of them by their officers "in league with 
the counter-revolution," the shore men mutinied and 
sent deputations to the ships' crews inviting them to 
join. However, they were not permitted to approach 
the battleships, but succeeded in gaining access to some 
of the smaller vessels and smuggling themselves among 
the crew, unnoticed by the officers on watch duty. It 
was late in the night. The officers of one of the gunboats 
were in their wardroom, talking about the mysterious 



MUTINY OF THE SAILORS 167 

"wireless," when a seaman entered without perillission, 
declaring that he came as a delegate from the crew. For 
this breach of discipline he was ordered to be placed under 
arrest. Some provocator on deck thereupon fired his 
rifle. Immediately from the other gunboats came answer- 
ing shots. In a frenzy of rage the crews began shooting 
their officers, who defended themselves with desperation. 
A regular fusillade ensued. Many unfortunate officers 
were dragged out and thrust alive under the ice. 

Admiral Nepenin, whose flag of Commander-in-Chief 
had been flown on board a gunboat anchored near the 
battleships, signaled to ascertain the cause of the firing. 
He received no answer. The battleships remained quiet, 
but the shooting from the gunboats continued. Officers 
sent thither with orders to enforce discipline were shot 
before they could cross the gangways leading to the ice. 

In this manner Admiral Nebolsin was killed. He had 
just arrived from Petrograd. Having reached the Capital 
in the very thick of the upheaval, he had made haste to 
rejoin his squadron. No trains were leaving the Finland 
station because the northern outskirts of the Metropolis 
were unsafe. Here the gallant Cyclist Corps was holding 
out against the Revolutionaries. So the Admiral walked 
along the permanent way, amid a hail of bullets, some 
twenty miles to Beloostrov, the frontier station, whence 
he managed to get a train to Helsingfors. Beloved by 
all the men, he was warned on arrival by some of the 
sailors "not to cross the ice." But learning that there 
was trouble in the fleet, he hastened all the more to join 
his flagship. On his way he heard firing from the gun- 
boats and went to ascertain the cause. And as he 
ascended the gangway of one small vessel the men shot 
him dead. 

When the full text of the Manifesto and Act of Renun- 
ciation came through. Admiral Nepenin made his arrange- 
ments to explain the tragic misunderstanding. But by 



168 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

that time the mutineers were ashore, many of them 
drunk, fraternizing with the local Russian and Finnish 
workmen and crowding the square in front of the station. 
Many carried rifles, but at first there was no shooting. 
Here it was decided to elect a new Commander-in-Chief. 
Finnish and Swedish Socialists were helping the Soviet 
emissaries. At their instigation it was proposed that 
Admiral Nepenin should be superseded by Admiral Max- 
imov, a junior flag-officer of pro-Finnish sympathies. A 
number of officers from the battleships had pluckily come 
ashore to try to bring the mutineers back to duty. They 
were standing in the square, and had the courage to 
address the crowd and to remonstrate against such an act. 

One of them said: "Maximov is not as good a chief 
as Nepenin, and you all know it. You are being misled 
by traitors." Thereupon the agitators prompted some 
of the drunken seamen to threaten the speaker with their 
rifles. The meeting cheered uproariously for Maximov. 
Some officers were then shot down. One who was present 
and escaped told me afterwards that he had seen a Swedish 
Socialist go up to a sailor and offer him ^ve marks (about 
$1) if he would kill an officer. 

A deputation was chosen to proceed to the flagship. 
Everybody understood what was going to happen. A 
sleigh was brought and left at the quayside. The depu- 
tation came with soft words. They requested Admiral 
Nepenin and his Staff to come ashore in order to explain 
matters. He consented readily enough, but asked that 
two of his Staff should remain in charge of secret plans and 
papers, which might be abstracted by agents and sym- 
pathizers of Germany, who were very numerous in Fin- 
land. This was agreed to. 

Directly the Commander-in-Chief had ascended the 
quay, he saw the sleigh waiting and knew that his end 
was nigh. A seaman rushed at him, uttering foul words, 
spat in his face, and shot him through the head. The 



MUTINY OF THE SAILORS 169 

body was flung into the sleigh and taken to the mortuary. 
There it remained for three days, an object of derision 
and infamous insult, used as a target for bullets and worse. 

Admiral Maximov assumed so-called command. He 
treated the men like long-suffering martyrs who had been 
imposed upon by his predecessor — "anti-revolutionary," 
as he called him. He allowed his sentry the use of an 
armchair and invited him to breakfast. 

The incident of the Manifesto was forgotten. Com- 
mittees had to be elected, and there was no more cause, 
real or fancied, for suspecting officers. But drunkenness 
and rowdyism ashore continued. The widows and 
children of those who had been butchered or drowned 
came seeking their lost ones. They were insulted and 
illtreated by the mutineers. 

Order and discipline had been almost unbroken on 
board the larger ships. The "casualties" in the other 
^hips were heavy. Forty officers had been killed, many 
more wounded. It was a serious loss. But the survivors 
did not quail. They adapted themselves as best they 
could to the committee system, knowing full well that 
the men could not handle the ships without them, but 
realizing also that any failure to carry out the wishes 
of the Committee would entail instant death. 

Admiral Verderevsky came from Petrograd to take up 
the duties of Chief of Staff. M. Guchkov had selected 
this competent officer with a view to his eventually 
assuming chief command. But before the change came 
into effect fresh trouble arose. The seamen had been 
permeated with "anti-militant" doctrines. They re- 
solved to doff shoulder-straps and other badges. In 
Petrograd the soldiers had done so, and had torn off 
shoulder-straps from officers. To avoid a repetition of 
excesses and to preserve appearances of discipline, the 
captains mustered their crews, "ordered" them to have 
shoulder-straps removed, and then had their own taken 



170 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

off, renouncing epaulettes and adopting sleeve-badges 
of rank. One of the "reasons" for this outbreak may 
be ascribed to the fact that Admirals carried a double- 
headed eagle embroidered on their shoulders, which was 
held to be a Reactionary badge. 

Subsequent events in the Baltic Fleet are too well 
known to call for detailed description. Bolshevist ele- 
ments obtained a complete mastery in some vessels. 
Two Dreadnoughts and a cruiser proceeded to Kronstadt 
in July to support the Lenin uprising.^ M. Kerensky 
ordered Admiral Verderevsky to torpedo them, but the 
order was read by the Committees, and to avoid another 
mutiny he had to promise the men not to take action. 
For this he was dismissed and was to be court-martialed, 
when suddenly M. Kerensky appointed him Minister of 
Marine. Later he again fell into disgrace. 

Our submarine crews were constantly interfered with 
by the Committees. Russian seamen manned the mother- 
ship of the flotilla. They sent emissaries who spoke 
Enghsh to persuade the British sailors to imitate their 
example. I need hardly say that they met with a chilly, 
and even a "watery," reception. 

The subsequent failure of the Baltic Fleet to repulse 
a German landing in the Gulf of Riga was to be expected, 
although it was beyond any doubt that the Russian 
ships were more numerous than those produced by the 
enemy. In modern Dreadnoughts, as well as in lesser 
craft, the Russians wielded a substantial superiority. 

More fortunately situated, the Black Sea Fleet long 

* M. Kerensky issued the following Order of the Day on this subject (July 
21st): "The detachments of Kronstadt and the battleships Petropavlovsk, 
Republic^ and Slava, the names of which have been disgraced by the actions of 
the counter-revolutionaries, shall arrest within twenty-four hours the ring- 
leaders and send them to Petrograd for trial. I hereby notify the Kronstadt 
detachments and the crews of these ships that if this order is not carried out 
they will be branded as traitors to the country and the Revolution, and the 
most rigorous measures will be taken against them." 



MUTINY OF THE SAILORS 171 

escaped the contagion. But in the end it also came 
under Bolshevist influences. Admiral Kolchak, its gallant 
commander, was "dismissed ' ' by the Committees. Under 
Lenin, German agents organized a massacre of Admirals 
and officers. 

In Kronstadt the huge naval depots had been con- 
vulsed by revolutionary agitation. Many officers were 
following special courses during the winter months, and 
had no connection with the depots. How many officers 
were killed will perhaps never be known. The bodies 
were slipped under the ice. Admiral Viren, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, was butchered in a most atrocious man- 
ner. He is said to have been burnt alive, fastened naked 
to a stake, in the presence of his distracted daughter. 
Scenes of the wildest debauchery continued for many 
days. Over two hundred officers had been cast into dun- 
geons "so that they should have a taste of incarceration." 
Admirals and captains were forcibly compelled to carry 
out repulsive menial duties. These unfortunate captives 
were detained for many months while the "Revolutionary 
Tribunal" was inquiring whether any of them had sat 
in courts-martial on the mutineers of 1905. The gar- 
rison gunners had kept aloof and preserved the fortress 
from harm. But soon, under the influence of agitators, 
they partly adhered to the Bolshevist cause. Thence- 
forward Kronstadt became a stronghold of Bolshevism, 
the headquarters of Lenin and his crew. The sailors and 
the ships sallied thence to support every succeeding dis- 
turbance in Petrograd, twenty miles up the Neva, and 
finally shelled the Winter Palace, thereby putting an 
end to Kerensky's rule. (November, 1917.) 

As Minister of Marine figured at one time a revolu- 
tionary adventurer named Lebedev. He had enlisted 
in the French Legion and risen to the rank of lieutenant. 
Returning to Russia — with or without leave from his 
superiors, I cannot say — ^he ingratiated himself with 



172 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Kerensky and was promptly raised to this high post. 
He, of course, knew nothing about naval affairs, but 
could make revolutionary speeches to the sailors. He 
always wore his French uniform. Under Bolshevist 
rule he was succeeded by a common seaman, named 
Dybenko. He claimed to have recognized Kerensky 
disguised as a sister of mercy. This was the man who 
eloped with the Bolshevist heroine Kolontay and the 
Crown Jewels. 

Shipbuilding during the Revolution came almost to 
a standstill. The dockyard hands were too busy with 
politics. Besides, the new "Ministers" had Bolshevist 
"ideas," which have no concern with national defense, 
and "sailors" were more useful on land for "lynching" 
Commanders-in-Chief who wished to fight the Germans. 



CHAPTER XV 

"NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 

Early Days of "Fraternization" — Army Displays Tendency to Revive — 
New Theory Invented — Credulity of Allies — All Incentive Killed — 
Miliukov Excluded — Tereshchenko the Tool of the Soviet — Alexeiev 
and Other Generals Resign. 

General Kornilov had given up the hopeless task 
of "commanding" the Petrograd garrison, which obeyed 
only the Soviet, and had gone to the Eighth Army (in 
April). All who understood what was passing behind 
the scenes saw clearly that Russia's hope lay in the sol- 
diers at the Front. I accompanied M. Guchkov on sev- 
eral tours of inspection, visiting the Twelfth, Fifth, and 
Second Armies, then stationed along the Dvina and 
southward. As the train left Petrograd (March 24th), 
I was told by the Minister that probably we should be 
stopped by the Soviet. However, it seems the order 
came too late. We found the Committee system rapidly 
developing, but the men still keen to fight. They were 
on good terms with their officers and gave the civilian 
Minister a rousing reception. German attacks at Riga 
had met a stout resistance. The enemy was concentrating 
forces in the rear, making ready to take advantage of the 
Revolution. Aeroplanes dropped proclamations explain- 
ing, in bad Russian, that "the English were to blame." 
They had deposed the "God-given Tsar" because he 
would not continue the war "in the interests of England," 
etc. 

Soon, however, the Germans altered their tactics. 
Realizing that military action would only stimulate 

173 



174 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

the Russian troops, they proceeded to "fraternize." 
Oflficers came under a flag of truce to General Dragomirov 
at Dvinsk offering an armistice, "so that the troops 
might exchange ideas." For this purpose the Germans 
hadorganized "kissing commandos," composed of men 
who spoke Russian. "Fraternization" was destined to 
succeed for a time. Meanwhile, desertion was taking 
place wholesale. The soldiers wanted to go home, 
because the Soviet had promised to distribute lands. 
The artillery shelled fraternizers, whereupon the infantry 
charged them with the bayonet. Then the gunners 
proceeded to enclose themselves with barbed wire. 
Finally the Germans gave up "fraternization," having 
obtained much valuable information about the Russian 
defenses and fearing lest their men might become "con- 
taminated." 

At Headquarters, General Alexeiev watched events 
with the deepest misgiving. He had been placed in 
supreme command, and refused to take the responsibility 
of permitting agitators in the Army. The Soviet insisted 
that he should issue the requisite permits to any of its 
members. An open rupture was avoided at the time by 
M. Kerensky's efforts. We know that the Soviet finally 
succeeded. As soon as the field had been opened for the 
agitators, they quickly gained control of the Committees 
and destroyed the last hopes of discipline and fighting 
efficiency. 

The abolition of the death penalty (March 20th) by 
M. Kerensky had lent an additional impetus to agitation 
in the Army. Many hundreds of thousands of deserters, 
demoralized by the cry of "land and freedom," were 
wandering about the war zone and blocking railway 
traffic, seriously aggravating the difficulties of transport. 

In conformity with the doctrine enunciated in the 
Duma two weeks before the Revolution by M. Kerensky, 
the Soviet proceeded to make overtures for peace. On 




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"NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 175 

March £7th it issued a pacifist Manifesto to the democ- 
racies of all countries, and more particularly to the 
"German brothers of the proletariat," whom it called 
upon to "cast off a despotic yoke, as the people of Russia 
had thrown off the autocracy of Tsardom/*' War was 
to be considered as an outcome of "Imperialistic aspira- 
tions" and "capitalistic policy," inasmuch as the interests 
of workers of all nations were "identical." Meanwhile 
"democratic Russia" would not "yield to the bayonets 
of a conqueror." Chkheidze had introduced this saving 
clause. As he explained to the Soviet, "So long as the 
German people refuse to overthrow Wilhelm our bayonets 
will be turned against Germany" — and therein lay the 
difference between Chkheidze and the Extremists — adding, 
"Long live the Army, whose discipline is based on the 
mutual good understanding of soldiers and oflScers!" 
This last phrase was intended as "eye-wash" for the 
bourgeoisie. 

That same day I had found in the train which was con- 
veying me to Riga a whole cargo of incendiary literature 
emanating from the Soviet. The conductors had orders 
to drop batches at every station. I took up one paper 
at random. It was the Pravda ("Truth"), organ of the 
Bolsheviki, wherein soldiers were bidden to lay down 
their arms, make peace with the German "brothers," and 
return to the villages, where "land and freedom" would 
be their portion. "Why do you distribute such stuff.?" 
I asked the conductor. "Don't you see it helps the 
Germans.?" "Yes," he replied. "It is bad for us, 
I know. But what can I do? I have my orders." And 
he showed me the inscription on one of the bundles: 
"By order of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' 
Delegates." I told M. Guchkov about it. He shrugged 
his shoulders. "We are lucky to be allowed to travel 
ourselves," was his mournful comment. 

Within a few days of the Soviet's formation we knew 



176 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

that the Extremists were doing what they pleased, al- 
though in open session Chkheidze was able to impose reso- 
lutions that suggested a "favorable complexion," repre- 
senting the majority to be imbued with "good intentions." 
However, we knew that the Bolsheviki had issued prikaz 
No. 1, and that nothing had been done by the Menshevist 
majority to counteract their fell designs. Moreover, 
the Press, almost entirely in Jewish hands, had gone 
over to the Soviet, and Moderate organs that would not 
publish the Soviet proclamations glorifying spoliation 
and promoting Anarchy had been summarily "expro- 
priated" on behalf of newly founded Socialist publica- 
tions. The revolutionary pseudo-Jews were thus destroy- 
ing Russia's hopes of a national revival and dragging 
the country into disaster. Young and old, these zealots 
intensified revolutionary passions. Through the Press 
they already wielded enormous power and were capturing 
other channels of control, the Committees and the militia 
(pohce). 

I called attention at the time to both these dangers.* 
On April 8th I reported on the Soviet's plans "to bring 
about the defeat of the Russian armies and a dishonor- 
able peace." Pacifist members of the House of Commons 
raised a great outcry, and M. Miliukov, who was attempt- 
ing the impossible task of reconciling the Soviet's pro- 
gram with sober dictates of Allied policy, indirectly 
supported the "Allied" Pacifists. On March 26th I 
reported from Riga on the pernicious influence of Jewish 
Extremists. But this appeal to moderation was wilfully 
distorted by the Jewish Press. Facts cited by me on the 
best authority were "proved" to be non-existent, and a 
campaign of slander and intimidation followed. Later on 
M. Vinaver, the eminent Jewish Deputy, admitted in 
conversation with me that Nahamkez and his ilk were 
a greater danger to the Jews than to the Russians. I 

1 The Times, March 28 and AprU 11, 1917. 



"NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 177 

felt that I had done my duty in calling attention to the 
ominous feature of the situation, and refer to these inci- 
dents here simply to show how impossible it was then 
to speak the truth about Russia. The Soviet regime 
was far worse than the okhrana. I know that on one 
occasion, at least, the okhrana had contemplated my 
expulsion for writing too freely about the Old Regime. 
Now, I was threatened with nothing less than murder. 
Under the dispensation of "freedom" applied by the 
Soviet, the truth had become unpalatable and dangerous 
in Petrograd and unacceptable in London. 

Behind the veil thus dropped by the Soviet and its 
pseudo-Jewish supporters, British and French pacifists 
worked unremittingly for the success of the Soviet plan. 
The respective Governments encouraged Socialist depu- 
tations to come and "convert" the Russian Revolution- 
aries, who knew infinitely more about revolution than 
did these "innocents." It was even rumored in Petro- 
grad that Mr. Arthur Henderson would succeed Sir 
George Buchanan. The French experiment with M. 
Albert Thomas had not, however, proved a success. The 
Allies dallied with the proposal to hold an international 
Congress in Stockholm, initiated by the Soviet in further- 
ance of its schemes. Oceans of ink were expended on this 
subject before the real motives of the Soviet were under- 
stood. Meanwhile some of the "missionaries" had them- 
selves been "converted." 

Another lamentable feature of the revolutionary period 
was the constant passage of Russian and pseudo-Jew 
revolutionaries from Allied countries. Every shipload 
that came from America, England, or France gave 
trouble. The exiles would go straight from the train 
to the Field of Mars and "stir up" the revolutionary 
pot. Whether "martyrs of Tsarism" or merely German 
spies, they all considered themselves to be entitled to 
a share in the spoils, and had to be provided with "fat 



178 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

places" in the Food, Agrarian, and other Committees. 
To these shipments we owed the advent of Bronstein- 
Trotsky and other Bolsheviki. 

The well-intentioned sophistries of M. Chkheidze 
could not long stave off a conflict between M. Miliukov 
and the Soviet. On April 10th the Provisional Govern- 
ment had issued a proclamation explaining its war policy. 
It repudiated aims of "domination" or "conquest," 
enunciated "its object to establish a durable peace on the 
basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny," 
called for "the defense, cost what it may, of our national 
patrimony and the deliverance of the country from the 
enemy who invades our borders" as "the capital and 
vital problem before our soldiers, who are defending 
the liberty of the people in close union with our Allies." 

The Soviet, under the benign influence of MM. 
Chkheidze and Tseretelli, accepted this statement of the 
case. But M. Slobelev, a Labor demagogue who had 
assumed control of the Soviet's news service and "Depart- 
ment of International Relations," was acting separately. 
So were all the Bolsheviki. Their joint activities had 
given rise to rumors that a separate peace was being 
secretly negotiated. As a matter of fact, after Russia had 
proclaimed her war aims the Austrians made a separate 
offer of a "declaration of conformity of aims," without 
specifying terms of peace. This offer had been preceded 
by a conference of the two Kaisers at Homburg and inter- 
views between Russian and German Socialists at Stock- 
holm. 

M. Mihukov thereupon addressed (May 1st) a Note to 
the Allied Governments attributing these "absurd reports" 
to "our enemies." He contrasted the "nation's" deter- 
mination as "a free democracy" "to bring the World 
War to a decisive victory" with the failure of the Old 
Regime "to appreciate and share the ideas" of her Allies 
"and of the great oversea Republic." He reaffirmed his 



"NO ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 179 

statement that "our country will maintain strict regard 
for the engagements entered into with the Allies of Rus- 
sia," and was "firmly convinced of a victorious issue to 
the present war . . . assuring a firm basis of a lasting 
peace," and the establishment "by the Allied democracies 
of guarantees and penalties necessary to prevent any 
recourse to a sanguinary war in the future." All the 
sober and stable elements in the country were thoroughly 
in accord with the tenor and substance of this Note. 
Moreover, it was substantially in agreement with the 
proclamation of April 10th, which had been accepted by 
the Soviet. 

But the words "decisive victory" could not be glozed 
over by the rhetoric of the Georgian orators. The storm 
broke as soon as the Note appeared in the papers, some 
days after its dispatch. It had not been "previously 
submitted." Kerensky denied all knowledge of it. 
Miliukov's premature pronouncement about the Regency 
was recalled, and the "free democracy" in the Soviet 
was particularly incensed that the Note should bear the 
date of the annual Labor festival. That was, so to 
speak, "the last straw." A grand palaver was arranged 
at the Marie Palace. The Bolsheviki sent orders through 
their "Chief of Staff," a certain Linde, to "concentrate" 
regiments in the square in front of the Palace. They 
intended to seize Miliukov and the other Cadet Ministers. 
Half a dozen regiments responded to the call, not knowing 
in the least what they had to do, but shouting vocifer- 
ously "Down with Miliukov!" This looked so much 
like treachery on the part of the Soviet that Kerensky 
and others for shame's sake persuaded the men to go 
to their homes, assuring them that the Soviet had never 
issued or countenanced the orders that had been given 
to them in its name. 

The outcome of this conference was the much- vaunted 
doctrine of "no annexation and no indemnity." M. 



180 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

Miliukov had to endorse it with the best grace possible 
in a further Note, which called upon the Allies to respond 
thereto. They did so readily enough, but France had, 
of course, to make certain necessary reservations in 
regard to Alsace-Lorraine, which had been French terri- 
tory. All the same M. Miliukov had to go and the Allies 
remained in disfavor. The Cadet leader was succeeded 
by young and fascinating M. Tereshchenko, a millionaire 
sugar-refiner who had coquetted with the workmen in 
Kiev and espoused their cause in the local War Industrial 
Committee. Under the Old Regime he had served as an 
oflScial in the Imperial ballet. His only qualification for 
the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs was an intimate 
knowledge of foreign languages and Allied capitals. But 
he was ready to please the Soviet, and was willing to ac- 
cept as his "assistant" an emissary of that body known as 
Avksentiev, who had been an "emigrant" in Paris, a 
writer on economics, and an inveterate supporter of the 
Socialist-Revolutionary party. (He was afterwards chosen 
President of the Peasants' Soviet, and later became Min- 
ister of the Interior.) Under these amiable auspices 
Russia's relations with her Allies continued till the Bol- 
sheviki swept the sham paraphernalia away (in November, 
1917). 

M. Guchkov had grown tired of constant interference 
from the Soviet. He had hoped to "head off" the 
Extremists by anticipating their wishes. It was a hope- 
less undertaking. M. Kerensky succeeded him, and 
tried an equally impossible task: to substitute rhetoric 
for discipline. 

General Alexeiev was requested by the Soviet to leave 
for having spoken slightingly about the "no annexation, 
no indemnity" clause. He considered it had been obvi- 
ously invented to kill any lingering inclination on the 
part of the troops to fight. What, indeed, should they 
fight about if the Soviet could drive out the invader 



,"N0 ANNEXATION AND NO INDEMNITY" 181 

with mere words? One regiment on the Central Front 
actually concluded peace with the enemy, agreeing to 
"surrender" Vilna and Kovno. "Free" Russia had 
promised to give freedom to the Poles, but why should 
the soldiers fight about it, if all the nations were to have 
the right to settle their own destinies? General Ruzsky 
was dismissed for "lack of courtesy" to Soviet agitators. 
General Lechitsky resigned because he could not stand 
the Committee nonsense. Generals Gurko, Dragomirov, 
and others followed suit. They saw the Army perishing 
under the Committee system, and could not agree to 
look on. 



CHAPTER XVI 

ANARCHY 

"Rights** for "Democrats'* and "Duties" only for Bourgeois — ^Workmen's 
"Wages" — Plunder by Soviets — Decline of Morals — ^Revelry in Winter 
Palace — Soldiers' "Joy Rides" — "Jacqueries" — Cossacks Restore some 
Order— Financial Ruin — Revolution "Costs" over $20,000,000 a Day 
—Soldiers Require a Thousand Millions Sterling — Filching the Gold 
Reserve — Art Treasures Lost. 

Two revolutionary lights came in to illuminate the 
mournful shadows of Coalition. The fire-eating Skobelev 
(nominally a Menshevik), as Minister of Labor, quickly 
stirred the workers up to a sense of their "rights." There 
was one charming feature about the Russian Revolution 
that much simplified all social and political questions: 
the partisans of Revolution had rights, the other people 
had only duties. M. Skobelev told the workers that all 
the profits of the mills should be theirs, and all the working 
expenses should be paid by the capitalist owners. The 
bland Chernov, alias Feldmann (a hybrid Socialist-Revo- 
lutionary with Bolshevist leanings and pro-German 
tendencies), as Minister of Agriculture, secretly incited 
the peasants to "take possession," while he ostensibly 
professed adherence to the recognized understanding that 
the land question could be settled only by the Constituent 
Assembly. "Meanwhile, why should they wait.? All the 
same it would be theirs." 

Both these "Socialists" were well off, and Feldmann- 
Chernov was reputed to hold large estates in the Caucasus, 
where they would be safe. Protection was also accorded 
to M. Tereshchenko's estates. A neighbor of his told me: 

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ANARCHY 183 

"We have no trouble, I am thankful to say. The Min- 
ister had troops sent to guard his property, and the whole 
neighborhood is quiet." 

We have seen that the Cadets failed miserably in their 
Coalition venture. Miliukov had been hounded out. 
Shingarev, a country doctor who had made a name in 
party and later in Duma dialectics, specializing in finan- 
cial questions, had tried to tackle the food problem at 
the Ministry of Agriculture. Then he had succeeded 
M. Tereshchenko at the Ministry of Finance. M. 
Nekrasov, a Siberian railway expert, had seceded from the 
party in order to remain in the Cabinet with the Socialists. 
He went from Communications to Finance. As the 
Soviet grew stronger it cast off most of the non-Socialist 
Ministers. Later, the Revolution, like Saturn, devoured 
many of its children. 

Anarchy in the Government was magnified a hundred- 
fold in the country. The workmen simply did not know 
how much to ask in wages and emoluments. At one 
great rubber factory they brought a number of sacks 
with a request that they should be filled with money — 
"the war profits of three years" — or they would "put the 
directors into the sacks and drown them." As nearly 
all the products of industry were being purchased by the 
Government for war purposes, the State had to pay higher 
prices. Private enterprise was completely crippled. All 
the smaller establishments had to close. The larger 
ones continued, losing money. But things looked so bad 
that they would surely have to improve, some time. 
They did not, and finally the Bolsheviki proclaimed the 
confiscation of all industries for the workmen. 

But money could be freely made. Russia was spend- 
ing fifty millions of rubles a day. This huge "dole" had 
to go into somebody's pockets. The Soviet absorbed 
its "share." Its members rolled about in expensive 
motor-cars. Kerensky, a humble lawyer, was no excep- 



184 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

tion to the rule. He lived in the Winter Palace, used 
the Emperor's carriages and motors, drank his cham- 
pagne, and fed lusciously out of his gold plate. 

The morals of "Free" Russia corresponded with the 
general absence of restraint among the Revolutionaries. 
"Ideals" had been swamped in the general scramble for 
material enjoyment. Kerensky set the example. There 
had not been so much rollicking gayety in the Winter 
Palace since the day it was built. Who could talk 
about Razputin now, while all this merriment was going 
on? Revolutionary Ministers were too much occupied 
with marrying and giving in marriage. They used the 
Imperial Crowns for the nuptial ceremony. They lodged 
their mistresses in grand-ducal abodes. Ajpres nous le 
deluge. 

While the domestic servants in Petrograd were dis- 
puting as to the respective merits of the eight- and the 
nine-hour day, under the belief that the one began at 
eight and the other at nine o'clock, their peasant relations 
were trying to live up to the general tone. Mansions 
pillaged, farmsteads destroyed, cattle maimed, land- 
owners, small and great, murdered or fugitive — such was 
the common report. Even the prisoners of war took a 
hand in the game. 

The whole apparatus of local government had been 
swept away. Half the Zemstvos were no more. They 
had been "replaced" by "committees" or "republics," 
governed by local hooligans, escaped convicts, and a 
sprinkling here and there of the Third Element. But 
most of its members were away at the Front. 

Few taxes were paid; the local treasuries were empty 
and had to obtain funds from Petrograd. The State 
Bank could not cope with the demand for notes, and 
increased the denominations to two thousand rubles. 
Previously the highest note had been five hundred rubles. 
Only the luckless manufacturers paid taxes, and they 



ANARCHY 185 

had been assessed by the Soviet economists at 97 per 
cent on the gross profits. Soviet agitators constantly 
clamored for a "compulsory expropriation" of the 
banks, thinking they could find money there galore. 
The soldiers' pay had been increased tenfold. They 
gambled, drank, and danced. The barracks resembled 
houses of ill-fame. Things were not much worse when 
Lenin "governed" in name as well as in deed. 

Living had cost fivefold its normal level when the 
Revolution broke out. It steadily increased. Every- 
body who could go left Petrograd. The Crimea and Cau- 
casus were choked up with fugitives. Huge fortunes had 
been made. They were squandered in riotous living and 
gambling in the cities and in entertainments of unprece- 
dented extravagance in the favorite Crimean resorts. 
The cities "beyond the pale" were overrun by the Chil- 
dren of Israel. At last they had taken possession of the 
"promised land." The soldiers in Petrograd traveled 
daily to Finland — without tickets, of course — to smuggle 
cigarettes, which they sold at a big profit, while their 
worthy comrades at Vyborg competed with them in the 
business. It would require a whole volume to describe 
all the abuses, corruption, and scoundrelism that went on 
in Russia during the reign of the Soviet. Never had a 
country suffered as much from the most ruthless invader. 

Earlier in his career, Kerensky had compared his coun- 
trymen with "mutinous slaves." But his own theories 
were largely responsible for the degradation, and he himself 
succumbed to it. The ideals of the Revolution were fine 
enough, if somewhat crude. Everybody became tovariskch 
(companion, comrade). The word appealed to the sim- 
ple, democratic ideas of the people. Private soldiers 
addressed their officers in this way. They called Kerensky 
"Tovarishch Minister." It sounded well enough from 
the lips of some old peasant-reservist, who in his village 
was accustomed to address everybody — his superiors as 



186 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

well as his equals — in tlie familiar second person singular. 
Under the banner of "class warfare" it became a mockery, 
a sign of contempt. 

Election urns were brought to the bedsides of wounded 
soldiers so that all should vote on municipal affairs with 
which they had absolutely no concern, simply because the 
soldier vote would go to the Socialists, and preferably to 
the Bolsheviki. The schools were invaded by Soviet 
delegates, who terrorized the pupils and deprived them of 
food. Sons of "counter-revolutionaries" were driven out 
of the military colleges. Red Cross hospitals were also 
"revolutionized." The soldier orderlies formed com- 
mittees, which decided what food and what medical or 
surgical treatment was to be applied, and forbade any 
rations to nurses or doctors other than the "ordinary" of 
the peasant-soldier. 

Here are some observations that I was able to make in 
the courfe of my travels within and without the war zone. 
In Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, and other large cities, the 
demoralized and undisciplined soldiery monopolized the 
tramcars, brutally flinging off women and children, and 
overcrowding them so that fatal accidents were of daily 
occurrence. Much worse was the condition of the railway 
service. Soldiers invaded every train, occupied all the 
carriages and compartments, corridors, lavatories, and 
even the footboards and roofs. Suburban traffic was im- 
practicable. Summer resort residents had a bad time, 
and officers "perched" on the steps while the men reveled 
on the cushions of first-class compartments. The revolu- 
tionary troops were "visiting" or "prospecting," which 
meant expropriation of palaces and villas, private. Im- 
perial, or grand-ducal, contraband "trade" in cigarettes, 
etc. Others were going home to "grab" land, others 
again "toured" the country. One soldier related to me 
that his free "joy ride" on the trains had extended to 
Archangel and Vladivostock. These "tourists" were 



ANARCHY 187 

acquiring first-hand knowledge of Greater Russia. Anar- 
chy was not altogether an unmixed evil so far as they were 
concerned. 

Foreigners traveling through Siberia were not molested, 
at first, although Russian passengers were unceremoni- 
ously bundled out of their compartments. But station- 
masters were often compelled to turn back a train because 
the soldiers wanted to go in that direction. Refresh- 
ment-rooms were plundered and wrecked. Restaurant 
cars had to be abandoned because the men invaded them 
and ate up all the provisions — without payment, of course. 

On the Moscow and Vitebsk lines, and all the railways 
leading from the Front, pandemonium reigned. Here 
no regard was shown to foreigners or Allied officers. One 
unfortunate British subaltern, nearing Petrograd, was 
thrown out of his compartment by the troops at Tsarskoe 
Selo, beaten, and imprisoned. Allied military repre- 
sentatives going to Headquarters met with^ brutality 
equally egregious. One General of my acquaintance had 
to sleep on the floor, while the revolutionary "heroes" 
crowded into his bed. Even the Commander-in-Chief, 
proceeding to visit the armies, had his carriage invaded 
and narrowly escaped being "marooned." Fortunately 
he had a small armed guard, and when the train was in 
the open country it was stopped, and the invaders had 
to jump off or be shot. I could multiply instances of 
this kind without end. The men who climbed on to the 
roofs in the cold of winter stamped their feet to keep 
themselves warm, and often broke through and fell 
on their comrades below. At night-time they frequently 
slipped off in their sleep, or were knocked off when the 
train passed under bridges or tunnels. Hence they 
came to be called letckiki (flyers). 

Whatever they touched they stole or destroyed. 
Window-curtains were torn off for all sorts of sumptuary 
purposes, for footgear or clothing. All the fittings dis- 



188 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

appeared. Benches were demolished for fuel. The in- 
side of a railway carriage after being thus "appropriated" 
was an appalling sight. Moreover, in their mad rush for 
seats, many would try to anticipate those who were 
entering by the doors, which in Russian trains are always 
at either end of the carriage, by flinging themselves 
through the windows, first smashing them with the 
heavy sacks wherein they carried "loot." I have hud- 
dled in a first-class compartment, the only passenger 
with a ticket, pell-mell with soldiers, nurses, and wounded 
men, and seen these sacks landing in our midst, preceded 
by fragments of glass and followed by the owners. More- 
over, food and goods trains were being systematically 
plundered by the deserters. 

For weeks and months this abomination continued. 
The so-called "Government" was powerless, the Com- 
mittees had no authority, and the railway staff were cowed 
and terrorized. Then the Cossacks took charge, and soon 
matters improved for a time. For the Cossacks would 
stand no nonsense. By that time also the cavalry began 
to round up deserters and to guard the main railway 
junctions. Everybody had to produce a document of 
some sort. But the deserters easily procured them. 
Whenever a man had made up his mind to leave his 
regiment, he simply notified the Committee and was 
furnished with a pass, or he terrorized the surgeon into 
issuing a certificate. (Lenin revived railway anarchy.) 

Meanwhile the transport crisis had been growing daily 
more acute from other causes. Cars and locomotives 
were in need of repair. The rolling stock had not been 
properly overhauled for several years, owing to pressing 
need of transport. It was thoroughly worn out, and 
almost every train had to "drop" a car or two on account 
of minor breakages. But the men in the railway work- 
shops were too busy with politics and committees. Thou- 
sands of engines were standing idle because these men had 



ANARCHY 189 

other matters to occupy their time. And, not satisfied 
with idling, they forcibly took over the management of 
several lines. At Tsaritsyn, an important food junction, 
they even proclaimed a separate Republic. 

Financial and administrative anarchy may be charac- 
terized by the situation as observed by me in one of the 
administrative divisions of the province of Petrograd soon 
after the Revolution.^ This district contains agricultural, 
timber, and textile industries. The local assessment 
amounted to about $175,000, which covered expenditure 
on roads, schools, hospitals, and police. Most of this 
money was expended for the people, but only $12,500 
came from the peasants and working-men— the rest was 
paid by land, forest, and mill-owners. The local admin- 
istration had been in the hands of the district Zemstvos, 
composed of elected tax-payers, who worked in the public 
cause gratuitously. Under the Soviet regime the Zemst- 
vos and police were driven out and the district was spKt 
up into seventeen separate republics, each under a com- 
mittee composed of workmen or peasants, ruled by a 
carpet-bag politician. They enrolled their own militia. 
The seventeen committees established a pay-roll for them- 
selves and their agents aggregating over $500,000, or three 
times the amount of the local revenue. They impounded 
and divided whatever money came into the local treasury 
office, levying contributions from the land and mill-owners 
to make up the difference. Private houses were annexed 
whenever they suited the convenience of the committees; 
parks and gardens were invaded; land was appropriated, 
and trees were felled and stolen by the peasants, but the 
owner had no right to dispose of his property. Open 
violence was not of frequent occurrence, because no one 
ventured to offer any resistance to the committees. 

Here are some incidents of rural life during the Rev- 
olution. A certain aged landowner who had enough 

1 The Times, September 22, 1917. 



190 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

money to satisfy modest requirements decided to make 
a present of his broad acres to the peasants, rather than 
be troubled by agrarian disorders. Summoning the vil- 
lagers, he said: "I am leaving after to-morrow to end 
my days in town. Take my land; divide it among 
you; it is yours." The peasants were grateful. Imme- 
diately they' began to discuss the momentous question how 
to divide the property. It was a difficult matter to adjust. 
The argument became so fierce that half a dozen of them 
died before nightfall. By the following sundown the 
deaths had doubled in number. When the proprietor 
reached his town residence he was followed by a deputation 
of the peasants. "Take back your land," they implored 
him: "if you do not, we shall all be dead." Another 
landowner offered one-third of his acreage to the peasants. 
Then one village rose against another, each claiming the 
preference, and, rather than agree to a compromise or 
fight out their quarrel, they each set a watch upon the 
other. The property was thus exceedingly well guarded. 

Another case is worth citing. The local committee 
had, as usual, fixed a minimum wage for farm labor. 
Formerly the pay did not exceed fifty cents a day. 
The committee decided that nobody must work for less 
than $5. Now, the peasants knew quite well that the 
landlord could not afford such remuneration. They 
were willing to work for much less, but they feared the 
bad men on the committee, who would not scruple to 
burn their houses and crops if they disobeyed. They 
sought a way out of the difficulty, and found it. "We 
sign a receipt for ten rubles ($5) a day, and you give 
us one ruble and a half (75c.)." A secret compact was 
thus concluded between the farmer and his laborers, and 
a few thousand acres remained under cultivation that 
otherwise would have lain fallow. 

In another place the peasants, carried away by M. 
Chernov's wild scheme of land spoliation, "grabbed" 



fr 







4) O 



K, ^ 



ANARCHY 191 

a landowner's property, plowed and sowed the fields, 
neglecting their own allotments. Then they began to 
divide up the stolen acres, and came to blows and murder. 
Finally they sent word to the owner: "Take back what 
belongs to you. We want nothing for our work, nothing 
for our seeds: we want only to remain alive." 

These incidents, culled "behind the scenes," afford 
some explanation of the surprising fact that amid the 
anarchy and terror spread broadcast over the land by 
Soviet agencies the instincts of a national conservatism 
had not altogether left the minds of the masses.^ 

To deal with the land question, "agrarian committees" 
had been established under the auspices of the Chernov 
administration. They were filled by revolutionary adven- 
turers, and their pay-roll aggregated $70,000,000 per 
annum. 

At the Moscow Conference, convoked by M. Kerensky 
at the end of August, 1917, astonishing figures were given 
by Ministers regarding the economic crisis. In the hope 
of grappling with the food problem, the Government 
had introduced a monopoly on grain stuffs. This method 
had been applied in other countries with success. But 
it required an efficient machinery of purchase, control, 
and distribution. None of these requisites were avail- 
able amid the prevailing anarchy. Local "food com- 
mittees" were instituted under the direction of a central 
board in Petrograd. One may easily picture the result. 
All these bodies were filled with adventurers or scoundrels 
who had no qualification except the profession of "revo- 
lutionary sentiments." Plunder and profiteering became 
a thousandfold more prevalent than had ever been known 
in pre-revolutionary times. Besides, these new "organ- 

^The Bolshevist "Government," soon after its usurpation of power in 
Petrograd (November, 1917), ordained the confiscation of all lands except those 
belonging to peasants, and all industrial property, for the benefit of the workers. 



192 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

izations" involved an outlay of colossal sums, amounting 
to $250,000,000. 

The peasants were still disinclined to sell their grain, 
in spite of high prices, because they could not purchase 
necessaries of life with the money. Boots cost ten times 
as much as formerly, but even at this price were difficult 
to procure. The leather trade had been disorganized. 
Textiles were worth their weight in gold and difficult to 
obtain. Owing to labor anarchy the mill production 
had fallen so tremendously that the total visible supply 
of cotton goods amounted in August, 1917, to 29,000,000 
yards for a population of over 180,000,000, or less than 
seven inches of material per capita. There were large 
quantities of food in the country and huge stores of grain 
in Siberia, but they were immobilized by lack of trans- 
port and inefficient or corrupt organization. And the 
Revolution had intensified the difficulties of coping with 
the problem. 

Measures for increasing transport capacity were pro- 
posed by the American Railway Commission, which had 
been sent to Russia in order to help the new regime. 
These measures would have increased goods traffic by 
40 or 50 per cent. But the prevailing anarchy rendered 
any improvement impossible. 

Within a few months of the outbreak of revolution the 
Treasury was completely emptied in order to supply 
colossal sums for revolutionary organizations (the Agra- 
rian and Food Committees, the Soviet and its affiliations) 
and for supplementary pay and allowances to the troops. 
Later, under the Kerensky administration and Soviet 
rule, this item increased to such an extent that the 
"supplementary requirements" of the Army called for 
an outlay of $5,500,000,000 (eleven milliards of rubles) 
per annum, representing an additional expenditure of 
about $450 per man, of which $50 were for pay and $400 



ANARCHY 193 

for food and other allowances. The "revolutionary" 
soldier was to be well cared for. 

Russia had spent $24,500,000,000 on the war,i and 
against this outlay had raised $17,500,000,000 on loans 
and notes; ^ the surplus of Ordinary Budgets provided 
about $900,000,000, leaving a deficit in unpaid bills 
amounting to $6,100,000,000 (figures for July, 1917). 
The rate of increase of expenditure before and after the 
Revolution may be estimated approximately by the issue 
of paper money. During the war months of 1914 the issue 
of banknotes averaged $109,500,000 per month; in 1915 it 
had risen very slightly to $111,500,000, and in 1916 
to $145,000,000. But during the revolutionary months 
(March to August, 1917), the averages leapt to $416,000,- 
000. Reckoning the difference between the last two 
averages, the Revolution had thus cost Russia, in actual 
Treasury disbursements in the form of paper currency, 
the colossal sum of $1,890,000,000 in seven months. This, 
of course, gives but a faint idea of losses sustained by 
industry and agriculture and the wanton destruction of 
State and private property, besides art treasures and his- 
torical relics of priceless value. 

^ According to a statement published in the Petrograd official Trade and 
Industrial Gazette (September 26, 1917), the total war expenditure, in actual 
disbursements by the Treasury, was given at Rs.41,392,700,000, of which 
Rs.80,944,600,000 were for the Army and Rs.2,057,900 for the Navy. Also 
included in the general total were immense sums, running altogether into mil- 
liards of rubles, assigned for other needs created by the war. Thus, up to 
September 14, 1917, were expended Rs. 3,264,100,000 on allowances to the 
families of soldiers; for the construction of new railways for military purposes, 
Rs. 369,300,000, and for developing those already in existence, Rs.1,172,700,000; 
on orders for railway engines and rolling-stock, Rs.617,600,000; on constructing 
and improving ports, Rs.115,200,000; further, on roads and waterways, 
Rs.79,700,000; on the development of the post and telegraph services, Rs.l22,- 
400,000; and so on. Finally, a very large sum, amounting to Rs.569,500,000, 
was used in giving assistance to refugees. The par value of the ruble was 
about fifty cents. 

2 The Soviet had constantly impeded the raising of War Loans, and at one 
time threatened to boycott the so-called "Liberty" Loan. 



194 "DEMOCRACY," "SOCIALISM," "FREEDOM" 

M. Nekrasov, then Minister of Finance, declared that 
never had the Tsar's government been so prodigal as 
"revolutionary Russia." What calamitous consequences 
had already been brought about by revolutionary excesses 
and anarchy? He pointed out that during the first 
three months after the Revolution the State revenue 
had declined in the following proportions, as compared 
with 1916: Land tax by 32 per cent, town real estate 
tax by 41 per cent, lodging tax by 43 per cent, war tax 
by 29 per cent, industrial tax by 19 per cent, insurance 
tax by 27 per cent, and outstanding land redemption 
dues by 65 per cent. This decline had been far greater 
in the following months. He warned his hearers that 
any measures of confiscation or expropriation of capital 
or real estate would only lead to a complete disappearance 
of the revenue, and would react upon the people at large, 
as their savings had been deposited in the State and private 
banks. ^ What has been shown above sufficed to render 
the continuation of war a financial impossibility. Lenin 
had been "behind the scenes"; he did "better" still 
when he himself appeared "on the boards." 

Having no funds wherewith to carry out the extrava- 
gant "bribes" promised to the soldiers, M. Kerensky's 
Government was compelled subsequently to disband a 
large portion of the Army. But the Committees and 
Soviets continued to draw their emoluments so long as 
the printing presses at the State Banks could provide 

1 On September 1, 1917, the State Bank held 1,297,932,927 rubles in gold 
in its vaults and 2,308,006,718 rubles in gold in foreign banks — altogether 
about $1,600,000,000 in gold. The issue of notes had then reached the sum of 
14,676,172,052 rubles. During the preceding week it had issued 245,000,000 
rubles in paper, and the available paper currency at the Bank did not exceed 
138,827,948 rubles. The deposits at the State Savings Banks had risen 
enormously prior to the Revolution, amounting in October, 1916, to 3,458,- 
200,000 rubles in cash and 1,119,900,000 rubles in securities. The Bol- 
sheviki in November, 1916, "captured" $300,000,000 in gold at the Moscow 
branch of the State Bank. 



ANARCHY 195 

enough paper money. When Leniu took possession the 
state of the Treasury was already hopeless. To carry 
on, he sought a loan of $5,000,000 from the State Bank, 
and tried to get the money by subterfuge, which failed; 
then the banks were "expropriated." The Bolsheviki 
repudiated Russia's State loans, ignoring the claims of the 
people whose savings they thereby sacrificed. 

At the end of 1917 Russia's debts, unsecured by any 
assets, exceeded the colossal figure of fifteen milliards 
of rubles ($7,500,000,000). Such were the net results of 
the Revolution. It had "cost" over $20,000,000 a day. 
Its cost in 1918 cannot be estimated in figures. 



PART III 
RUSSIA AT WAR 

CHAPTER XVII 

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 

Second Humiliation Repulsed — Pourtales and Sazonov — ^A Forgotten Doc- 
ument — ^Wilhelm's Ruse to Gain Time — Pledged his "Word of Honor" 
— Sukhomlinov's Boast — Russia "Ready" — Popidar Enthusiasm — Suc- 
cess of the Mobilization — Hopes of Reform — ^The Grand Duke and Yan- 
ushkevich — ^Efficient Generals "Shelved." 

Russia opened the struggle with Austro-Germany 
under the happiest auspices. The people were unanimous. 
They had had enough of German influence and domi- 
nation. Already, in 1909, when Austria tried to force the 
Balkan issue on the backs of the Serbs, all the educated 
classes understood that she was merely a skirmisher for 
the German hosts, then preparing to hurl themselves at 
the Empire of the Tsars; and the humiliation inflicted 
upon Russia in the person of M. Sazonov by the German 
Ambassador, Count Pourtales, was felt and resented by 
them. The masses and the classes, workmen and peas- 
ants, nobles and burgesses, rich and poor, without dis- 
tinction of race or religion, hailed the call to arms. The 
Winter Palace was thronged with hundreds of thousands 
of loyal subjects, who acclaimed the Sovereigns on their 
appearance on the balcony. The troops inside the 
Palace mingled their prayers with those of the autocrat. 
Vociferous cheers resounded in honor of the Grand Duke 
Nicholas Nikolaievich as he drove away from this memo- 

197 



198 RUSSIA AT WAR 

rable function flying the black and yellow pennant of 
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Russia's armies. 

Even to the "man in the street," unversed in the 
secrets of diplomacy or military plans, it was quite 
clear that the Germans were out to fight; that Russia 
and her Allies and friends were in for a querelle d'allemand ^ 
— as the French so adequately express it — a quarrel which 
the Teutons were picking simply and solely because they 
felt themselves strong enough to win against ail possible 
odds, and had determined to crush opposition to their 
dreams of world-power and oppression. 

The Russians had been developing their strength in 
industry and commerce during the decade of semi-consti- 
tutional existence. They believed that their Army was 
well equipped. The Minister of War, in an inspired 
article published by the Press, had announced "We are 
ready." So they would stand no more humiliations. 

^ Germany in 1909 compelled Russia, under threat of war, to exercise 
pressure upon the Serbs in a quarrel which had the sympathy and approval of 
Russia and other countries. And in 1914 Count Pourtales was confident that 
the Russians would also not fight. The author met him in the drawing-room 
of the Foreign OiOBce at Petrograd almost daily during the week that preceded 
hostilities. The German Ambassador went out of his way to persuade the 
author, whom he "knew to be influential among prominent Russians," to 
"warn his Russian friends not to be led astray by the clamor of the Press" — 
meaning the Novoe Vremya, the leading anti-German organ — "into imagining 
that the country would support them in going to war about a trumpery affair 
like the Serbian question." He (Pourtales) was "well informed" about the 
feeling of the country. The author tried in vain to persuade him that he was 
mistaken. Pourtales then oracularly declared that the existing attitude of 
certain elements in Petrograd was "extremely dangerous" — clearly indicating 
that Germany had made up her mind to fight. When the mobilization of the 
Russian armies was publicly announced, Germany sent an ultimatum demand- 
ing that Russia should "recall" or "cancel" the mobilization within twelve 
hours. Even then Pourtales was confident that the Tsar's Government would 
give in. He came to Sazonov with two notes verhales written on a sheet of paper: 
the one to be read in case of Russia's consent, the other in the improbable case 
(as Pourtales imagined it) of her refusal. When Sazonov calmly announced 
that Russia had already given her answer, Pourtales lost countenance, burst 
into tears, and departed, forgetting the telltale document in his hurry and 
confusion. 




Photo taken by the Author m July, 1916. 



RUSSIA S FIGHTING GENERALS 

General Irmanov, of the famous Third Caucasian Corps, showing his diamond-hilted 
sword — the highest reward for leadership — to General Abram Dragomirov, of the Ninth 
Army Corps. General Irmanov resigned his rank during the Revolution and enlisted as a 
private soldier. He was then hale and hearty, though over 70 years old. General 
Dragomirov was afterwards Commander-in-Chief of one of the Fronts, and resigned in 
protest against Bolshevism. Their Chiefs of Staff, General Rosanov and Colonel Iskritsky» 
stand beside them. 



THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 199 

Since the Germans wanted a "preventive war," let them 
have it. " God is on our side ! " 

Never had the Tsar been so popular as at that moment. 
He had proclaimed war against drunkenness — the great 
national evil — and now he had proclaimed war on the 
Germans, the nation's foes. People readily overlooked 
the appointment of Goremykin as Prime Minister; they 
even forgot the absurd notion that had inspired the 
Imperial rescript on March 19, 1914, wherein it was set 
forth, in blind disregard of the teachings of history and 
common sense, that "futile aspirations" — meaning con- 
stitutional reform — were irreconcilable with "the welfare 
of the people." 

In proclaiming war, the Tsar said from the Throne: 

At present we have not only to succor a kindred land which has been un- 
justly wronged, but to safeguard the honor, dignity, and integrity of Russia 
as a Great Power. We firmly believe that in the defense of their country all 
our true subjects will rise united in a spirit of self-sacrifice. At this great 
hour of trial may all internal differences be forgotten; may the union of the 
Tsar and his people become closer and stronger. 

Russians believed that the Tsar, in summoning his 
people to embark upon a national war, had abjured his 
superannuated notions, and in this spirit they understood 
the Tsar's Manifesto. 

Having lived in Russia during the days of the war 
with Turkey (1877-8) and the war with Japan (1904-5), 
I can confidently say that nothing like the same enthu- 
siasm was observable at the outbreak of either of those 
two conflicts; yet the former had been essentially a 
popular and a patriotic enterprise. 

Anxiety prevailed only on one point: would the 
British nation join in the struggle.'^ During the few days 
that elapsed between the proclamation of war by Russia 
and the announcement that England had become her 
Ally, many prominent Russians appealed to me, among 
them being MM. Krivoshein and Sazonov. My reply 



200 RUSSIA AT WAR 

was: *'I stake my head on it. The Germans will force 
us to fight, even should we still wish to stand aloof." 
Extraordinary scenes of enthusiasm were witnessed by 
me in the Duma after the news came that Great Britain 
had espoused the cause of injured nations. Allied rep- 
resentatives received tremendous ovations, such as the 
Duma had never known. 

In view of the facts that have been adduced regarding 
Germany's scheme of a "preventive war," it is interesting 
to cite some interesting revelations made by General 
Yanushkevich, the Chief of Staff, and General Sukhom- 
linov, the former Minister of War, on his trial before the 
Supreme Court in Petrograd last September. They 
throw a curious light upon the circumstances of the out- 
break of hostilities. Germany, be it noted, had planned 
to overwhelm France, and, having soon crushed her, to 
launch all her legions upon Russia. It was, therefore, of 
the highest importance to the General Staff in Berlin that 
the mobilization of the Russian Army should be delayed; 
every day gained at the outset of war would be of price- 
less value. We shall see how vital was this consideration 
when we treat of the first invasion of East Prussia. 

The Germans subsequently asserted that their mobili- 
zation began "officially" only after Russia had com- 
menced mobilization. The argument does not bear crit- 
icism. The Germans knew that Russia would require 
three weeks to mobilize her Army, whereas they could 
place all their war effectives in the field within half that 
space of time, thanks principally to their great superiority 
in railways. Moreover, the machinery of mobilization 
could be started in Germany — and was so started — before 
an official announcement was made, whereas in Russia it 
could not begin without an Imperial ukaz promulgated 
by the Senate. 

W^en, in response to British appeals, Wilhelm osten- 
sibly agreed to "restrain" Austria-Hungary and pledged 



THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 201 

his "word of honor" to the Tsar (July 30th) not to 
mobihze the German Army if Russia abstained from a 
general mobilization, the German troops on the French 
border were already being concentrated for their dash 
into Belgium, and on this point the Allied Staffs had 
precise information. Wilhelm was thus making use of 
British peace efforts to hoodwink the Tsar and to gain 
time. It was a ruse de guerre of a kind which the Germans 
persistently resorted to before and during the war. 

General Yanushkevich deposed as follows: "On 
July 29th we had decided to mobilize. The Emperor 
instructed me to convey assurances to Count Pourtales, 
the German Ambassador, that in proclaiming a mobili- 
zation Russia intended no hostile act towards Germany. 
I informed Sazonov; the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had a poor opinion of Pourtales. He said that Pourtales 
would construe my words in his own way, and advised 
me to have a talk with the German Military Attache, 

who was more competent in such matters. Major 

answered my summons at the General Staff. He had 
usually come in uniform, and punctually at the time 
appointed, and spoken in Russian. On this occasion he 
kept me waiting a whole hour, appeared in plain clothes, 
and spoke only in French. I pointed out that Russia 
had no aggressive intentions towards Germany. The 
Major replied that, unfortunately, Russia had already 
begun to mobilize. I assured him that the mobilization 
had not begun. He then declared with aplomb that on 
this point he had more precise information. I gave him 
my word of honor as Chief of the General Staff that, 
at that precise moment, 3 p.m., July 29th, the mobili- 
zation had not yet been proclaimed. He still remained 
incredulous. I then offered to give him a written pledge. 
He politely declined it. At that moment the Russian 
mobilization had not commenced, although the ukaz 
ordering the mobilization was in my pocket. 



202 RUSSIA AT WAR 

"From the Attache's behavior," continued the wit- 
ness, "I understood that Germany had decided before- 
hand to have war with us, and that no power on earth 
could avert war. I understood, and afterwards I defi- 
nitely ascertained, that at that moment Germany had 
already mobilized, but had managed to do so in secret, 
although the German Press asserted that at that moment 
Germany had not mobilized and that Russia had begun 
to mobilize. I categorically affirm that the first day of 
mobilization in Russia was the 30th of July." 

Proceeding with his account of what transpired on the 
29th and 30th July, General Yanushkevich deposed: 
*'It was first decided to order a partial mobilization, 
affecting only the southwestern military districts, in 
order to frighten Austria-Hungary. Then this matter 
was reconsidered, and on July 30th, after I had made a 
report to the Emperor, the ukaz to the Senate, ordering 
a general mobilization, was signed. In urging a general 
mobilization, I had pointed out to the Tsar the necessity 
of defining our attitude quite clearly, not only towards 
Austria, but also towards Germany, who stood behind 
Austria's back. We knew quite well that Germany 
desired war, that, indeed, she was incapable of deferring 
a conflict because she was aware that our enlarged pro- 
gram would be ready in 1918, and that she must needs 
use her opportunities before the program was com- 
pleted. From Peterhof I came straight to the Council of 
Ministers, then sitting, and read out to them the ukaz 
that had been signed by the Emperor. 

"But, late that same day (July 30th), about 11 p.m., 
I was summoned to the telephone by the Emperor. He 
asked me what was the position of the mobilization. I 
answered that it was already in progress. Another 
question was then put to me: * Would it not be possible 
to substitute a partial for a general mobilization, so that 
only Austria-Hungary should be affected.'^' I replied 



THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 203 

that it would be exceedingly difficult, that such a course 
would entail a veritable catastrophe, that mobilization 
had already begun, that 400,000 reservists had been 
summoned. ... Then it was explained to me by the 
Emperor that he had received a telegram from Wilhelm, 
in which Wilhelm pledged his word of honor that if 
a general mobilization were not proclaimed by us the 
relations between Germany and Russia would remain 
*as hitherto,' friendly. 

"After the conversation with the Tsar," continued 
General Yanushkevich, "I hastened to Sazonov, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and convinced him that it 
was not possible at that hour to recall the general mobili- 
zation. I implored him to give his support. He prom- 
ised me to report to the Emperor in the morning. He did 
so, and at half -past four in the afternoon of July 31st a 
conference was held at the Palace, at which Sazonov, 
Sukhomlinov, and myself were present. In ten minutes 
we had decided that it was impossible to withhold a gen- 
eral mobilization, as such a course would be fatal to Russia. 
Sazonov had reported to the Emperor in this sense. At 
5 P.M. the question was definitely settled in favor of 
the general mobilization." 

But it transpired afterwards that General Yanushke- 
vich's telephone conversations during those days with 
the Tsar and other personages were immediately reported 
to the German General Staff, which knew precisely the 
day, the hour, and the substance of every such conver- 
sation. General Yanushkevich noticed the ominous click 
which betrays the "tapping" of a "through" call, and 
immediately gave orders to put up a direct wire to Peter- 
hof. 

Resuming his account of the earlier conversation with 
the Tsar, General Yanushkevich added: "I ventured 
to retort that I had no faith in Wilhelm's word of honor, 
because I knew definitely that Germany had already 



204 RUSSIA AT WAR 

mobilized. And, as a matter of fact, I had received 
suflficiently reliable information at that time to show that 
Germany had mobilized. There is a difference between 
Russian and German methods. In Germany the mobili- 
zation is carried out by orders from the Minister of War, 
but with us it has to be preceded by the promulgation 
of a ukaz through the Senate." 

This narrative was borne out by the statements of 
General Sukhomlinov. He deposed as follows: "On 
the night of July 30th I was rung up by the Emperor 
and told to cancel the mobilization." (The ex-Minis ter 
of War, in his further deposition, showed — as General 
Yanushkevich had explained — that the Tsar wanted to 
revert to a partial mobilization.) "It was a direct order, 
not admitting rejoinder. I was overcome, knowing that 
it was impossible to cancel the mobilization for technical 
reasons, and also because it would provoke frightful 
confusion in the country. . . . Half an hour later General 
Yanushkevich telephoned. The Emperor had told him 
to suspend the mobilization. He replied that it was 
technically impossible to do so. Then the Tsar had 
said: 'All the same, suspend it.' General Yanushkevich 
Sasked me what was he to do. I replied: 'Do nothing.' 
I heard General Yanushkevich utter a sigh of relief, 
saying 'Thank God!' 

"Next morning I lied to the Emperor — I told him 
that the mobilization was proceeding partially, only in 
the southwest, although I knew that the mobilization 
was a general one and that it was impossible to stop it. 
Fortunately the Emperor changed his mind that day, 
and I was thanked instead of being censured." 

While the mobilization was in progress General Suk- 
homlinov obtained the Emperor's permission to set 
aside half the Winter Palace for the convenience of 
G.O.C.'s, who there consulted together before joining 
their armies at the Front. But jealousy of the Minister's 



THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 205 

influence led to a peremptory order to stop these consul- 
tations. The Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich had 
never forgiven General Sukhomlinov for abolishing the 
Supreme Council of State Defense, of which he had been 
President. He now suspected the Minister of designing 
to take control of strategy during the campaign, as he 
had monopolized the direction of Army affairs before 
the war. He had all the more grounds for this appre- 
hension because Sukhomlinov had been the Tsar's tutor 
in strategy. These bickerings led to a complete estrange- 
ment between the War Office and Headquarters during 
the war, so long as Sukhomlinov and the Grand Duke 
remained at their posts. 

Some surprise had been felt in military spheres over 
the appointment of the Grand Duke to the Supreme 
Command. The Emperor had made this choice osten- 
sibly because "for general reasons" he did not then "think 
fit to assume" these duties himself, and it was to be 
inferred that he had substituted one of his kinsmen merely 
on account of his kinship. There were good reasons for 
selecting a member of the Imperial family. He could 
enforce obedience with greater authority. Purely mili- 
tary considerations of fitness to command had not played 
a decisive part in the matter, for there were many other 
Generals in the Tsar's Army who had far greater claims 
to leadership, chief among them being Alexeiev. But 
he and consummate strategists like Ruzsky were kept 
in the background. 

The selection of General Yanushkevich to be Chief of 
Staff was even less comprehensible. He had terminated 
his Army career after commanding a battalion for four 
months, without seeing any active service. Later he 
had served in the juridical section of the War Office, 
and obtained a readership at the Staff College. Thence, 
by a series of lucky promotions, he had risen to be Chief 
of the College and Chief of the General Staff, by General 



206 RUSSIA AT WAR 

Sukiiomlmov's favor and protection, the all-powerful 
Minister not wishing to have a man of strong and inde- 
pendent personality in occupation of this high post. 
Thence he had passed "automatically" to the highest 
military function that had ever been filled by a living 
Russian, that of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Com- 
mander-in-Chief, with a host of many millions of men 
under his orders. General Yanushkevich had no expe- 
rience whatever of war, and, what is still more extraor- 
dinary, he had only the vaguest knowledge of the supply 
of munitions available. He declared at the Sukhomlinov 
trial: "We had no information till November (1914) as to 
the quantity of munitions that could be supplied to us." 
Yet he had left the General Staff only three or four months 
previously, and must, or should, have known what 
quantity of munitions had already been used up, what 
remained, and also what were the available means of 
producing more in the meantime. 

Was it surprising under these circumstances that the 
Russian Army showed a lamentable deficiency in leader- 
ship.? Army Group Commanders apparently did what 
they thought fit, without co-ordination between muni- 
tionment and strategy. The appointment of General 
Zhilinsky to command the northern group, apparently 
because he had been Chief of the General Staff and 
was Governor-General of Warsaw, was on a footing with 
the other selections. The disasters in East Prussia and 
in Galicia were inevitable. 

Meanv/hile the nation was working like one man to 
carry out the mobilization. General Lukomsky at the 
War Office and General Dobrorolsky at the General 
Staff directed the complex machinery with great skill 
and entire self-abnegation. I saw the latter several 
times in the sanctum whence he exchanged telegrams 
with all the four corners of the Empire. Unkempt, 
unshaven, begrimed by toil, he had rested neither by 



THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES 207 

night nor by day for a whole week. But he was in high 
spirits: "It is going splendidly. I can take a little 
sleep now. We are well within our schedule, and I 
expect we shall be several days ahead of it." He was 
right. The mobilization was complete on the sixteenth 
day, or five days earlier than could be foreseen. At 
the General Staff in Petrograd we all expected to reach 
Berlin before the end of the year. 

General Lukomsky was rewarded by the Tsar in a 
unique manner. He was given the black and yellow 
ribbon of St. George to wear with his order of St. Vladimir. 
The statutes of the order of St. George did not admit 
of its bestowal except for service in the field. The Em- 
peror had invented this device to show how great was his 
appreciation of his work. 

But no organization, however skilful, could have ac- 
complished the task with such amazing rapidity unless 
the people themselves had put their heart and soul into it. 
And that was precisely what the Russian nation had 
done. Reservists flocked to the colors. The village 
wives and maidens did not wail, as the Russian peasant 
women do on parting with their menfolk — there were 
no lamentations such as we heard later in the war, when 
disaster had overtaken the armies and the toll of casu- 
alties had grown long. The railwaymen were splendid. 
They did not have to go to the trenches then or later, 
but, throughout the war, and even during the Revolution, 
guards and engine-drivers bore themselves like true men. 
Whoever saw the mobilization of 1914 can never forget it. 
The memory of those early days of the war hovers over 
me as I write, and sheds its fragrance over the bitterness 
of ensuing years, over the horrors of war, and the still 
greater horrors and shame of revolution and anarchy. 

On the railway lines leading westward came train- 
loads bearing an armed multitude out of the depths of All 
the Russias. On the Moscow-Brest-Warsaw line the 



RUSSIA AT WAR 

trains moved all one way on both tracks, day and night, 
in endless procession. It was like a double-ribbon of 
cheering, exulting humanity stretching out in endless 
miles, eagerly hastening to have done once and for all 
with the hated Niemtsy (Germans). The cities on the 
way hailed them and brought food. The village women 
cheered them on. The boys smuggled themselves into 
the trucks and went off to fight. Many girls donned 
the simple field dress and came disguised. Soon it became 
necessary to place a guard at the stations, lest all the 
schoolboys in Russia should join the armies. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

POOR ARMAMENTS; SPLENDID ARMY 

Credits Unused — Undeveloped Industry — Red-tape in Artillery Department — 
Krupp & Co. — Sukhomlinov in Control — ^Woeful Lack of Shells — Russia's 
Armaments and German Plans — Miasoiedov — New Army Formations — 
Enormous Effectives — Swarms of Cavalry — Few Guns — The Siberian 
Troops — Military Colonization — ^The Caucasians and Finland Troops. 

People were not aware, however, of the true state of 
affairs in the War Ministry, and more particularly in 
the Artillery Department. The Army was "ready" to 
fight, but not sufficiently equipped for modern war. 
The Duma had repeatedly called attention to official 
neglect of the country's defenses. In 1907 a Supreme 
Council of State Defense had been instituted by the 
Tsar, under the Presidency of the Grand Duke Nicholas 
Nikolaievich. He summoned Kokovtsov and said: "It 
is awful! There are no shells, no rifles, no cartridges." 
Kokovtsov replied that he had never been given an oppor- 
tunity to consider the question. Together they drafted 
the estimates for an immediate expenditure on arma- 
ments of $146,500,000. Some months later the "grand 
program" was passed by the Duma. They refused, 
however, to vote a lump sum because they had "no 
confidence" in the War Minister on account of his prox- 
imity to the Court. The money was to be voted yearly. 
They wanted to maintain a hold upon the Government. 
They did not intend to be parsimonious. Far from it. 
(But events have proved that they were mistaken. They 
had not sufficiently taken into account the industrial 
question, and had unconsciously lent themselves to 

209 



210 RUSSIA AT WAR 

bureaucratic dilatoriness and red-tape.) During the 
seven years (1908-14) the Treasury assigned a total 
of $231,850,000 to the War Departments, but only 
$70,000,000 had been expended, leaving $161,850,000 
unutilized.^ 

The Army programs were to be completed by 
1918. The Germans knew this, and, doubtless, the fact 
played a leading part in their consideration of a "pre- 
ventive" ^ war in 1914. Probably they also knew — ^but 
the Russian nation did not know — that the program 
was not being carried out in regard to armaments and 
munitions. It had failed almost completely in this vital 
point — as shown by the huge amount of unused credits 
— for two reasons of unequal importance. 

The first and lesser reason was to be sought in purely 
departmental technicalities — the red-tape prevailing in 
the Artillery Department — and in a prolonged personal 
conflict between the Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich 
as Head of the Ordnance and General Sukhomlinov as 
Minister of War. 

The second and major reason emanated from the still 
undeveloped condition of home industries. When Ger- 
man Staff plans for a war against France and Russia 
assumed concrete form in 1908 — after the conclusion of 
the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 — it was decided 
not to place any more orders for guns and munitions in 
Germany. It seemed to be obvious that the one thing 
to do was to manufacture them at home, or, if possible, in 
allied or friendly countries. But the Artillery Depart- 
ment could not change its routine ideas and methods. 

1 Count Kokovtsov. The Sukhomlinov trial. 

2 France, "degenerate and broken by political strife" — as the Germans 
then pictured her — had dared to increase her army by restoring the three years' 
service system; England was "England, the unready," and would not inter- 
vene — so the Germans imagined; the Kiel Canal had been widened for the 
passage of German Dreadnoughts. Last, but not least, the Archduke Franz- 
Ferdinand's death had to be avenged in the interests of absolutism. 



POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 211 

They had alwaj^s gone to Krupp, Krupp's agent in 
Petrograd (M. Wachter) was an important personage who 
held the rank of Actual Councillor of State in the Russian 
hierarchy (an equivalent of Gewirkliche Staatsrat). They 
had always done business with him. He was a courtly 
gentleman. No suspicion could ever attach to him, or 
to them, of collusion or bribery. Goodness knows what 
might be thought if they commenced negotiations with 
"strangers." Besides, the available Russian firms were 
also mostly German, so it would come to the same thing 
in the end. Give the order to Krupp in Germany, or 
to Tillmans,^ or to Siemens & Halske, or to the Russian 
branch of the Allgemeine Elektricitats Gesellschaft — was 
it not the same thing.^ In one way, certainly. Because 
the German firms in Russia could not be expected to 
refuse information to the General Staff in Berlin any 
more than could Krupp. And the Miasoiedov espionage 
case subsequently demonstrated the fact that one, at 
least, of these firms had free access to fortress plans and 
other military "secrets." In another way it did not. 
Krupp might hold up or lay an embargo on supplies at 
a crucial moment. The German firms in Russia could not. 

Admiral Grigorovich, the Minister of Marine, had to 
work under the same unpleasant auspices. But he 
palliated the danger by inviting representatives of reputa- 
ble British firms to superintend the construction of 
machinery for the ships under construction. But Ad- 
miral Grigorovich was not opposed to the Duma, and his 
credits were not doled out. 

No proper appeal was made to Russian industries by 

1 The notorious Miasoiedov was an intimate friend of the senior partner in 
this firm, and through him was invited to attend the Imperial "shoots" at 
Rominten, Miasoiedov was then Colonel of Gendarmerie at Vierzhbolowo. 
He was discovered to be using a car with a double bottom wherein he smuggled 
goods from Germany, and for this cause had been dismissed. During the war 
he was reappointed to active service. Before the war Sukhomlinov had em- 
ployed him to spy on officers till Suvorin and Guchkov denounced him as a spy. 



212 RUSSIA AT WAR 

the Artillery Department, and, moreover, it would not 
have been successful without guarantees that could not 
be given — ^guarantees of a political as well as of a financial 
character. The okhrana would have interfered — as it 
did constantly interfere — with any development of labor 
problems. 

Besides, the Artillery Department was very busy 
experimenting with shell-fuses. It wanted to be quite 
sure that it had an ideal fuse ^ before proceeding to spend 
an urgent grant of $5,000,000 voted for munitions by 
the Duma. Moreover, the earlier program had been 
based on the experience of the Japanese War, which 
appeared to call for a reserve of 350 rounds per gun. 
Later this figure was raised to a thousand. The Depart- 
ment had two shell factories in the country. In 1914 
they were producing fifty thousand shells per month. 
The Department expected to accumulate by the middle 
of 1915 something like four million shells, which was 
considered to be amply sufficient for a war of three or 
four months. That was the maximum period that any 
war could last, in the opinion of the experts. Heavy 
guns — anything above three inches — had been little used 
in the Japanese War, and Were almost entirely neglected. 
The total reserve of shells above three-inch caliber did not 
exceed fifteen thousand. The Artillery Department had 
not made good the depletion of munition stores on the 
western frontier, which had been resorted to for the 
requirements of the army in Manchuria; it did not even 
know where these stores were situated. 

Proportionately speaking, the Russian Army was not 
so well prepared for war in 1914 as it had been in 1904.^ 
Eleven artillery brigades on mobilization were found to 
be without guns. 

1 A mania for super-excellence has ever been the Russian's bane. In 
revolution as well as in fuses they wanted to "improve" on other countries. 
2 General Vernander. The Sukhomlinov trial. 



POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 213 

M. Timashev, Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
during the period of increased armament, was kept in 
complete ignorance of the munition difficulty. Army 
affairs were never discussed before civilian members of 
the Cabinet. He and his civilian colleagues knew no 
more than did the public up to the very outbreak of war. 
They saw the article "We are ready" in the papers, 
and that was all the information they had. Even after 
the Galician reverses had brought home to people's minds 
that there were no shells, he was not approached by the 
War Office. He, himself, called a meeting of manufac- 
turers, who were treated to a patriotic appeal by the 
Minister of War. 

In 1910 "we began to do something," as General 
Polivanov expressed himself in giving his evidence. The 
program was being "realized," but "our industries 
could not cope with it, and the Artillery Department 
was holding up designs." However, "up to that time 
all our military preparations, such as they were, had 
provided only for another war with Japan, our struggle 
with that country having completely exhausted our 
means of defense." 

The Germans were not in ignorance of this change in 
the venue, as a little incident which occurred on Feb- 
ruary 20, 1910, clearly shows. A war game was to be 
played in the Winter Palace under the direction of the 
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich. Many leading Gen- 
erals of the Russian Army had assembled there to undergo 
a test of their fitness for high command. They waited 
in vain. A telephone message came from Tsarskoe 
Selo dismissing the assembly, on the pretext that the 
Grand Duke "had not had time to prepare himself," 
but intimating that no more "war games" would be 
held "lest umbrage be taken by certain Powers." 

Meanwhile the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievich, 
who was notoriously anti-German, had been relieved of 



214 RUSSIA AT WAR 

his office by the abolition of the Supreme Council. Pre- 
viously he and the Chiefs of War Departments, including 
the Chief of the General Staff, reported independently 
to the Emperor. General Sukhomlinov urged that this 
method only created confusion, and to a certain extent 
he was right. ^ But now everything was concentrated 
in his hands, and the Tsar saw Army affairs through his 
eyes only. This was a fatal mistake, because General 
Sukhomlinov, being a courtier, represented matters 
invariably in a favorable light for himself. He was 
unable, however, to assert his authority over the Artillery 
Department, and could not get rid of the Grand Duke 
Sergius, whose position at Court was too strong. 

Guchkov and a number of Deputies and officers formed 
a sort of informal club to discuss matters of State defense. 
General Gurko took a leading part in the work. But it 
displeased the Court. They were dubbed the "Young 
Turk Party " and placed under a ban. 

Sukhomlinov was now master of the situation as 
regards the personnel^ if not so much the materiel, of the 
Army, and, without challenging, or in any way reflecting 
upon the finding of the Court that tried him in August- 
September, 1917, impartial critics will be disposed to 

* On this subject the author recalls a conversation with General Sukhom- 
linov which has an anecdotal interest. Relating the arguments he had used, he 
said: "I reminded His Majesty that even Napoleon declined to receive more 
than five ministerial reports in the course of a week. And here was the Tsar 
having to pass upon the reports of tv/elve Ministers and of half a dozen sep- 
arate heads of departments connected with the War Office. The Tsar replied 
that the Kaiser managed to do it, so the Grand Duke had pointed out. To 
this I rejomed: *Yes, your Majesty, that may be so. But you are not the 
Kaiser. He is older and more experienced. Just think yom-self what will 
happen when each of the departmental reports run counter to the other, as 
they often do. You will have to make the decision, and it will be beyond your 
capacity!'" It must be remembered that Sukhomlinov had been the Tsar's 
tutor. What he said about the multiplicity of ministerial and departmental 
reports was perfectly true, and experience had shown that the utmost con- 
fusion often resulted from conflicting decisions endorsed by the unhappy 
autocrat. 




CAUCASIAN NATIVE HORSE DIVISION IN THE CARPATHIANS 



POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 215 

admit that he accomplished not a little for the better 
organization of Russia's man-power, although he was 
found guilty of delinquency in providing armaments. 

In 1908 the standing Army was composed of Field and 
Reserve formations. The former represented sixty-three 
divisions of infantry, twenty-eight divisions of cavalry, 
and thirty-one brigades of field artillery, all grouped in 
thirty-one army corps, altogether about 528,000 bayonets, 
70,000 sabers, and 3700 guns. The Reserve formations 
represented equivalents of a little over six corps, com- 
prising about 500,000 men. This brought up the total 
peace strength in infantry to 1,280,000 men. On mobili- 
zation the Reserve battalions expanded into regiments 
of three-battalion strength, giving about eighteen addi- 
tional Reserve corps, or 540,000 bayonets, while the 
two-battalion line regiments (not counting the Guards) 
on mobilization expanded to four-battalion strength, 
giving 480,000 additional bayonets. Thus, on mobiliza- 
tion the Army received over one million additional 
effectives, and represented a total fighting strength of 
2,300,000 bayonets. 

In 1910 the Reserve formations were abolished. They 
had not stood the test of war in the Japanese campaign. 
They lacked esjprit de corps and eflSciency. They were 
transformed into field units. The Duma had voted in 
secret session (1909) an increase of the annual contingent 
to nearly 460,000 men. The new organization, based 
on a three years' service with the colors, took approxi- 
mately the following form: seventy-five guards and line 
divisions, each of sixteen battalions (with some minor 
exceptions), and as many field batteries, grouped in thirty- 
seven army corps, containing altogether 1,200,000 bay- 
onets and 6000 guns. So far, the difference in bayonets 
was slightly in favor of the old scheme, and the increase in 
guns was "on paper." But in quality of fighting material 
the new organization gave better promise. On mobiliza- 



216 RUSSIA AT WAR 

tion this superiority was also to be implied. Every one 
of the regiments in the seventy army divisions "budded 
off" a second-line regiment, regular cadres of young and 
efficient officers and men being provided to form the 
second-line units, while the parent-regiment "ffiled 
up" with the pick of the men v/ho had just been released 
from active service. By this method Russia had 1,200,- 
000 first-class, and over 1,100,000 second-class fighting 
men available on mobilization. 

At a conference summoned by the Tsar at Tsarskoe 
Selo, on March 23, 1913, it was decided to further increase 
the peace footing of the Army by 400,000 men, for which 
purpose it was proposed to assign $111,500,000 in a lump 
sum, or $45,500,000 annually. M. Kokovtsov agreed. 
This enlarged program had been necessitated by the 
clear and positive information received from the Russian 
military representatives in Berlin, and the evidence 
afforded by the secret intelligence service of German 
designs to seek a decision on the battlefield. This informa- 
tion showed that in 1908, as soon as Russia had begun 
to think about repairing her armed defenses, the Germans 
planned a war for 1909, and then, having humiliated 
Russia, they again decided in 1910, as soon as they had 
information about the first program, to force a war in 
1913. But once more they could find no favorable oppor- 
tunity. Then, having learned of the enlarged program 
which was to be completed by 1918, they resolved finally 
and irrevocably to defeat Russia's plans of independence. 

The basis of the seven years' program was not 
affected by the enlarged scheme. In fact the mobiliza- 
tion of 1914 was carried out according to the plan laid 
down in 1910, which was then somewhat superannuated. 

It should be added that artillery brigades on mobiliza- 
tion contained six-gun instead of eight-gun batteries, 
whereby the difficulty of arming the second-line brigades 
was partially overcome. Thus the strength of the active 



POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 217 

Army in field guns at the outbreak of war was nominally 
about 5200. An artillery park (40,000 rounds) was 
attached to each army corps. 

The cavalry was little affected by the new scheme. 
Cossack second- and third-line formations provided on 
mobilization a total of over twenty divisions. Another 
regular cavalry division was raised in the Caucasus, 
besides a volunteer Native Horse Division (afterwards 
nicknamed "The Savages"), bringing up the total to 
fifty cavalry divisions, or 120,000 sabers, the largest 
force of trained horsemen that modern warfare had 
known. Each regular cavalry division was composed 
of a Hussar, a Lancer, a Dragoon, and a Cossack regi- 
ment, and was ordinarily attached to an army corps. 
Alexander IH had converted all the line cavalry regiments 
into dragoons and ordained very unbecoming uniforms. 
Sukhomlinov, himself a hussar, restored all the glories 
of the olden time. It had cost some money, but looked 
decidedly effective on parade and at Court. 

In medium and heavy guns the Army was woefully 
ill-provided. There were altogether twenty- two mortar 
divisions of 4.7 Krupp howitzers attached to army corps, 
and twenty-one batteries of heavy artillery. In aero- 
planes and wireless there was tremendous deficiency. 

Another lamentable defect was the paucity of machine 
guns. There were only four per regiment, and even this 
number could not be rendered immediately available, 
because harness and cartridge-belts had not been pre- 
pared in suflScient quantity. Also there was a deficiency 
of rifles. The Ordnance Department had "miscalcu- 
lated," and besides, 150,000 rifles had been given to 
Serbia before the war. 

General Sukhomlinov was responsible for another 
important change in the Russian defense system. He 
abolished the fortresses in Poland, and moved four army 
corps eastward to the Volga, constituting a new military 



218 RUSSIA AT WAR 

district at Kazan. He claimed that the fortress "idea" 
was superannuated, that it weakened initiative among 
commanders in the field, etc. The General Staff in 
Paris was somewhat disconcerted, and an exchange of 
views took place, which apparently satisfied the Allies. 
Sukhomlinov argued that his scheme of army reorgani- 
zation and the distribution of the new corps (one in the 
Caucasus, two in Siberia, and three in European Russia) 
left the position on the western border unweakened, 
while it brought the new formations nearer to their sup- 
plies and reserves and more easy of mobilization. But the 
question of the fortresses gave rise to much controversy. 
When the war broke out the dismantling of the great 
strongholds of Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw, and Ivangorod 
had been substantially carried into effect. But the 
services rendered by Ivangorod, hastily re-equipped, and 
more particularly by Ossowiec, did not bear out Suk- 
homlinov's theory. 

Never in the history of the world had there been such 
an army as the one that assembled on the Austro-German 
frontiers by the end of August, 1914. As fighting mate- 
rial the Russian infantryman was unrivaled. He could 
fight and march, and suffer all the privations of cam- 
paigning, on a modicum of food and comfort that only a 
primitive rustic population could endure. Moreover, the 
first-line regiments were splendidly disciplined and well 
led, and they alone represented an army of nigh upon 
1,500,000 bayonets. As for the 50,000 Guards, I do not 
think they had their equals in any other armies in num- 
bers and physique, if not in courage. They were the 
pick and flower of a hundred million men of one race, 
language, and creed. These giants looked upon Austrian 
troops with the supremest contempt, and at first insisted 
upon attacking them bolt upright, scorning to take cover. 

More particularly interesting had been the history of 
the Siberian troops, which deserves some attention as 



POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 219 

a record of military colonization. At the time when 
the Great War began, the Siberian troops consisted of 
five army corps, or ten divisions, in all about 160,000 
bayonets. Some of the earliest units from which this 
splendid force had developed had gone to the Far East 
in the middle of the nineteenth century to safeguard the 
borders, stretching for thousands of miles eastward from 
the Urals to the very shores of the Pacific Ocean, the 
Cossacks being too few for this vast zone. For service 
in desert and in wild and uninhabited places, the Govern- 
ment decided not to send newly conscripted recruits, but 
officers and men drafted from active units. 

At that time people knew so little about Siberia that 
few were desirous of proceeding thither for service. Lots 
were drawn by officers, and only the healthiest were 
selected, while the men were detailed at the rate of ten 
per company, soldiers able to read and write, healthy, 
and of irreproachable behavior.^ 

Preparations for the long journey were protracted and 
complicated. Horses and conveyances had to be pre- 
pared, and equipment obtained of a character more suit- 
able to the distant region. The officers and some of the 
men traveled with their families, taking with them domes- 
tic cattle and all their household effects, prepared to sever 
their ties with Europe. As far as the Urals the earlier 
travelers proceeded by steamers and railways, but from 
Ekaterinburg or Cheliabinsk the entire distance to the 
Russo-Chinese frontier, six hundred miles, had to be 
traversed on foot. To the Trans-Amur region the last 
part of the journey was made by water. In front of 
the battalions marched two companies in line; then 
came the transport wagons with provisions, uniforms, 
equipment, cartridges; then another company, and the 
transport conveying officers' and soldiers' families. 

In Western Siberia, where the route of the battalions 

^ Colonel Smolianinov. The Times Russian Supplement. Jan. 1915. 



220 RUSSIA AT WAR 

passed over the Great Siberian track, halts were made 
in the villages, prosperous and thrifty, like all villages 
in Siberia. Here the tired travelers rested a day or two, 
and then continued their journey. But the farther they 
proceeded towards the east the more difficult it was 
to advance. The "taiga," or Siberian jungle, began, 
with its narrow paths winding in and out, obstructed by 
the thick-spreading tree-roots which protruded from the 
swampy, uneven ground. 

Thousands of mosquitoes and horse-flies hovered in 
clouds over the column, depriving human beings and 
horses of all peace, and when the battalion stopped for 
the night a thick cordon of sentries with loaded rifles 
was drawn round the sleepers, as no one could be sure 
that somewhere near there was not prowling a bear, 
quick to detect the scent of abundant fresh meat. Thus 
they went on for weeks, passing towns, villages, and 
detached zaimki, as the farms of well-to-do peasants 
(often exiles originally) are called in Siberia, until they 
reached the town of Srietensk, on the Shilka. Here 
began loading on shallow-draught barges and rafts, and 
the column transformed itself into a huge river transport, 
slowly moving eastward, avoiding the inshore shallows. 
This voyage was a long-awaited rest. Sitting in the 
barges, the soldiers cleaned and dried themselves and 
mended their overcoats, uniforms, and boots, which had 
been ripped and torn in the forests. At sunset the 
entire caravan made fast to the bank, and the passengers 
landed and cooked supper. 

With the arrival of the travelers at the appointed spot, 
their privations were not yet ended. Many battalions, on 
getting as far as Khabarovsk and receiving instructions 
as to their post, encountered impenetrable forest and 
continuous masses of gray stone. Here their work began, 
and, where till then the foot of man had never trod, 
rang out the sound of ax and saw. By autumn, when 



POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 221 

terrible rains and wind from the sea begin, had arisen 
a barrack settlement, seething with life. Thus arose and 
were created almost all the towns and settlements of 
the Far East — Khabarovsk, Novokievsk, Possiet, Iman, 
Shkotovo, Barabash, De Castries. 

The strategic importance of De Castries was enormous. 
The sea at this spot forms a splendid harbor, of sufficient 
depth and well protected, which could readily be utilized 
for a hostile landing. Troops landed here, by making 
use of Lake Kesi, could easily debouch on the Amur, 
and without difficulty establish themselves in the middle 
of its lower reaches, thus flanking the fortress of Niko- 
laevsk, which closes ingress to the Amur from the Tatar 
Straits. To-day De Castries is a fortified place. But 
about five years ago there was nothing there save a light- 
house and barracks for a company of infantry. It is dif- 
ficult to imagine the gigantic work accomplished by these 
companies engaged in preparing De Castries for conver- 
sion into a fortress. 

Years passed, and the battalions grew more and more 
accustomed to the new conditions, which became easier 
for every succeeding contingent of recruits. Every sol- 
dier who joined the Siberian Rifles, irrespective of what 
he was before conscription, passed through a severe 
and laborious military school. During the first four 
months of duty, on them devolved all the heavy work of 
building, of felling trees, floating them down the rivers, 
uprooting stumps. In the following year they entered 
the hunting detachments formed from time to time in 
every company for stalking bear, tiger, or deer. They 
spent whole weeks in the jungle, so among the Siberian 
riflemen there were a large number of first-class hunters 
and exceptional shots. Work and hunting in the jungle 
did not cease even in the winter, although the frosts reach 
40 deg. to 49 deg. Fahr. A pqlushuhka (short fur coat), 
a shaggy black fur cap (papakha)^ felt boots, and a pair 



222 RUSSIA AT WAR 

of broad plain skis — these were the only things that 
distinguished winter from summer equipment. 

Four years of such service so inured the men to the 
new regime, unfamiliar to natives of Central European 
Russia, that a good fourth of them felt no desire to return 
home, and settled in the Far East, working as laborers, 
artisans, and farmers, creating there a new vigorous 
and prosperous Russia, differing from the poor Russian 
peasantry in Europe. 

During the last ten or fifteen years many of the condi- 
tions of life had improved. Siberia and the Far East 
was being energetically colonized and linked up with 
civilization. But in the Siberian units before the war 
might still be found a large cadre of officers who had 
undergone all that has been described above. Every 
day one of the companies of the regiment, in full marching 
order, with the necessary transport, tents, and camp 
kitchens, left barracks to go into the field or the jungle 
for training, winter and summer alike. 

Straight from the cars these Siberian columns were 
hurled into the fight near Warsaw. And here, under 
strange conditions, with an unfamiliar opponent, who had 
at his disposal every technical appliance for slaughter 
and destruction, they fought in accordance with the rules 
of their Siberian school. Taught by experience to rely 
upon their own efforts and not to look back for the 
approach of reinforcements, one brigade fought two 
days with two corps of Germans, sustaining the shock 
against the Polish capital. Only on the third day did 
reinforcements arrive, when a fierce conflict raged 
along the whole line, terminating in the rout of the 
Germans. In this struggle only a handful of the sur- 
vivors of the Siberian Rifles took part; the remainder had 
fallen, honorably vindicating their wonderful traditions. 
Later, at Augustovo, the Third Siberian Corps marched 
thirty miles and then charged Hindenburg's men with 
the bayonet and drove them back to East Prussia. 




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POOR ARMAMENTS: SPLENDID ARMY 223 

The three army corps from the Caucasus were picked 
troops, with traditions older and more glorious than 
those of the Siberians. They had long been recruited 
from the hardy Russian settlers on the Caucasian border- 
land, men of splendid physique, reared in a sunny land 
of mountains and plains, inured to hardship, to burning 
heat and searching cold, imbued with traditions that 
were as inspiring as those of their near relations, the 
Cossacks. At Ivangorod the Third Caucasian Corps, 
under General Irmanov, performed prodigies of valor. 
One division, commanded by General Ivanov, held out 
for nine days on the left bank of the Vistula in marsh- 
lands, with water up to their waists and necks, till the 
Guards came up, and then, together, they drove the 
enemy helter-skelter to the very doors of Cracow. 

The Finland Rifles represented a younger but not 
less seasoned force. They had been raised when, the 
Finns declining to serve in the Russian Army, it became 
necessary to assure the northern borderlands against 
hostile invasion. All the oflScers and N.C.Oi's were 
picked men. Service in Finland was much sought after, 
owing to the greater comfort and cheapness of living in 
the Grand Duchy, and vacancies were readily filled up. 
The Finland Corps (the XXIId) had been brought up 
to a high standard of efficiency. Summer and winter 
the men were constantly on campaign service. Like 
the Siberians and Caucasians they had their hunting 
companies, which used to travel on skis hundreds of 
miles into the forests around Ladoga and Onega after 
bear and elk in winter and lesser game in summer and 
autumn. These men fought splendidly at Augustovo. 
One company was surrounded by the Germans, held its 
trenches for fourteen days, and then, having expended 
the last cartridge and biscuit, fought its way back to 
the Niemen, losing four-fifths of its strength in killed 
and wounded. 



CHAPTER XIX 

SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 

Russian Offensive — Distribution of Armies — Pressure Diverted from Allies — 
Hindenburg Intervenes — Strategy Upset — A Decisive Battle — Incom- 
petent Generals — Ruzsky's Recovery — Galician Campaign — No Muni- 
tions — Japan's Offer — Ivanov Left in Ignorance — No Boots, no Rifles — 
The Great Retreat — Alexeiev — The Tsar as Generalissimo — Excessive 
Mobilization — Lack of Unity and Modern Methods — Allies Help — 
Sacrifices in Vain — ^Russia's Losses — The Navy. 

It would be a work of supererogation to retrace all the 
vicissitudes of the Russian campaign during the two 
and a half years of war under the Old Regime. But 
some of its outstanding features have still to be more 
clearly elucidated. Russia took the offensive at the 
outset for two reasons: firstly, because her Army had 
been strengthened sufficiently to warrant this course, 
and the advantages of offensive strategy were obvious; 
secondly, because "Russia had to support her AlHes. 
According to the plan jointly agreed upon, it fell to her 
share to divert the attention of Germany from France."^ 

A general offensive against the Austro-German coali- 
tion necessitated the clearing of Russia's flanks in Poland, 
so that the huge armies assembled behind the Niemen, 
the Vistula, and the Dnieper could freely utilize the 
Polish salient as a 'place d'armes whence they could launch 
themselves into Silesia, cut off the Austrians, and menace 
Berlin. Such was the problem set before the High Com- 
mand at the Headquarters near Baranovichi in August, 
1914. 

On August 16th the mobilization and concentration 

* General Yanushkevich (I.e.). 
224 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 225 

of the armies was completed. General N. I. Ivanov 
commanded the Southern or Kiev group; General Zhil- 
insky the Vilna or Northern group. Their forces were 
about equal. Each had about 1,200,000 bayonets, over 
2000 guns, and huge masses of cavalry. Each launched 
his main attack on the same day, August 17th, after 
preliminary reconnaissances and skirmishes by the horse- 
men. In both cases enemy territory was invaded. 

The difference between the respective merits of the 
Staff work soon became apparent. General Alexeiev, 
directing the operations in the south, never faltered or 
made a mistake, and, thanks to his remarkable talents, 
the men under the leadership of Generals Ruzsky, Brusilov, 
and Radko-Dmitriev scored an almost uninterrupted 
series of brilliant victories, successively capturing posi- 
tions of great strength at Zaleshchiki, Halich, Tarnopol, 
and Bzhezany, "rushing" Lemberg (September 2, 1914), 
reducing the great fortress of Pshemysl (March 21, 1915), 
and, earlier, crossing the Carpathians, threatened the 
plain of Hungary and came within a few miles of Cracow.^ 

They were superior in numbers to the enemy, but, 
on the other hand, they had to overcome tremendous 
obstacles and almost throughout these operations they 
were short of munitions. 

In the north, Zhilinsky had an overwhelming superi- 
ority over the Germans. Only five corps had been left 
to guard the Prussian frontier while the bulk of Wilhelm's 
hosts were hurled against France. In East Prussia the 
Germans had two active corps and some reserve forma- 
tions and garrison troops equivalent in number to about 
two corps. Against this force Generals Rennenkampf 
and Samsonov each wielded an army of five army corps 
of first-line troops. 

^ Many of the Slav soldiers of Austria-Hungary, forming a large portion of 
the Army, went over to the Russians, thereby greatly facilitating the Russian 
advance. Subsequently, the Czechs and Slovaks entered the Russian service. 



226 RUSSIA AT WAR 

Rennenkampf s cavalry, including the Guards (many 
of whose officers were of the Baltic-German nobility), 
simply romped into East Prussia. Eydtkuhnen was occu- 
pied August 6th; two days later, the Chevalier and 
Horse Guards rode down German batteries; on August 
17th the Prussian forces were smashed at Stalluponen; 
Insterburg fell August 24th; the Russian right was near 
Konigsberg, their outposts as far west as Bartenstein, 
and the whole of the northeastern corner of "Junker- 
land" was in their power. 

Samsonov's army having concentrated behind the 
Narew, he proceeded to direct his main thrust from 
Soldau, in the southwest corner of the province, towards 
Allenstein, and, having turned the "impregnable" de- 
fenses of Mazuria, with its lakes and swamps, to join 
hands with Rennenkampf and sweep East Prussia clear 
of the enemy. His troops crossed the frontier and took 
Soldau, Neudenburg, and Allenstein; then, after a ten 
days' fierce engagement captured Frankenau (August 
24th and 25th). 

The position was now (August 24th) as follows: 
Rennenkampf held the line Friedland-Gerdauen-Norden- 
burg-Angerburg, facing southwest. Samsonov occupied 
the triangle Soldau-Allenstein-Frankenau, facing north- 
west. And the interval between the armies was being 
scoured by Russian cavalry, who had almost met.^ But 
in both armies there was lack of direction and manage- 
ment. Neither General used his opportunities for captur- 
ing important lines of road and railway, with which the 
province had been richly endowed for strategic purposes. 

Rennenkampf had wasted his time in amenities with 
the Brandenburgers, seeking to impress them by the 
humane and kindly disposition of the Russian troops, 
which was repaid at every opportunity by the sniping 
of Russian soldiers. His Staff appear to have broken 

^ Ajdistance of only sixteen miles separated the armies. 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 227 

down at the crucial moment. Instead of hastening to 
join Samsonov, they issued orders and counter-orders, 
so that the bewildered commanders did not know what 
to do. Meanwhile the Staff had made no arrangements 
whatever for a possible retreat. 

Samsonov, recently commanding in Turkestan, had 
joined his army when its advance had already begun. 
He had been detained, it seems, by General Zhilinsky at 
Vilna. So he was unable to personally supervise the 
initial arrangements of his move into enemy territory. 
To this fact must be ascribed the astounding neglect of 
assuring the safety of his left flank, which soon gave the 
enemy his chance, and of providing food and ammuni- 
tion for some of his corps. The food and ammunition 
had been "delayed." He had three divisions of cavalry 
and should have been able to secure himself from surprise. 
But the cavalry had all been sent on in front. 

The Germans had been doing their best to hamper 
the advance of the invaders, but wisely contented them- 
selves with delaying battles. The situation on August 
23d was wellnigh desperate. Refugees were flocking 
into Berlin, and it looked as if nothing could prevent 
the occupation of East Prussia. Heeding the clamor 
of Junkerland, the German Headquarters Staff finally 
gave orders to send troops from the West. They were 
seen entraining in Belgium on Friday night, August 28th. 
But on the 23d Hindenburg had assumed charge, and 
immediately took advantage of the mistakes committed 
by the Russians.^ Assembling what troops he could, 
the remnants of two corps from Konigsberg and the 
scrapings from Thorn and other fortress garrisons, he 
struck at Samsonov's left, cutting off supplies from the 
Russian 1st Army Corps under General Artomonov, 
which it seems had no ammunition, and, as a consequence 

^ It is said that the Russian wireless messages interchanged by the armies 
were not even coded, and this greatly helped the German counter-move. 



RUSSIA AT WAR 

thereof, Artomonov retired, exposing the whole of Sam- 
sonov's left flank. He then struck at Soldau, Samsonov's 
main line of retreat. Soldau fell on the 26th. Samsonov 
tried desperately on the following day to recapture it. 
He had to fall back upon Neudenburg, whence he had 
no way of escape. Meanwhile Hindenburg's scratch 
army, skilfully handled, was driving the loosely strung 
out Russian forces into the Mazurian swamps. They 
fought desperately for six days; then 90,000 surrendered 
and the remainder escaped into the woods, leaving 30,000 
of their comrades killed, wounded, or drowned, and, finally, 
straggled into Poland. Nearly 100,000 men subsequently 
rejoined the colors, but the tales they brought back with 
them inflicted a tremendous blow upon the prestige of 
their commanders. 

A British officer had joined Samsonov in the woods 
near Neudenburg some hours before the disaster had 
become irreparable. Urging him to immediately return 
lest the enemy's cavalry should have already closed all 
avenues of escape, Samsonov said: "My right flank 
(the Vlth and Xlllth Corps) is crushed, my left (the 
1st Corps) does not exist. I cannot go back. I am going 
forward," and pointing northwestward, he shook hands 
and resumed his study of the maps spread out by the 
roadside. Soon afterwards he and his Staff were fugi- 
tives, and, unable to survive the loss of his army, he shot 
himself. 

Hindenburg lost no time in following up his success. 
Again he struck northeastward to intercept Rennen- 
kampf's line of retreat. A disaster of equal magnitude 
to that of Samsonov's army was averted solely by 
the cavalry. A whole corps under General Klian of 
Nakhichevan, including a division commanded by Gen- 
eral Gurko, swept across the line of the German advance 
and enabled the army to recross the frontier with the loss 
of some 30,000 prisoners. The retreat was indeed a 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 229 

terrible one, several corps retiring simultaneously along 
one road, under the fire of German artillery, who unlim- 
bered their guns in the open within a few hundred yards 
of the highway. And every window in every town or 
village traversed by the Russians was belching missiles, 
old guns, horse-pistols, and blunderbusses having been 
mobilized to speed the parting "guests." 

The whole of Samsonov's artillery and much of Ren- 
nenkampf's had been lost. Also some 400,000 rounds 
of shell — a terrible sacrifice, for a shortage of munitions 
had already begun to make itself felt. 

Hindenburg unwarily pursued the Russians to the 
Niemen. General Ruzsky, the victor of Lemberg, having 
taken command in the north, soon turned the tables 
on the invaders at Augustovo, and again punished them 
in February, when, aided by Colonel Miasoiedov, their 
secret agent on the Staff of General Siever's corps (the 
Xth), the Germans turned its flank and nearly crumpled 
up the whole of the Niemen front. 

Meanwhile, Hindenburg had gone to other and more 
important scenes. He had destroyed the Russian plan 
of a combined offensive. He now proceeded to deprive 
them of their strategical position in Poland, whereby 
he hoped at one stroke to drive their northern group 
beyond the Vistula and check the advance of the southern 
armies on Cracow. Twice he struck and twice he failed. 
But on each occasion the Austrians secured a respite. 
General Ivanov's troops having to send aid. In these 
onslaughts Hindenburg had the help of troops brought 
from the West in response to the call of Brandenburg. 

Russia had thus fulfilled her appointed task. She 
had diverted some of the German legions from sadly 
harassed France. But, owing to mismanagement and 
inefficiency on the part of her Generals, she had done so 
with incalculable prejudice to the future success of her own 
and Allied plans. The Battle of Soldau, or Tannenberg, 



230 RUSSIA AT WAR 

as the Germans quite arbitrarily named it for purposes 
of their own,i was one of the few great decisive battles 
in history. From its effects Russian strategy was not 
destined to recover, and for this reason I have described 
the East Prussian campaign somewhat in detail, utilizing 
the information I had been able to obtain from inde- 
pendent — not official — sources, from the lips of officers 
and soldiers who had been engaged therein. The whole 
subsequent record of the struggle between Russia and 
the Central Powers bears the imprint of this disaster. 
Not in vain did the Germans idolize Hindenburg, al- 
though I have shown that Hindenburg's task was unhap- 
pily not a very difficult one. 

The final and crowning disaster of the great retreat 
was due to causes similar to those that had brought about 
Hindenburg's victory — lack of organization and co-ordina- 
tion. The scarcity of shells was noticeable in the early 
days of the war. As a matter of fact, on August 21, 1914, 
the Artillery Department had received a telegram from 
the Northern Front asking for "more munitions." Ex- 
perience of the first days of war had shattered all the 
calculations that had been based upon the lessons of the 
Japanese campaign. From that time onward the cry 
for munitions never ceased. In February, 1915, the 
requirements of all the armies were estimated at 60 parks 
(2,400,000 rounds) per month. Instead of that they 
received 8 parks (480,000 rounds) .^ Why, it may be 
asked, was the Southern Army group thrust forward in 
reckless fashion when there was no prospect of supplying it 

^ At Tannenberg, a village some distance from Soldau, a great battle was 
fought July 15, 1410, between the Teutonic Knights and a Slav army composed 
of Poles, Russians, and Lithuanians, in which the Germans were completely 
routed. By attributing the same name to the Battle of Soldau, the descend- 
ants of the vanquished Teutons flattered their own pride and revenged them- 
selves for the historical ignominy which they had sustained at the hands of the 
despised Slav races. 

2 General G. Danilov, D.M.O. at G.H.Q. The Sukhomlinov trial. 




(From a photograph published by the " Russkoe Slovo ") 



MEETING STRATEGY 



As a result of Bolshevist agitation the Armies of the Southwestern Front would not 
ioUow up their successes against the Austro-Germans, and when the Russian lines were 
opened (July 19, 1917) 12 divisions one after the other declined to close in on the enemy, 
although it was known that there were only 2 German and 1 Austro-Hungarian Divisions 
advancing (on Tarnopol) . The picture represents the colonel of a regiment— hat in hand — 
explaining the situation to his men and imploring them to fight. Every battalion or com- 
pany had erected hustings for the Bolshevist propaganda purposes. The inscription on the 
t»anner is " Liberty and Equality." 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 231 

with shells? The answer is to be found in the complete 
estrangement that existed between Headquarters and 
the War Departments. General Sukhomlinov was mak- 
ing promises which could not be fulfilled and Headquarters 
was blaming him for not doing the impossible. 

General Ivanoy was kept in ignorance of the real 
state of affairs, and allowed to do what he pleased. Gen- 
eral Ivanov undertook the campaign in the Carpathians 
at his own risk and peril, hoping that shells would be 
supplied to him. He did not consider it possible to 
remain inactive, because inactivity in the field is fatal.^ 

General Vernander, Assistant Minister of War, had 
summoned representatives of twenty-two firms and asked 
them to help. But "they demanded such huge sub- 
sidies that we could do nothing." Besides, his depart- 
ment was "arranging technical conditions." In the early 
days of January, 1915, designs and specifications were 
handed to agents of American firms and Sukhomlinov 
expected to obtain deliveries in April. These munitions 
did begin to arrive in April, but in April, 1916. 

The Army also lacked rifles, boots, and clothing. 
President Rodzianko related in Court that he had been to 
the Stavka (General Headquarters) in October, 1914, 
to discuss these matters. The Grand Duke asked him to 
intercede with the Emperor. M. Rodzianko recom- 
mended wide recourse to the Zemstvos, for which purpose 
he proposed to summon a Zemstvo Congress. The Min- 
ister of the Interior (M. Maklakov) retorted: "I know 
what you want — to prepare a revolution." 

In January, 1915, the Duma took up the question. 
Sukhomlinov promised his assistance, but nothing was 
done. Then, in March, M. Rodzianko again visited the 
Stavka. The Grand Duke said: "The Army cannot go 
on fighting without rifles or boots." M. Rodzianko 
went to Galicia "to see for himself," as the Grand Duke 

* General Yanushkevich (I.e.). 



232 RUSSIA AT WAR 

had suggested. He was with the Third Army (General 
Radko-Dmitriev) and witnessed enemy attacks when 
the Russian artillery had only three rounds per gun. He 
saw soldiers armed with sticks. Radko wept: He said 
"I cannot hold out unless I have arms.^ We shall have 
to surrender all that we have won." M. Rodzianko 
saw General Kornilov at the place which he managed 
to hold till he was wounded and taken prisoner. After 
that M. Rodzianko went back to the Stavka. "You 
see, I was right," exclaimed the Grand Duke. Then 
M. Rodzianko asked leave to bring the whole matter before 
the Tsar and, on behalf of the Duma, to insist upon 
energetic measures being taken. The Tsar agreed to 
appoint a Special Conference. Evidence of departmental 
chaos and intrigue and of personal rivalry between 
General Sukhomlinov and the Grand Duke Sergius was 
so overwhelming that General Sukhomlinov was dis- 
missed. But the Artillery Department still continued 
its obstructive methods. Thereupon M. Rodzianko went 
to the Grand Duke Sergius and said to him: "Unless 
you resign I shall have you exposed in the Duma." The 
Grand Duke was then appointed to another post: In- 
spector General of Ordnance. 

In April, 1915, the Special Conference drew up a com- 
prehensive scheme of mobilizing industries for immediate 
munition production. This scheme was laid by till 
August "to wait for the Duma Committee," as General 
Yanushkevich afterwards stated. An offer of 1,000,000 
rifles from Japan was declined because they were of a 
different caliber from the Russian rifle. Viscount Motono, 
the Japanese Ambassador in Petrograd, had suggested 
to General Sukhomlinov in the early months of the war 

* The wastage of rifles during the early months of the war had been very 
great, as it necessarily must be in field warfare, especially going over enormous 
distances, as the Russian Army had done. Moreover, there was no organiza- 
tion then to collect the rifles of wounded men or to utilize captured rifles. 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 233 

that Japanese industries could supply munitions, and had 
pointed out that, during their own war with Russia, 
the Japanese had suffered greatly from shortage of muni- 
tions till they had mobilized their industries. The offer 
and the advice were both disregarded till long afterwards. 

On May 2, 1915, General Mackensen, having stiffened 
the Austrian ranks with picked German troops, opened 
a bombardment such as the Russian Army had never 
known. Something like 700,000 shells burst upon the 
shallow Russian trenches.^ The much- vaunted "pha- 
lanx" pierced Radko-Dmitriev's single line; the Rus- 
sians had no ammuniton. The enemy mustered twenty- 
four army corps against the Russian fourteen, and the 
Russians had to retreat. They fought stubbornly, hero- 
ically. Who can describe all the tragedy of that retreat! 
It will live for many a year in the minds of those who 
came through it alive. It left an aftermath of bitter- 
ness and disappointment which did much to strengthen 
the ferment of revolution. 

Warsaw fell August 5, 1915. Novo-Georgievsk capit- 
ulated — through treachery, it is said — ^August 19th, 
uncovering the Russian flank. Brest-Litovsk, the great 
Lithuanian border stronghold, fell August 25th. Worst 
of all, Kovno had fallen a week earlier, also through 
treachery, deserted by its Commandant, who fled in- 
land and was arrested — a raving lunatic. Kovno was 
immensely strong, yet it did not resist more than seven 
days. This catastrophe threatened to close the main 
avenue of escape for the tortured armies. The road 
eastward through the Pripiat marshes was already 
overthronged by countless fugitives.^ Artillery could 

^ The Russian troops had not been trained to trench warfare and were con- 
stitutionally averse to "digging in." This was noticeable during the first year 
of the war, and, to a lesser degree, afterwards. 

2 More than 3,000,000 Poles, Lithuanians, Galicians, and Jews fled east- 
ward into Russia during the great retreat. The population of Petrograd and 
Moscow increased by nearly 1,000,000. 



234 RUSSIA AT WAR 

not pass through this concourse without throwing carts 
with their human freight into the morass on either 
side. Many thousands thus perished and many more 
thousands died on the way. 

At this appalling conjuncture of disasters the Tsar 
decided to assume the High Command (September 5, 
1915). He alleged a chivalrous motive: he did not 
desire to wrest anyone's laurels, so he came in when 
things looked gloomiest. But he himself did not realize 
that he was acting as a puppet in the hands of Raz- 
putin, who had taken this opportunity to settle old 
scores with the Grand Duke. He appointed General 
Alexeiev his Chief of Staff. The Grand Duke Nicholas 
Nikolaievich went to take command in the Caucasus, 
where General Yudenich secured for him afterwards a 
series of brilliant victories against the Turks, resulting 
in the capture of Erzerum, Erzinghian, and Trebizond. 
It is interesting to note that before his departure the 
Grand Duke said to a friend: "If I had had my choice 
I should also have selected General Alexeiev, but I 
took the man that was given to me. He was in favor 
then. He is in disfavor now. I am not going to de- 
sert him when he is down." And General Yanush- 
kevich went with him as his assistant, but he never 
again had anything to do with armies in the field. 

General Alexeiev succeeded in an apparently hopeless 
task. He extricated all the northern armies from the 
jaws of the trap that was closing upon them. The 
Guards had set their back against Vilna and held 
open one of the jaws. A daring German cavalry raid 
to Molodechno was countered, and finally, when the 
order to evacuate Vilna came (September 18th), the 
weary, war-stained armies marched across country 
along the route that had carried Napoleon's invader's 
in 1812. 

Modestly, General Alexeiev told me afterwards: "It 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 235 

was our men's endurance on the march that saved us." 
He was only partly right. 

The armies in the field had been under the undivided 
control of their commanders. There had been no inter- 
ference from Petrograd or Tsarskoe Selo. The reserve 
formations in the rear had, on the other hand, no con- 
nection except with the War Office. And here, again 
utter chaos and inefficiency had prevailed. The reserves, 
hurried up during the retreat, were often raw peasants 
who had never handled a rifle, who had not the rudi- 
ments of military training or discipline, and were armed 
only with sticks. In tens and in hundreds of thousands 
they fell prisoners into the hands of the Germans, adding 
only to the confusion of the retreat. General Alexeiev 
set himself to remedy this evil. He wanted a substantial 
support for future operations. The War Office had an 
efficient chief in General Polivanov, who, however, did 
not long remain there because he was not liked at Court, 
and General Shuvaiev, a commissariat expert, took his 
place. The War Department now went to the other 
extreme, from excess of zeal towards the Tsar, now 
Generalissimo. Too many men were called out — ^mil- 
hons and millions in excess of efficient requirements, 
needlessly irritating the villagers, reducing agricultural 
labor and the production of foodstuffs. 

Russia's armies scored many a gallant victory in the 
several offensives afterwards undertaken by General 
Brusilov, wherein such leaders as Kaledin, Lechitsky, 
Sakharov, Shcherbacher, Lesh, Count Keller, and others 
distinguished themselves. The Dvinsk and Riga held 
their positions stanchly, and even drove back the enemy. 
(Platonovka, November, 1915.) 

Munitions and heavy guns had increased very largely. 
Russia's Allies helped her, but she herself produced 
over 80 per cent of all her own requirements. The 
wastage of rifles had so diminished in trench warfare 



236 RUSSIA AT WAR 

that now there was a fair sufficiency. But in technical 
improvements, in modern applications of trench artil- 
lery, etc., the War Department still continued its old 
methods. While I was at the Southwestern Front 
in December, 1915, thousands of soldiers' lives were 
wasted because no trench mortars were available. The 
Artillery Department had been "experimenting" to 
"improve" French and British models. Later, General 
Lukomsky, leaving the War Office to take command 
of a division, was able with the use of trench mortars 
to score easy successes in the Carpathians without 
much loss of life. 

Under the influence of the Old Regime persistent 
unwillingness had always been shown to any direct 
contact between the Russian and Allied Armies. Of- 
ficers applying for temporary service in France in order 
to acquaint themselves with the latest methods were 
not encouraged. 

Of the Siberian, Caucasian, and Finland, as well 
of the first and even the second line regiments that 
fought so gallantly in 1914 and 1915 Httle remained 
save the name. They had been filled and refilled. 
The losses during the war were heavy, if prisoners be 
counted in. Casualties in killed and wounded of course 
affected chiefly the fighting units, and more particu- 
larly the infantry. By the end of 1915 the fighting 
units had lost 200 and even 300 per cent of their effect- 
ives.^ One colonel told me that he had nearly 25,000 
men on the strength of the regiment, of whom less than 
3000 were then in the ranks; the remainder had been 
killed, wounded, or incapacitated for further service. 

* Losses in the artillery averaged about 30 per cent; in the cavalry about 
25 per cent. Officers of these arms were not strangers to their men; hence 
these men remained disciplined long after the infantry had become "revolu- 
tionized." Moreover, the younger infantrymen, who were better educated, 
had been replaced by older men, who were mostly illiterate. 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 237 

On a rough estimate the total losses at the beginning 
of the Revolution may be stated at 4,500,000, including 
500,000 killed, nearly 2,000,000 wounded or invalided, 
and over 2,000,000 prisoners. At the end of 1915 the 
men on service numbered 6,000,000. Something like 
16,000,000 men had been "called up" by the end of 
1916, or nearly 10 per cent of the population. Approx- 
imately 8,000,000 men were then distributed in the 
various towns and cities, undergoing instruction, more 
or less appropriate, and guarding communications, etc. 

It was said soon after the war began that the shortage 
of officers had reached an enormous figure — 30,000 to 
50,000. Training corps, established in various parts 
of the country, provided a contingent of prdporshchiki 
(ensigns, or the equivalent of our temporary second- 
lieutenants) whose loyalty and patriotism could not 
compensate for their lack of efficiency, whence the 
prestige of officers was sadly diminished in the eyes 
of their men. 

The depreciation in the fighting value of old first- 
line units owing to losses was counterbalanced by notice- 
able improvement in quality of the new second line. 
General Alexeiev considered them equal to the new 
first line. Russia's Regular Army of over 2,000,000 was 
replaced in 1916 by a serviceable host of 4,000,000 com- 
batants, resembling a militia rather than a regular 
army. But the Germans did not possess material of 
a much higher quality, while the Austrians were dis- 
tinctly inferior. 

Munition supply had increased very largely in 1916. 
During the summer of that year I was present at the 
operations near Baranovichi. General Ewert made an 
effort to break the German line towards Vilna and so 
force the enemy back from the Dvinsk and Riga 
Fronts. The artillery preparation and the attack pro- 
ceeded under my eyes. The Russian guns were su- 



238 RUSSIA AT WAR 

perior in numbers, in caliber, and m range. There was 
no lack of munitions. Three lines of trenches fell be- 
fore the attacking waves of infantry, including strong 
points which the enemy had been preparing since Sep- 
tember of the preceding year. But the operation failed. 
And I have no hesitation in saying that the failure was 
due to errors of organization, training, and leadership 
much more than to other causes. The losses were very 
heavy, chiefly because infantry attack and artillery 
preparation and support were not properly combined. 
I then appealed to Headquarters to send oJBScers to the 
Allied Armies and invite instruction. But nothing came 
of it; and, I may add — through no fault of General 
Alexeiev. 

I have not spoken of the Navy in connection with 
program or fighting, but in both respects it had 
compared very well with the record of the land services. 
Admiral Grigorovich had done what he could to bring 
ships and men to a high standard of strength and effi- 
ciency. Shipbuilding had given the Baltic Fleet two 
squadrons of super-Dreadnoughts and two modern units 
of the largest type to the Black Sea. The Baltic Fleet 
could not, of course, hope to deal with the combined 
strength of Germany's battleships. But once Great 
Britain was in the war, the Russians could feel more or 
less secure. When Admiral Beatty came with his Battle 
Cruiser squadron to Reval and Kronstadt in the summer 
of 1914, he and his officers and men received an enthu- 
siastic welcome from the Russian sailors. That visit 
encouraged hopes in Russian breasts that they would 
not be left to fight the Germans alone. And, some 
weeks later, a French squadron came, bringing M. Poin- 
care on his last visit to the Russian Government. 

The Baltic Fleet was then under the command of 
Admiral Essen, an eminently capable leader, who was 
succeeded on his untimely decease by Admiral Kanin. 



SOLDAU-TANNENBERG AND AFTER 239 

Admiral (then Captain) Kedrov had greatly improved 
gunnery in the fleet. Our submarines entered the 
Baltic soon after the war began and rendered very 
substantial assistance, sallying forth even from ice- 
locked harbors. The Russian Naval Intelligence was 
excellent. Little, however, could be done to prevent 
the Germans from taking Libau. On the other hand, 
all attempts to enter the Gulf of Riga were successfully 
defeated till the Revolution had undermined discipline 
and enabled the Germans to seize the waters and the 
islands of the Gulf. 

In the Black Sea, Russian sailors quickly asserted 
their mastery over the German raider and submarine 
menace. Russian submarines constantly intercepted the 
transport of coal from Asia Minor to Constantinople 
and maintained a ceaseless and silent vigil on and around 
the Bosporus, remaining deeply submerged during the 
long hours of daylight to avoid German aeroplane bombs. 
These submarines twice torpedoed the Goeben and Breslau, 
necessitating prolonged repairs to those scourges. 

Under Kerensky the twelve Russian Dreadnoughts 
in the Baltic failed to challenge a numerically inferior 
German force, and the Fleet Committee sided with Lenin 
in demanding a "democratic" peace. In November 
they joined Lenin. Two months later some of the 
Black Sea imits took part in a Bolshevist plot instigated 
by German agents, and the sailors murdered four Ad- 
mirals and sixty officers. In 1918 the Black Sea war- 
ships, cut off from their bases by the German occupa- 
tion of the littoral, had to surrender. The Germans 
also captured a whole fleet of warships and transports 
that had been built at Nikolaiev for an invasion of 
Turkey. The Revolution disabled Russia at a time 
when combined land and sea operations against Germany 
and her allies would have assured a decisive victory. 



CHAPTER XX 

"THE HUN WITHIN THE GATES" 

Prisoners of War — Dependence on German Goods — Peasants in Rags — Ger- 
man 'Captm-e" of Industries and Coal Supply — Northern Trade Routes 
Undeveloped — ^The Archangel Explosion. 

It was not the actual losses in the war that depressed 
the Army and the nation, but the apparent hopelessness 
of the struggle. The enemy had taken 2,000,000 pris- 
oners, mostly untrained reserves, but the Russians had 
captured a larger number (nearly 2,000,000 Austrians 
and about 200,000 Germans). The Austrian prisoners 
were working in the villages. Many of them belonged to 
Slav races, Galicians, Czechs, Slovaks, etc., or Rumanes, 
who could be trusted. The Germans were sent farther 
North and East. They afterwards helped the Bol- 
sheviki in Eastern Russia and Siberia. 

i Owing to the lack of co-ordination between the War 
Departments, skilled labor had been recklessly con- 
scribed at the outbreak of war for service in the trenches, 
and the mobilization of industries thus became still 
more difficult. From the same cause the output of the 
Donetz coal mines fell considerably. This affected the 
great steel and iron works in the South, and still more 
the munition works in Petrograd,^ which had formerly 

^ The Putilov works, with a trebled staff of over 50,000 hands, was able in 
1916 to produce more munitions in one month than could be received from the 
Allies in a whole year. The shortage of coal prevented a further increase of 
output. The transfer of these works to the coal and iron regions in the South 
was repeatedly urged, but the Government would not take a decision. Many 
of the important rubber and munition works at Riga were "evacuated" into 
the interior during 1915-16. 

240 



'THE HUN WITHIN THE GATES" 



24*1 




242 RUSSIA AT WAR 

obtained their supplies from Great Britain. Before the 
war, Westphalian coal was fast ousting British fuel, 
thanks to the monopoly that German exporters (for 
secret military reasons) were introducing under the 
superintendence of Herr Hugo Stinnes. 

The Germans already held a virtual monopoly on 
scores of imported goods, from upholsterer's nails to 
steam-hammers, practically all chemical and pharma- 
ceutical products and electrical fittings and machinery. 
The war deprived Russia of most of the appurtenances 
of modern life and comfort. British firms had not 
sufficiently cultivated the Russian market, and, more- 
over, owing to the severance of communications, it 
was exceedingly difficult for them to remedy the neglect. 
According to the statement made before the Moscow 
Conference in August, 1917, by the Minister of Supplies, 
Russia was then receiving only 16 per cent of her muni- 
tions from abroad, but the proportion of goods obtained 
for the open market was too trifling to bear any com- 
parison. Imports from Germany had not been for- 
bidden during the war: they were penalized by in- 
creased customs duties; but all that was imported 
through the frontier station at Tornea in the North of 
Finland in the form of German, Swedish and Danish, 
goods could not even begin to satisfy Russia's require- 
ments. Unfortunately, champagne was "smuggled" to 
the detriment of necessaries, the price per bottle in 
Petrograd having risen to 150 rubles (nominally $75) 
during the Revolution. 

None of the great Allied or enemy nations were 
suffering from the effects of the war to an extent that 
could be compared with the privations of the Russian 
people, more particularly the middle class and the 
peasants. The former were underfed and ill-clad. Boots, 
shoes, and goloshes were almost unobtainable. I have 
seen thousands of people waiting all night in the hope 
of buying a pair of boots, glad to pay any sum ($25 



"THE HUN WITHIN THE GATES" 243 

and even $50 for footgear that used to be sold for $5). 
An ordinary overcoat which formerly cost $10 or $15 
was selling for $60 or $100. (Under the Bolshevist regime 
these prices rose tenfold.) The earnings of a whole month 
went to pay for a pair of shoes, and nothing remained 
for food, which had increased in price tenfold. The 
peasants had food, but no clothing. How far would 
seven inches of cotton goods suffice to cover the naked- 
ness of man or woman? They went about in their old 
cotton rags. Cloth was, of course, out of the question. 
It had all been monopolized for the Army. Already, 
at the end of 1916, it was extremely difficult to obtain 
common woolen garments in Petrograd. In the villages 
they had long ago been unprocurable. The peasants 
had only their sheepskin coats and what homespun 
material they could still weave. And even this source 
of supply had been greatly reduced by the wholesale 
slaughter of sheep for the foodless market. 

In order to strengthen their hold upon the Russian 
consumer and to circumvent protective duties the Ger- 
mans had opened many large industrial enterprises in 
the country, and, more particularly in the chemical, 
electrical, and engineering branches. These works were 
taken over by the Russian Government after war had 
broken out, and helped very much to increase the out- 
put 1 of munitions. But the Germans had cunningly 

^Many of the German manufacturers and merchants were exiled to the 
northern provinces, to the Urals and to Siberia, as enemy subjects. There 
they laid their plans and made their arrangements for the future development 
of their economic conquest of Russia. The German prisoners of war, and more 
particularly the oflScers, were studying Russian (books for this purpose were 
actually imported from Leipzig during the war), and preparing themselves 
to take part in a "peaceful" invasion of the country after the war. Another 
instance of German "forethought" may be cited here. During the Revolution 
it became known from statements made by German prisoners that many 
mobilized industries had been reconverted to peace production in view of immi- 
nent separate peace with Russia and the enormous requirements of the Russian 
markets. Germany's terms to Lenin provided for duty-free entry of German 
goods and fifteen years' monopoly of the Russian grain trade. 



244 RUSSIA AT WAR 

contrived their equipment in such a manner that some 
essential process had to be carried out in Germany. To 
remedy the deficiency in war-time was difficult. How- 
ever,^ it was done — often with the help of German tools 
and machinery supplied through the "disinterested" 
medium of Swedish agents. 

Much of the burden and stress of war might have 
been obviated by Russia had the Government taken the 
most elementary precautions to assure communications 
with Allied or friendly countries in the event of a con- 
flict with Germany. The General Staff knew positively 
in 1908 that Germany meant to fight, yet nothing was 
done to repair the deficiency. A railway to the Murman 
coast had been talked about twenty-five years ago. 
The scheme was revived twenty years later to develop 
the fisheries on the newly discovered Kanin banks, 
whence British trawlers were drawing a fabulous harvest. 
Still nothing was done. It did not suit the watchful 
Germans that anything should be done; their agents 
in Petrograd knew how to clog the bureaucratic cog- 
wheels. When the war-cloud burst, Russia had a 
single-track narrow-gage line between Vologda and 
Archangel and no other communication with her arctic 
seaboard except the fitful waterway of the Northern 
Dvina, frozen or shallowed for eight months in the year. 

Months and years of war passed before the railway 
to the Murman was begun and completed and the Arch- 
angel gage widened. By the autumn of 1917 both 
were in fairly good working order. Prior to that time 
enormous difficulties had been encountered in the trans- 
port of armaments and other war material — difficulties 
that were due to blundering and red tape, and largely 
to German machinations in the Petrograd chanceries, 
which were far more harmful than German mines dropped 
by innocent-looking "neutrals" in the White Sea. 

I shall cite one example. It will help us to under- 



"THE HUN ^WITHIN THE GATES" 245 

stand how true had been the saying that "Russia had 
to fight the German within, as well as the German 
without, her gates." By the end of July, 1916, an im- 
posing accumulation of stores was spread along the 
shore at Archangel awaiting transport to the interior. 
The narrow-gage railway had been quite incapable of 
handling such traffic. Now things began to look more 
hopeful. The wide gage was in operation. Train upon 
train had been loaded and on the point of being dis- 
patched, when, suddenly, orders came from Petrograd 
to suspend all southward freight "because large and 
urgent consignments were coming north." The traffic 
manager remonstrated. He pointed out that war ma- 
terial had to take preference, and explained that if 
many train-loads of goods were sent to Archangel they 
would completely "bottle-up" the sidings and paralyze 
all traffic southward. His expostulations were unheeded. 
He received fresh and peremptory orders. By this time 
the "urgent consignments" were already arriving. They 
consisted of huge quantities of ^^ vodka for the American 
market." The traffic manager's warnings had not over- 
stated the position; "blockage" was complete and 
irreparable. However, "salvation" came in an unex- 
pected manner. A terrific explosion occurred, destroy- 
ing the "cork" and incidentally much of the war material. 
Whatever the cause of the explosion may have been, 
whether accident or malicious design on the part of 
German or other agents, it enabled the traffic manager 
to resume work on the railway. 

At Vladivostok matters were not much better. All 
travelers who passed that way during the years 1916-17 
reported seeing vast quantities of goods lying on shore. 
The distance that had to be traversed in order to bring 
them to. European Russia had involved too great a 
strain upon the railway. But much of the delay was 
due to bad management and, during the Revolution, 



246 RUSSIA AT WAR 

to interference from the Committees and Soviets. At 
Tomsk the Workmen's Committees passed a resolution 
insisting that not more than two trains should be al- 
lowed to pass daily, "because the engines also required 
a rest." 



CHAPTER XXI 

NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 

Poland as a '^ Buffer State" — ^The Polish Army — German Temptation to Poles 
— ^The Little Russians — "Ukraina" Movement — Austro-German Intrigue 
— loltuhowski's "Mission" Fails — Blue and Yellow Replaces Red Flag — 
Siberia and Caucasia "Separate" from Anarchy — "Constitutions" in 
KhiTa and Bokhara — ^Russia Deserted by the Finns — Enlistment in 
German Army — Bolshevist Aid. 

The war had entailed national and political prob- 
lems that called for the application of tact and states- 
manship which often ran counter to the prejudice and 
customs of the Old Regime. Foremost among these 
problems stood the Polish question. Reference thereto 
has already been made in previous chapters, but it will 
be useful to summarize certain aspects which more 
immediately concerned the war. " United Poland " would 
be at once a "buffer" State between Russia and Ger- 
many and a powerful antidote to Germanic world-power. 
By reiterated pledges Russia bound herself to restore 
this unity. The Grand Duke Nicholas, as Commander- 
in-Chief of the Tsar's armies, at the commencement of 
the Great War solemnly proclaimed this purpose; it 
had been reaffirmed and extended by a Declaration of 
the Premier before the Duma after the Russian retreat 
in 1915, when the words "Polish autonomy" were first 
uttered by a Russian Minister; it was still further de- 
veloped by the Revolutionary Government in its an- 
nouncement to the people and to the Allied nations 
that it would "liberate Poland." 

But Austro-German policy during the war tended 

247 



248 RUSSIA AT WAR 

to discount all the possibilities of an Allied vindica- 
tion of the Polish cause. The Poles in Galicia had long 
been the spoilt children of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 
In Posen and Silesia they, on the contrary, had had 
to contend with an agrarian and cultural campaign of 
Prussification against which they had presented a united 
and unbreakable front, comparing well with the resist- 
ance offered by their countrymen in the Vistula prov- 
inces to Russifying tendencies manifested shortsightedly 
by Tsardom. In this respect the administrators deputed 
by Nicholas II continued to play the German game. 
Almost on the eve of war, General Zhilinsky, on taking 
charge of the Warsaw Governor-Generalship, proclaimed 
his unconditional adherence to the policy of Russification 
that had been followed with varying intensity by his 
predecessors. This attitude revealed an utter incapacity 
to estimate the causes and consequences of German 
aggression. But the Poles themselves, taught in the 
school of bitter experience, knew how to differentiate 
between the hard, calculating domination of the Germans 
and the imitative but comparatively innocuous rule of 
the Russian bureaucracy; they also realized that a 
genuine solution of their national hopes could be assured 
only by the Powers of the Entente. Later they were 
to be sorely tempted to make terms with their German 
masters, but they — or at least a majority of them — 
held out in the face of almost desperate provocation 
and distress, remaining stanch in their belief that the 
Allies alone were capable of assuring to them a free and 
independent existence. 

Early in the war the Poles had intimated to the 
Russian High Command their desire to form themselves 
into units for the defense of their country. A similar 
movement had been initiated in Galicia. Pan Pilsudski,^ 

^ Afterwards "Dictator" of Poland during the period following the defeat 
of Germany (November, 1918). 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 249 

a representative of the so-called Austrian Orientation, 
had raised a small force of Polish Sokoly to fight against 
the Russians, believing that the liberation of Poland 
could never be acceptable to the autocracy. Later, 
when the Austro-Germans were in possession and a 
tame Council of State (Rada Panstwa) had been insti- 
tuted at Warsatv to encourage Polish hopes of inde- 
pendence, this same Pilsudski gradually lost his belief 
m the possibility of salvation under Germanic auspices, 
resigned from the Council, and declined to use his legion 
on the Russian Front. Meanwhile, the Grand Duke, 
domineered by the Court and the bureaucracy, had 
had to discourage the Polish volunteer movement. 
There were over half a million Poles serving under the 
Russian colors, and they, like their countrymen in the 
German and Austro-Hungarian units, were unconsciously 
shedding each other's blood, not knowing when their 
bullets or bayonets were being directed against Polish 
breasts. 

Had Russia then accepted and encouraged the idea 
of a Polish Army, which was to reach the incipient 
stage of realization three years later,^ the course of 
the Great War might have been much modified. When 
Polish units did finally make their appearance on Russia's 
side, they were too small to make the desired impres- 
sion. Moreover, the Germanic control over Polish lands 
had asserted itself in such a fashion, and the Revolution 
had so weakened the Russian army, that the prospects 
of Russia being able to exert an influence over the 
destinies of Poland had become more remote. On the 
other hand, all the provinces conquered by the Austro- 

* A Congress of Polish soldiers, assembled in Petrograd (May, 1917), decided 
in favor of the formation of a Polish Army. But the movement encountered 
some opposition in their own ranks, and was approved half-heartedly by the 
Provisional Government. This Congress elected General Pilsudski honorary 
Commander-in-Chief of the new Army, a proceeding which afterwards afforded 
the Germans a pretext for ordering his arrest. See Appendix. 



250 RUSSIA AT WAR 

Germans had been endowed with an appearance of 
self-government, and there was much German talk of 
a revival of United Poland, of course without Posen and 
without a sea-port at Dantzig. 

It was notorious, however, that the produce of Polish 
lands had been diverted for German use and profit. 
As an offset to this system of spoliation, which entailed 
famine to the urban population, the conquerors had 
everywhere — for selfish purposes — safeguarded and de- 
veloped rural property. Farming was carried on with 
the aid of improved German implements and machinery, 
and half the profits handed over to the owner of the 
land or deposited to his credit at the banks if he had 
sought refuge in Russia, the other half being taken over 
by the Germanic treasuries. While the Russian armies 
in their retreat had destroyed Polish farms and estates, 
the Germans were taking every care of them and even 
paying the owners a share of the revenue. This was a 
clever move on their part. It had an undoubted influence 
upon the many thousands of Poles who had been driven 
from their homes, to flee before the German invasion. 

Mistakes on the part of Russian oflScials, and to a 
lesser degree lack of discipline and restraint on the part 
of the Russian troops, had also been noticed in Galicia. 
When the victorious hosts of Russia swept westward 
to Cracow during the first year of the Great War, they 
were met with open arms by the natives, who had been 
ignorant, or were oblivious, of the treatment that had 
been meted out to their co-religionaries in Kohlm and 
Lublin.i Very soon, however, they were disillusioned. 
In the wake of the Russian legions came trainloads of 
the Orthodox clergy and administrators, imbued with 
the hope of unifying the Galician Ruthenes under the 
Russian scepter by means of "spiritual conversion." 

*The Ruthenes of Kholm and Lublin had been ruthlessly "dragooned" 
into the Greek Orthodox Church by "Russificators." 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 251 

The experiment ended in failure, for the Ruthenes were 
an obstinate race, with the proverbial obstinacy of their 
Little Russian kinsmen; nothing could shake their alle- 
giance to their priests, to the Greek-Catholic Church 
and to the Pope. The missionaries went away disap- 
pointed. 

But the attempt to hustle Galicians into unity with 
Russian ways and beliefs left an aftermath of bitter- 
ness, which grew during the winter and the spring of 
1915 and killed any inclination on the part of the natives 
to seek Russia's protection. They hailed with joy the 
return of the Austrian and even the German armies. 
A short taste of Russian rule had more than sufficed. 
Even gratitude for $150,000,000 expended by the Russians 
on relief work and seeding their fields was forgotten. 

On the southwestern borders separatist designs had 
long been brewing. Fostered by Austrian and German 
agents, the so-called Ukrainian (Borderland) movement 
eventually tended to shake off alien trammels. In 
August, 1914, the Austrian Government promoted a 
Union for the Liberation of the Ukrainia with the help 
of Russian subjects, notably Skoropis-Ioltuhowski, Mele- 
newski and V. Doroshenko. Later the Germans took 
over this organization. Von Bergen and Trautman, of 
the Berlin Foreign Office, were in charge of its operations, 
and spent large sums of money on propaganda and on 
the dispatch of agents to Russia. The President of 
the Union, loltuhowski, who was working in conjunction 
with Lenin, received large allowances every month for 
his expenses. His associates received 1200 marks monthly ; 
those who were chosen by the Union to agitate in prison 
camps received 600 marks monthly; and those who 
were sent into Russia received a lump sum of 1000 
rubles. Independently of this, the German Government 
also spent a considerable sum of money upon organizing 



252 RUSSIA AT WAR 

volunteers amongst the "Ukrainian" prisoners of war 
in order to fight against Russia. 

All these facts are confirmed by documentary evi- 
dence in the possession of the Russian military author- 
ities.i Besides these details the following may be added. 
After the occupation of Kliolm by the German armies, 
the Union sent a telegram of congratulation to Wilhelm. 
This telegram was printed in the Viestnik Soiuza and 
signed by Doroshenko and Melenewski, In the year 
1915 the Union published a pamphlet in Munich calling 
upon Germany to liberate the Ukraina from the Russian 
yoke. In August, 1914, the Union appealed to Sweden 
and Bulgaria, calling upon them to join with the Ukraina 
against Muscovite barbarism. The appeal to the Bul- 
garian people was printed in the Sofia paper Utro with 
the help of the Austrian Legation. At the end of 1914 
Melenewski went to Constantinople to the Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talaat Bey, to ask him to 
help the Ukraina in its desire to separate from Russia. 
The latter promised to give his help. Propaganda was 
also carried on by Biberovich and Stephankowski, who 
edited newspapers in Vienna and Lausanne. 

"Ukrainian" separatism appealed to a small group 
of literary men among the Little Russians. They alleged 
that in language, in customs, and in character the Little 
and Great Russians had drifted somewhat apart during 
the centuries since the country had been devastated 
by the Tatars. Ukraina had then been recolonized by 
Russians under the auspices of Polish, Russian, and 
Lithuanian magnates. There existed another incentive 
to Ukrainian separatism — the economic and cultural 
questions. People of one race and one language (the 
Little Russians and the Galician Ruthenes) had naturally 
sought a development of commercial and intellectual 
relations. These had been, however, much hampered 

1 Russkoe Slow, September 2, 1917. 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 25S 

by Russian and Austrian custom-house duties and police 
restrictions. Moreover, on the Russian side the Ukrain- 
ians saw with envy their kinsfolk beyond the border 
enjoying certain cultural rights which were denied to 
them — the right of tuition in their native tongue and 
its official status. And, although a closer inspection 
would have revealed the hollowness of the Ruthene 
liberties, dominated as the people were in their daily 
lives by Jewish officials and land-agents and even by 
Poles, the poverty of the Ruthene peasants, bedecked 
under the gay colors of their national dress, and the 
speciousness of their religious freedom under a Church 
adopting the Greek rites but recognizing the authority 
of Rome and its Hapsburg supporters — although there 
was no sound motive for envy, especially after the over- 
throw of the autocratic regime — the catchword "Ukraina 
for the Ukrainians" was successfully promulgated by 
the aforesaid group of literary men, backed by the 
Austro-German propaganda. 

The errors of the Old Regime had involved needless 
harrying of the Ruthenes inhabiting the districts of 
Kholm and Lublin and professing the Greek-Catholic 
or United faith. Russification had there taken the form 
of forcible conversion to Orthodoxy and later to a sep- 
aration of these districts from the kingdom of Poland 
as defined by international treaty. But Russian Neo- 
Slavophilism had dictated a conciliatory attitude towards 
the Ruthenes of Galicia. Indeed, its leaders, while 
accepting in principle a reconciliation with the Poles, 
persistently reproached them for "oppressing the Gali- 
cians." 

So, while the consolidation of the German occupation 
of Courland and the virtual separation of Finland were 
undermining the edifice built by Peter the Great on the 
shores of the Baltic, and threatening to close his "win- 
dow into Europe," a similar movement in the Ukraina 



254 RUSSIA AT WAR 

threatened the integrity of the dominions acquired to 
the south of Muscovy by the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich 
and on the Black Sea by Catherine the Great. The blue 
and yellow flag of Ukraina had been substituted for 
the red flag of Revolution, symbolizing thereby a ten- 
dency to break away from Revolutionary Russia. Ger- 
many wanted to break up the "Empire" of the Tsars, 
but she had more urgent need of food. Hence she took 
particular care to confine Bolshevism to other parts of 
Russia. 

Professor Hrushevsky (formerly of Lemberg Uni- 
versity), the leader of the movement, had declared in 
written and oral utterances that nothing less than the 
whole of Southern Russia, including Siedlce and Voro- 
nezh, Kursk and Novorosiysk, with all the Euxine 
seaboard and Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, were under 
his plan to be evolved into a separate State, with a 
population of 37,000,000 souls. Hrushevsky was propa- 
gating this idea before the war. The name Ukraina 
(Borderland) was to be given to the new State. His 
"national" ideals were utilized by Austria and Germany 
in a conspiracy to weaken Russia. 

The Ukrainian "leaders" formed a so-called Central 
Rada or Council in Kiev soon after the Revolution 
broke out in Petrograd. In April the Rada announced 
its intention to call a Constituent to decide the future 
form of government for Ukraina. Soon a Congress of 
Ukrainian "representatives" proclaimed itself for "au- 
tonomy in a federal Russian Republic." The movement 
was extended to Poltava, Kharkov, and Odessa. A 
series of Ukrainian demonstrations began in Kiev, often 
developing into street conflicts with the Jews and 
the Russian Revolutionaries. Sermons were preached 
in the churches for the first time in the native dialect. 
The soldiers enrolled themselves into separate Ukrainian 
regiments. 




GENERAL L. G. KORNILOV 
Who led his army to victory and then saved the whole 
Southwestern Front from disaster by stern measures of 
discipline. He was betrayed by Kerensky and the Bolshe- 
viki. The son of a simple Siberian Cossack and a Buriat 
mother he rose by his own unaided exertions, by sheer 
force of genius and valor, to be Russia's greatest military 
leader. He was then aged only 47. 




GENERAL MICHAEL VASILIEVICH ALEXEIEV 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 255 

The arrival of Count Szeptycki, the Greek Catholic 
Metropolitan of Lemberg, gave rise to fresh manifesta- 
tions. He had been imprisoned under the Old Regime 
for alleged conspiracy against the Russians in Galicia. 
His visit led to a revival of Romish tendencies, buried 
since the days of Catherine. At the end of May, M. 
Kerensky came to Kiev, visited the Rada, and light- 
heartedly promised the fulfilment of their wishes by 
the Russian Constituent Assembly. But the Ukrainian 
"leaders" were not disposed to wait. Negotiations were 
carried to Petrograd, where a special commission reported 
in favor of local self-government, not venturing to use 
the word "autonomy." Finally, to save the Ukraina 
from anarchy, the Rada drew up a Manifesto called the 
"Universal," in which, after censuring the Provisional 
Government "for refusing to comply with Ukrainian 
demands," it announced that "the Ukrainian people 
would proceed to manage their own affiars." Soldiers 
were dispatched to various cities to read and explain 
this document, and incidentally to levy a land tax of 
a penny per acre for the Rada's expenses. The pro- 
mulgation of the Universal in Kiev was attended by a 
grand open-air meeting, amid the ringing of church and 
cathedral bells (June 26th). Prince Lvov issued a counter 
manifesto on the danger of changing the form of adminis- 
tration in the country and in the Army in war-time. 
His arguments were two-edged; they fell unheeded upon 
the Rada. Within a few days the new Ukrainian Govern- 
ment had been formed under the modest name of General 
Secretariat. 

This body proceeded to address the population of 
Ukraina as the responsible Government of an autonomous 
State. The writ of the Provisional Government was 
no longer recognized in Ukraina. Its administrative 
prerogatives were suspended. M. Kerensky and his 
associates, MM. Tseretelli (a Georgian) and Tereshchenko 



256 RUSSIA AT WAR 

(a Little Russian), came to Kiev on July llth to confer 
with the members of the General Secretariat and with 
the local Soviet. The Military Secretary had ordered 
a parade of Ukrainian soldiers in honor of the occasion. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the district forbade it. 
Nevertheless the parade was held. MM. Hrushevsky, 
Petlura, and other Ukrainian "Ministers" went out 
to take the salute, while Kerensky and his Ministers 
discreetly abstained from appearing. That two rival 
authorities — the Russian and the Ukrainian — were in 
open conflict became self-evident. 

An agreement was concluded with the Rada by 
MM. Tseretelli and Tereshchenko (July 14th) without 
the previous assent or knowledge of non-Socialist Min- 
isters in Petrograd. This led to a serious Cabinet crisis 
on the eve of the Bolshevist uprising in July, 1917. 
During the Bolshevist usurpation the Germans occupied 
Ukraina and set up their Hetman (the Russian General 
Skoropadski) who continued to rule nominally until the 
German overthrow (Nov., 1918) when the whole para- 
phernalia of mock Ukrainian government disappeared. 

Other "autonomies" and "republics" arose within 
the confines of the Empire. The Caucasians and the 
Siberians each "separated" themselves from Bolshevist 
anarchy. The Lithuanians, the Letts (their kinsmen), 
and the Esthonian Finns successively displayed similar 
tendencies whenever they escaped the heavy hand of 
the Teuton invader. Bokhara and Khiva, the semi- 
independent Elianates of Central Asia, did not escape 
the contagion. 

The Revolution had aroused interest in tlie peoples 
inhabiting the Caucasus and Turkestan that stood in 
the path of German designs and ambitions not less 
than did the Ukrainians and the Cossacks. The atrocities 
in the Black Sea Fleet (January, 1918) betrayed the 
hand of Germany, Through Bolshevist agents she was 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 257 

even preparing the way for combined land and sea 
operations from Constantinople and Constanza against 
the Black Sea littoral, her objectives being Odessa, 
Rostov, and Tiflis. 

Having turned the Russian flank in the Baltic with 
the aid of the Bolsheviki and feeling herself secure there 
under the auspices of the Lenin-Trotsky regime and the 
new Finnish Republic, Germany planned a vast flanking 
operation in the South. If permanently successful, it 
would have turned the British position in Mesopotamia, 
encompassed the Cossacks, Ukrainians, and Rumanians, 
and opened the road for German influence and commerce, 
under subservient Ottoman auspices, into the heart 
of Asia. 

Already she held all the trump cards after her in- 
vasion of the Ukraina, the capture of the Black Sea 
Fleet, and a foothold on the Caspian; but her own military 
collapse and the national rally in Russia have ruined her 
dream of Asiatic conquest. 

Let us briefly review the elements that held sway 
in this field of conflict. The Cossacks and the Ukrai- 
nians are dealt with elsewhere. 

On the southern slopes of the great Caucasian mountain chain the Geor- 
gians, Armenians, and Tatars, each in fairly equal proportions (total popula- 
tion about six millions), have not lived in perfect harmony. 

The Georgians, numerically the strongest, inhabit a solid strip extending 
from the sea-coast eastward beyond Tiflis, which lies within their country. 
The Armenians live on the border of Asia Minor, the Tatars along the Caspian. 
Baku is their center, but it also contains a large Armenian population. 

The Georgians are nearly all Christians. They have proclaimed their 
Church autocephalous. They are essentially a fighting race. The Armenians 
and the Baku Tatars are wealthy and mercantile. The Trans-Caucasian 
Tatars, like their more numerous kinsmen in Kazan, are not warlike. In this 
respect they difiFer entirely from the Moslem hill-tribes in Cis-Caucasia and the 
Turcomans. 

Extraneous factors lend a still more complex ciiaracter to the position. 
The Baku Tatars are the most enlightened and the wealthiest among the 
twenty million followers of Islam that inhabit Russia, and, given certain con- 
ditions and incentives originating from the German-led Committee of Union 



258 RUSSIA AT WAR 

and Progress, might have been tempted into an Islamic combination. On the 
other hand, the natural wealth of Trans-Caucasia — oil and cotton — predicate 
a maintenance of close ties with the industries of Russia. The same may be 
said of Turkestan. Nothing short of the permanent conquest of the Caucasus 
by the Germans with the aid of Turkish troops could have overcome these con- 
siderations. 

Central Asia has been the scene of strange events during the Revolution. 
"Democratic" Governments have been set up within the palaces of the Emir 
of Bokhara and the Khan of Khiva, apparently with the assent of these poten- 
tates. Much discussion has been engendered regarding a so-called Turanian 
Movement, uniting the Russian Tatars. 

The Russian framework embraces a number of separate Moslem groups. 
There is " Mawara-en-Nahr," the country "beyond (i.e., northeast of) the 
River" Oxus, which is an integral part of the civilized Eastern world, with 
ancient centers of Islamic culture in its cities, a peasant population in the oases 
and irrigated riverine tracts, and nomads in the steppes between. The total 
population is about five and a half millions, and about 83 per cent of them 
speak the Turkish dialect called Chagatai. Mawara-en-Nahr is as un-European 
as India. It is cut off from Russia by deserts as India is from England by the 
sea, and under the Tsardom it was divided, on the Indian system, between 
protected native States and Russian-administered provinces. 

Between Mawara-en-Nahr and Eiu*opean Russia lies Kirghizistan, a vast 
steppe-land which no civilized State before Russia, whether Moslem or Chris- 
tian, has ever ruled. The native Kirghiz — from four to five millions in number 
— speak the same Chagatai dialect as the Moslems of Mawara-en-Nahr, but 
differ from them in their economic life and culture. The Kirghiz are nomads, 
threatened with extinction by the immigration of an agricultural peasantry 
from the overcrowded parts of Russia in Europe. 

North and west of the steppes lies European Russia, a settled country of 
fields and towns; and here, in the Urals and along the Volga, there is another 
Moslem population, about four millions strong, entirely surrounded by Russians, 
but holding their own against them, and not inferior to them in civilization. 
These Moslems, whose center is Kazan, speak the Tatar ^ dialect of Turkish, 
but are Europeans in spite of their language and creed. They have not only a 
peasantry but an urban class — shopkeepers, merchants, an intelligentsia, a Press. 

Lastly, there are the Moslems of the Caucasus and Crimea, four and a half 
millions in all, but divided (for the Caucasus is another Balkan Peninsula) by 
differences of religion, civilization and speech. There are Shias and Sunnis, 
townsmen and peasants, and untamed mountaineers. Turkish-speakers and 
Persian-speakers and speakers of innumerable indigenous tongues. 

Under the Tsardom these various Moslem groups had few links with one 
another beyond their common inclusion in the Russian Empire; but since the 
Revolution there has been a spontaneous movement among them to make 
their aggregate weight of numbers tell by democratic organization. Realizing 

*The Tatars are incidentally the "old clothes" dealers and waiters in 
restaurants. 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 259 

that they are behind most other Russian populations in education and economic 
development, they seek to compensate for this weakness by organizing on the 
largest scale, and they dp not shrink from the problems this involves. They 
have taken in hand the reconciliation of Sunni and Shia, and they build con- 
sistently on the Islamic basis, in preference to the Turanian. In view of the 
fact that over 80 per cent of the Russian Moslems are Turkish-speakers, this is a 
noteworthy choice of policy; but the Turanian basis is less practicable than 
the percentage makes it appear, for Qiagatai, Tatar, and Azerbaijani are not 
so much dialects as independent languages, and when the first All-Russian 
Moslem Congress met at Moscow last May, Russian was adopted as the medium 
of discussion, because no other language, whether of the Turkish family or not, 
was equally familiar to all the delegates. 

During the Revolution the Caucasus and the Crimea 
have afforded a refuge to countless numbers of Russians, 
and much wealth has accrued thereby to the inhabitants. 
But the anarchy of Bolshevism has reacted heavily upon 
the industries of these countries as well as of Turkestan, 
and has therefore aroused a strong anti-Bolshevist cur- 
rent. Therein lies their prospects of revival. 

Among Russia's many races the people of the Grand 
Duchy of Finland occupied a special place. The Duchy 
had been conquered from Sweden a century ago, but 
its people had never been enslaved. And the Finns 
should have been the first to volunteer for service in the 
Great War. But all that they did — and not willingly 
either — was to pay a small annual grant to the Imperial 
Exchequer. They did not otherwise feel or assume the 
burden of war. The Finland rifle regiments were Rus- 
sian — as explained elsewhere. The Finns had refused 
to serve in the Russian Army, as they wanted to form 
an army of their own. For a century they had enjoyed 
a privileged position within the Empire, yet in the hour 
of its need they did not provide a single soldier. On 
the contrary, when the war began, some 3000 Finnish 
students deserted to Germany and were trained by 
the Germans to form the nucleus of a Finnish army 
organization whenever the moment was favorable for 



260 RUSSIA AT WAR 

an armed uprising of the Grand Duchy. Stories of 
oppression by Russia had long formed the theme of 
pro-Finnish constitutional quibblers. True, Nicholas II 
needlessly irritated his Finnish subjects. But that and 
the blundering of incompetent bureaucrats filling high 
posts on the borders, where tact and judgment were par- 
ticularly requisite, served merely to cloak the latent 
disloyalty of the Finns themselves and their hatred 
of all things Russian. 

Finnish and Swedish Socialists played an ugly part 
in the disorganization of the Russian troops in the 
Grand Duchy, or, as the Socialists afterwards pro- 
claimed it, the "Finnish Republic." Finnish workmen 
employed in the munition factories in Petrograd lent 
themselves readily to pro-German propaganda and had 
a great deal to do with the excesses committed in the 
early days of the Revolution. In return for this co- 
operation their people were supported by the Bolshevist 
army and navy committees in Helsingfors, which openly 
espoused the cause of the Diet in its defiance of the 
Provisional Government writ of dissolution. It was 
with the aid and support of Bolshevist soldiers and sailors 
that Svinhuvwud and his associates in the Senate (Min- 
istry) of the Grand Duchy proclaimed a Republic. 
And having in this manner declared their "independence," 
they hastened to appeal to the Entente Powers for 
official recognition. Later the Finnish "Reds" came 
into conflict with the Swedo-Finnish "Whites." During 
the spring and summer of 1918 the country was torn 
by civil war. Germany sent an army corps and tried 
to instal a Monarchy. The Teutonic host endeavored 
to seize the Murman railway. Finland was encouraged 
to drive out the Allies from the Arctic ports. 

The Finns are an honest, thrifty, and hardworking 
people, but their ingratitude to Russia and their pro- 
German sympathies should not be underestimated. 



NATIONALITY PROBLEMS 261 

Thence partly arise some of the reasons why they have 
suffered from a shortage of food supplies during the 
war. Russian wheat used to come to them through 
Germany. 



CHAPTER XXII 

SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 

The July Offensive — Bolshevist Interference — General Gutor*s Mistakes — 
Superiority of Russian Armies — Austro-German Reserves used up — 
Kornilov's Success — Disaffection. 

I HAD lived through the alternating hopes and failures 
of the war and shared the joys of deliverance from the 
long nightmare of intrigue, inefficiency, and corruption 
of the Old Regime. With my Russian friends I had 
fondly thought that the advent of New Russia might 
be saved from the perils of revolution and anarchy, that 
the war which had swept away the Old might strengthen 
and pacify the New dispensation. And so it would 
have been, had the great cause of the nations and of 
freedom not been subverted by ruthless hands to serve 
interests that were neither Russian nor free. 

Mob-rule and mob-law were the inevitable accom- 
paniment of the Soviet and its satellites, the Committees. 
The masses and the soldiery had grown tired of a struggle 
that all had long felt was being misdirected, and were 
easily misled by visionaries or traitors to believe it was 
fruitless and unnecessary, while on the other hand they 
were seduced by promises of "land and freedom." Not 
step by step, but with the swiftness of an avalanche, 
Anarchy was rushing upon the edifice of State and society. 
Soon it would crash them into the abyss. In vain 
generals and statesmen warned the people: "You are 
on the very edge!" In vain Kerensky, in his better 
moments, had hurled insulting epithets at the mob: 

262 




CO ^ 



2 § 



5 ^ 



Ph .2 



O 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 268 

"You are not free men, but mutinous slaves." The 
avalanche, once started by Kerensky's own friends, 
rushed on, sweeping the "ideals" of the Revolution 
before it. 

But ere Bolshevism had achieved its ultimate ends 
we still had some hope — a very faint one — that the 
Army might save the situation. If the soldiers at the 
Front, the pick and flower of the nation, could only 
detach themselves from its mass, the avalanche might 
perhaps be stilled, or, at least, its devasting effects 
lessened. 

All thinking Russia gladly hearkened to the promise 
of an offensive which resounded in June, 1917. That 
the spirit of the nation had not entirely succumbed 
to the deadening influence of effeteness and the alluring 
poison of Anarchy had been shown by the formation 
of numerous battalions of volunteers who variously 
styled themselves "Battalions of Death," " Kornilovsty " 
(after the popular General), "Death or Freedom Boys," 
etc. Then the women came forward. They must needs 
fight if the men would not. And they also formed a 
"Battalion of Death," and fought right well. 

The Provisional Government adopted the idea of 
a general offensive. But a conference at Mogilev be- 
tween Ministers and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, 
General Brusilov, who had been transferred from the 
Southwestern Front to succeed General Alexeiev, did 
not yield so much promise. It was ascertained that a 
simultaneous offensive on all the fronts would necessitate 
indefinite delay. The Northern Front had suffered such 
ravages from the proximity of Petrograd and its de- 
moralizing influences, that scarcely any hope could be 
entertained of its reviving before the season had matured 
too much for effective operations. The Western or 
Central Front, recently commanded by General Gurko, 
was better off, as the Bolshevist strongholds, Petrograd 



264 RUSSIA AT WAR 

and Kronstadt, were farther away. But it was badly 
infected, and nothing could be done much before the 
end of July. The Southwestern Front looked more 
promising. With careful nursing it might be counted 
upon to deliver a blow some time in June. 

In Rumania things were less cheerful. The Ru- 
manian Army had revived marvelously under French 
auspices. It was splendidly led, well disciplined and 
equipped. Its officers and men were inspired by patriot- 
ism and eager to drive the invaders beyond their borders. 
Not so the Russian armies under the King's nominal 
command. The fact that Russian troops were serving 
under royalty had attracted the fiercest propaganda 
of revolutionary agitators. Whatever hope there could 
be of success in this theater lay almost entirely with 
the Rumanians themselves, but would they be able to 
draw the Russian armies with them? No one could 
venture to give an assurance on this point. 

It was finally decided to deliver the first and most 
important blow in Galicia and Bukovina, following up 
this offensive with a second one in the direction of Vilna 
and a third in Rumania, as soon as the respective fronts 
could move. This plan was carried out with some 
modifications. General Gutor's attack (Southwestern 
Front) was twice postponed, because of delays in the 
concentration of reserves and artillery, due to disor- 
ganization of the railways, and also largely because 
agitators were constantly getting at the troops. Then 
the Southwestern offensive had to be delivered in 
two phases — Bzhezany-Zlochow and Stanislawow, instead 
of simultaneously — a circumstance which greatly added 
to the difficulties of the enterprise. 

There seems to be no doubt that the Army Committees 
and the Commissaries representing the Government tried 
to counteract pacifist propaganda. Although the Com- 
mittee system was destined to break down utterly as 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 



265 




osoioo 

trt Irj H ==^ 



Russian Line,9ho»n mmm^m 
Area of Retreat 'f^^'f^^ 



266 RUSSIA AT WAR 

a suBstitute for discipline based upon the undivided 
authority of the oflScers — ^just as the Soviet system had 
failed to afford a substitute for the undivided authority 
of Government — the goodwill and patriotism of indi- 
viduals must be recognized and appreciated. Committee- 
men, some of whom were officers, some privates, went 
about stimulating their comrades before the attack, and 
were foremost in the fight, and many of these devoted 
men fell at the head of the attacking waves of infantry. 
But these bright examples only served to emphasize 
the hopeless absurdity of the Committees as a system 
of army management. 

General Gutor had been an excellent corps commander. 
He was not of the caliber that is required from the 
leader of a group of armies. The strategy and tactics 
adopted by him bear witness to his deficiencies. Had 
he borne in mind the peculiar conditions of the case 
he would have, above all, avoided frontal attacks against 
positions of exceptional strength and difficulty; he 
would have shunned forest sectors, wherein a loosely 
disciplined force would be easily shaken and dispersed. 
Yet this was precisely what he failed to do. In one 
respect his dispositions were well taken; he singled out 
Austro-Hungarian divisions as the main objects of at- 
tention, rightly appreciating their inferior stability. But 
he seems to have been guided in the selection of one 
of the main points of his offensive by the fact that his 
old corps was stationed in the vicinity. 

The plan was briefly as follows : 

First The Eleventh Army, General Erdelli (west of 
Tarnopol), was to operate along an eleven-mile front — 
Presowce (opposite Zborow) to Byshki (opposite Tsen- 
iow) — and strike northwestward, attacking the 32nd 
and 19th Austro-Hungarian divisions. Objectives: Zlo- 
chow and Gliniany, along the railway to Lemberg. 
The left flank, on reaching Pomozhany, was to push 
towards Bzhezany, around the woods, and make for the 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 267 

other railway leading thence to Lemberg, getting into 
immediate touch with the right flank of the Seventh 
Army. 

Second. The Seventh Army, General Belkovich (south- 
west of Tarnopol), was to operate along a ten-mile front 
— Kuropatniki (IJ miles south of Byshki) to Miechychow 
(situated southwestward) — get well astride of the Zlota 
Lipa and strike also northwestward, attacking the 54th 
and 55th Austro-Hungarian Divisions and part of the 
20th Turkish Division. Objectives: Bzhezany-Bobrka- 
Lemberg. The right flank was to get into touch with 
the corps on Erdelli's left; the left flank was to make 
a strong diversion against Ottoman troops and endeavor 
to reach Rohatyn, flanking the railway. 

Third. The Eighth Army, General Kornilov (east of 
Stanislawow), was to operate along a twelve-mile front 
— Jezupol-Stanislawow-Lysiec — west and northward, at- 
tacking the 15th Austro-Hungarian and the 2nd Austro- 
Hungarian cavalry divisions. Objectives: the Stanisla- 
wow-Dolina-Bolidow railway. It was to exert strong 
pressure northward, to reach the Halich-Lemberg railway. 

General. A combined enveloping movement was to 
be carried out by the Seventh and Eighth Armies against 
the 19th and 20th Turkish, 38th Austro-Hungarian, 
24th German, 75th German Reserve, 55th German, and 
34th Landwehr Divisions, and two German regiments 
(241 and 242), all of which were to be strongly held by 
energetic demonstrations of three corps belonging to 
the Seventh Army. 

General Kornilov carried out his appointed task in 
more than the full measure. Had his army been entrusted 
with a more important mission, and had suitable reserves 
been forthcoming, he might easily have reached Rohatyn 
from Halich, turned the strong Bzhezany position, and, 
following up his successes at Kalush, reached Dolina, 
south of Lemberg, thereby severing the enemy's com- 
munications and isolating some of his forces. 



268 RUSSIA AT WAR 

The topography of the battle region was such that 
a succession of ridges and deep river valleys, formed by 
some of the northern tributaries of the Dneister, and the 
dense forests around Bzhezany rendered the central 
section of the Russian thrust (athwart the Zlota Lipa 
and its affluents) a particulary difficult one to nego- 
tiate; whereas if General Gutor had disposed his group 
so as to throw its weight on the flanks (Halich and Zlo- 
chow), he would have obviated at once the danger of 
frontal attacks (Bzhezany and Koniuchy), which were 
bound to suffer delay, if not disaster, before strongly 
fortified woods, and have secured the advantage of 
operating in fairly open country (the Dneister and its 
tributaries, the Gnila Lipa and the Strypas). And al- 
though in the light of subsequent information it became 
evident that the Russian Army could not be counted 
upon for a sustained offensive, it may have been rea- 
sonably assumed that a successful and rapid advance, 
without too heavy losses, would have so heartened the 
men that Bolshevist appeals to desertion might have 
been less heeded, and perhaps the shameful opening of 
the front, with consequent panic and disaster, would 
have been avoided. 

Criticism of General Gutor's strategy was freely in- 
dulged in by Russian experts at the time. There could 
be no motive for passing it over in this review of the 
Galician operations of 1917. On the other hand, the 
considerations just cited afford a necessary explanation 
of the heavy losses that were sustained in the Russian 
attacks, notably at Bzhezany, which certainly contrib- 
uted to the disastrous success of Bolshevist propaganda. 
These criticisms were sanctioned by the dismissal of 
General Gutor before the final disaster.^ It may be 

^ The immediate cause of General Gutor's removal was ascribed to the 
explosion of a huge ammunition dump near Bzhezany by the enemy's shell fire 
(see map, p. 278). 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 269 

added that he was a brave and gallant soldier who had 
never sought a higher command and accepted his pro- 
motion obediently, with much personal misgiving. The 
difficulties encountered at Bzhezany were, moreover, 
visited upon General Belkovich, commanding the Seventh 
Army. He was succeeded on the eve of the retreat by 
General Selivachev, whose corps, including a Czecho- 
slovak brigade that bore the main brunt of the fighting, 
had done well in the offensive on the right flank, opposite 
Zborow. There appeared to be no sound reason for 
this change in the high command. General Belkovich 
could not be held responsible either for the defective 
strategy of his superior or for the loss of discipline 
among his men. 

Never had the Russian Army been so well equipped. 
Artillery of all calibers, trench mortars, machine guns 
had been provided in abundance, with plenty of ammu- 
nition. There were armored cars, including British and 
Belgian contingents, posted with every active corps. 
The roads and railways — a heritage of Austrian dominion 
— ensured easy and rapid intercommunication. The 
Russians had repaired them, and had laid down field 
railways to their heavy batteries. As regards numbers, 
the Russians had a superiority of nearly two to one. 
Only in aeroplanes were they deficient. A good many 
British and French machines had been provided, but 
they were not sufficient to cope with the Germans. How- 
ever, what they lacked in numbers they made up in 
daring. Splendid work was done by the Russian airmen, 
and they were exceedingly well supplemented by balloon 
observers in large numbers, who ran hourly risk of death 
from the constant onslaughts of enemy aircraft. The 
positions of hostile batteries were almost invariably 
detected and counter-battery work organized in approved 
style. But, however well they were equipped and how- 
ever well they handled their guns, the Russian artillery 



270 RUSSIA AT WAR 

could do little with the enemy's strong points in the 
wooded areas. This was an additional reason why a 
plan of attack in the open should have been adopted. 

The enemy lines were thinly held — about one division 
per seve miles, not counting reserves. Confronting 
the Eleventh and Seventh Armies — a stretch of 100 miles 
— stood altogether about 30 divisions (14 German, 13J 
Austro-Hungarians, and 2 Turkish). Of this total, 14 
were in the first line, 16 in reserve. The Russians had 
assembled 54 divisions, of which 37 were in the first line 
and 17 in reserve. Prince Leopold of Bavaria was in 
general command of the enemy forces under the direc- 
tions of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, while the northern 
group, comprising the Bug Army,^ IV Austro-Hungarian 
(von Krobatin), and II Austro-Hungarian (Boehm-Er- 
moUi), was under the orders of General von Linsingen. 
The ordre de hattaile of the enemy's divisions at the time 
the Russian offensive began was approximately as follows: 

Opposite the XI (General Erdelli's) Army (count- 
ing from north to south) were the 4th Austro-Hungarian, 
27th Austro-Hungarian, 12th German Landwehr, 33rd 
Austro-Hungarian, 197th German, 32nd and 19th Austro- 
Hungarian, seven divisions in all, with 12| divisions 
in reserve. Opposite the VII (General Belkovich's) 
Army was the German Southern Army (von Bothmer), 
represented by 54th and 55th Austro-Hungarian, 20th 
and 19th Ottoman, 24th German, 75th German Reserve, 
38th Austro-Hungarian (Honved) Divisions, in all seven 
divisions with three in reserve. 

From this distribution of their reserves it is evident 
that the German Staff had prepared for a movement 
directed principally on the northern sector (Zlochow), 
and that General Gutor's preference for the Bzhezany 
direction was unexpected by them, as indeed it might 

1 The Bug Army (von Bernhardi) faced the Russian Special Army, north of 
Brody (see map on p. 387). 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 271 

have been, for the tactical considerations set forth above. 
It is interesting also as an indication that Field-Marshal 
von Hindenburg did really believe in the possibility of 
a Russian offensive, and that, notwithstanding "fra- 
ternization," German propaganda, and the cheap bluster 
of the German Press, the enemy's High Command had 
not made up its mind to regard Russia as a negligible 
quantity. Moreover, with the help of their excellent 
railway system the enemy could easily transfer their 
reserves from one sector to another. 

Opposite the VIII (General Kornilov's) Army, which 
included only about eight divisions, stood the 58th 
German, a German brigade, 34th German (Grena- 
dier), 2nd Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, 15th and 36th 
Austro-Hungarian, 42nd Austro-Hungarian (Honved), in 
all five infantry and one cavalry divisions, the III 
Austro-Hungarian Army (Tersztyansky von Nadas), with 
no reserves to speak of. The Archduke Josef, in com- 
mand of the group which, farther south, included the 
VII (von Kowess) and the I (von Rohr) Austro- 
Hungarian Armies, apparently felt the utmost confidence 
in the inability of the Russians to dislodge him from 
the Dneister valley. 

The tremendous havoc wrought in the enemy's ranks 
by the Russian offensive, which promptly led to whole- 
sale surrender of Austro-Hungarian regiments, evidently 
caused the utmost confusion among the enemy Staffs. 
Divisions, hurriedly brought up from reserve, were as 
hurriedly flung about from one sector to another. For 
instance, the hapless 15th German Reserve Division 
was battered at Bzhezany and then smashed by Kornilov's 
troops. More than five German and one Austrian divi- 
sions (the 53rd Reserve, 24th Reserve, 15th Reserve, 
241st New, 4th Ersatz, and a Bavarian Landwehr brigade 
and also the 11th Austro-Hungarian) were brought up 
to Bzhezany to take the place of German and Austrian 



272 RUSSIA AT WAR 

divisions that had been wiped out or surrendered. On 
the Stanislawow sector, also, five German and one Austrian 
divisions (the 83rd, 20th, 15th Reserve, 8th Bavarian 
Reserve, Jaeger Guards, and the 16th and 5th Austro- 
Hungarian) came into first fine. Out of the total of 
fifteen divisions known to be in reserve along this front 
the enemy had thus used up twelve. They had only 
three divisions to draw upon on a front of 100 miles. 

These facts and figures are sufficiently eloquent. The 
Russian Army had done well. True, it had a superi- 
ority in numbers, but this superiority was partly dis- 
counted by the above-mentioned errors of strategy and 
tactics, and, above all, by the demoralizing influence 
of indiscipline and unceasing propaganda. Sufficient 
has been said to justify the assumption that, had the 
Russian High Command been in a position to take the 
necessary measures for enforcing discipline, the Austro- 
German hosts would have sustained a signal defeat and 
Lemberg would soon have been in Russian hands. A 
Russian victory then would have altered the whole sub- 
sequent course of events on all the Allied fronts. It 
must ever remain a blot upon the Revolutionary Democ- 
racy of Russia that it should have deprived the High 
Command of the necessary power to put an end to the 
activity of Extremists; that it should have espoused 
doctrines which enabled traitors to subvert the Army 
and have done nothing itself to checkmate their devices. 

The Russian offensive began at nine o'clock on the 
morning of Sunday, July 1st. After fierce bombardment 
and under cover of their barrage, the infantry attacked 
according to plan, as above indicated. The Russian 
barrage was so well handled that the enemy were quite 
helpless to resist the oncoming waves. One Russian 
division, taking the offensive at the point where I was 
observing the attack, rushed three lines of trenches within 
twenty-five minutes, and I counted the battalions and 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 273 

regiments which surrendered to them wholesale — there 
were 5000 Austrians with their officers. (General Korni- 
lov's movement was started a week later.) 

I was an eye-witness of the main events, but most of 
my messages to The Times were intercepted by the Soviet 
censor in Petrograd, although they had been approved by 
the Army censorship. Much heart-burning had been 
endured by the Russian Commanders before the ad- 
vance. Individual units were constantly developing 
sporadic weakness. Several mutinies broke out. The 
Bolsheviki were extremely busy. Loyal committeemen 
had no rest day or night, scouring the front in motor- 
cars to enliven the low-spirited or to talk over the 
cowards. The gunners did their utmost during the artil- 
lery preparations to inflict visible ravages upon the enemy's 
trenches so as to hearten the infantry for the assault. 
One of the Corps Commanders prayed silently during the 
fateful minutes preceding the appointed time. Would 
his men go over the top? He hoped so, but could not 
feel sure. When, punctually at 9 a.m., the troops swarmed 
over and the attacking waves rolled onward, this General 
devoutly crossed himself. 

German official communiques had announced the com- 
mencement of the attack a day before it began, near 
Koniuchy, between the Zlota Lipa and the Strypa, and 
had prematurely boasted of its failure. The offensive 
was, of course, ascribed to "increasing pressure of the 
other Entente Powers." Later the Germans recorded 
"a strong destructive Russian fire over our positions 
from the Lemberg-Brody railway as far as the heights 
south of Bzhezany," and an increase of "firing activity 
to the north and northwest of Lutsk," but repeated 
the claim that "all attacks had been repulsed." These 
versions were so obviously "doctored" that neither 
the German nor the Austrian communiques could afford 
any idea of what was really happening. 



274 RUSSIA AT WAR 

Much heavy fighting lay before the Russians before 
they could hope to take Bzhezany. This place, situated 
fifty miles from Lemberg — the nearest Russian position 
to the Galician capital — was protected by a lake, the deep 
defiles of the Zlota Lipa, and the high hills, reaching 
an elevation of 1300 feet, on the east and south. When 
Count Bothmer fell back there in the summer of 1916, 
after his stubborn defense of the Strypa line, he estab- 
lished himself on all the higher ground, where he could 
command the Russian positions. At Koniuchy the 
Russians still had many of these higher positions before 
them before they could reach the Zlota Lipa, which is 
itself a formidable barrier, as the stream is in a deep 
cleft of the hills, like most of the tributaries of the 
Dniester in this part of Galicia. After the Austrian 
breakdown in 1916 the Germans reconstituted their 
armies in Galicia, and entrusted these key positions 
largely to their own troops and to the Turks, who had 
held them since. Almost the last success of General 
Brusilov's great offensive was won at this point, before 
events in Rumania turned attention to new battles in 
another field. 

[ On July 2nd, about three o'clock in the afternoon, 
after a severe and stubborn battle, the Zaraisky Regi- 
ment occupied the village of Presowce, while the gallant 
troops of the 4th Finland Division and of the Czecho- 
slovak Brigade occupied the strongly fortified enemy 
positions at Mogila, on the heights to the west and south- 
west of the village of Zborow, and the fortified village 
of Kozhylow. Three lines of enemy trenches were 
penetrated. The enemy then retired across the Little 
Strypa. The Czecho-Slovak Brigade captured 62 officers 
and 3150 soldiers, 15 guns, and many machine guns. 
Many of the captured guns were turned against the enemy. 
Enemy positions to the west of Josefowka (north of 
Koniuchy) were also taken. Altogether in the battle 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 275 

of July 2nd, in the neighborhood of Zloehow, the Russians 
took 6300 prisoners (officers and soldiers), 21 guns, 16 
machine guns, and several bomb-throwers. 

To the southeast of Bzhezany the battle continued 
with less intensity. In the battle of July 1st in this 
region the Russians had taken 53 officers and 2200 
soldiers, mostly Germans. 

The success at Koniuchy had been compromised by 
an untoward incident. In their precipitate flight or 
surrender the enemy had left much store of wine and 
spirits behind them. The Russian soldiers, disobeying 
their officers, plundered these stores. The men of a 
whole division which had fought bravely became drunk, 
and might have fallen an easy prey had the enemy 
counter-attacked. Another division was sent forward, 
but was checked by the German machine guns placed 
in the trees of the adjacent forest. 

Meanwhile the gallant fighting at Bzhezany had been 
marred by indiscipline and even mutiny on the part 
of some units. The key to this position lay in the 
triangle formed by the confluence of the Zlota and the 
Tseniow. Its slopes descended precipitously, clothed on 
the northern side of Bzhezany and Lysona woods. This 
triangle was known as the Flat-Iron (Utiug), Here 
many thousands of Russians fell, and in helping them 
with Maxims, Hotchkiss, and armored cars, five British 
soldiers were killed. Here also whole regiments of 
Austrians and Germans were wiped out. The plan of at- 
tack consisted in a flanking movement over the western 
slope of the ridge, so as to turn the woods. Unfortunately, 
the right flank advanced too rapidly and was caught in 
a cross-fire from the heights, and when orders were 
given to a division posted in reserve to relieve the pres- 
sure on their comrades, they flatly refused to budge, 
alleging that they had not agreed to fight on the first 
day of the offensive. The advantage that might have 



276 RUSSIA AT WAR 

been gained on the ifirst day could not be recovered. 
Several lines of enemy trenches were taken, literally filled 
with their dead. Some of these lines remained in the 
hands of the Russians till the day of panic and disaster. 

During the fighting of July 1st and 2nd the total 
number of prisoners had risen to 300 officers, 18,000 men, 
29 guns, 33 machine guns. 

Instead of improving, the men were growing daily 
less reliable. Divisions refused to remain more than 
twenty-four hours in the front line, and that only on 
the condition that they would be strictly on the de- 
fensive. The Corps of Guards, oblivious of its glorious 
traditions, was no exception to this degrading rule. 
One of the regiments (the Grenadiers) had elected a 
Bolshevist officer named Dzevaltovsky, and would take 
no orders. M. Kerensky himself tried to persuade them, 
but they threatened violence and he had to leave. Finally 
this regiment was surrounded by cavalry, armored cars, 
and artillery. It then surrendered Dzevaltovsky,^ who 
was removed for trial — not involving the death penalty. 
Half the men were distributed in other units, where 
they spread the Bolshevist contagion. Some of the 
Guards divisions after that did some fighting. One of 
them, on being sent (July 5th) to relieve a line division 
near Dzike Lany, which had been the scene of gallant 
fighting by a Siberian corps, was misdirected in the 
dark into the enemy's trenches — a piece of almost in- 
credible treachery. The astonishing part of this adven- 
ture was that the guardsmen took the trench and then 
went on to capture the next enemy's position. Every- 
.thing pointed to a coming crisis which the gallantry of 
individual units could not forestall. 

On July 7th, General Cheremisovs corps (Kormiov's 
army) after a brilliant advance from Stanislawow, crossed 
the Lomnica and advanced slightly on its left flank 

1 Afterwards "honorably" acauitted bv a Bolshevist court. 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 277 

(Bohorodczany-Solotwina). On a wide front General 
Kornilov's army was now in movement south of the 
Dniester. The Russians were retracing their steps taken 
in the retreat of 1915, when General von Linsingen's 
cavalry swept forward across the country south of the 
Dniester to Halich, and thereby turned the main Russian 
front north of the river. In three days the Russians 
had gone forward fifteen miles west of Stanislawow, they 
had at two points crossed the Lomnica, had taken Halich, 
to which the enemy had retired, and were pushing on 
westward along the road to Dolina and Stry. The 
country before them was less adapted to defense than 
that north of the Dniester, where the deep-cut channels 
of the tributaries flowing south to that river were a for- 
midable obstacle to an advancing army. 

Halich, by reason of its bridgehead position, was a 
place of the first strategic importance, and both com- 
batants had made strenuous efforts for its capture since 
the war began. General Brusilov reached the river bank 
opposite the town in the summer of 1916, and seemed 
about to take it, when the Rumanian campaign, which 
had just begun, diverted Russian efforts elsewhere. 

The remarkable success of General Kornilov's move- 
ment had brought a tardy recognition of the value of 
the Halich-Dolina direction. A neighboring corps was 
added to his right flank and reinforcements hurried up. 
But they came too late to do much good. The two 
flanking corps on the right and left of General Cheremisov 
advanced very slowly owing to the diflSculties of the 
terrain, but his troops continued their progress, and 
during the night of July 11th and 12th they forced their 
way into Kalush. Here, as at Koniuchy, scenes of 
debauchery were enacted, and the drunken soldiery 
committed nameless acts of violence. A Cossack cavalry 
regiment came up in time to repulse a German counter- 
attack. I was in Kalush on the morning after its cap- 



278 



RUSSIA AT WAR 



ture. On all sides there was evidence of the precipitate 
flight of the Headquarters of the Third Austrian Army, 
situated in the suburbs on the banks of the Lomnica. 



iPiahoFF 




33^ 



MAP SHOWING THE PRINCIPAL PLACES MENTIONED IN THE ACCOUNT OF OPEEA- 
TIONS IN THE DIRECTIONS OF BZHEZANY AND ZLOCHOW (jULY, 1917). 



General Tersztyansky had evidently considered himself 
safe from attack. 

During the day we strengthened and extended our 
position on the west bank of the Lomnica in preparation 



SHORT-LIVED VICTORY 279 

lor the arrival of the enemy's reserves. That evening 
heavy rain set in, necessitating the suspension of the 
advance. The Lomnica was transformed into a boiling 
torrent and all the bridges were swept away. The Ger- 
mans brought up six batteries and shelled our communi- 
cations, but the following day our guns silenced them 
and covered our positions across the river. Rain con- 
tinuing, it became necessary to withdraw the bulk of 
our forces, a move which was safely carried out on 
the night of July 15th. 

Meanwhile we had extended our lines in the valley 
of the Lomnica, for the eventual resumption of the 
offensive. 

According to the statements of prisoners the enemy 
had transferred hither the Jager Reserve Division from 
Vilna, the remnants of the German 75th Reserve Divi- 
sion from Bzhezany, and the Austrian 5th Division from 
the Carpathians. During our attacks on July 8th, 9th, 
and 10th, the Austrian 15th Division lost 80 per cent, 
the German 33rd Division 40 per cent, the Austrian 
16th Division 50 per cent, and the Austrian 36th Divi- 
sion 30 per cent, while the Austrian 2nd Cavalry Divi- 
sion lost little. The enemy had altogether 44 bat- 
talions with 32,000 bayonets, of which they lost over 
16,000, including 12,000 prisoners. Our losses were about 
one-third. We had taken over 100 guns. 



CHAPTER XXm 

THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 

Failure of the Committee System — Lenin and German Plans — ^The Front 
Opened — "Military Strategy" — A Narrative of Disaster — Horrors of 
the Retreat — ^Kornilov's "Death to Traitors" — The Armies Saved — 
Brave Women — Rumania's Peril — Boastful German Accounts — Our Dead 
at Kzhywe — Story of the British Armored Cars — Valentine's Burial — 
Censored Telegrams. 

"Our further successes will depend on the measures 
that may be taken to restore a proper spirit of subordi- 
nation among the men at the front and the reserves. 
This question is bound up with the whole political 
situation of Russia. The Army has done better than 
was expected, but the present Committee system has 
failed." 

The warning note struck in the concluding paragraph 
of this message sent by me to The Times just after the 
success of Kornilov's offensive was almost immediately 
justified by events. All unknown to the brave "Korni- 
lovtsy" (bearing the name of their leader on their sleeves, 
inscribed on a blue shield surmounted by a white skull 
and cross-bones) and the "shock battalions," who had 
won victory west of Stanislawow, a dread catastrophe 
was being enacted in General Erdelli's Army. It was 
not altogether unexpected. In the following laconic 
sentences the Russian Headquarters Staff recorded the 
defection of its troops: 

After strong artillery preparation, the enemy persistently attacked oup 
detachments on the Pieniaki-Harbuzow front (on both sides of the headwaters 

280 



THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 281 

of tbe Sereth and twenty miles south of Brody). At first all these attacks were 
repelled. 

At ten o'clock, July 19th, the 607th Mlynoff Regiment, situated between 
Batkow and Manajow (in the same region), left their trenches voluntarily and 
retired,^ with the result that the neighboring units had to retire also. This 
gave the enemy the opportunity for developing his success. 

Our failure is explained to a considerable degree by the fact that under 
the influence of the Extremists (Bohheviki) several detachments, having 
received the command to support the attacked detachments, held meetings and 
discussed the advisability of obeying the order, whereupon some of the regiments 
refused to obey the military command. The efforts of the Commanders and 
Committees to arouse the men to the fulfilment of their duty were fruitless. 

On July 26th I telegraphed as follows : 

From the words of an officer captured near Bzhezany a fortnight ago, we 
understood that the Germans were preparing an artful stroke in conjunction 
with their agents in Petrograd and in our armies. "You will see that your 
troops will run away when the time comes, and we shall have a walk over," he 
declared. Events have fully borne out this prophecy. Lenin and his crew 
have well earned their pay. The disturbances in Petrograd, organized on the 
16th and 17th inst., were obviously directed from Berlin so as to coincide with 
the German plan. The thunderbolt fell almost on the day when the High 
Command on this front changed hands, and the harvest in Eastern Galicia and 
Bukovina had nearly been gathered. 

A whole day before the news of the crisis in Petrograd reached us, Lenin's 
agents were acquainted with it through traitors in the wireless service. They 
spread a report among the troops that the Bolsheviki were in control of the Gov- 
ernment, and that the war was at an end. The execution of the German plan 
became ridiculously easy. 

The enemy entered at our most sensitive point near Zborow, and advanced 
in the direction of Trembowla. The wedge thus driven in would sever the 
Tarnopol-Buchach railway and the highways, disuniting the Eleventh and 
Seventh Armies and exposing the right flank of the latter to serious peril. 

Our line was opened on the morning of the 19th inst. north of Zborow. 
On the 18th General Brusilov, who had come to Tarnopol, summoned General 
Kornilov and ordered him to take over the command from General Gutor. 
The rupture was represented to be a slight affair, as we had eight divisions in 
reserve. The Staffs of the neighboring armies were not even informed of it. 
General Kornilov, however, realized that the danger was great, and gave the 
necessary orders. But he had to go to Stanislawow in order to transfer his 
command of the Eighth Army to General Cheremisov. Much precious time 
had to be wasted in journeys. 

^The survivors afterwards declared that they had not sufficient artillery 
support. 



282 RUSSIA AT WAR 

My gallant colleague Lembich, the war correspondent 
of the Russkoe Slovo, wrote simultaneously from another 
part of the Front: 

The line had been ruptured on a comparatively small section, and the harm 
done might have been easily retrieved by steadiness and discipline on the part 
of the troops. The High Command at once gave orders to move perfectly 
adequate forces to the place where the breach had been made, with the design 
of getting the Germans, who, it appears, were rushing forward, in a vise, and to 
cut them off from retreat on two sides. But then it was that took place that 
horrible thing that has now been given in the Army the name of "Meeting 
strategy J" The majority of the troops ordered to the breach either did not leave 
their quarters or began to assemble meetings to decide the question whether 
they should go to the positions indicated or not by means of voting. Two reg- 
iments, which had been given a more responsible task than others, considered 
the question until late at night, and the men, not being able to come to a decision, 
separated. During this time the Germans, not encountering any serious 
resistance, penetrated eight miles to the rear of our lines, began to capture 
batteries and a number of prisoners, and to outflank Jezierna, the Headquarters 
of the Staff. 

In the evening of this unhappy day panic began to spread in the Army, 
deliberately encouraged by certain suspicious characters, Bolsheviki in uniform, 
who flooded the Army in the days of the Revolution. The rumor was circu- 
lated that the Germans had pierced our front at two points and that the line 
of retreat to Tarnopol had been cut off. One after the other the divisions sent 
to encounter the Germans refused to attack, or, on the first encounter with the 
enemy, began to desert, breaking up in disorder, creating great uproar and con- 
fusitm. The cavalry and artillery alone rose to the height of their duty, and 
with the greatest steadfastness supported the few heroic units of infantry who 
covered the retreat. Yesterday one valiant Cossack regiment saved the posi- 
tion in an exceptional way, and, in horse and foot formation, repelled the 
violent attacks of the Germans. 

Resuming my own narrative of events, I note that, 
being in Stanislawow on the 21st (the Moslem festival 
of Bairam), I had gone to sup with my Caucasian friends 
of the Ingush Native Horse, who had been fighting con- 
tinuously throughout our offensive; and while we were 
at table discussing some delicious plof (slices of toasted 
mutton with rice) to the sound of native pipes, and 
admiring the skill of the tribal dancers, the Colonel 
received the startling news that Tarnopol was in dire 
peril and that next morning early the regiment would 



THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL «83 

go with all speed to the rescue. My message to Ths 
Times continues: 

Having rejoined the British Armored Car Headquarters on the 17th inst., 
I left again for Stanislawow on the afternoon of the 20th inst. Nothing was 
then known of the rupture of the front at a point only twenty-five miles distant 
on the previous morning, and the first report of it reached Commander Locker- 
Lampson late on the 20th. At Stanislawow " rumors " began to circulate during 
the afternoon of the 22nd that Tarnopol was for some mysterious reason "in 
danger," but nothing whatever was known at the Staff. 

General Cheremisov assumed command of the Eighth Army that morning. 
I saw him at noon. He was disquieted by the defections among his own men, 
but said not a word of the rupture in the front of the Eleventh Army. On the 
morning of the 23rd the Staff had information that left no doubt as to the mag- 
nitude of the catastrophe. 

My first thought was to rejoin the British section, whose position I judged 
to be an extremely perilous one. Abandoning all impedimenta (which was lost, 
together with the photographs I had taken), I jumped into the first car going 
to Buchach in the hope of meeting the British contingent as it fell back through 
Podhajce. 

At Buchach I came across our transport and Colonel Valentine, ^ of the Brit- 
ish Air Service. From them I heard the full story of the disaster. The R.F.C. 
oflBcers had safely removed the aeroplanes and the aeronautical stores from the 
zone of the Eleventh Army under the full blast of the Russian panic and the 
German advance. 

We were destined to witness some strange scenes on the road from Buchach 
eastward, although the enemy was still thirty miles distant. A man on a white 
horse dashed through the town yelling: "German cavalry are behind: save 
yourselves." He was afterwards arrested, and proved to be a German spy. 
Indescribable confusion ensued. A multitude of deserters and transport cars, 
lorries, and ambulances headed eastward at top speed. The roadway was 
littered with impedimenta. Through this inferno, through burning dust, and 
under a scorching sun, we literally fought our way, using our sticks and fists, 
and brandishing revolvers at the deserters, who repeatedly tried to storm our 
cars, until we had got ahead of the rout. Then, placing our lorries across the 
road, we dammed the tide of panic. 

Leaving Buchach at 5 p.m., we reached Proskurow (in Russia) only at 
eight o'clock the following morning. 

* Lieutenant-Colonel James Valentine, R.F.C, D.S.O., died soon afterwards 
in Kiev of heart failure, brought on by the hardships he had endured during the 
retreat. He was only twenty-nine years old. He had been one of the foremost 
competitors in aviation contests in England, and had served during the war in 
France. For the best part of a year he had been in Russia, in charge of instruc- 
tion in British aeroplanes. For his signal gallantry during the retreat he was 
recommended by General Kornilov for the Order of St. George. 



284 RUSSIA AT WAR 

The following telegram appeared in the Russkoe Slovo: 

Active Army, July 21. Two regiments were disbanded at night. An 
armed force was employed in the work of disbanding. The revolted regiments, 
which were in reserve, were surrounded by Cossacks and two batteries. When 
it finally became clear that the regiments would not voluntarily give up their 
arms and their leaders, they were told to settle the question in the space of 
three bugle calls. The first was played, then the second, then the third. After 
this Kalinin, Commissary of the Front, gave the order to open artillery fire on 
the insubordinate regiments. About a hundred projectiles were fired. The 
firing did its work and the regiments laid down their arms. 

The Germans and Hungarians were attacking with 
insignificant forces. The Russian disaster was the work 
of only two German and one Austro-Hungarian divisions. 
Twelve divisions were ordered to oppose them, but the 
attempt failed through the behavior of the soldiers. 
An attempt to attack the enemy's salient from the 
flanks was made, but the troops did not choose to obey 
orders. Use had to be made of machine-gun fire to 
restrain marauders and deserters, who threatened the 
houses and shops of peaceful inhabitants. There was 
no time for the evacuation of Kozowa, an important 
strategical base for supplies of food and ammunition. 
It was occupied by the Austrians on July 23rd. The 
Russians had left there more than 600 railway wagons, a 
sanitary train, railway engines, and an immense quan- 
tity of ammunition and other stores. The road to 
Tarnopol was crowded with thousands of carriages and 
carts and motor-carts, moving eastward in clouds of 
dust. Deserters pillaged the shops of the town. Of- 
ficers were unable to preserve order among the troops 
there, and many killed themselves in despair. Tarnopol 
was occupied by the enemy on July 22nd. A Battalion 
of Death, composed of cadets, reduced the rioting soldiers 
in Tarnopol to order, not hesitating to shoot them when 
necessary, superintended the work of evacuation, and 
set fire to stores that it was not possible to remove. 
After the cadets had left, soldiers began a pogrom, which 



THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 285 

was stopped by shooting fourteen of the men who were 
caught red-handed. Fleeing bands of marauders sacked 
houses on their way. There were cases of famiHes being 
bayoneted and women and children violated. 

Kerensky had abolished the death penalty. General 
Kornilov took the law into his own hands, and sent the 
following telegram to Army Commanders : 

I consider the voluntary retreat of units from their positions as equivalent 
to treason and treachery. Therefore I categorically require that all com- 
manders in such cases should, without hesitation, tiu:n the fire of machine guns 
and artillery against the traitors. I take all responsibility for the victims on 
myself. Inaction and hesitation on the part of the commanders I shall count 
as neglect of duty, and such oflBcers I shall at once deprive of their command 
and conmiit to trial. 

A formal ukaz, signed by Kerensky, by Efremov, 
Minister of Justice, and by General Yakubovich, restoring 
the death penalty in the Army during the war, was issued 
on July 25th. In this ukaz the military crimes involving 
the death penalty were set forth, and the composition 
of the military-revolutionary courts to deal with the 
most serious offenses was laid down. They were to con- 
sist of three officers and three soldiers chosen by lot. 
The verdict was to be decided by a majority of votes; 
if the voting were equal, the verdict was to be in favor 
of the prisoner. 

Between Krewo and Smorgon the central group of 
armies began its offensive on July 20th. They took 
some positions and 1000 prisoners; then they declined 
to do any more fighting, except the woman's battalion, 
which lost heavily but never faltered. Farther north, 
at Lake Naroch, the attempt to advance was even less 
effective. The troops of the Central and Northern Fronts 
were more subject to Bolshevist influences than their 
comrades in the South. 

In Rumania the forward movement began still later, 
and at first, thanks to the ardor and the dash of the 



286 RUSSIA AT WAR 

Rumanian Army, it yielded substantial results in cap- 
tured positions, guns, and prisoners; but soon, owing to 
the defection of the Russians, the tide of battle turned 
in favor of the enemy, and some of the forces under 
the command of the King and of General Shcherbachev 
found themselves hemmed in, and were extricated with 
great difficulty. 

Tarnopol fell July 22nd, Stanislawow was evacuated 
on July 25th, Kolomea (recently General Kornilov's 
headquarters) on July 27th. Czernowic, the capital of 
the Bukovina, had to be abandoned a day or so later. 
Kamieniets was prepared for evacuation. But, thanks to 
General Kornilov's firmness and skill, the Russian armies 
made a stand on the Zbruch. The Germans could not 
secure a footing across the river. 

The Austro-German accounts of their "victory" in 
Galicia and Bukovina afforded cheerful reading for their 
unenlightened public at home. Counter-attacks on the 
Russian flanks (at Zwyzyn, on the upper reaches of the 
Dniester, and at Nowica, southeast of Kalush), which 
had prefaced but had not caused the rupture of the 
Russian front, were represented in the light of mani- 
festations of German skill and superior valor. Thence- 
forward, the course of the Russian retreat was persistently 
depicted as being a succession of hard-won battles. For 
the first time in history an enemy's war bulletins were 
magnifying the courage and valor of a panic-stricken 
foe. The motive was easy to understand. It was less 
flattering to German vanity to appraise the foe at his 
just value; moreover, the Germans did not want the 
Russians to think that their armies needed re-forming, 
and there was also an abiding hope that by impressing 
them with the idea that Russian troops had fought well 
the covert scheme of a separate peace on "honorable" 
terms might be furthered. But while German military 
critics indulged in dithyrambics about the invincible 




Scale oF Mi1e& 



7 5. y 



Mil 



rard^dt Russiin Advtnce 
•• •* Retreat 



MAP lULTOTBATINa'THB BUBSIAN OFFENSIVB AND RETBBAT IN GALICU (jULY, 1917), 



288 RUSSIA AT WAR 

prowess of the Austro-German forces in Galicia and 
Bukovina and the stanch resistance offered to them 
by the Russians, the German General Staff prudently 
deferred publishing the usual official summary of the 
operations or from stating the number of prisoners taken. 
(Later it was given as 40,000.) 

General Kornilov had proved himself to be a great 
leader of men — I may say, one of the greatest military 
commanders of his time — as well as a clear-sighted 
statesman, capable of quickly grasping a situation and 
of acting upon it. I saw him frequently during the 
anxious week when he was marshaling his broken line 
to safety, at all hours of the day and of the night, and I 
never noticed any hesitating or faltering. One of his 
army chiefs, in despair at the wild retreat of his men, 
telegraphed: "I cannot hold my line. Only 12,000 
troops out of my army remain; the rest have fled. You 
are asking impossibilities." But Kornilov knew — and 
his subordinate did not know — that unless the 12,000 
held out, two whole armies would be unable to retire in 
safety. He answered: "You have my orders." And 
the "impossible" was accomplished. It is true that 
the cavalry (including the gallant Polish Lancers), the 
heroic cyclist battalion, a handful of "Death or Vic- 
tory" volunteers, and last, but not least, the British 
armored cars, had flung themselves into the breach. 

I had the honor of conveying a message from him 
to my countrymen and a number of crosses of St. George 
to be bestowed upon those who had more particularly 
distinguished themselves. It was all the more pleasing 
to me because I had been amongst these men in good 
and evil fortune, and knew how well they had deserved 
recognition from the Commander-in-Chief. 

On the first day of the offensive at Bzhezany they had 
gone into action, in cars and in trenches. Five had been 
killed. They lay buried near Kzhywe (southeast of 



THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 289 

Bzhezany) in ground that was soon, alas! to fall into 
enemy hands. Over the grave where they rested together 
a plain wooden cross had been planted with the follow- 
ing inscription: 

Here lie Five Englishmen 

C.P.O. J. MacFaklanb 
C.P.O. E. Viane 
C.P.O. W. J. Locke 
P.O. W. G. Pearson 
P.O. W. L. Mitchell 

They Died Fighting for Freedom in a Foreign Land, 
Fear God and Fear Nought. 

I wrote a detailed report of the work done by the 
British armored cars during the retreat, and telegraphed 
it, August 1st, from the Headquarters of the Seventh 
Army to The Times, It was sadly curtailed and muti- 
tilated in transmission, and I think it only right to 
reproduce it here in full, for in the opinion of the Rus- 
sian commanders the Allied co-operation had contrib- 
uted greatly towards extricating their armies from a 
plight that at first appeared to be hopeless. 

Commander Locker-Lampson, whose headquarters were at Kozowa, near 
Bzhezany, learned on the evening of July 20th that Jezierna had fallen. He 
was summoned to the Corps Staff and asked to withdraw the whole of his force 
from theur positions and hold the right flank. The enemy had advanced, 
forming a salient, and the Staff hoped to be able to attack along the line Kuro- 
patniki-Taurow-Jezierna and to use our cars to turn them back. 

All our armored cars were collected at Kozowa that night, and none of us 
had any sleep, as we were sent early next day to be attached to a Cossack regi- 
ment. Three squadrons of our cars, operating together, were spread fanwise 
across the front from Kuropatniki to the Tarnopol road. Rumors had already 
spread that the Russians were deserting their trenches and fleeing, and cer- 
tainly their morale was bad on our arrival. We reported ourselves to the head- 
quarters of a Cossack division, but nobody there could give any detailed instruc- 
tions. The Corps Commander believed that our force might keep the infantry 
from running away. 

Lieutenant-Commander Smiles took the right-hand sector north of the 
Tarnopol road, and dashed ahead through the villages of Halenkow and Olesin 



290 . RUSSIA AT WAR 

(due north of Kozowa) very successfully. The cars outdistanced the Russian 
infantry by many hundred yards. The cars under his command got within 
close range of the advancing Germans and Austrians. They delayed the 
advance for several hours, fighting incessantly, then fell back as the German 
and Austrian artillery came up. 

The Russians remained in their trenches as long as the armored cars stayed 
with them, but as the Austrians advanced and the Germans were crying out 
"Hurrah!" the Russians of their own accord flung down their rifles and ran for 
their lives. Despite this shocking defection we attempted to keep the enemy 
back, in order to stem the retreat, but it was impossible. We had to give way, 
and the fleeing Russians crowded our cars, breaking them down so that we 
lost three, which we had to abandon. 

An exactly similar state of affairs occurred with the other squadrons which 
checked the Austrians and managed to keep the advancing infantry back until 
their artillery arrived, rendering further resistance impossible. The Russian 
retreat became a rout, and though we went into action time and again during 
the day, the effect produced was only local. A panic ensued at Kozowa. 
Everybody ran away. We did our best to stop the runaways. 

All our stores were removed the following night. The enemy began shelling 
Kozowa; some of our men were wounded by shrapnel, and the Staff ordered 
us to retire. Great craters filled the road from Kozowa to Kzhywe, impeding 
the retreat to Podhajce, where we arrived safely. The only regiment that did 
good work that day was one of the Finland Division. The cars covered our 
retreat. Every car that went into action fired over 3000 rounds. 

By the evening of the 22nd our force was transferred to an aerodrome some 
miles from Podhajce on the road to Monastezhyska. The doctor and the 
English nurses, who had been doing splendid work in the hospital at Podhajce, 
left with our column. 

The same day the Staff of the corps to which oiur force was attached had 
been transferred to Bialokernica, a few miles east of Podhajce. We were 
ordered to reconnoiter and destroy any remaining stores. One heavy car 
reached Teliacze without sighting the enemy. It found that the stores had 
been destroyed by Russian gunners. Kozowa was burning, but was apparently 
unoccupied. The Austrian advance was incredibly slow, and both these places, 
within a few miles of the enemy's original lines, were still unoccupied on July 
22nd. Other cars went north along the road to Kzhywe, also without meeting 
the enemy. We had been delayed near Podhajce by a shocking panic among 
the troops and transport. On the afternoon of the 22nd our transport column 
and damaged cars proceeded south to Buchach, which was also in a state of 
panic. 

The next day our cars were transferred to another corps belonging to the 
same army and ordered to operate along the Buchach-Tarnopol road. A 
section went into action with four cars. The situation was desperate. There 
were great gaps in the front corps, caused by flight of whole divisions. The 
Corps Commander had no information of the whereabouts of the enemy or of his 
own troops. Our cars were able to give him invaluable information, and besides, 
they kept the enemy at bay. The hottest fightmg occured at the villages of 



THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 291 

Pantalicha and Darachow, about ten miles west of Trembowla. At Darachow 
we ambushed the enemy in the houses and courtyards, destroying them whole- 
sale. During that night, thanks to the respite which we had been able to 
afford them, the Russians rallied, entrenched themselves, and even drove out 
the enemy from some of their positions. 

On the 24th our cars operated on the high road from Darachow to Buchach. 
At four o'clock that morning the Corps Commander summoned Commander 
Locker-Lampson to the village of Laskowce and told him that two divisions 
had bolted, leaving a gap of fifteen miles north of Laskowce as far as Trembowla. 
Our cars were entrusted with the task of protecting this huge space. 

Working along the road between Chmielow and Darachow, they did great 
execution among the advancing infantry, mainly Austrians. Lieutenant- 
Commander Smiles came up later with two cars which had been repaired. 
Commander Locker-Lampson himself went into action. One of our oflBcers 
spotted an Austrian standing on a knoll, drove his car in that direction, and 
came plump into a large force of the enemy at a range of fifty yards. Opening 
fire, he mowed them down and got out safe. The cars eventually left Chmielow 
owing to severe shell fire. The enemy did not venture to make a direct attack 
on Chmielow, but, making a detour over fields where the cars were unable to 
operate, tried to surround the village. The attempt was unsuccessful. 

Our cars were invincible on the road, and fought a series of rearguard actions 
the whole of the rest of the day, frequently under a fierce fire from the enemy's 
field guns. One car had its engine completely blown out by a direct hit and 
had to be abandoned. The crew removed the guns and material and withdrew 
in safety. Another car was struck by a shell which smashed a plate, wounding 
all the crew, including Sub-Lieutenant Wallace. Driver Swan, although badly 
wounded, drove the car out of action. Another car got on fire, but was safely 
removed. A car with Commander Locker-Lampson had its dynamo damaged 
by a splinter. All the squadrons re-formed that evening at Buchach. 

The whole of the 25th was given to patrol work within the triangle Buchach- 
Chortkow-Trembowla. 

On the 26th, at the village of Kobylowloki, half-way between Chortkow and 
Trembowla, the cars got into action for the first time with German cavalry, 
which all immediately decamped. 

Some of our men were for twenty hours in their seats in the armored cars. 
The Corps Commander said we had given him a respite of twenty-one hours by 
filling a gap which otherwise would have offered the enemy's cavalry, motors, 
and mounted infantry a chance to cut our line of retreat. The extraordinary 
feature about these operations was that the British Armored Car Division 
practically held up the Germans on a whole army front. This exploit was 
rendered possible by excellent judgment in selecting such a splendid road for 
operations as the highway between Buchach and Tarnopol. Our cars were 
repeatedly under artillery fire at a range not exceeding 2000 yards. 

On July 27th, Lieutenant-Commander Smiles, with two light and one heavy 
car, held the German cavalry for a considerable time on the Trembowla road, 
north of Husiatyn. The village of Shivkowce had to be evacuated at 4 p.m., 
and rearguard actions were fought by our armored cars, permitting the infantry 



292 RUSSIA AT WAR 

to retire. An alarm compelled a fm-ther retirement during the night, wherein 
one car was lost. On the 28th, continuous rearguard actions by Smiles were 
fought with the same squadron along the road to Suchadol from early morning 
to 2.30 P.M. In Husiatyn the Russian infantry had thrown down their rifles 
and machine guns, and a 'provocateur who had spread panic had been killed and 
crucified. By three o'clock all the troops had crossed the River Zbruch, and 
our cars were the last things on wheels to cross. Five minutes later the bridge 
was blown up, and fifteen minutes later some German cavalry reached the bridge 
by another route. Soldiers and villagers on this side of the river at Husiatyn 
cheered the armored cars as they went past. 

The 29th was a day of rest for the cars, as the enemy had not crossed the 
river. Pillaging went on. Three of our officers attacked with their fists three 
hundred pillagers and put them to flight. Some German prisoners who had 
been brought to our base got into conversation with one of our men. One of 
them spoke English. He stated that the British armored cars seemed to he 
everywhere along the front, and one day alone had killed over six hundred. 

On the 30th, Lieutenant-Commander Wells-Hood and his cars were con- 
tinuously in action on the outskirts of Husiatyn. Very good work was done 
by Sub-Lieutenant Benson in a heavy armored car with a three-pounder gun. 
The enemy had mounted maxims on the church standing on a ridge east of 
Husiatyn, and in the absence of Russian artillery these could not be dislodged. 
Our car destroyed the emplacements in the belfry after fifteen minutes' firing 
at a distance of 2000 yards. Four times consecutively during the morning our 
cars went into action. The Russian Divisional Commander was loud in their 
praise. The best targets so far secured in the war were obtained against 
German infantry on this occasion. In the evening, using a Lewis gun, Petty 
Officer Rogers, in one of Lieutenant-Commander Wells-Hood's cars brought 
down an enemy aeroplane which was sniping our reserves. On the 31st, 
Lieutenant-Commander Ruston and his cars were in action against the enemy 
continuously throughout the day. Sub-Lieutenant Southam, who already 
had had one car blown up under him, took great risks, as opportunities for 
advancing against the enemy were small in view of their heavy artillery, which 
had been brought up and was pounding the road. Our casualties in wounded 
represented 20 per cent of the fighting force. 

Ten days later, at Kiev, on my way north, we buried 
Valentine. The city was in an uproar. Ukrainian regi- 
ments were exchanging volleys with the Russian cavalry 
at the railway station. The garrison was torn by Bol- 
shevist factions. An octogenarian professor-colonel who 
was in "command" had been trying to apply his theories 
of a "democratic republic" among the troops, with the 
result that he had twice had to make a hurried escape 
from his headquarters. He plaintively informed me that 



THE BOLSHEVIST BETRAYAL 



he could not count upon his men to bury a "bourgeois 
monarchist" Englishman. But a Cossack sotnia effectu- 







TOtALCAPTURES 

OFf/CatS.-^ 7,787 

*f£m. 3S0,645 

GIW5. 405 

MACff.GtMS t326 

CMSSOHS 292 



%V^' 



^§L 



">^-0 30 20 SO 40 SO 



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN 1916. 



ally prevented any nonsense. The company of terri- 
torials who rendered the last honors was not interfered 
with. And we knew that the Russian troops, if left 



294 RUSSIA AT WAR 

alone, would never display feelings other than those of 
afiFeetionate loyalty and respect for a fallen ally. It 
was the Cossacks who bore Valentine's coflBn from the 
cathedral to the gun-carriage, and, after a four hours' 
march in the dust and heat of an August morning, car- 
ried him through the military cemetery to his last resting- 
place. As we drew nigh to the grave the horsemen 
lined the pathway, and we passed under a double row 
of drawn Cossack sabers. 

There had been some uncertainty about the arrange- 
ments for the funeral, so I telegraphed two days before- 
hand to our military mission at the Stavka requesting 
instructions from General Kornilov. This telegram 
reached its destination a week later, when I had already 
reached Mogilev. It bore the mark of the Petrograd 
telegraph office. Apparently all messages for Head- 
quarters were being transmitted for "censorship." It 
showed clearly enough that the Soviet regime did not 
trust the Army. This incident has its importance, for 
at that time the relations between Kornilov and Keren- 
sky were not even "strained." 

As a commentary on the difference between the spirit of the Russian annies 
in 1916 and 1917, this map shows the remarkable achievements of the troops 
on the Southwestern Front some months before the Revolution and its attend- 
ant breakdown of discipline. It speaks for itself. I may add that these same 
troops were better armed and munitioned in 1917 and had a greater superiority 
in numbers over the enemy. But they lost all that bad been won in 1916, and 
thus forever discredited the Revolution. 



PART IV 
KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

CHAPTER XXIV 

THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 

Attempts to Restore Discipline — Savinkov Supports Kornilov — Kerensky 
Vacillates — ^Failure of the Moscow Conference — A "Socialist Autocrat" 
— Collision with Kornilov and Kaledin— ^he Truth about the Military 
Dictatorship — Another Bolshevist Move — Kerensky Parleys — ^The Dem- 
ocratic Conference — Lenin Reappears — ^The "Red Guard" — Kerensky's 
Overtures to Kornilov — Intrigues with Bolsheviki — Circumstances of the 
Cavahy Expedition — Kornilov Dismissed — Alexeiev to the Rescue — 
Kornilov's Intercepted Orders of the Day — Alexeiev Resigns — ^The Lvov 
"Misunderstanding" — Bolsheviki Turn against Kerensky — ^The Lenin 
Government and Armistice. 

Bolshevism had snatched victory from our grasp, 
but all hope was not yet lost. The men had rallied 
under General Kornilov's stern measures of discipline. 
Behind them was the nation, largely composed of sound 
elements that awaited the signal of some strong man 
backed by an organized force to revolt against the 
terror of the Soviet. The heart of the nation was still 
sound. Its sturdier portions, the inhabitants of the 
borderlands — the Cossacks, the Caucasians, and the Si- 
berians — ^had done their best in the offensive and were 
ready to unite together and to save the country at 
the eleventh hour from anarchy, from collapse, and from 
shameful surrender to German intrigue, with its pros- 
pect of complete subjection of new-found liberties to the 
domination of the Huns. 

295 



296 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

Here is an evidence of self-sacrificing loyalty shown 
by the Russian settlers in Western Siberia. Already in 
April they had formed three "death" battalions of 
volunteers, which hurried up to take part in the offensive. 
One of them, the 2nd Orenburg Battalion, reached the 
Front when our line had been opened and the disgrace- 
ful retreat was in full blast. They had no transport 
and no iron rations. Forcing their way through the 
fugitives, they rushed forward and engaged the enemy. 
Three days and nights they were continuously in action 
without receiving any food. Then they were relieved. 

I saw them at P , our base, whither they had come 

to refit and refill. Out of 1000 men only 500 remained. 
Three companies of reserve men were paraded and in- 
vited to join the volunteers. The reserves had come 
from Bolshevist towns. They were a poor lot, untrained 
and undisciplined. After conferring with their "Com- 
mittees" these "soldiers" declined to join the bat- 
talion. 

Having restored some semblance of discipline at the 
Front by the simple method of reviving the death penalty 
for deserters and succeeded thereby in arresting the 
further advance of the enemy. General Kornilov boldly 
urged upon the Provisional Government the adoption 
of similar methods among the troops in the country 
and the workmen employed on the railways. He had 
forbidden political meetings and had restricted the Com- 
mittees to their normal domestic functions. He de- 
manded similar measures among the reserve troops. 
It was quite obvious that to continue the war with any 
prospect of victory necessitated an immediate compli- 
ance with his demands. The Chief Commissary of the 
Government with the southwestern armies had entirely 
endorsed General Kornilov's energetic program. This 
commissary was M. Savinkov, a well-known revolutionary 
and writer. He was one of the few Russians who had 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 297 

played an active part among the Maximalists in 1905 
and later. It was said that he had been privy ^ to several 
political assassinations. Being clear-sighted and patriotic, 
however, he had now subordinated party aims and 
ideals to the stern necessities of the hour. Proceeding 
to Petrograd, he boldly and energetically canvassed 
General Kornilov's plan, and partly as a result of his 
intervention General Kornilov was appointed to the 
Supreme Command. ^i 

I shall now briefly outline the events that followed. 
M. Kerensky himself had been at the Front and knew 
how complete was the failure of the Committee system 
as a military organization. He had himself been hooted 
and jeered at by soldiers who were being "revolutionized" 
by Bolshevist agitators behind the backs of their Com- 
mittees. His own perfervid oratory had failed to remedy 
the evil. He had just scored heavily against the Bol- 
sheviki of Petrograd and Kjonstadt — thanks to the help 
of the Cossacks. What could the country expect of him 
at this juncture.'^ He was Minister-President by this 
time, it should be mentioned, and claimed to have 
absolute powers. I ask, what should he have done at 
this critical juncture.^ And I say unhesitatingly — and 
all men of common sense and common patriotism agree 
— ^he should have proclaimed himself openly for General 
Kornilov, as his fellow-Socialist M. Savinkov had done. 

But this "bold, fearless" orator, who had made 
people believe in him and follow him, was at heart only 
a revolutionary — a tool of the Soviet, as he had been 
from the beginning. He boasted later on that he would 
"save Russia" if it cost him his "soul" — in other words, 
that he would sacrifice his political "ideals" to the 
"interests" of his country. And that was precisely 

* While reproving Terrorism, one cannot withhold a certain measure of 
respect from men who, like Savinkov, risked their own lives in support of 
"ideals," however misguided. 



298 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

what he lacked the courage to do. I have related else- 
where how he proceeded to play a game of "fast and 
loose" with the avowed traitors who had disrupted the 
Army — with Lenin, with Trotsky and the other pseudo- 
Jews who were acting in the interests of Germany. In 
the same way he now played with Kornilov and even 
with his own successor at the War Office, Savinkov. 

General Kornilov's drastic measures had been ap- 
plied without previous sanction from Petrograd, but 
they could not be upset by the Soviet just then. The 
shame inflicted upon Russia by its associates was too 
palpable. Besides, the Soviet had not recovered from 
the fright inflicted upon it by Lenin and Company. 
But even before they could rally themselves Kerensky 
had taken his stand against Kornilov. Messages to 
the Stavka — even those that were addressed to Allied 
missions — ^from any part of the country were passing 
"by order" into Kerensky 's hands. He was , treating 
Kornilov as if he were an enemy. General Kornilov's 
record precluded suspicion of partiality for the Old 
Regime. A son of the people, he had been systematically 
"shelved" throughout his previous military career. But 
General Kornilov was becoming too popular, and might, 
if he were allowed to restore discipline among the 8,000,000 
reserve troops, become too powerful and turn the country 
against the Revolutionaries. Then good-bye to the 
sweets of sham government and the delights of the 
Winter Palace. Under no circumstances must the 
Kornilov program be applied without "guarantees." 

Waiting impatiently for an answer, because he had 
evidence that the Germans would soon make their move 
on Riga, General Kornilov at length obtained an in- 
vitation from M. Savinkov to come to Petrograd and 
make a report to the Council of Ministers. It appears 
that M. Kerensky did not know of this invitation. 
His astonishment and ill-suppressed fury quickly found 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 299 

vent against the Minister of War. A few hours after- 
wards M. Savinkov was curtly requested to resign. But 
General Kornilov would not be refused a hearing, and 
M. Kerensky listened with the best grace possible. The 
Generalissimo unfolded his anxieties to the Ministers 
and hinted that a "counter-move" might be advisable 
in order to check the German advance. Thereupon M. 
Savinkov slipped a note into his hand telling him to 
beware of discussing plans, because certain persons — 
indicating M. Chernov — were not reliable. The Council 
agreed "to consider" the Kornilov program. 

But M. Kerensky had other views. He hastened 
the assembling of a Popular Conference at Moscow, 
hoping thereby to strengthen his own position. Repre- 
sentatives of all four Dumas, of the Zemstvos and Munici- 
palities, of the Co-operatives, the Soviets, the Committees, 
military and social organizations, were invited. The 
revolutionary element was, of course, to be largely 
represented, but there were also to be delegates from 
the manufacturers, the landowners, the oflScers, the 
Kiiights of St. George, and the Cossacks. The Conference 
met in August, 1917. Never had the Grand Theater 
at Moscow witnessed such a gathering. 

Kerensky had signified to Headquarters that General 
Kornilov would probably be "too busy." He did not 
want him to come, but General Kornilov had made up 
his mind to come, in order to have an opportunity of 
telling the country that his recommendations were still 
in abeyance, although the danger of invasion was more 
than ever pressing. On the eve of the great day he 
arrived, accompanied by a faithful bodyguard of Turco- 
mans. Moscow gave him an enthusiastic welcome, as 
he traversed the streets on his way to the Iberian chapel. 
Kerensky was coming out of the Imperial apartments 
in the Kremlin to go for a drive in one of the Emperor's 
motor-cars when he heard the cheers of the multitude. 



300 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

He immediately gave orders to drive in the opposite 
direction. The great day was to be on the morrow. 
That evening I was having tea with some of the gor- 
geously attired Turcoman princes in Kornilov's saloon 
carriage when Kerensky summoned him to the tele- 
phone and "requested" the Generalissimo not to speak 
at the Conference. He replied that he did not intend 
to discuss politics, but only the affairs of the Army. 
Surely he had the right and the duty to do so. Kerensky 
could not find a convenient rejoinder. But Kornilov 
felt that relations were becoming "strained," and, for 
the first time, showed some signs of nervousness. His 
entourage determined to redouble their precautions, 
fearing lest some attempt should be made to arrest 
him, as Kerensky had arrested Gurko — on a trumped-up 
charge. 

From the very outset of the proceedings it was appa- 
rent that the Conference was a "sham." The Bol- 
sheviki werfe "in command," although they showed few 
signs of their presence. As usual, they trusted not to 
oratory, except for appealing to the mob and to the 
ignorant soldiery. This audience of bourgeois and Men- 
sheviki was not in their line. But they gave us all a 
taste of their power by calling a general strike of trams 
and restaurants. Fortunately a large supply of sand- 
wiches and refreshments had been laid in at the Grand 
Theater. The Bolsheviki were also too busy organizing 
their next "coup" in Petrograd. As usual, they preferred 
"to act" rather than "to talk." 

I cannot say whether Kerensky was consciously blind, 
or whether he had succumbed to mental derangement. 
Certainly he acted and spoke like a person who was 
afflicted by a mania of grandeurs. He adopted the manner 
and tone of an autocrat. Two hapless A.D.C.'s were 
left standing "at attention" behind his chair for several 
hours. Still wearing the khaki tunic, breeches, and 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 301 

gaiters which he had affected when he became Minister 
of War, he dehvered a long and violent harangue, the 
sum and substance of which was that he (Kerensky) 
was the Supreme Power, that anybody who dared to 
wrest the "scepter" — he used the Imperial formula 
"our scepter" — from his grasp would be crushed, that 
he would ruthlessly suppress all attempts against "our 
power" with "blood and iron." At the same time he 
announced that the country and the Revolution were 
in deadly peril and that everybody must help him; but 
that he, and he alone, would save the country and the 
Revolution, adding, "even if I lose my own soul in the 
attempt." The impression produced upon me by nearly 
an hour of hysterical "talk" of this description left no 
doubt in my mind that we were on the eve of another 
crisis. 

Then General Kornilov appeared in the rostrum. 
The contrast between the two men was overwhelming. 
Here was calm, sober sense. Without a superfluous 
word or gesture, without even raising his voice, Kornilov 
told the plain, unvarnished tale of Russia's agony, of 
the men who had wanted to save their land from thral- 
dom, of the sapping of discipline, of the officers who had 
been foully murdered or shot in the back, and of the 
specter of hunger in the ranks. The foe was even then 
beginning to knock at the gates of Riga. By dealing out 
death to traitors the Army had saved the southern 
provinces. Would they not take the lesson to heart? 
Would they wait till the Germans were in Riga and 
in Petrograd, before they understood .^^ By leaving a 
few traitors alive, countless victims, unspeakable misery 
and shame, would be involved. 

The audience was divided into two fairly equal por- 
tions, one for Kerensky, the other for Kornilov. The 
same division was noticeable when General Kaledin 
proclaimed the Cossack veto on further delay and Gen- 



302 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

eral Alexeiev pilloried the doctrinaires of indiscipline. 
Kerensky had jumped up in a fury of rebuke to the 
Cossack chieftain. "We have invited you to state 
your opinions. We do not permit you to proffer advice 
or dictation," he cried. 

Speeches, parliamentary or revolutionary, followed 
in endless succession. They were not pertinent to the 
issue. The Conference had been summoned to declare 
itself for or against Kerensky. It did neither, although 
it seemed to do both. It should have declared itself 
for Kornilov, but its revolutionary taint was too strong. 
The events that followed were even then visible to all 
who had eyes to see, but even those who were most clear- 
sighted did not realize that Kerensky was capable of the 
maddest compromise to maintain himself in oflBce, and 
would bring his country to the lowest depths of national 
humiliation and despair. 

General Kornilov had returned to the Stavka immedi- 
ately after his speech. General Kaledin hastened back 
to his Cossacks. All their friends and supporters made 
arrangements to evade Kerensky's spies, who were cease- 
lessly shadowing them. 

There was no "conspiracy," of course, unless one 
could apply that term to the outspoken wish of every 
thinking Russian who had not succumbed to revolutionary 
dogma or interest. In Kornilov all their hopes were 
centered. Kornilov and Kaledin, with the Cossacks be- 
hind them, would save the country. Let Kornilov be 
Dictator! Such was the unanimous cry outside the 
revolutionary camp. A great popular organ like the 
Russhoe Slovo was openly supporting him. Was that 
a "conspiracy"? No, but it was gall and wormwood 
to the man who had arrogated dictatorial power to him- 
self and who was far gone in madness. We can under- 
stand now all that was soon to happen. 

The Kornilovites knew quite well that another Bol- 



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IB «< 

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W3 



a ^ 



o sr 



S" 3 




THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 303 

shevist rising was imminent and that Kerensky would 
either have to join Kornilov or be swept away. But 
Kerensky was blind and rash. He did everything to 
upset the arrangements that were being made with a 
view to checking Bolshevist designs. He helped the 
Bolshevist game. It was not the first time. 

However, Kornilov still did not quite despair of the 
acceptance of his program by the Kerensky Govern- 
ment. His supporter, M. Savinkov, had been taken 
back into favor, with the erratic inconsequence that 
characterized many of Kerensky's acts. 

On his return to Petrograd, Kerensky was apparently 
under the delusion that he had scored a definite triumph 
in Moscow, and adopted a somewhat haughty tone 
towards the Soviet. Then, suddenly, the Bolshevist 
menace assumed concrete form. Positive information 
reached the Stavka that another uprising was imminent. 
And Kerensky authorized M. Vladimir Lvov, who had 
been his associate in the first Coalition Government, to 
convey certain proposals to General Kornilov, which 
were accepted. Then M. Lvov was suddenly arrested. 
Some days earlier. General Kornilov had been asked to 
send troops to help the Government. But, as the Bol- 
sheviki, evidently informed about it, became aggressive, 
M. Kerensky parleyed with them, carefully concealing 
the fact that he was already negotiating with General 
Kornilov and also that Savinkov had talked him round 
to accepting in part the Kornilov program. 

An authoritative version of the events that occurred 
after the Moscow Conference was given by General 
Kornilov in an Order of the Day to the Army (September 
10th, No. 897): 

The Galician disaster sustained by the armies of the Southwestern Front 
clearly showed to what an extent the dismtegration of our Army had gone. 

As Commander-in-Chief of that front I considered it my duty to present a 
demand for the introduction of the death penalty for traitors and cowards. 



304 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

My demand was granted, but not to the full extent, as the grant did not apply 
to the rear, which was the most infected by criminal propaganda. 

Assuming the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I submitted to the 
Provisional Government the conditions which I regarded as indispensable for 
the salvation of the Army and for its regeneration. Among these measures 
was the introduction of the death penalty in the rear. 

The Provisional Government approved my proposals in principle, and I 
reaflSrmed them on August 27th at the State Conference in Moscow. 

Time was precious; every day lost threatened us with dire consequences, 
yet the Provisional Government could not decide, on the one hand, to carry 
my proposals into effect, and on the other hand permitted them to be subjected 
to criticism by the newspapers and by various organizations. Simultaneously, 
with a view to achieve the final disruption of the Army, a campaign was begun 
against the representatives of the High Command. 

According to authentic information, preparations were being made at that 
time for an armed uprising of the Bolsheviki in Petrograd. There were clear 
indications that they intended to seize the Government, if only for a few days, 
in order to proclaim an armistice and to take decisive and irrevocable steps 
towards the conclusion of a shameful separate peace, and therefore to destroy 
Russia. 

Seeing the weakness of the Provisional Government and their lack of decision 
to take energetic measures against persons and organizations who were clearly 
leading Russia to her destruction, and desiring to forestall a catastrophe, I 
decided to concentrate four cavalry divisions upon Petrograd, so that, should 
the Bolshevist uprising take place, it might be crushed in the most decisive 
and prompt manner. It was necessary to make an end once for all of the crim- 
inal activity of traitors in the rear. 

In taking this decision I was not following any plans of personal ambition, 
and did not seek to take upon myself all the burden of undivided responsibility 
for the Government of the country. My intention was to work in harmony 
with persons enjoying the public confidence and with numerous public organi- 
zations who were endeavoring to save Russia. I hoped, with the help of these 
prominent public men, to endow our coimtry with a strong Government capable 
of saving it from shame and ruin. I merely considered it necessary that I, as 
the Supreme Generalissimo, should be a member of the new Government. 

The Bolshevist uprising in Petrograd was intended for September 10th or 
11th. By September 6th three cavalry divisions were already concentrated 
at Pskov, Velikie Luki, and Dno station. 

On September 6th, M. Savinkov, Director of the Ministry of War, came to 
the Stavka and brought me a draft of the proposed measures to be taken by 
the Provisional Government, based upon the demands I had presented, and 
informed me that although these measures were to be introduced within a few 
days, the Provisional Government strongly apprehended that this might call 
forth an uprising in Petrograd and severe opposition on the part of irresponsible 
organizations. At the same time M. Savinkov told me that the Provisional 
Government, apprehensive of a Bolshevist uprising, did not feel sure about its 
own forces, and wanted me to place at its disposal a corps of cavalry, which it 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 305 

wished to be moved towards Petrograd. It was, he added, the intention of the 
Government, as soon as it was informed of the concentration of such a corps, 
immediately to proclaim martial law in Petrograd. 

The wishes of the Provisional Government as transmitted to me by M. 
Savinkov entirely corresponded with the decision I had already taken, and, 
therefore, that same day I gave the necessary orders for putting down a possible 
rising in Petrograd. 

On September 7th came to me at the Stavka M. Vladimir Lvov, member 
of the State Duma, former Procurator of the Holy Synod, and, speaking on 
behalf and in the name of M. Kerensky, the Minister-President, asked me to 
state my views regarding three various methods of organizing a new Govern- 
ment, suggested by M. Kerensky himself: (1) The withdrawal of Kerensky 
from all part in the Government; (2) the participation of Kerensky in the Gov- 
ernment; and (3) a proposal to me to assume the dictatorship which was to be 
proclaimed by the existing Provisional Government. 

I replied that I considered the only solution lay in the establishment of a 
dictatorship and the proclamation of martial law throughout the country. 

Under the dictatorship I understood not a one-man dictatorship, inasmuch 
as I had pointed out the necessity of participation in the Government by 
Kerensky and Savinkov. 

Let it be known to all that in taking this decision I considered and still 
consider, any return to the Old Regime to be an utter impossibility, and the 
task of the New Government should be exclusively devoted to saving the coun- 
try and the civic liberties won by the Revolution of March 12th last. 

On the evening of September 8th I exchanged telegrams with the Minister- 
President, Kerensky, who asked me if I would confirm what I had said to Lvov. 

As I could not entertain the idea that the emissary sent to me by the Pro- 
visional Government could distort the sense of my conversation with him, I 
replied that I did confirm my words fully, and again invited Kerensky and 
Savinkov to come to the Stavka, as I could not answer for their safety if they 
remained in Petrograd.^ 

In reply to this the Minister-President stated that he could not leave for 
the Stavka on the 8th, but that he was starting on the 9th. 

It is evident from the foregoing that up to the evening of the 8th my actions 
and decisions were proceeding in full accord with the Provisional Government, 
and I had every reason to consider that the Minister-President and the Director 
of the Ministry of War were not playing a double game. 

The morning of the 9th showed the contrary. I received a telegram from 
the Minister-President intimating that I must immediately hand over the oflBce 
of Supreme Commander-in-Chief to my Chief of Staff and myself immediately 
leave for Petrograd. 

The Chief of Staff declined to take over the post. I likewise considered it 
impossible to hand it over until the situation had been fully cleared up. Through- 

* M. Tereshchenko left Petrograd for Mogilev on the evening of September 
8th to attend a conference of public men summoned by General Kornilov. He 
was recalled by a telegram from M. Kerensky when he was half-way. 



306 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

out the whole of September 9th I conferred by telegraph with the Director of 
the Ministry of War, Savinkov, and from these conversations it appeared that 
the Minister-President and Savinkov himself not only repudiated the proposals 
that had been made to me, but even disavowed the fact of their having made 
them. 

Considering that under the existing circumstances further hesitation pre- 
sented fatal dangers, and that, moreover, the measures already ordered could 
no longer be countermanded, I decided, with a full appreciation of the weight 
of my responsibility, not to hand over the post of Supreme Commander-in- 
Chief, in the hope that thereby I might save my country from imminent disaster 
and the Russian people from German slavery. 

In this, my decision, I was supported by the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
various fronts, and I am convinced that I shall have with me all the honest 
defenders of our much-suffering country. 

What had happened was simply this, that on the 
evening of September 8th Kerensky reaHzed that the 
Bolsheviki were very strong. On the other hand, his 
prejudice against Kornilov impelled him to go on treating 
with them and to represent Kornilov as their enemy. 
He thus enlisted their support. Trying to palliate this 
act, he afterwards explained that circumstances had 
compelled him, because the Bolsheviki had assembled 
enormous quantities of explosives and threatened to 
blow up the Winter Palace and the bridges. Moreover, 
he permitted the arming of the Bolshevist workmen 
who formed the "Red Guard," and received deputa- 
tions from the Kronstadt garrison. Simultaneously he 
was consulting M. Miliukov (who advised, as usual, the 
formation of another Coalition Cabinet), and later Gen- 
eral Alexeiev. 

By that time the Kornilov cavalry was approaching 
Petrograd. Under joint Kerensky-Bolshevist auspices 
the garrison set forth to meet them. The Bolsheviki 
had taken up the rails behind the Kornilov contingent 
and severed the wires. But all were in deadly fear of 
the cavalry. M. Chernov, of agrarian disfame, organized 
a novel form of skirmishers. Singly and in groups they 
stole up to the Caucasian regiments, bringing procla- 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 307 

mations signed by Kerensky wherein it was stated that 
Kornilov was a traitor and that he had been superseded 
and arrested. The emissaries further added that Kornilov 
had shot himself. Bereft of all means of communication 
and completely mystified and misled, the cavalry stayed 
their march. Had Kornilov been with them, he could 
have taken Petrograd almost unresisted. But he was 
directing very critical operations from Headquarters, 
and he had not counted upon treachery. Kerensky 
had imposed upon the credulity of Savinkov, who was 
also now against Kornilov. Later, Savinkov recanted 
and left the Ministry to enlist as a private soldier, vow- 
ing that, sooner or later, he would have Kerensky's 
blood. 

General Alexeiev now sacrificed himself. None of 
the Generals at the Front would take Kornilov's place. 
Kerensky pledged himself not to arrest Kornilov or any 
of his supporters, and, on that understanding, General 
Alexeiev went to Mogilev "to save the situation." The 
following hitherto unpublished documents fully describe 
the position at that moment: 

ORDER OF THE DAY TO THE ARMY. 

Mogilev, September 11th, No. 900: 

I, General Kornilov, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, hereby explain to all 
the armies entrusted to me, to their Commanders and to the Commissaries and 
elected organizations, the significance of the events which have just occurred. 

It was known to me from authentic written data, from the reports of our 
Secret Service, from intercepted telegrams and personal observation, that: 

1. The explosion at Kazan, where over 1,000,000 shells and 12,000 machine 
guns were destroyed, was caused with the undoubted connivance of German 
agents; 

2. Germany had spent millions of rubles to organize the destruction of 
mines and works in the Donetz Basin and in the South of Russia; 

3. Our Secret Service had reported: 

(a) A simultaneous blow is being prepared on our whole front in order 
to break and rout our weakened Army. 



308 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

(b) An insurrection is being organized in Finland. 

(c) It is intended to blow up bridges over the Dneiper and Volga. 

{d) The organization of a Bolshevist uprising in Petrograd is being 
proceeded with. 

4. On August 16th, during a sitting of the Council of Ministers in the Winter 
Palace, Kerensky and Savinkov personally requested me to be careful and not 
to talk about everything, because among the Ministers there were men who 
were unreliable and disloyal. 

5. I had grounds for weighty suspicion of treason and treachery among 
the ranks of various irresponsible organizations who are in the pay of Germany, 
yet exercise an influence upon the work of the Government. 

6. In view partly of what has been said above, and in full agreement with 
the Director of the Ministry of War, Savinkov, who came to the Stavka on 
September 6th, a whole series of measures were drafted and taken for the sup- 
pression of the Bolshevist movement in Petrograd. 

7. On September 7th the Minister-President sent to me a member of the 
Duma, V. N. Lvov, and there then occurred a historical act of provocation. 

There could not be the slightest doubt in my mind that irresponsible influ- 
ences had got the upper hand in Petrograd and that our country was being led 
to the edge of her grave. 

At such moments one cannot discuss, one must act. And I took the decision 
which you know of: to save my country, or to die at my post. 

You are well acquainted with all my past life, and I declare that neither 
before nor at present was I moved by personal desires or personal aims or 
ambitions, but that only one purpose, one aim guided my life, and that was to 
serve my country, and to this I summon all, as I have summoned the whole 
nation and the Provisional Government. 

No answer has yet come to me. 

I did not surrender the office of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, nor could 
I have done so, because not one of the Generals would take it; and therefore I 
give this order to all the personnel of the Army and Navy, from the Com- 
manders-in-Chief to the last soldier, to all Commissaries and to all elected 
organizations, to unite together at this fateful hour in the life of our country, 
to join their efforts without thinking of themselves in the cause of our country's 
salvation, and for this purpose to remain in all tranquillity at their posts, ready 
to repulse the imminent onslaught of the foe. 

I pledge my word of honor as an officer and a soldier, and assure you once 
more that I, General Kornilov, the son of a simple Cossack peasant, have by 
my whole life and not in words only shown my unfailing devotion to my country 
and to freedom, that I am alien to any counter-revolutionary schemes whatso- 
ever, and remain on guard over the liberties we have won, desiring only that 
the great Russian nation should continue to enjoy its independent existence. 

(Signed) Supreme Commander-in-Chiep, 
General Kornilov. 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 309 

The following telegrams were sent to M. Kerensky, 
to General Kornilov, to the Minister of War, and to 
other military officials by the Commanders-in-Chief of 
the various Russian fronts: 

Fbom General Klembovsky, C.-n-C. Northern Front, 
September 10th. No. 574a. 

I have received a telegram from Supreme Commander-in-Chief notifying 
me that I have been appointed in his place. While ready to serve my country 
to the last drop of blood, I cannot, without failing in loyalty and love to her, 
accept this oflBce, as I do not consider myself sufficiently strong or competent 
for such a responsible post during the difficult and troublous times through 
which we are now passing. I consider any change in the Supreme Conunand 
to be the most dangerous at a moment when the enemy threatens the integrity 
of our country and our freedom, and^when measures are urgently needed to 
stimulate discipline and efficiency in the Army. 

(Signed) Klembovsky. 

From General Baluiev, C.-in-C. Southwestern Front, 
September 10th, No. 10,459. 

In my telegram as Commander of the Eleventh Army, 12th (26th July) 
I stated my views regarding the conditions that were necessary to raise the 
fighting efficiency of the armies and thereby to save Russia. As regards the 
measures that should be taken, I am entirely in agreement with General Korn- 
ilov. I have just received a telegram that General Kornilov has been ordered 
to hand over the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I consider the depart- 
ure of General Kornilov would be destructive to the Army and to Russia; 
firstly, because General Kornilov has always put his whole heart and soul into 
his work for the welfare of the country and that he is the only man in Russia 
who is capable by his iron will to restore order in the Army; and secondly, 
because his dismissal indicates that the measures rejected will not be carried 
out by the Government although the present situation in Russia insistently 
demands the carrying out of extraordinary measures. General Kornilov's 
retention at the head of the Army is urgently needed, regardless of any political 
complications. 

(Signed) General Baluiev. 

From General Shcherbachev, C.-in-C. Rumanian Front, 
September 10th. No. 493. 

I consider any change in the Supreme Command at the present difficult 
time through which Russia is passing to be extremely dangerous from a military 
point of view. Fully agreeing with the measures proposed by General Kornilov 
for restoring discipline and efficiency in the Army, I consider it my duty to 



310 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

declare that the supersession of General Kornilov will inevitably exercise a 
fatal influence upon the Army and upon the defense of Russia. I appeal to 
your sense of patriotism, in the name of the salvation of our country, to avoid a 
rupture in our ranks. 
Jassy. {Signed) Shchebbachev. 

From General Denikin, C.-in-C. Western Front, 
September 9th. No. 145 

I am a soldier and unaccustomed to play hide-and-seek. On July 29th, 
at a conference with the members of the Provisional Government, I declared 
that they had by a whole series of military enactments demoralized and dis- 
rupted the Army and trampled our battle-flags in the mire. By my retention 
as Commander-in-Chief the Provisional Government had to my mind recog- 
nized its weighty transgressions against the country and a desire to repair 
the evil that had been done. To-day I have received the news that General 
Kornilov, who had presented the well-known demands which could still save 
the country and the Army, is to be relieved of the post of Supreme Commander- 
in-Chief. Taking this to mean the return of the Government to a course of 
studied destruction of the Army, and consequently to the ruin of our country, I 
consider it my duty to acquaint the Provisional Government that along this 
course I shall not travel with them. 

(Signed) General Denikin. 

The senders of these telegrams were subsequently 
dismissed and arrested, in some cases under circum- 
stances of the utmost brutality. 

But the Army never received these Orders of the 
Day. Bolshevist agents at Mogilev intercepted them, 
It had been diflScult, for the same reason, to get them 
printed. On the other hand, Kerensky's foul and slan- 
derous proclamations against Kornilov were scattered 
broadcast. The Bolsheviki stirred up the Committees, 
and immediately a series of abominable outrages were 
perpetrated upon officers who lay under the slightest 
suspicion of being pro-Kornilov. The Kerensky-Bol- 
shevist "Coalition" set the example by arresting Korni- 
lov, Lukomsky, (then Chief of Staff), and most of the 
officers at Mogilev. Thereupon General Alexeiev, after 
protesting in the strongest terms against Kerensky's 
violation of his pledges, left the Stavka, and eventually 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 311 

General Dukhonin accepted the post of Commander-in- 
Chief. Noble-hearted Denikin had been brutally ill- 
treated by a Bolshevist rabble. Other high officers 
shared his fate. Many were murdered. One was 
"boiled." 

The Kerensky "sham" government shed crocodile's 
tears over the dreadful harm that Kornilov had done 
to the Army. Things were improving, and he must 
needs spoil them, forsooth. When Riga fell and the 
Germans overran Oesel, it was, of course, Kornilov's 
f^ult. Much had been made of the Lvov "misunder- 
standing." He was also a "bad man." He had mis- 
construed M. Kerensky 's "good intentions" and had 
induced General Kornilov "into error." The obvious 
discrepancy between these two versions did not worry 
such people as Kerensky and his friends. 

After a short period of internment at Mogilev, General 
Kornilov was transferred to Bykhov,^ a neighboring 
townlet, to be put on his trial for "high treason." A 
Committee of Inquiry went down "to investigate." 
Of the six members, three were pseudo-Jews of the 
Soviet. And yet, after the most searching examination, 
even this body could find no case against him except 
for "attempting to change the existing form of Govern- 
ment," i.e., the Soviet regime. His trial was, however, 
postponed, because already some of the General's de- 
positions had got into print and enabled the public and 
the Army to obtain a glimmering of the truth. 

It was damning for Kerensky, and completely spoilt 
his hopes of collaboration with the Bolsheviki. The 
Soviet also became "obstreperous." Then the madman 
lost all sense of realities. He "proclaimed war on the 
Soviet" and demonstratively withdrew from it, resigning 
his post of Vice-President of the Executive Committee. 

* He escaped thence in December, the day before Dukhonin was murdered. 



312 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

His acolytes, Chkheidze and Tseretelli, followed suit. 
The complaisant M. Tereshchenko informed the Allied 
representatives that all was well. "We shall soon dis- 
pose of the Soviet and of the Bolsheviki," he boasted. 

At a "Democratic" Conference, convened by him in 
the early days of October, 1917, Kerensky managed to 
secure a half-hearted assent to the formation of another 
Coalition Government. The majority of the Socialists 
recognized the impossibility of eschewing bourgeois sup- 
port; indeed, some of them now recognized the fact 
that the Revolution had been the work, not of the 
"democracy" alone, but also of the bourgeoisie, and 
that the very essence of the social upheaval was bour- 
geois, it being mainly concerned with the acquisition of 
property. None except blind fanatics could imagine 
that the peasants having once come into possession of 
lands would give them up. 

The Bolsheviki argued from another point of view. 
*They contended that the Revolution had hitherto been 
"usurped" by pseudo-Socialists in alliance with bour- 
geois to the detriment of the "democracy." The pacifism 
of demoralized soldiers and sailors, and wholesale jac- 
queries by the peasants, were, in their eyes, appeals for 
the advent of a Bolshevist Government. Such was the 
gist of arguments used by Lenin in printed and oral 
utterances at this time. 

The War Office had been entrusted to a semi-Revolu- 
tionary semi-Bolshevist professor — a Colonel named Ver- 
khovsky, who had been "commanding" the Moscow 
soldier-rabble. He proceeded to settle the food and 
the money problems and incidentally pave the way to 
a premature peace by wholesale demobilization of the 
reserves. 

The propertied and non-Socialist classes had offered 
their support to Kerensky because, after the Kornilov 
affair, they saw no other alternative to a Bolshevist 



THE FIGHT WITH BOLSHEVISM 313 

regime. The new Coalition, including four Constitu- 
tional Democrats, was formed October 8th. Meanwhile 
Kerensky proclaimed Russia a Republic in order to 
pacify the Left. It was, moreover, decided to institute 
a sort of provisional parliament, with consultative 
powers, in the hope that it would obviate the persistent 
interference of Soviets and Committees. 

This body was formed out of members of the Demo- 
cratic Conference and nominees of the propertied classes, 
which were represented in a proportion of about 25 per 
cent. The Provisional Council of the Republic — as it 
was styled — met October 20th, a few days after the 
Germans had consolidated their conquest of the city 
and gulf of Riga by the occupation of Dago Island. In 
his inaugural address, Kerensky denounced the Bolshe- 
viki — ^his recent allies against Kornilov — as traitors. 
Trotsky retorted by branding the Council as a counter- 
revolutionary organization. 

Trotsky had "captured" the Petrograd Soviet some- 
time earlier, and had been organizing a Military Revo- 
lutionary Committee to direct eventual Bolshevist oper- 
ations in the Capital. The garrison and the populace 
being informed of Kerensky's connection with the Korni- 
lov "plot" and of the plan to send Petrograd troops to 
the Front, joined Trotsky, obeyed his orders, and turned 
their backs on Kerensky. The latter appealed to the 
Cossacks in his hour of need, but he had deceived, bullied, 
and slandered them and their beloved Ataman, Kaledin. 
They refused to act as his police. He then fled, vainly 
hoping to find support outside. Konovalov and the 
other members of the latest Coalition were left in the 
Winter Palace guarded by a handful of loyal officer- 
cadets and women. Subjected for hours to a merciless 
fusilade and shelled by warships, they could not resist. 
Lenin's forces suppressed resistance ruthlessly in Petro- 
grad, Moscow, and other cities. The Bolshevist coup 



314 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

of November 7th, unlike the two preceding ventures, was 
a complete and immediate success. 

And as General Kornilov had predicted, the Bol- 
sheviki began their rule by negotiating an armistice, 
without even consulting the Allies. Like the various 
Coalitions they were also a "sham" — but "made in 
Germany." 



CHAPTER XXV 

THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 

Origin of the Cossacks — Three Centuries of Loyal Service— Ermak — Sea- 
rovers — St^nka Rdzin — The "Siech" — Conquest of Siberia — Arctic Explor- 
ation — The Cossack Lands — Home of Agricultural and Mineral Resources 
— ^The Twelve Armies — Organization Past and Present — Fighting Record 
— Elective Offices — Conditions of Service — ^The Don "Outlanders" — 
Numbers in the Field — Fighting Peculiarities — General Kaledin — ^A 
Message to King George and the British Nation. 

Throughout this narrative of Russia's past and 
present history, I have endeavored to speak in terms 
that may be comprehensible to those of my readers 
who do not know Russia or the Russians or have a 
superficial and often misleading acquaintance with Rus- 
sian affairs. It is the truth and the whole truth that has 
been unfolded in these pages — a record of glorious pos- 
sibilities alternately wasted by narrow conceptions of 
statehood under the autocracy and wrecked by extrav- 
agant dreams 'of Millennium under the Revolution; an 
autocracy and a Revolution that were dominated in turn 
by the okhrana and the Soviet — institutions that were 
"to wipe away all tears," but, in fact, only constrained 
or terrorized the living forces of the nation. 

The Russian people had been, so to speak, in swaddling 
clothes throughout the ages of Tatardom and autocracy; 
their best men had sought sanctuary from oppression 
in the border wildernesses, and later were drafted thither 
as prisoners or exiles. Like our Pilgrim Fathers, these 
early emigrants had gone forth to colonize new lands; 
like our bold seamen, they founded new states and em- 

315 



316 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

pires. While Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher were laying 
the foundations of our oversea dominion, Ermak Timo- 
feievich, a Cossack (in Russian, Kazdk — ^freebooter) with 
a handful of hardy adventurers, overran Western Siberia, 
and came to John the Terrible to lay the new realm at 
the autocrat's feet. 

Our own Robin Hood had his counterpart in the Volga 
Ataman "Stenka" ^ Razin. The exploits of this bold 
spirit live to this day in popular legend. Every peasant 
knows of his daring raids across the Caspian in open 
boats to the confines of Persia,^ whence he was reported 
to have brought back a lovely princess as his bride. 
And still more do they appreciate Stenka's undying 
love of freedom, his "complaint" against oppression, 
which is so poetically rendered in one of the beautiful 
songs of the Volga — the "Song of Stenka Razin." 

In the dawn of Rusmr history exploits of equal 
audacity had been accomplished by forerunners of the 
Volga freebooters. Prince Oleg had "hung his shield" 
upon the gates of Byzantium. Legends describe how 
Oleg's men fixed wheels to their boats so that "they 
sailed over land and sea." Long after the Principalities 
of Little Russia had been overshadowed by the Duke- 
doms of Suzdal, Vladimir, Tver, and Moscow and the 
Republics of Novgorod and Pskov, which finally suc- 
cumbed to the "ingathering" power of the Terrible One, 
the hardy free-rovers of the Dnieper continued to main- 
tain their traditions. (The Crescent had triumphed 
over the Cross, and the avenues of commerce had been 
closed in this direction, wherefore it became necessary 



* Diminutive of Stepan (Stephen). 

2 Thence, perhaps, originated the name "Cossack," derived from the 
Turkic word " robber." (The Persians later had their own ** Cossack ' ' brigade.) 
There also, perhaps, the Cossacks acquired their battle-cry "Urd!" which means 
"Kill!" (Our Hurrah!) But more probably these words, like many others used 
by the Cossacks, were introduced into Russia by the Tatar invaders* 



THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 317 

to develop an outlet into Asiatic markets through the 
Volga. Muscovy owed its rise to this economic cir- 
cumstance.) 

Cossackdom asserted itself as a barrier against the 
infidel. The Free Republic of Zaporozhia (literally, 
the lands below the Dnieper Rapids), with its Sifch, 
or "Slasher" army, survived even the Polish domina- 
tion 1 and was dispersed under the Great Catherine. 
Who has not read the thrilling pages wherein Senki- 
ewicz relates the long-drawn story of the Cossack struggle 
against Polish rule.'* Who has not heard of Taras Bulbd, 
the Cossack hero of Gogol's immortal epicf* Who does 
not remember the story of Mazeppa, a Cossack chieftain 
who was bound on the back of a wild horse for "treach- 
ery" to the "oppressors" of his land.^* 

The "Cossack" name had been more particularly 
identified with the Little Russians, but we have seen 
that their brethren ot^reat^ Russia were not less entitled 
to it. All had been equally animated by a love of 
freedom and independence, all were fearless and stanch. 
And now the Great Russian Cossacks again showed '> "^ 
their marvelous qualities as pioneers of their country ' 
and people. Going ever eastward through Siberia, they 
passed mighty rivers, overpowered the resistance of 
native tribes, till finally they reached the open sea. 
Little is known about the doings of these remarkable men. 
They were ignorant and unlearned and left no records. 
They simply notified their discoveries of boundless lands 
and islands. Thus Dezhnev, a Cossack, sailed the 
Arctic Ocean in an open boat (1647-54), rounding what 
was afterwards called Behring Strait after a Russian 
naval oflScer who came there a century and a half later. 
Dezhnev built a fort at Anadyr Bay. A Cossack sotnia 
under Volodimir Otlasov conquered Kamchatka. Later, 

* A well-known picture by the great Russian painter, Hya Repin, represents 
the warriors of the Siech writing an egregious epistle to the Khan. 



318 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

in 1870, two Cossacks, Vaghin and Bermiakov, discovered 
the New Siberian Islands. It is asserted by Colonel 
Vandam, a well-known Russian writer, that some of 
Dezhnev's contemporaries crossed the Straits and skirted 
the coast of Alaska and southward to what is now San 
Francisco. 

Meanwhile their brethren in Great Russia had grown 
and multiplied. Their services were in demand. Great 
tracts of land were bestowed upon them by successive 
sovereigns. The Don Cossacks were the most numerous, 
because thither had flocked all the hardy youth of the 
Great Russian plain. Here grew up a new nation of 
horsemen. The vast prairies of the South afforded ideal 
pasturage and the soil was exceedingly fertile. The 
Don Cossacks became noted riders and husbandmen, 
and in the still waters of their river they gathered a rich 
harvest of fish. 

From the Volga, Cossacks radiated eastward, forming 
two separate hosts — the Orenburg and tlo^d Yaik or Ural 
Armies. The name Yaik was forbidden after the up- 
rising of Pugachev ^ (early in the eighteenth century), 
in which the Yaik Cossacks had taken part, and they 
were afterwards styled the Ural Cossacks, till the Rev- 
olution, when the old name was revived. A small 
group of St^nka Rdzin's followers settled in the estuary 
of the Volga and were known as the Astrakhan Cos- 
sacks. 

When Catherine the Great finally broke the resistance 
of the Si§ch, she arranged for the transfer of its warriors 
to the Cis-Caucasian border. The advantages of her 
plan were twofold. An unsubmissive element was elim- 
inated from Little Russia and settled in a region where 

^ Hence the Russian word Pugachevshchina, equivalent of Jacquerie, applied 
to agrarian troubles, reminiscent of the wholesale destruction of property that 
attended Pugachev's uprising. Pushkin wrote a wonderful novel on the sub- 
ject entitled "The Captain's Daughter" {Kayitanskaia Dock), 




TYPE OF KUBAN COSSACK 

{Drawn by M. Kravchenko) 



THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 319 

their inborn fighting spirit would safeguard the Empire 
from incursions. For the Caucasian tribes were then 
untamed and predatory, and might help the Turks or 
the Persians to invade Russia. This was the origin of 
the Kuban and the Terek Cossacks. 

The Cossack organizations had been originally based 
on the elective principle. Their Atamans, or head-men, 
and minor officers were chosen in common assembly. 
The Sifch host had been divided into regiments, which 
in peace-time were styled Kuren (smoke), as they lived 
in one building and foregathered around one hearth. 
In time of peace the army obeyed the orders of a Camp 
Ataman, who was assisted by a Pisar (clerk). They 
fulfilled duties approximating those of a Minister of 
War and his Chief of Staff. Discipline was not very 
strict. The whole army voted on war or peace. As 
soon as war was decided upon, the authority of the 
Camp Ataman became subordinate to that of the Field 
Ataman,^ specially elected for the occasion. He was 
handed a hulava (mace) of office, and from the moment 
he had taken it no man dare to question his authority 
under pain of instant death. So long as the campaign 
lasted discipline of the sternest, most uncompromising 
character was enforced. Any Zaporozhian who imbibed 
a drop of strong drink was instantly put to death. Need- 
less to say, refusal or delay in complying with orders, 
or any discussion thereof, were punished with equal 
rigor. Cowardice or treachery was visited with dreadful 
punishments. The guilty were impaled or torn to pieces 
by their comrades. This penalty was heralded by cries 
of ''Na pohiheir* (To destruction!). 

In their new home the Zaporozhians were "modern- 
ized" and placed under appointed officers. The scalp- 

^ During the early days of the Cossack revolt against the Soviet (August, 
1917), it was proposed to elect General Kaledin "Army Ataman" and General 
KornUov "Field Ataman." 



320 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

locks which they and the Poles affected in imitatioD 
of their Tatar and Turkish foes disappeared. But 
some of their old privileges remained. And nothing 
could quench their inveterate love of freedom and in- 
dependence. 

Meanwhile the Great Russian Cossacks had also been 
subjected to more direct control and to abolition of 
many of their rights and privileges. This circumstance 
had indirectly fostered Pughachev's movement, which 
was also, however, aided by a general feeling of revolt 
among the peasant-serfs against their owners. Puga- 
chev, an ignorant and drunken ruffian, had impersonated 
the dead Tsar and promised a "Golden Charter" (Zolo- 
taia Gramota), which he declared had been "withheld" 
by his Ministers. The Golden Charter was to bestow 
Land and Freedom. (Two centuries later the legend 
of the Tsar and the "Golden Charter" was revived 
by agitators, during the jacquerie of 1905. And the 
fact that similar yarns did not materialize in 1917 shows 
that the villagers had become more enlightened.) 

The Cossacks had not so much to complain of, after 
all. They were still free men. Vast tracts of land and 
exclusive rights of fishery were granted to them in per- 
petuity. In return for these rights they had to render 
military aid to the State whenever they might be called 
upon to do so. 

In Asia, geographical conditions had led to a gradual 
"budding-off." The Siberian Cossacks estabhshed in 
the region nearest to the Urals had been supplemented 
by the Enisey and Trans-Baikal, later by the Trans- 
Amur and the Ussuri Cossacks, and an offshoot into 
Central Asia had become the Semirechensk (Seven Rivers) 
Cossacks. 

Platow's Cossacks rendered signal service during the 
invasion of 1812, fiercely harrying the retreat of Napo- 
leon's broken legions, and, later, entered Paris. The 



THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 321 

Cossacks figured in every succeeding war: in the Crimea, 
in the Caucasus, in Turkestan, in Manchuria. They 
were not, however, in particular favor with the Old 
Regime, which treated them somewhat contemptuously 
as Irregular Cavalry, suitable for repressing internal 
troubles rather than for warfare. However, all who 
had to travel in the wilds of Siberia appreciated the 
inestimable value of the ubiquitous Cossack. 

The Cossack organization as it existed under the Old 
Regime was briefly as follows: All the above-mentioned 
groups (twelve in number) were designated as "armies," 
each under the command of a chief appointed by the 
Tsar (who was "Hetman" of all the Cossacks), and 
known as Nakaznoy Ataman. Under him was the civil 
and military administration of the "army" (voisko). 
The Cossack settlements, or stanitsas, were adminis- 
tered by elected "elders" under a central board,^ which 
had charge of the lands, fisheries, etc., and funds of 
\he^voisko. In some cases the funds were very con- 
siderable, notably in the oil regions of the Kuban, which 
came within the Cossack lands. Every Cossack was 
entitled to an allotment out of the voisko land reserve, 
which the Socialists tried to "confiscate." No one 
could become a Cossack except by adoption by a stan- 
itsa. The settlements sometimes bestowed upon a non- 
Cossack the privileges of a pochetny starik (honorable 
old man) for distinguished service. Russian Generals 
prized this honor exceedingly. 

Cossack boys entered the ordinary Military Schools 
and, eventually, received commissions in the regular 
Army. Such a one was the poor Siberian Cossack lad, 

* The Cossack armies and their headquarters were as follows: Don, Novo- 
cherkask; Kubdn, Ekaterinodar; Terek, Vladikavkaz; Yd-ik, Uralsk; Oren- 
burg, Orenburg; Astrakhan, Astrakhan; Semirechensk, Vierny; Siberian, 
Omsk; Enisey, Irkutsk; Trans-Baikal, Chita; Trans- Amur, Blagoveshchensk; 
Ussuri, Vladivostok (see p. 330). ^ 



322 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

Laur Kornilov, afterwards Generalissimo of the Russian 
armies. Or they passed through the Cossack College 
in Petrograd and became Cossack officers. To this 
category belonged the Don Cossack Kaledin, afterwards 
elected Ataman of all the Cossacks. Officers had their 
own peculiar designations. Thus, a lieutenant was styled 
horunzhy (bannerman), a captain was esaul (Turkic 
for chief of an aul or camp), and a colonel was voiskovoy 
starshind (army elder). 

Under the Old Regime non-Cossack officers were, 
however, frequently given high command in the Cos- 
sack armies. This created irritation and friction. What 
is more, they sometimes obtained as a reward for services, 
or by Court favor, large grants of land out of the Cos- 
sack reserves, and thereby virtually became Cossacks. 
Thus a Cossack gentry and nobility arose, owning large 
estates. 

Every male Cossa^ck was liable for service from the 
age of eighteen upwards. According to age he passed 
from one ochered (class) to another. He had to appear 
for service with his own horse, clothing, equipment, 
and side-arms. Rifle and ammunition and food and 
fodder were supplied by the State. All carry the lance. 
The Cossack infantry had been famous among the 
Zaporozhians, and we find its traditions reasserted by 
the Kuban army. When the males of the family were 
too numerous, or for other causes the Cossacks were 
unable to appear mounted, they formed what were 
known as plastun (creeper) battalions, this name having 
been used in the Zaporozhian days to designate their 
method of attack — they crept up to and then "rushed" 
the foe. 

The Kuban and T6rek armies had adopted the "cher- 
kesska," or long tunic with ornamental breast cart- 
tridge-case, and the hashlyh (hood), papdJcha (sheepskin 
bonnet), and Mrka (camel's-hair cloak) of the Caucasians, 



THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 323 

as being most suitable for their climate. Other Cos- 
sacks wore a plain buttonless long coat and trousers 
of the blue cavalry color and a broad strip down the 
leg, differing in hue in each army — ^red for the Don, 
blue for the Orenburg, yellow for the Ussuri, etc. During 
the war they, of course, adopted khaki and in winter the 
papdlcha. Unlike the Zaporozhians they wore their hair 
long on the crown — a mark of distinction which was 
emphasized by leaving a long curl to protrude from 
beneath their headgear, rakishly set over the ear. The 
Caucasian Cossacks shaved their heads in summer like 
the native tribesmen, but always retained the papdkha, 
which was often stained a reddish hue with henna. This 
gave an excellent "protective" coloring. 

In type they showed both their origin and their asso- 
ciations. Thus the Don Cossacks are blue-eyed, fair- 
haired, and rosy-cheeked — the true Great Russian type. 
The Kuban and Terek armies had little foreign blood, 
having bred true to their original Slav ancestors — the 
auburn-haired, somewhat dusky Little Russians. Among 
the Orenburg and Yaik warriors Mongol blood made 
itself noticeable, and the admixture of native strains 
became more noticeable in the Asiatic armies. General 
Kornilov, for instance, was half Buriat. A Kalamuk 
type was often very pronounced. The faces in a sotnia 
made one think of the wild horsemen of Djenghiz Khan. 
The Orenburg Cossacks were not so long ago — about 
fifty years — engaged in constant warfare with the Khan- 
ates of Central Asia, often capturing their brides among 
the native tribes. Kuban and Terek Cossacks waged a 
relentless war with the Chechen, Ingush, and other 
warlike tribes of the Caucasus, but jealously avoided 
all admixture with them. 

The Don Cossacks had in late years to contend with 
an invasion of land-hungry rustics from the North. Steel 
and iron industries sprang up in the Donetz coal basin, 



324 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

which contains some of the finest ore and coal in the 
world, and in huge quantities. Moreover, the growth 
of Rostov-on-the-Don (almost adjoining the Don Cos- 
sack capital, Novocherkask), due to the great develop- 
ment of agriculture and the proximity of rich oilfields 
at Baku, Grozny, etc., brought a large influx of non- 
Cossack inhabitants. All these new-comers were styled 
inogorodtsy (other townsmen).^ Their advent caused 
much trouble to the Army Board, because they were 
constantly clamoring for a share of the Cossack land. 
And this vexed question lay at the root of demands 
formulated in the Duma to introduce Zemstvos in the 
Don province, the effect of which would have been to 
give the inogorodtsy something like a preponderance in 
local affairs. Later, the Cossacks came to an amicable 
arrangement with them. 

In point of numbers the Cossack armies may be 
roughly estimated at anything between 100,000 and 
150,000. If all the male population were "called up," 
the figure would be several times larger. Ten divisions 
of Cossack cavalry, or 24,000 sabers, were with the 
colors when war broke out. The second and third 
ocheredi gave another twenty divisions, bringing up the 
total to 72,000. But other classes were also summoned, 
and the strength of the Cossack host mobilized during 
the war must have far exceeded 100,000. Two plastun 
brigades were also formed, equal to 12,000 bayonets. 
These figures do not include the Cossack artillery, which 
was numerous and excellent. 

Before the end of 1915 the Cossacks had captured 
73,000 prisoners and taken 143 guns and 143 machine 
guns. The Don Cossacks alone took 33,000 prisoners 
and 59 guns and the Kubd,n 15,000 prisoners and 38 
guns. The T^rek Cossacks took 11,000 prisoners and 

* "Cossack-land" also attracted many British enterprises connected with 
mining and agriculture. 



THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 325 

23 guns and the Orenburg 6800 prisoners and 19 guns. 
Thus they had shown their fitness for warfare under 
modern conditions, taking their turn in the trenches — 
a distasteful occupation for born horsemen. At the 
very beginning of tlie war many Cossack girls replaced 
their brothers in the ranks so that the farm-work should 
not suffer. It was nothing to them. They had bestrid- 
den horses since early infancy. Later the women had 
to bear almost the entire burden of farm-work, and 
well they acquitted themselves of the task. Nearly 
all the Army funds were exhausted during the war. 

I had been with the Cossacks in the field and in the 
trenches before the Revolution and admired their adap- 
tability and stanchness. In one place the Germans were 
on a high ridge beyond a broad, deep river. Every night 
the Cossacks would swim their horses across and, leaving 
them in the brushwood, steal up and capture German 
prisoners. The enemy caught one of the Cossacks, cut 
a strip of skin out of the sides of his legs, and crucified 
him on a high tree in full view of his comrades. From 
that day few Germans were brought in, but the Cossacks 
continued their successful nightly excursions. 

A special form of mounted attack is peculiar to the 
Cossacks, known as the lava. Perhaps the horsemen 
of Tatary knew it, but certainly the Cossacks elaborated 
and made it their own, and although I have seen "crack" 
regulars going through the intricate evolutions, they 
never quite come up to the Cossack level. It is essen- 
tially a Cossack "trick." The idea is to confuse and 
surround the enemy. 

Imagine a regiment of six sotnias launched against 
an opposing force of horse or foot in the open. When 
the signal for the lava has been given the six hundred 
gallop wildly without any semblance of order. Their 
commander has, however, remained behind, and they 
are watching him. With a movement of his saber he 



326 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

directs exactly what each sotnia and each man has 
to do. 

Suddenly the confused mass separates, dashing off 
in different directions, some even "bolting" backward. 
Then another wave of the sword, and lo! as if by magic 
the helter-skelter resolves itself into a combined on- 
slaught upon the enemy's flank or rear. As the contest 
proceeds innumerable other "combinations" may be 
evolved. To use a homely simile, it is something like a 
charge of American footballers, with consequences even 
more fatal. 

The Caucasian tribes are also great adepts at the 
lava. I have seen the "savages" — as the Native 
Horse Division was dubbed — work wonders in this way. 
For the astounding thing is that during the war Cos- 
sacks and regular cavalry often charged trenches filled 
with Austrians and captured them. They have even 
swum rivers to get to the enemy and sabered all before 
them — mother-naked. 

I had also some experience of the plastun brigade. 
These Kuban infantrymen were the terror of the hapless 
Hungarians who sat in the opposing trenches. Barbed 
wire could not stop their incursions. And, when the 
order came to attack, without artillery preparation, the 
plastun companies flung their burkas over the wires and 
were on the enemy. / Batko^ (Daddy) Gulyga, their com- 
mander, said that nSie ^I his men were ever taken 
alive. They died fighting. The man who fell into the 
enemy's hands would never find a bride among the 
girls of the Kuban. 

The Revolution was hailed by the Cossacks as an 
augury of the revival of old and cherished independence 
in matters that concerned their internal organization. 
Immediately they began to assemble a hrug (circle) 
first in the Don and later in the other neighboring armies. 
M. Guchkov dispatched General Hagondokov, a noted 





MICHAEL VLADIMIROVICH RODZIANKO 
President of the Duma. 



GENERAL KALEDIX 
Hetman of all the Cossacks. 




LENIN (right) AND TROTSKY (lEFt), THE BOLSHEVIK LEADERS 



"7 



7 



THE HOPE OF RUSSIA 327 

Cossack leader, to encourage the men and to prepare a 
pan-Cossack Congress. The movement soon embraced 
all Cossackdom, and, as stated above. General Kaledin 
was elected Ataman of all the Cossacks with headquarters 
at Novocherkask. 

It was thanks to the Cossacks that Russia did not 
go to pieces in the first months of revolution; they 
alone restored a semblance of order on ,the railways 
and kept desertion in check; they held the country against 
the inroads of Bolshevism. But they were only 100,000 
horsemen scattered over a front of over 1500 miles and 
many more miles of railway. They were willing and able 
to support the Government, but they could not save 
Russia single-handed against a coalition of Government 
and Soviet, both dallying with Bolshevism. Kerensky 
sought their aid when it pleased his fancy or suited 
his purpose. Then he turned on them — to "negotiate" 
with Lenin. 

And many a Cossack had been figliting the enemy 
without as well as the enemy within. At Kalush the 
3rd Caucasian Cossack Division went into action under 
my eyes. Who shall adequately describe that scene! 
Here was a garden city rushed at nightfall against a 
handful of Germans and shamelessly plundered by the 
Committee-led soldiers, who all night had drunken their 
fill and perpetrated nameless atrocities on the inhabit- 
ants. And there, beyond the hills, a large force of Ger- 
mans was rapidly approaching. As I crossed the shell- 
swept valley of the Lomnitsa my car broke down and 
I got out to watch the Cossacks. Coolly they rode 
into the city; then, dashing forward, dismounted and 
drove the enemy back. 

The Cossack Congress declared its unalterable will 
to recognize only the properly constituted Government 
of Russia, to continue the war in all loyalty to the 
Allies, and to maintain order in the country till the 



328 KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 

Constituent could meet. I attended its proceedings and 
noted some isolated attempts at obstruction on the 
part of inogorodnie, who had surreptitiously entered the 
hall. There was complete unanimity among the Cos- 
sacks. Later a Soyuz (League) of all the Cossacks was 
formed, and a Council elected. 

When the Soviet Press began to attack General 
Kornilov, the Cossack Council passed a resolution de- 
nouncing any attempt to displace him from the post of 
Generalissimo. M. Kerensky, thereupon, demanded a 
written retraction. The Cossacks replied with another 
resolution declaring their readiness to support Kornilov 
and Kerensky. But this did not satisfy the revolutionary 
autocrat. He still insisted on a retraction. They ig- 
nored the demand. 

At the Moscow Conference, General Kaledin,i a great 
burly man who looked and spoke as if nothing could 
shake him from his purpose, voiced the views of Cos- 
sackdoni. Amid shouts of rage from the Socialists and 
under violent rebuke from Kerensky he declared in the 
name of the twelve armies that the Cossacks, "who 
had never been slaves, and were not drunken with 
freedom," "who had never deserted or shirked their 
duty," "would not be false to their traditions"; "they 
would serve the country in the field of battle and in the 
fight with traitors at home." "They had saved Socialist 
Ministers from the Bolsheviki on July 16th, and would 
save Russia from anarchy and betrayal." He concluded: 
"The time for words has passed. Our patience is ex- 
hausted. It remains for us to accomplish the great 
work of salvation." 

He had already realized the fact that his enemy was 
presiding at the Congress, but he did not, perhaps, 
anticipate that Kerensky was unconsciously playing into 

* As Commander of the Eleventh Army he had pierced the German front 
on the Pripiat. A man of excellent parts as a leader. 



THE HOPE OF^ RUSSIA 329 

the hands of Russia's most inveterate foes, the Bol- 
shevist agents of Germany. Among Kerensky's other 
mad acts was an attempt to deprive the Cossacks of 
their elected Chiefs. He even tried to arrest Kaledin. 
The task before the Cossacks became still more difficult, 
but they were not the men to turn back. 

When I had written my account of the Moscow con- 
ference to The Times, a few of my Cossack friends came 
to bid good-bye. Before hurrying off to Novocherkask 
they wished to convey certain messages to the Allies. 
They anticipated a Bolshevist uprising and wanted the 
Allies to be prepared for it. 

They hold a compact block of the richest territory ^ 
in Southeastern Russia, backed by Cis-Caucasian tribes 
with whom they had fought in the old days.^ The 
Ingush and Chechen horsemen, the Cherkess and Tatar 
tribes, the natives of Kabarda and Daghestan rose 
during the war to espouse the common cause. Faithful 
and loyal to their salt, like all good Moslems, no treachery 
could affect them, and it was not their fault any more 
than it was the fault of the Cossacks that the cavalry 
sent to Petrograd under General Krymov in September 
1917 was "nobbled." On learning how he had been 
betrayed the hapless Krymov shot himself. i 

But in Russia there remain other strong and stanch A%* 

elements. The Old Believers, to whom most of the c ^ 
Cossacks_bdQng, count many millions oFEa^rdy settrefs, yfil) 
of thriving merchants, and prosperous manufacturers. 
Many of the greatest names in Moscow are borne by men 
of the Old Faith. Then there are the millions of small 

^All the principal coal, iron, copper, oil, and gold-fields and the steel, 
cotton-growing, wheat-raising, and cattle-breeding industries of Russia in 
Europe and in Asia are within range of Cossack-land (see map). 

2 During the short-lived invasion of Bolshevism in Cis-Caucasia (early in 
1918) these old feuds broke out afresh with dire results to the Cossacks and 
to the tribesmen. Much damage was incidentally caused to the oil fields. 
It was during these troubles that Gen. Kaledin in despair committed suicide. 



KORNILOV AND THE COSSACKS 



landowners — ^peasants who have bought their holdings. 
These are elements of stability which cannot be swept 
away, no matter what harm revolutionary jacquerie 
may do. And behind and beneath all the destructive 
agencies that have been at work, the old edifice of local 
government still stands. Indeed, by the irony of fate, 
the volost or parish zemstvos are even now being born. 



The Cossack Population and Lands. 

and the areas of land 



The numerical composition of the Cossack "armies 
belonging to them may be roughly stated as follows: 



Army of: 



Population. 



Land 

(Thousand 

Acres) . 



Per Capita 
(Acres). 



1. Don 

2. Kub^n 

3. Ydik (Ural), 

4. Orenburg 

5. Terek 

6. Trans-Baikal. 

7. Siberia 

8. Trans- Amur.. 

9. Semirechensk 

10. Astrakhan . . . 

11. Ussuri 

12. Enisey 

Total 



1,500,000 

1,350,000 

900,000 

530,000 

270,000 

270,000 

180,000 

50,000 

45,000 

40,000 

34,000 

30,000 



32,400 

18,000 

17,500 

20,000 

3,400 

27,000 

14,000 

2,700 

1,900 

2,200 

1,600 

900 



22 
14 
20 
38 
20 
100 
80 
50 
40 
54 
48 



5,199,000 



141,600 



It should be noted that the Kubdn and Terek "armies" hold valuable oil- 
bearing lands, which if properly developed would offer certain countervailing 
advantages making up for the comparative smallness of the areas belonging 
to them. The Orenburg and Ural armies were never touched by Bolshevism. 



CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER XXVI 

THE NEW RUSSIA 

In the history of a great commonwealth like Russia 
the events of the past year are bound to leave their 
trace, but they cannot remove or even radically modify 
the fundamental conditions of Russia's existence. Those 
who seek to make us believe in the power of Bolshevism 
to undermine and overthrow all that has hitherto existed 
should first of all demonstrate the possibility of reversing 
social and economic laws. But we know that to be 
impossible, for in their operation these laws are fixed 
and immutable as the stars. i 

To superficial observers the "communism" of primi- 
tive muzhikdom falsely appeared in the guise of a pre- 
paratory stage to "socialism." Into such a confusion 
of elementary facts the Russian bureaucracy was misled 
by the Revolution of 1905, and its errors have been 
adopted by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and by their 
Bolshevist rivals. In reality the peasant commune was 
a survival of the crude conditions of serfdom. It was 
bound to disappear — and was fast vanishing in fact — 
before the spread of education and the development of 
a higher form of social activity, as exemplified in the 
enormous increase of small-holdings. The "communism" 
of the peasants was not a negation of the principle of 
individual property nor — still less — a conscious self- 
restriction of the rights of ownership, which forms the 

331 



332 CONCLUSION 

very essence of modern socialism; it was simply an utter 
incomprehension of the idea of property in general. 
Hence the muzhik was prone to consider "lands, waters 
and all that therein lived or grew" as "nobody's" or 
— as he put it — as "God's." But between this primitive 
conception and the high-f angled notions of "State so- 
cialism" or "land nationalization" lies an ocean of 
ignorance, to traverse which is utterly beyond the edu- 
cational standard of the average peasant. To him the 
idea that the land, etc., is "God's" afforded an argument 
for "helping himself" and not in the least for sharing 
what he could lay his hands on with "others" except 
his own particular friends, for he had and still has no 
conception of State or nationhood. To him the "Little 
Father" was the "State" and the Orthodox Church is 
the "nation." To this day a peasant does not address 
his countrymen as "Russians" but as Pravosldvnye ("You 
of the orthodox faith"). 

Unless we understand these essential facts of peasant 
psychology we are bound to go astray in our estimation 
of the Russian problem. But having grasped them, we 
can understand the dishonesty of the peasant, his lack 
of "patriotism," the unseemly readiness with which 
he repudiated his "Little Father" — once the powers 
of the day, i.e., the Bolshevist agitators, could defy 
authority — and his tumultuous willingness to accept 
the doctrines of spoliation. And because the Russian 
peasant had no consciousness of "statehood" or even 
of "nationality," except as an expression of lay or ecclesi- 
astical lordship, the flouting of all bonds of discipline 
found the Russian soldier and sailor — and also the mill- 
hand — a ready prey to the wildest excesses. He became 
a rudderless craft — the sport of wind and wave. 

What has been said above applies with special force 
to the mass of ignorant peasants in European Russia, 
who have lived exclusively by agriculture. They rep- 



THE NEW RUSSIA 333 

resent something like 60 per cent of the population, 
or in round numbers as many millions of souls. Among 
this section we find the influences of serfdom still domi- 
nant, for here the great landed estates were principally 
centered. Here also the population was and remains 
densest and the agrarian problem has become most acute, 
with the least prospect of a local solution even by an 
equal apportionment of all existing lands. Among them 
also the peasants had migrated annually seeking em- 
ployment and the parasitic element in the commune 
attained its most formidable proportions. Under the 
influence of "socialistic" teachings — misapplied and mis- 
understood — one peasant here proceeded to despoil 
another peasant, causing widespread ruin. 

Among this benighted element the process of reaction, 
which ever waits upon the excesses of revolution, in- 
volves perils that may serve the purpose of the dark 
forces presently arrayed against Russia's revival and 
progress. 

But as I have indicated in Chapters II and IV, and 
more particularly in Chapter XXV, the Russian people 
are not all formed in this primitive mold. The riverine 
tradesmen and artificers and the Cossacks and, I may 
add, the Mussulman element — which alone numbers 
over 20,000,000 — are not of the material that will suit 
the Bolshevist book. The descendants of the Siech 
warriors, of the Don and Volga freebooters, of the 
Novgorodian merchants or the Pomor fishermen each 
and all represent traditions of initiative and independence 
and have very clear and precise notions regarding the 
rights of property. 

Such are the outstanding facts of the Russian situ- 
ation as accounted for in the preceding chapters. Let 
us resume the data therein collected regarding the char- 
acter and scope of the Revolution. The nation and the 
Army realized quite well when the war broke out that 



334 CONCLUSION 

the quarrel had been fastened upon them by Germany 
and they were unanimous in desiring to shake off Teutonic 
domination and aggressiveness. But they grew tired — 
with good reason — of seeing the conduct of the war 
hopelessly muddled, and the great problems of food and 
transport mismanaged, and of finding their offers to mend 
matters persistently ignored. The Revolutionaries took 
the opportunity to organize an uprising in Petrograd, 
and the autocracy, having outlived its day, found no 
supporters in the hour of need. It fell like a rotten 
pear. 

Throughout the tumult of upheaval the Revolution- 
aries were marshaled by an old and experienced hand 
— an extremist who had formed a temporary alliance 
with the German propaganda and who came to Russia 
under German auspices, provided with German money. 
The whole course of the Revolution was directed by this 
man and his allies. They were infinitely superior in 
skill and daring to the Socialist doctrinaires or visionaries 
who claimed to represent the masses of the people.^ 
Behind the backs of sham coalition Governments they 
carried out unhesitatingly and unfalteringly their pro- 
gram of disruption of Russia's armed forces and of her 
material and financial resources with a view to rendering 
it impossible for her to continue the struggle. The 
various phases of this conspiracy have been traced and 
their authorship established in this book. Their desig- 

^On "assuming power," Lenin made the following characteristic statement 
to a representative of the Matin (November 10th): "You may be sure that 
whatever may be the variations of the struggle, we must always in the end 
prove the stronger, because boldness is on our side, whereas Kerensky" — here 
Lenin shrugged his shoulders disdainfully — "is nobody. He has always hes- 
itated. He has never done anything and he is always vacillating. He was a 
partisan of Kornilov and had him arrested. He was an opponent of Trotsky 
and he allowed him his liberty. . . . and, as he has not dared to defend himself, 
I firmly believe he did not dare to attack us." He might have added, had he 
been quite truthful, that Kerensky had been of the greatest service to the 
Bolshevist cause. 



THE NEW RUSSIA 335 

nations are: priJcaz No. 1, the Stockholm Conference, 
the doctrine of "no annexation and no indemnity," 
the opening of the Galician front, and the wholesale 
plunder of the Treasury. Bolshevism was most dan- 
gerous while it worked behind the screen of Democracy. 
When it came into the light of day with Lenin's usur- 
pation of the Government in Petrograd, its troubles began. 
It had to conclude an immediate peace and feed and 
enrich the mob ... or perish. 

Obviously, Bolshevism is a destructive, not a con- 
structive, agency. It has laid waste the country, agri- 
culturally and industrially. It offers no practicable 
method of feeding and clothing the people. All who 
could leave the cities have fled home to their villages. 
The northern and central portions of European Russia 
are in the throes of famine, and it is unlikely that any 
surplus food will be available for export from European 
Russia for a long time to come. Thus from an economic 
point of view the continuance of the present regime is 
an impossibility. From a political standpoint it is 
equally absurd. 

The only calculable effect of the Revolution upon 
Russian economic conditions is a certain hastening of 
the process of disintegration of large landed estates, 
which has been proceeding with varied degrees of in- 
tensity during the past fifty years — since the Emancipa- 
tion. It is obviously ridiculous to suppose that the 
peasant freeholders of some 100,000,000 acres, whose 
numbers run into many millions, will accept confisca- 
tion under any guise. ^ It is equally improbable that the 
spoliation of the banks and the resultant prejudice to 
the savings of the people will be accepted without demur. 

1 Leninite usurpation was followed by confiscation of all property, but the 
Bolsheviki did d*. venture to confiscate Peasant and Cossack lands. 



336 CONCLUSION 

The workers in the mills will soon tire of village life. 
And how are they to return to their looms or lathes if 
industries remain the sport of socialistic experiments? 

We may take it for granted that European Russia 
will lose a great deal of its previous capacity for export- 
ing foodstuffs, both in the near and distant future. 
Farming has already suffered enormously and great agri- 
cultural enterprises, notably the sugar industry, are 
likely to sustain serious damage, the successful cultiva- 
tion of beetroot requiring large areas.^ But agriculture 
and industries will not disappear — ^far from it. 

Siberia had only begun to figure as a producer of 
foodstuffs when the war broke out; she was already, 
however, regarded as a formidable rival to European 
Russia, so that the through freights on grain were de- 
liberately increased west of Cheliabinsk, lest Siberian 
wheat should swamp the Russian export market. But her 
resources had then been barely tapped. Emigration is 
bound to resume in large proportions, for the purely 
agricultural surplus population of European Russia has 
• no alternative outlet. It is, indeed, the only solution of 
the Russian agrarian problem. Enormous tracts of the 
richest loam lands are still untouched both to the north 
and to the south of the great Siberian main railway. 
Siberia will unquestionably be the greatest wheat-pro- 
ducing country of the near future. And her natural 
outlets are Archangel and Rostov-on-the-Don.^ 

^ The productivity of Russian agriculture in 1900 was estimated at $2,125,- 
000,000. In 1910 it had risen to $4,825,000,000. The total production of 
Russian mills and industries in 1910 had reached an estimated value of $2,500,- 

I ^^ 000,000. Russia was the greatest cereal producer and exporter in the world. 

, The quantity of grain harvested averaged 60,000,000 tons, of which one-fourth 

(about 16,000,000 tons) was exported. The loss of this huge contribution to 
the world's import necessitated food saving and exports on an unprecedented 
scale from the United States and Canada and until Russia is restored the food 
requirements of Europe must be dependent almost entirely upon America. 

2 The play of economic forces will compel the various republics and autono- 
mies of 1917 Russia to coalesce afresh. 



THE NEW RUSSIA 337 

I need only mention a few of the other natural products 
of the vast Russian Empire — the great forests of the 
north and east, the cotton and fruit of Turkestan and 
Caucasia, the furs of Siberia, the hides and tallow of 
Caspia, the fisheries of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and 
the Caspian Sea — to recall so many items of commerce 
that Bolshevism can never control or destroy. 

With all her industries going, Russia was unable to 
satisfy half the requirements of her market — the re- 
mainder had to come from abroad. The Germans were 
benefiting enormously by the growth of Russian con- 
sumption. It was, indeed, their craze for monopolizing 
this great Russian market that prompted them to go 
to war. They were afraid of Russia's growing inde- 
pendence and armaments and, judging others by them- 
selves, concluded that Russia, becoming strong enough 
to protect her own interests, would shake off the German 
economic yoke. But we have seen from the narrative 
of her munition tragedy how sadly behindhand Russia 
was in her industrial development. And it is beyond any 
question that her industries must, in the future, attain 
a much greater extension than before. No combination 
of Lenins can stultify this growth for long. The textile 
regions of the Volga, Moscow, and Petrograd, the steel 
and iron industries of the South and of the Urals, the 
copper mines of the Urals and Siberia, the great coal 
and oil fields of Cis-Caucasia and Asiatic Russia will 
outlive Bolshevism and any other combination of "isms," 
for they are the very heart's blood of the country. 

The war and the Revolution have been sad trials for 
Russia. Her people have had to suffer more than any 
other of the great belligerent nations. The Revolution 
has been worse than an invasion of the Tatars. Indeed, 
one may regard this latest ordeal as being another service 
rendered by the Russian people to humanity. We may 
learn from their bitter experience more about the dead- 



338 CONCLUSION 

liest foe of our civilization and more readily detect its 
secret workings. We may hope also that the modern 
Huns who have launched this visitation will have cause 
to regret their foul work as they already have deplored 
the application of poison gases.^ The Russians survived 
Tatardom; they are a great multitude and have not 
all succumbed to the German Bolshevist poison. The 
Revolution has stirred up the dregs and muddied the 
current of national life. But its effects have not been 
altogether unsalutary, nor have its lessons been lost 
upon the best elements of the nation. 

The war and the Revolution together provide a hard 
school for Russia's many millions. The bombardment 
of the Kremlin, the desecration of national shrines, the 
wholesale murder of officer-cadets, the "lynching" of 
General Dukhonin and all the "abomination of desola- 
tion" wrought by Bolshevism have forever discredited 
its teachings. But even if Bolshevism had not been 
stained by such acts, its attempts to conclude an armis- 
tice and a separate peace with the nation's enemies can 
never be forgiven. 

Russia has been resolving itself into its constituent 
parts during the Revolution. This tendency is con- 
servative rather than centrifugal. It is intrinsically a 
revolt against anarchy. It should not excite alarm 
but rather be hailed as a first step towards final crys- 
tallization of the new State. And whether that State 
will be a monarchy or a Republic, a federation or a single 
organism, is not pertinent to the main issue that con- 
cerns Russia's friends. The deadening and disastrous 
hegemony of Petrograd is coming to an end. A huge 
commonwealth like Russia cannot be governed from one 
essentially un-Russian center. Even London could not 
hope to govern the whole of our Overseas Dominions. 

* This was written in December, 1917. The prediction has been realized. 



THE NEW RUSSIA 339 

Muscovy, Little Russia, Siberia, and the Caucasus are 
so many great communities, each having its own peculiar 
interests and requirements. Moscow, Kiev, Irkutsk, and 
Tiflis — not to speak of Rostov, Orenburg, Archangel, 
Omsk, Blagoveshchensk, and Vladivostok — will develop 
mightily in the future, and by this strengthening of its 
nerve-centers the whole country will be stimulated to 
healthy growth. 

Local government has attained a full measure of 
expression in the establishment of the Volost Zemstvos. 
Therein lies an assurance of solidarity between all classes. 

The time has come for Russians to cast off old ideas 
and old hatreds, to repudiate the doctrines of mate- 
rialism, and to reassert their true spiritual leanings, to 
purify and refine their Church, which has regained her 
freedom and independence under a Patriarch, and to 
spread the blessings of education. 

A new Russia is springing up amid the ruins of the 
old. The day of Lenin and destruction draws to a close. 
Do^not believe outward aspects and appearances. Russia 
is not dead. Her agony, still upon her, is not the agony 
of death, but the agony of a living, breathing organism 
struggling to find expression, wrestling against the fiend 
of Bolshevism that has gripped her when she was at 
her weakest. 

And to my readers who are saddened and disheartened 
by Russia's collapse, who see in it an evidence of dis- 
loyalty, a disinclination to share the common burden 
of our Great Cause, I would address an earnest appeal 
to read carefully the record of "Russia's Agony" and 
then to ask themselves, in all truth, justice, and equity, 
if the Russian people are not more sinned against than 
sinning. Let them take as their type and exemplar 
of true Russian ideals that perfect man and stainless 
knight Michael Vasilievich Alexeiev, who stands out 
unsullied amidst the intrigues of a pro-German Court 



340 CONCLUSION 

and the insane vagaries of disloyal demagogues. Lei 
them pay due regard to the fearless genius of a Kornilov 
and the stanchness of a Kaledin. These are all men 
of the people. These and Rodzianko are the true Rus- 
sians. Let them heed the promise of Cossackdom, the 
Dutovs and their kin — the "hope of Russia." 

Three centuries ago Russia was afflicted as she is now 
with a "time of confusion." Then, Minin, a tradesman 
of Nizhni, aroused the people and Count Pozharsky led 
them. In a week they had driven the Polish invader 
out of Moscow. History repeats itself. 

A few words must be said about ourselves. If Ger- 
many captures the Russian market, it will not matter 
much to her what she may lose in the West. She could 
then recoup herself for any such losses within a few years 
and be in a position to resume her campaign for world 
mastery with all the odds in her favor. It is by no 
means certain that she can succeed in capturing Russia, 
since her own overthrow — but she will certainly try to do 
so — unless the Russians surrender their birthright — an 
improbable event, as I have shown — and their Allies fail 
to make use of their opportunities. For this purpose 
we must cultivate the Russians — not exploit them as 
the Germans do — with a fair policy of give and take, 
and must develop a living contact with the people. Prop- 
aganda of the right sort is essential, but it will never 
be really effective so long as Russian newspapers have 
to depend upon German firms for their advertising 
revenue. We have too long forgotten and neglected the 
sea routes of the North and East. 

Let us not underrate the dangers of which I speak, 
but on the other hand let us not overrate or misunder- 
stand them and jump to wrong conclusions. Bolshevism 
is an enemy that we have to deal with not only in 
Russia. 



APPENDIX I 

DECLARATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC 

In November, 1915, all the Moderate Parties in the 
Two Houses formed a "Progressive Bloc," which drew 
up and submitted to the Government an important 
"Declaration" embodying a program of policy and 
reform which, if it had been accepted, would have staved 
off, and perhaps prevented, the Revolution. Here is 
the text of the Declaration: 

The undersigned representatives of parties and groups of the State Council 
and Duma, moved by the conviction that only a strong, firm, and active 
authority can lead the country to victory, and that such authority can only 
be one based upon popular trust and, as such, capable of organizing the active 
co-operation of all citizens, have come to the unanimous conclusion that the 
most important and urgent task of establishing such an authority cannot be 
realized without compliance with the following conditions: 

The creation of a united Government composed of individuals enjoying the 
confidence of the country and union with the legislative bodies for carrying out 
a definite program at the earliest date. 

Decisive change of methods of administration, which have hitherto been 
based upon distrust of public independent action, ^ in particular (a) strict intro- 
duction of the principle of law in administration; (6) abrogation of dual au- 
thority, military and civil, in questions that have no direct relation to the 
conduct of military operations; (c) extension of local government; (d) a wise 
and continuous policy directed towards the preservation of domestic peace and 
the removal of discord between nationalities and classes. 

For the realization of such a policy the following measures must be adopted 
both in administrative and in legislative channels: 

I. The cessation, by the Imperial prerogative of clemency, of actions raised 
in connection with purely political and religious offenses not associated with 
crimes of a general penal character; liberation from punishment and restora- 
tion to rights, including that of participation in elections for the State Duma, 
Zemstvo, and municipal institutions, of persons condemned for such offenses; 

^ The Okhrana is here alluded to. 
341 



342 APPENDIX I 

and amelioration of the lot of others convicted for political and religious crimes, 
with the exception of spies and traitors. 

II. The return of those exiled by administrative order for matters of a 
political and religious character. 

III. Complete and decisive discontinuation of religious persecution under 
whatever pretext and abolition of circulars which have resulted in the limita- 
tion and distortion of the meaning of the Ukaz of April 30, 1905.^ 

IV. Settlement of the Russo-Polish question, viz., abolition of restriction of 
rights of Poles ^ throughout Russia, the immediate drafting and introduction 
into the legislative institution of a Bill for the autonomy of the Kingdom of 
Poland, and the simultaneous revision of legislation concerning Polish land- 
ownership. 

V. Entry upon the path of abolition of restriction of the rights of the Jews, 
in particular further steps towards the abrogation of the Pale, facilitation of 
access to educational establishments and abolition of hindrances to the choice 
of professions. Restoration of the Jewish Press. 

VI. A conciliatory policy in the Finnish question, in particular changes in 
the composition of the administration and Senate, cessation of prosecution of 
functionaries.^ 

VII. Restoration of the Little Russian Press, immediate revision of the 
affairs of the inhabitants of Galicia who are kept under arrest and of those 
exiled, and liberation of those who have been wrongfully subjected to prose- 
cution. 

VIII. Restoration of the activity of professional unions and cessation of the 
persecution of the representatives of workmen on hospital boards on suspicion 
of belonging to non-legalized parties. Restoration of the labor Press. 

IX. Agreement of the Government with the legislative institutions con- 
cerning the speedy introduction of the following: 

(a) All Bills having immediate connection with national defense, the 
equipment of the army, security for the wounded, settlement of the lot of the 
refugees, and other questions indirectly connected with the war. 

(b) Of the following program of legislative work directed to the organiza- 
tion of the country for co-operation for victory and for the support of domestic 
peace: Equalization of the peasants' rights with other classes; introduction of 
parish {volost) Zemstvos; amendment of the Zemstvo regulations of 1890, 
amendment of the municipal regulations of 1892, introduction of Zemstvo insti- 
tutions into the outlying districts, i.e., Siberia, Archangel Province, the Don 
Province, the Caucasus, etc., a Bill concerning co-operative societies; rest for 
commercial employees, betterment of the situation of post-office and telegraph 
employees; ratification of temperance forever; Zemstvo and municipal con- 

* Establishing freedom of conscience. 

2 Polish officers were excluded from the General Staff, etc. 

^ In the majority of cases these prosecutions were due to refusals to recognize 
Imperial legislation regarding equality of rights for Russian subjects in Finland, 
especially the right to carry on trade, which was restricted by the Finnish law 
to citizens of the Grand Duchy. 



APPENDIX I 343 

gress and unions; regulations concerning revision, introduction of Courts of 
the Peace in those provinces where their introduction had been stopped for 
financial considerations; realization of legislative measures which may be 
found necessary in the execution of the above-indicated program. 

The foregoing declaration was signed by Count V. A. Bohrinsky for the 
progressive group of Nationalists; V. Lvov for the Center; I. I. Dmitriukov 
for the Octobrists; S. Shidlovsky for the group of the Union of October 17th; 
T. Efremov for the Progressivists; P. Miliukov for the party of National Free- 
dom (Cadets) in the Duma; D. D. Grimm for the Academic group; and V. 
Mellor-Zakomelsky for the group of the Center in the State Council. 

Half a year later, at the reassembling of the Duma in April, 1916, these 
demands were reiterated with the warning "Time will not wait." 

The whole record of the Revolution has tragically 
demonstrated the appositeness of every item in this 
Declaration. 



APPENDIX II 

THE "SOLDIERS' CHARTER*' 

The "Soldiers' Charter" was issued by M. Kerensky 
as an Army Order. He boasted that he was conferring 
privileges on Russian soldiers such as were not enjoyed 
by any other armies in the world. It consisted of the 
following clauses: 

1. All serving in the Army enjoy all the rights of citizens, but while on duty 
they must strictly conform their conduct to the demands of military service and 
military discipline. 

2. Every person serving in the Army has the right to belong to any political, 
national, religious, economic, or professional organization or society. 

3. Every person serving in the Army has the right, when off duty, to utter 
freely and publicly, orally, or in writing, or in print, his political, religious, social, 
and other views. 

4. All persons serving in the Army enjoy complete liberty of conscience, 
and no one can be prosecuted for his faith or be compelled to attend divine 
service or religious rites performed according to another religion. Attendance 
at common prayer is not obligatory. 

5. All persons serving in the Army are subject, in respect of their corre- 
spondence, to the rules common to all citizens. 

6. All publications, periodical and non-periodical, without exception, must 
be delivered, without let or hindrance, to the addresses.^ 

7. All persons serving in the Army have the right to wear civilian dress 
when off duty, but military uniform remains obligatory at all times for all persons 
serving in the Army in the military sectors and at the front. The right to wear 
civilian dress in certain large towns within the military zone may be granted to 
persons serving in the Army by Commanders of the armies at the Front, or of the 
Navy. A mixed form of dress is absolutely prohibited.^ 

8. The mutual relations of persons serving in the Army must be based on the 
strict observations of military discipline, and also on the sentiment of dignity 
of citizens of free Russia and on mutual trust, respect, and courtesy.' 

* None except Bolshevist organs reached the troops. 

2 This rule was constantly violated. 

3 As no penalties were implied, this clause had no meaning and no value. 
This applies also to Clause 12. 

344 



APPENDIX II 345 

9. Such special phraseology which has hitherto been regarded as obligatory 
for individual soldiers is to be replaced by the ordinary forms of speech. 

10. The appointment of common soldiers as orderlies is abolished, an excep- 
tion being made for officers, army surgeons, army officials, and army clergy in 
the active Army and Navy, in fortress districts, in camps, on board ships, and 
on manoeuvres, as well as in such places as offer no opportunity for hiring ser- 
vants. In these cases one orderly is allowed on conditions and at a pay agreed 
upon mutually. 

11. Orderlies who are used for personal service are not freed from active 
service. 

12. The obligatory salute, both by individual soldiers and by units, is abol- 
ished, and is replaced for all persons serving in the Army by a voluntary and 
mutual salute. An exception is made for ceremonial occasions, for funerals, 
etc., when military honors are prescribed. The command "Attention" also 
remains in all cases provided by the rules. 

i^^ 13. In those military districts which are not included in the zone of military 
operations, all persons serving in the Army, when off duty, have the right to 
leave the barracks, or the vessel, as the case may be, after previously informing 
the competent authority and receiving a proper certificate of identity. In 
case of vessels in port, also that part of the crew is allowed to leave for shore 
which is not required in case the ship may have urgently to raise anchor. 

14. No person serving in the Army may be punished or fined without a 
proper trial, but in face of the enemy a commander has the right, on his per- 
sonal responsibility, to take all measures, including the use of armed force, 
against persons declining to obey his orders, such measures not being regarded 
as disciplinary punishments. 

1^ 15. All punishments which are offensive to the honor and dignity of a 
person serving in the Army, as well as which inflict torture or cause damage 
to health, are not allowed. 

16. The employment of punishments which are not mentioned in the dis- 
ciplinary code is an offense against law, and persons guilty of committing them 
are to be placed before a court-martial. A commander striking his subordinate, 
whether in the line or outside it, is also to be placed before a court-martial. 

17. No person serving in the Army may be subjected to corporal punish- 
ment. This exemption also affects those who are undergoing a term of punish- 
ment in military prisons. 

18. The right of appointing to posts, and, in certain cases defined by law, of 
temporarily removing from command, belongs exclusively to the commanders, 
who alone have the right to issue orders affecting the fighting activity and 
efficiency of any unit, its training, its special work, as well as the work of inspec- 
tion and administration. On the other hand, affairs concerning internal self- 
government, punishment, and control belong to the elected Army organiza- 
tions, committees, and courts. 

Parts of Clauses 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 14 and the second 
part of 18 — consolidating the Committee system — are 



346 APPENDIX II 

obviously incompatible with military discipline. The 
main defect of this "Charter" lay in the fact that it 
conferred "rights" without defining "duties." 

Under the Bolshevist regime the rank and pay of 
oflScers were abolished. Commanders of regiments and 
lesser units were elected. The Council of the People's 
Commissioners under Lenin appointed their nominees to 
the higher commands. Thus Krylenko, a demagogue 
who addressed students' meetings during the semi- 
Revolution of 1905, under the sobriquet of "Comrade 
Abram," became Generalissimo. 




MAP OF BDSSI. 



APPENDIX m 

FOREIGN TRADE OF RUSSIA 

The Foreign Trade of Russia in 1912 represented a value of over $1,320»- 
000,000. Of this sum exports represented approximately $790,000,000, 
chiefly foodstuffs and raw materials, while the imports (manufactured goods) 
exceeded $530,000,000. About 30 per cent of the exports went to Germany 
and over 40 per cent of the imports came from that country. 

A comparison of the relative positions of German and British trade with 
Russia up to the outbreak of war is given in the following returns for the five 
half-years ended June, 1914: 

Imported from England. Imported from Germaniy. 

1910 $38,050,000 $106,850,000 

1911 36,200,000 122,550,000 

1912 82,250,000 123,300,000 

1913 40,500,000 149,800,000 

1914 49.750,000 186.350,000 



347 



INDEX 



Agents provocateurs, 82, 83, 96 

Agricultural productivity, 336 n. 

Alexander I, Tsar, 10, 11 

Alexander H, Tsar, 5, 12, 76-8, 98 

Alexander III, Tsar, 12, 60-1, 78-9, 
217 

Alexander Nevsky, 8 

Alexandra, Tsaritsa, character of, 
32-3; infatuation for Razputin, 
34, 40-2, 71; unpopularity of, 36; 
estrangement from Alexis, 44, 
160; description of, 46, 47; dis- 
astrous influence of, 160 

Alexeiev, Gen., Chief of Staff to the 
Tsar, 234-5; disapproves policy 
of secrecy, 65; Guchkov's letters 
to, 69; efforts of, to maintain 
discipKne, 174; staff work by, 
225; dismissed by Soviet, 180; 
deceived by Kerensky, 307, 310; 
estimate of, 339; mentioned, 47, 
118, 152 n., 153, 155, 205, 238, 263 

Alexis, Tsarevich, birth of, 31; del- 
icacy of, 33; accident to, 41; 
estrangement from his mother, 45, 
160; Tsar's abdication for, 153; 
his question regarding, 159-60; 
removal to Tobolsk, 160-1; esti- 
mate of, 44; suitability for con- 
stitutional monarch of Russia, 
339; mentioned, 37, 44, 46 

Alexis Mikhailovich, Tsar, 254, 339 

Allies, Russian ignorance regarding, 
64-5, 236 

Alsace-Lorraine question, 180 

Andronikov, Prince, 119 

Archangel railway, 244-5 

Aristocracy, 22 

Army; 
Anarchy gaining upon, 262, 276 
Casualties, 103, 236, and n., 240 
Caucasian troops, 223 



Army (continued) 

Committees, 173, 181, 188, 280, 282 
Cossacks, strength of, 289, 293-4, 

323-5 (see also Cossacks) 
Cyclist battalions, 127, 167 
"Death or Victory" Volunteers, 

263, 284, 288, 296 
Death penalty — ^abolished, 174; re- 
stored, 285, 303 
Demoralization of, 101-2, 185-8 
Desertion and panic, 63, 280-1 
Disbandment of part of, 194 
Discouragement of recruiting, 65 
Disease in, 63 
Duma supported by, 144 
Election of oflBcers, 137 
Equipment lacked by, 231-2 
Excesses committed by, 284-5 
Expenditure on, under the Revo- 
lution, 192 
Finland Rifles, 223 
Fraternization with enemy, 173-4 
German names in, 53 
Grenadier deserters, 138, 281 
Guards, 218; anti-Tsar, 116 
Ignorance in, of Allies' achieve- 
ments, 64-5, 236 
Mobilization of, 200 et seq., 206-7 
Munitions, see that heading 
Mutiny — incitements to, 133; out- 
break of March, 1917, 116-17 
Officers — disarming of, 138; dis- 
missal of, 140; shortage of, 237 
Pay of, 64 

"Peace" negotiations by, 180 
Personnel of, 218 
Prisoners — lost by, 240; taken by, 

324-5 
Rations of, 63 
Raw peasants in, 235 
Siberian troops, 219-22 
"Soldiers' Charter," 344-6 



[349 



350 



INDEX 



Army (continue^ 
Soviet delegates from, 13d~6 
Strength of. 215-7 
Sukhomlinov's changes, 214, 217-8 
Unreadiness of (1914), 212; mi- 

suspected, 198-9 
Volunteer battalions during the 
Revolution, 263 
Assassination, 96-8 
Augustovo, 222, 223, 229 
Austria: 
Balkan issue raised by, in 1909, 197 
Offer of (1917), 178 
Autocracy — essence of, 12-13; iso- 
lation the necessary condition of, 
1, 10, 13 
Avksentiev, 180 
Axehod, 93 
Azev, 83, 98 

Bakunin, 76 

Baltic Provinces, 50 

Baluiev, Gen., 309 

Barnaul outbreak, 28 

Beletsky, 37 

Beliaev, Gen., Ill, 122 

Benckendorff, Count, 159 

"Black Hundreds," 72, 86-7, 114 

Biberovich, 252 

Bobrinskaia, Countess, 84 

Bokhara, 256 

Bolsheviki: 

Army corrupted by, 281 et seq. 

Atrocities by, 311 

Defeatist program of, 99 

Financial and administrative ex- 
cesses of, 189 et seq. 

Finnish intrigues of, 260 

Industrial policy of, 183 

Rising of September 17th — warn- 
ings of, 302-3; rising of Novem- 
ber 7th, 313-4 
Bolshevism: 

Impermanent, 331, 335, 338-9 

Kronstadt stronghold of, 166, 171 

Nature of, 97 n., 335 
Bolshevist, origin of name, 95 
Breshko-Breskovskaia, £. K., 94 
Breslau, 239 
Brest-Litovsk: 

FaU of (August, 1915), 233 

Peace negotiations at, 100 



British armored cars, 288 et seq. 
British submarines, 170, 238-9 
Bronstein-Trotsky, see Trotsky 
Brusilov, Gen., 118, 225, 263, 277 
Buchanan, Sir George, 72, 110, 127, 

200 
Bulgaria: 
Russian emancipation of, 11 
Ukranian appeal to (1914). 252 
Bureaucracy: 
German orientation of, 51 
Origin and nature of, 15-16 
Byzantine associations, 7-8 
Bzhezany, 268-9, 271, 275 

Cadets, 96, 141; program, 86 
Catherme the Great, 12 n., 48, 164, 

318 
Caucasian troops, 223 
Caucasians, independence proclaimed, 

by, 256 
Caucasus: 

Fugitives in, 185 

Successes in, 234 
Chaikovsky, Nicholas, 92 
Chekhov, 76 

Cheremisov, Gen., 281, 283 
Chernov, 139 w., 182, 299, 306 
Chkheidze, 96, 128 n.^ 140, 142 and 

n., 175-6, 178, 312 
Church: 

Freedom regained by, 339 

Government supported by, 88 

Old Faith and, 25 n, 

Ruthenes dragooned by, 250-1 
Clergy, 25 

Clothing shortage, 242-3 
Coal shortage, 240 and n. 
Committees: 

Army, 173, 181, 188, 280, 282 

Excesses of, 189 

Food, 191 
Communications, defective, 244 
Congress of Nobles, 23, 71, 114 
Constantine, Grand Duke, 75 
Constituent Assembly, demand for, 

143, 156-7 
Constitution of 1905, 2, 13, 24 
Constitution signed by Alexander II, 

77-9 - 
Constitutional Democrats, see Cadets 
Co-operative movement, 90-2 ^ 



INDEX 



351 



Cossack, origm of name, 316 n.' 
Cossacks: 

Ancient glories of, 316 et seq. 

Appearance of, 322-3 

Armies of, 321 and n., 322 

Battle-cry of, 316 n.* 

Characteristics of, 317 

Congress of, 326-8 

Don. 318, 323, 324, 330 n.; out- 
landers among, 324 

Dress of, 322-3 

Explorations by, 317 

Fighting strength of, 217, 324-5 

Imperial attitude towards, 321 

Kubdn, 319, 322-6, 330 n. 

Lands of, 320, 329 and n.,2 330 n. 

Lava, attack of, 325-6 

League of, 328 

Military liability of, 322 

Nobility and gentry among, 322 

Numbers of, 324-5 

Officers, 322 

Orenburg, 318, 323, 325, 330 n. 

Organization of, 319 

PlasUn battalions, 322, 326 

Railway anarchy crushed by, 188 

Semirechensk, 320, 330 n. 

Siberian, 320, 330 n. 

T^rek, 319, 322-4, 330 n. 

Women workers among, 325 

Ydiik, 318, 323, 330 n. 
Council of Empire, 71 
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' 

Delegates, plans for, 126 
Court, the: 

German influence at, 50, 52-3 

Personnel of, 46-7 

Razputin's power at, 34 et seq. 
Crimea, fugitives in, 185 
Czechs, 240 
Czernowic, 286 

Dadianis, 142 n. 
Dago Island, 313 
De Castries, 221 
Decembrists, 10, 75, 82 
Denikin, Gen., 310 
Destructiveness, spirit of, 144 
Dezhnev, 317 

Dmitry Pavlovich, 39, 40, 162 
Dobrovolsky, Gen., 206 
Donetz coal basin, 323 



Dostoievsky, 76 

Dubrovin, 87 

Dukhonin, Gen., 311 and n., 338 

Duma, the: 

Clerical element in, 88 

Exposures by, 61 

German models in, 52 

Labor members of, arrested (Feb. 

1907), 73; released, 119 
Proclamation of, 129 
Prorogation of (March, 1917), 114 
Provisional Executive Committee 
(March, 1917), 122, 126; list of 
members of, 128 n.^; military 
organization of, 133 
Revolutionary center in, 85-6 
Socialist-Revolutionary relations 
with, 98 
Durnov6, 52 

Drink prohibition evaded, 66-7 
Drunkenness, 24, 27-8, 127-8 

East Prussia disasters, 206, 227-9 

Education: 

Illiterate percentages, 23, 90-1 
Jewish emancipation through, 57 

Electoral Law (June, 1907), 88 

Emigration, restrictions on, 16, 24 

Engelhart, Col., 128 n.2 

Erdelli, Gen., 266, 280 

Ermdk, 316 

Essen, Adm., 238 

Esthonian Finns, 256 

Ewart, Gen., 237 

Feldmann, see Chernov 
Financial position, 194 n. 
Finland: 

Government defied by, 149 

Independence proclaimed by, 260 

Romanov refugees in, 161 

Smuggling from, 185 

Students from, deserters, 259 

Troops from, 223 
Finns: 

Alexander I's pledge to, 11 

Esthonian, 256 

Mongol origin of, 9 n. 
Food shortage, 62-4, 66-8, 73, 192, 
243; high cost, 67; in Finland, 261 
Foreign trade in Russia, 347 
Franco-Russian Alliance, 79 



352 



INDEX 



Freedericks, Count, 151, 159 
French Revolution parallels, 161 

Gallcia: 

Russian offensive in, 264 et seq.% 
disasters, 206; German accounts 
of, 286 
Russian political failure in, 250-1 
Gapon, Father, 31, 82 
Germans in Russia, 48 et seg.; number 
of, 54; merchants and their 
schemes, 243 n. 
Germany: 

Armistice negotiated with, 314 
Bolshevist intrigue with, 99 n., 308 
Espionage by, 203, 211 and n. 
Fraternization tactics of, 174 
Imports from, during the war, 242 
Mobilization in, 200 et seq. 
Monopolies of, in Russia, 242 
Riga success of, 170 
Russia coerced by (1909), 198 n. 
War schemes of (1908-1914), 216 
Gerschuni, 94, 97-8 
Glinka- Yanchevsky, 87 
Goeben, 239 
Gogol, 76, 317 
"Golden Charter," 320 
Golitsyn, Prince, 73, 114, 121 
Golubev, 71 

Goremykin, 90, 120 n., 199 
Great Britain — Russian rapproche- 
ment with (1915), 51; Cossack 
attitude to, 329 
Great Russia, 9 
Grigorovich, Adm., 123, 238 
Grimm, M., 130, 139 n. 
Guchkov, M., relations with the Tsar 
and Alexeiev, 68-9; in the Pro- 
visional Government, 141; inter- 
view with the Tsar, 152-3; Cos- 
sack policy of, 326-7; succeeded 
by Kerensky, 180; mentioned, 
130, 173, 175, 211 n., 214 
Gurko, Gen., 69, 181, 214, 228, 263, 

300 
Gutor, Gen., 264, 266, 268, 281 

Habalov, Gen., 104, 110, 115, 123 
Halich, 277 

Helsingfors, atrocities at, 165-6 
Henderson, Arthur, 177 



Hertzen, 76 

Hertzenstein, 86 

Holy men, 30 

Holy Synod, 25 

Hospitals "revolutionized," 186 

Hiushevsky, Prof., 254, 256 

Imperial appanages, 163 

Industrial development: 
Backwardness of, 337 
Donetz basin, in, 323 
German exploitation of, 49 
German schemes for, 243 n. 
Political effects of, 16, 80 
Value of production (1910), 336 n. 

Industrial War Committee, 73 

Ingush horsemen, 282, 329 

Intelligentsia, 23, 30 

loltuhowski, 99 w., 145, 251 

Irmanov, Gen., 223 

Ivangorod, 218, 223 

Ivanov, Gen., Ill, 154-5, 223, 225, 
231; estimate of, 155 

Japanese offer of munitions declined 

(1915), 232 
Japanese war: 

Effects of, 2, 13, 213, 

Experiences of, 212 

Nature of, 199 

Pro-German check after, 51-2 
Jews: 

Assimilationist theory, 55 and n. 

Disabilities of, 55-8. 

Pale, the, 55 

Pogroms of, 56, 59, 83 

Poland, position in, 54-5 

Press controlled by, 176 

Revolutionary, 23, 93-5 

Suspicions against, 59-60 

Soviet dominated by, 139 and n. 

Terrors of, 139-40, 142 
Joffe, 100 

John of Kronstadt, Father, 31 
John the Terrible, Tsar, 4-5, 18, 316; 
Razputin's likeness to, 32 

Kaledin, Gen., 149, 235, 313, 322, 327, 
329, 340; at the Moscow Con- 
ference, 301, 328 

Kanin, Adm., 238 

Katkov, 78 



INDEX 



353 



Kaulbars, 79 

Kazan explosion, 307 

Keller, Count, 235 

Kerensky, Alexander Fedorovich, fam- 
ily of, 141; youth of, 99 w.; leader 
of Toilists, 97; internationalism 
of, 97 n., 103 n.; speech preced- 
ing March outbreak (1917), 103; 
the Revolution, 118; the Soldiers' 
Charter, 344-6; in the Provincial 
Government, 140-1; offends the 
Soviet, 157; abolishes death pen- 
alty, 174, 285; succeeds Guch- 
kov, 180; luxurious living of, 
183-4; army disbandments by, 
194; plays fast and loose, 297-8; 
relations with Lenin, Kornilov, 
and Savinkov, 298, 302-3, 327; 
at the Moscow Conference, 300- 
2; proclaims war on the Soviet, 
302; tries to arrest Kaledin, 329; 
proposals to Kornilov, 303-5; 
betrays Kornilov, 150, 306-10; 
visit to Ukraina (May, 1917), 
255-6; Order of the Day (Sept., 
1917), 308; proclaims a Repub- 
lic, 157, 312; denounces the Bol- 
shevists, 313; on Kronstadt mu- 
tineers, 170 n.\ on mob rule, 262; 
relations with Cossacks, 313, 327; 
estimate of, 100; Lenin's esti- 
mate of, 334 w.; mentioned, 88, 
128, and n.\ 140, 179, 185 

Khan, Gen., 228 

Khiva, 256 

Kiel Canal, 210 n.2 

Kireiev, 78 

Klembovsky, Gen., 309 

Kokovstov. Count. 27-8, 89-90, 209, 
216 

Kolchak, Adm., 171 

Kolomea, 286 

Kolontay, Mme., 139 n. 

Kornilov, Gen., humble origin of, 
321-2; Buriat strain in, 323; 
the Galician offensive, 267, 271, 
277; ordered to supersede Gutor, 
281; orders the death penalty, 
285; urges disciplinary measures, 
264; Commander-in-Chief, 144, 
297; reports to Kerensky, 298; 
at the Moscow Conference, 301-2; 



Kerensky*s proposals to, S03-5; 
betrayed by Kerensky, 150; 
Order of the Day, 303-6; ar- 
rested, 310; escapes, 31l:fn.; 
estimate of, 288, 340; mentioned, 
47, 173, 232 

Kornilovtsy, 280 

Korolenko, 94 

Kovno, 233 

Kozowa, 284 

Krivoshein, M., 85, 91, 199 

Kronstadt, Bolshevist atrocities at, 
165-6 

Krupp, 211 

Krymov, Gen., 329 

"Land and Freedom," 77 

Land grabbing, 186, 190-1 

Land tenm-e: 

Aristocrat landlords, 21 
Communal, 20, 21, 331 
Small-holdings, 89 

Law reform, 2 n, 

Lebedev, 171 

Lechitsky, Gen., 181, 235 

Lembich quoted, 282 

Lenin, alias Vladimir Ulidnov, career 
of, 99 «., 139 w.; German mission 
of, 99 n., 100; Social Democratic 
leader, 93-5; eliminates MUiukov, 
146; a defeatist, 146; financial 
cowp of, 195; informers of, 281; 
Kerensky 's relations with, 297-8; 
violence of, 313; estimate of, 
99 n., 100; quoted, on Kerensky, 
334 n. 

Leopold, Prince of Bavaria, 270 

Letts, 9 w., 256 

Lithuanians, 9 n., 256 

"Little Father," 11 

Little Russia, 9 n., 252-3; Jews, 5^. 

Livinov-Falinsky, M., 83 

Locker-Lampson, Commander O., 289, 
291 

Lukomsky, Gen., 206-7. 236, 310 

Lvov, M. Vladimir, 303-5, 308 

Lvov, Prince, 72, 142, 144, 153, 157. 
255 

Mackensen, Gen., 233 
Maklakov, M., 37, 231 



354 



INDEX 



Malinovsky, 96 

Manuilov, 119 

Maps, 113, 241. 265. 278, 287, 293. 
facing 347 

Marie, Empress, 71, 162 

Marie Pavlovna, 36 n. 

Marxism, 94-5, 100 

Maximalists, 96-9 

Maximov, Adm., 168-9 

Mazurian swamps, 226, 228 

Mazm-s, 9 n. 

Mensheviki, 99 

Menshevist, origin of name, 95 

Miasoiedov, Col., 68, 211 and n., 229 

Michael Fedorovich, Tsar, 11 

Michael, Grand Duke, Tsar's abdi- 
cation in favor of, 154; declared 
Regent, 156; his renunciation, 
157-8; declaration from the 
Throne, 157-8; mentioned, 122, 
161 

Middle classes, 21, 23 

Mihailovsky, 94 

Miliukov, M., in the Provisional Gov- 
ernment, 141; eliminated, 146; 
difficulties with the Soviet, 156-7, 
176, 178-80; Notes to Allied 
Governments, 178-9; mentioned. 
84 and n.; 114, 206 

Mingrelia, 142 n. 

Minimalists, 97-8 

Minin, 340 

Monasteries, 25-6 

Moscow, revolutionary. 129 

Moscow Conference (Aug., 1917). 
149, 191,|299, 328 

Motono, Viscount, 232 

Munitions: 

Credits for, 209-11 

Japanese rifles declined, 232 

Lack of, 206, 212-3, 217, 225, 229- 

32; improved supply, 235-8 
Output of, rate of. in 1914, 212; 
in 1916, 240 n. 

Nahamkez-Steklov. 133, 139 n., 176 
Narodovolsty, see "People's Will" 
Natural products of Russia. 337 
Navy: 
Baltic Fleet — under Old Regime, 
238; under Revolutionary Com- 
mittee, 239; mutiny. 133. 165 



Navy (continued) 
Black Sea Fleet. 170; mutiny, 82, 

239 
Condition of, in 1916, 66 
Strength of. 238 

Nebolsin, Adm.. 167 

Nepenin, Adm.. 167-8 

Nekrosov. M., 183, 194 

Nicholas I. Tsar, 11, 76; quoted, 
15 

Nicholas II, Tsar, tragedy at Corona- 
tion of, 43; Temperance edict of, 
12, 27; Finnish policy of, 260; 
popularity of, on outbreak of 
war, 5, 197, 199; Speech from the 
Throne, 199; vacillations as to 
mobilization, 201 et seq.; honors 
Lukomsky, 207; conflicting re- 
ports endorsed by, 214 n.; as- 
sumes chief command, 37, 234; 
warnings to, from various quar- 
ters. 68 et seq.; Duma's telegram 
to, 130; abdication of, 142; re- 
turn from the front, 151; inter- 
view with Guchkov, 152-3; Act 
of Abdication, 154-8; return to 
Mogilev, 155; captive at Tsar- 
skoe, 159; Kerensky's interview 
with, 100; removed to Tobolsk, 
158, 160-1; character of, 32. 
44, 46; attitude to autocracy, 13, 
32; home life of, 36, 45-7 

Nicholas Mikhailovich, Grand Duke, 
69-70; letter to the Tsar, 70-1 

Nicholas Nicholaievich. Grand Duke. 
President of Supreme Council 
of State Defense, 209, 213; es- 
trangement from Sukhomlinov. 
205; Commander-in-Chief on 
outbreak of war, 197; promises 
Polish freedom, 247; hatred of 
Razputin, 35; demands muni- 
tions and equipment, 231 ; rele- 
gated to the Caucasus, 161-2, 234; 
successes in the East, 69; ap- 
pointed Generalissimo, 153; re- 
fused by Provisional Government, 
156; in the Caucasus, 161-2 

"Nicky" and "Willi" Treaty. 41 n.. 
51 n. 

Nihilists. 77 

Novoe Vremya, 198 



INDEX 



355 



Octobrists, 68, 86-7 
Oesel, 311 

Okkrana: 
Co-operative movement opposed 

by. 92 
German orientation of, 51 
Institution and character of, 18-19 
Interference of, 212 
Labor provocations by, 83 
Peasant education and, 81 
Prikaz No. 1 attributed to, 142, 
Soviet worse than, 177 
Stolypin's relations with, 87-9 

Old Believers, 24 n., 329 

Orlov, Count, 69 

Pan-Slav movement, so-called, 78 
Peace terms, 243 n. 
Peasants: 

Illiteracy, 23; education opposed 
by Okhrana, 81; their zeal, 91 

Psychology, of, 332 

Serf influences amongst, 332 
Peasants' Union, 84-5 
''People's WiU, The," 77-8, 97; 

program, 96 
Peter III, Tsar, 12 
Peter the Great, Tsar, 1, 4 
Pilsudski, Gen., 248-9 and n. 
Pitirim, Metropolitan. 73, 120 
Platow's Cossacks, 320 
Plehve, 16, 83; assassinated, 98 
Plekhanov, 93-5 
Pobednostsev, 79 
Pogroms, 59, 83, 142 
Poland; 

Army of, 249 

Autonomy of, promised, 247 

Fortresses of, abolished, 217-8 

Gernaan overtures to, 248-50 

Jews in, 54-5 

Partition of, 54 

Russian retreat from, 233-4 

Russification of, attempted, 248 
Poles, stock of, 9 n. 
Police: 

Enrollment of, against the Revo- 
lution, 110-11, 115, 142 

Jewish bribery of, 56, 58 
Political assassinations, 77, 83 
Polivanov, Gen,. 68, 235 
Polovtsov, Gen., 148 



Pomieschchik, 9 
Population of Russia: 

District averages of, 80 n. 

Jewish and German proportions in, 
54 

Mussulman element in, 333 

Peasant proportion of, 332-3 

Statistics of, 23 
Pourtales, Count, 197, 198 n. 
Pozharsky, Count, 340 
Pravda, 175 
Press, the: 

Censorship of, 23, 35 

German influence in, 49, 52, 64 

Jew revolutionaries in control of, 
176 
Prikaz No. 1, 133, 137, 142, 176 
Pripiat marshes, 233. 328 n 
Prisoners, enemy: 

Cossack takings, 324-5 
Prisoners, Russian, 240 
Progressivists, declaration of, 341-3 
Protopopov, arrest of Labor Members 
by, 38-43, 73, 119; police dis- 
guised by, as troops, 115, 142; 
breakdown of, 107; resignation 
of, 121; imprisonment of, 120 n. 
Provisional Council of the Republic, 

313 
Provisional Government: 

Appeal issued by, 143 

Establishment of, 140 

Finnish defiance of, 260 

Personnel of, 140-1 

War policy stated by, 177-8 
Prussians, Slav origin of, 9 n. 
Pugachev, 318 and n., 320 
Purishkevich, 39-40 
Pushkin, 76 ^ 

Radko-Dmitriev, Gen., 225, 232-3 

Railway anarchy, 186-9 

Razputin, character of, 31-2; power 
of, 33-7; ousts the Grand Duke 
Nicholas, 69. 234; hated by the 
Tsarevich, 44, 160; murder of, 
39-40 

Red Guard, the, 146 

Rennenkampf, Gen., 225-6, 228 

Revolt of 1905, 82 

Revolution of 1917: 
Effect of, economic, 335 



356 



INDEX 



Revolution of 1917 (continued) 
Industrial conditions under, 183 
Moral laxity under, 184 
Police against, 110-11, 115 
Outbreak of, 104 et seq. 
Revolutionaries from abroad, 177 
Riga: 

German seizure of, 170, 311 
Russian defense of, 239 
Rodzianko, President of the Duma, 
warns the Tsar, 72; recommends 
Zemstvo assistance, 231; the 
Revolution, 121-2; address to 
the soldiers, 129-30; estimate of, 
136; mentioned, 112, 117-8, 144, 
340 
Romanovs: 
Election of, 11 
Treasures of, 163-4 
Treatment of, 161-3 
Rumanes, 240 
Rumania: 

Conditions in (1917), 264 
Offensive in (July, 1917), 285-6 
Queen of, 71 
Russian, origin of name, 8 
Russian standard, 4-5 
Russians, traits of, 10, 26, 137-8 
Rtissico Slovo, 102, 282, 302 
Ruthenes, 9 w., 250 and n., 251, 

253 
Ruzsky, Gen., 118, 152-3, 205; 
success of, 225; dismissed, 181 

Sakharov, 235 

Samsonov, Gen., 225-9 

Savinkov, Gen., 211 n., 296-7, 303-8 

Sazonov, M., 38, 199; relations with 
Pourtales, 197; 198 w.; action 
regarding mobilization, 203 

Schools, Soviet's invasion of, 186 

Serbia, 197, 198 n. 

Serfdom: 

Emancipation from 5; land allot- 
ments, 24 n.i; communal owner- 
ship, 21 
Origin of, 10 

Sergius Mikhailovicn, Grand Duke, 
210, 214, 232; assassinated, 98 

Shcherbachev, Gen., 309 

Shcheglovitov, M., 120 

Shingarev, 183 



Siberia: 

Co-operative movement in, 92 
Cossack colonization of, 317; off- 
shoots of, 320 
Development of, future, 336-7 
Emigration to, encouraged, 79 
Peasant prosperity in, 19-20, 220 
Troops from, 218-22 
Siever, Gen., 229 
Skobelev, 178, 182 
Slavophil movement, 78 
Slovaks, 240 

Smiles, Lt.-Commander, 289, 291 
Social-Democratic party, 93 
Socialism, three forms of, 93 et seq, 
Socialist-Revolutionary party, 93-4, 
98, 331 ; fighting organization of, 
97 
Socialists, Duma activities of, 86 
Soldau, 228, 229 and n, 
Soviet, first (1905), 99 n. 
Soviet (1917): 
Army discipline destroyed by, 

174 
Bolshevist terrorism of, 147-8 
Censorship by, 294 
Department of International Rela- 
tions, 178 
Headquarters of, 147 n. 
Influence of, 262 
Kerensky's breach with, 311 
"No annexation and no indem- 
nity" formula, 179-80 
Peace overtures of, 174 
Soldiers included in, 134-6 
Terrorism of, 176-7 
Spirit monopoly, 79 
Stead, W. T., 84 
Stenka Razin, 316 
Stinnes, Hugo, 242 
Stockholm, Russian and German 

Socialists at, 178 
Stockholm Conference question, 177 
Stolypin, M., Premiership of, 87-9; 
agrarian policy of, 85, 87-9; 
on Siberia, 20, 91-2; anti-revo- 
lutionary activities, of 95; quoted, 
20,21 
Struhwe, Peter, 94 
Students' clubs, 95 
Stiirmer, M., 38, 45, 73; imprison- 
ment of, 120 and n. 



INDEX 



359 



Sukhomllnov, Gen., estrangement 
from Grand Duke Nicholas, 
204-5; conflict with Head of 
the Ordnance, 209-10, 214, 232; 
army changes by, 214, 217; revel- 
ations by, 200, 204; mentioned, 
211 n., 231 

Supreme Council of State Defense, 
205, 209, 214 

Sytin Ivan Dimitrivich, 102-3 

Szeptycki, Count, 255 

Talaat Bey, 252 
Tannenberg, 229 and n. 
Tarnopol, 282, 284, 286 
Temperance edict, 2, 12, 27 
Tereshchenko, 180, 182, 255, 305 w., 

312 
Teutonic Knights, 50, 230 n. 
Third Element, 80-1, 92, 104, 184 
Timashev, M., 213 
The Times quoted, 132-3, 289-92 
Toilists, 86, 97 
Tolstoy Count Leo, 31, 76 
Tomsk workmen's committees, 246 
Transport difficulties, 62, 66, 188, 192 
Treaty of Portsmouth, 17 
Trotsky, 96, 100, 313; career of, 139 n.; 

Kerensky's relations with, 298 
Tsaritsyn, Republic at, 189 
Tseretelli, 96, 142 w., 178, 255, 312 
Turgeniev, 76 
Turkish war (1877-8) — character of, 

199; effects of, 78-9 

Ukraina: 

Austrian and German designs on, 
251 

German intrigue in, 99 n. 

Independence of, 253-6; the "Uni- 
versal," 255 

Land policy of, 335 n. 

Polish relations with, 252 
Unification of Russia, a necessity, 
337 n. 

Valentine, Col., 283 and n., 292 
Vandam, Col., cited, 318 
Verderevsky, Adm., 169-70 
Verkhovsky, Col., 150 
Vernander, Gen., 231; cited, 212 n^ 



Victoria, Grand Duchess, 71 

Vinaver, M., cited, 176 

Viren, Adm., 171 

Vladimir Krasnoe Solnyshho, 8 

Vladivostok congestion, 245 

Von Bernhardi, 270 n. 

Von Hindenburg, Gen., 271; in East 

Prussia, 228-30 
Voyeikov, Gen., 45, 52, 112, 151, 159 
Vyborg Manifesto, 86 
Vyrubova, Mme., 47, 159 

War enthusiasm, 209 
War expenditure, 193 and re.* 
War weariness, 262 
Warsaw: 

Fall of, 233 

Siberian troops at, 222 
Wells-Hood, Lt.-Commander, 292 
Wilhelm II, Kaiser, action of, on eve 

of war, 200-1 
White Russians, 9 n. 
Williams, Lt.-General Sir John Han- 
bury, 45 
Witte, Count, 37 and n., 41 and n.. 



Yakubovich, Gen., 285 
Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff, 204-5, 

234; revelations by, 200-4; cited, 

329 w.i 
Yiddish, 55 
Yudenich, Gen., 234 
Yusupov family, 162 

Zaporozhians, 317, 319, 322 

Zasulien, Vera, 93 

Zemstvos: 

Committees replacing, 184 
Composition of, 2 n.; peasaats 

formerly excluded from, 16 
Establishment of, 77 
Extension of system, 89 
Food supply organized, 107 
Government opposition to, 72, 80 
Organizing ability of, 72, 92 
Utilization of, demanded, 231 
Volost, 80, 330, 339 

Zhilinsky, Gen., 225, 227, 248 

Zionism, 55 n. 

Zubatov, 82 



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